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Consumer Protection Economics: 
A Selective Survey 
Pauline M. Ippolito * 
Federal Trade Commission 
The papers in this volume were presented at a conference on Empirical Ap-
proaches to Consumer Protection Economics held at the Federal Trade Com-
mission in Washington. D.C. on April 26 and 27. 1984. 1 The conference was 
sponsored by the FTC's Bureau of Economics; the early stages of conference 
preparation were under the guidance of David T. Scheffman. then Associate 
Director for Special Projects; subsequent preparation for the conference and 
the production of this volume were handled by this Editor. 
I. Introduction 
Consumer protection regulation is one of the primary activities of the Federal 
Trade Commission. Until the early 1970s. the Commission solicited little 
economic advice on consumer protection policy and little was offered by 
economists. Even economists employed at the FTC spent virtually no time on 
consumer protection matters before 1974. in contrast to the substantial com-
mitment to competition case work and research. The first small budgetary alloca-
tion for economic analysis of consumer protection policy within the FTC was 
made in the mid-1970s; a division of economists to support this function was 
established in 1978. Before this time. decisions dealing with "unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices" were apparently judged to be issues that would not benefit 
from an economic perspective.2 
In many ways this is not surprising. The economics of consumer protection 
regulation is essentially contained in the economics of information3 ; twenty years 
ago there was no "economics of information." The traditional economic view 
O[ would like to thank Ronald Bond. Gerard Butters. John E. Calfee. Peter Huang. Richard [po 
polito and Ylichael Lynch for helpful comments. The opinions expressed here do not necessarily 
represent the opinions of the Federal Trade Commission or any individual Commissioner. 
I [n most cases. papers in this volume are revised versions of papers presented at the conference. 
2 The legislative authority for consumer protection activities at the Federal Trade Commission 
is contained in the 1938 Amendments to Section 5 of the FTC Act. The operative sentence oi Sec-
tion 5 states that "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce are declared unlawful."' The "unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices" clause is generally regarded as the legal basis for the Commission' s consumer pro-
tection function. LIke its antitrust authority. this legislative language maximi2es the agency's flex-
ibility in defining the scope of conswner protection law. 
3 The development of the law and economics literature has also had a substantial influence in 
the changing economic views of consumer protection regulation. This is especially true in evalua-
tions of regulatory and judicial approaches to perceived information problems. Because of space 
limitations. [ ""ill not rel'iew many of the related developments in this area. 
1 
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of consumer protection issues at the time was one of indifferenc~ or outright 
hostility. The economic consensus of twenty years ago is probably fairly sum-
marized by the position that as long as' there are a sufficient number of com-
petitors, consumers receive an optimal mix of goods and services~4 The issue 
of contract enforcement and the possibility of fraud would probably have been 
acknowledged, but not as problems of interest to economists. 
This is not to imply that economists did not recognize the importance of in-
formation in markets. In the Wealth of Nations (1776), for instance, Adam Smith's 
observation that "the wages of labour vary according to the small or great trust 
which must be reposed in the workmen" reflected the special economic response 
required for one type of situation where information about the quality of a ser-
vice is not available before purchase. However, with very few exceptions,s 
recognition of the issue did not lead to any serious analysis of the implications 
of imperfect information for individual decision making or for overall market per-
formance. This trivializing treatment of information's role in markets provides 
an easy explanation for the long-standing indifference of economists towards 
consumer protection policy. 
In the last twenty years the situation has changed dramatically. Today's 
economics journals are literally filled with articles detailing the many possible 
effects of costly information.6 While models based on assumptions of perfect 
information are certainly appropriate for many - and maybe even for most -
economic problems, there is a growing recognition that in some cases informa-
tion matters. Many market arrangements and many government policies are to-
day seen to be fundamentally shaped by the information environments in which 
they exist. Contracts, liability rules, retailing organizations, advertising, the 
degree of vertical integration, the nature of investment patterns and industry 
structure are just a few examples. 
These developments have certainly been of interest to those trying to evaluate 
or to guide consumer protection policy. At institutions like the FTC it is now 
routine for perceived consumer protection problems to be discussed in terms 
of possible market solutions, the likely effects of alternative regulatory ap-
proaches on consumer and firm behavior, and the associated benefits and costs 
of these interventions.7 The theoretical developments of the last twenty years 
have brought the analytical tools of economics to consumer protection regulation. 
Despite these substantial developments, consumer protection regulation re-
mains a topic of great controversy. This is certainly the case in the political and 
4 The monopolistic competition view of markets might be the exception here in that excess com-
petition in some activities such as advertising was expected. 
5 Stigler's 1961 paper is certainly an anomaly in the literature of the time as is the earlier paper 
by Scitovsky (1950) which also focused on the implications of information in consumer markets. 
6 See, for instance, Arrow (1974), Banel (1977), the symposium described in Spence (1976), 
and Stiglitz (1979). 
7 For a policy discussion of these issues, see, for instance, the Policy Review Session on Con· 
sumer Infomsation Remedies, FTC (1979). 
. 
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regulatory arenas.s Here the fundamental debate is often framed as a contest 
between the "pro-consumer" groups, who essentially argue that consumers 
do not have access to sufficient information to influence market performance 
adequately, and the "pro-business" groups, who argue that market discipline 
is a better arbiter of product quality and consumer choices than government 
regulation. 
The issues are no more settled in the economics profession, and surprising-
ly, the tension here is fundamentally the same as in the policy arena. As briefly 
reviewed in the next section, the economics of information literature has 
developed along two major lines: the first is the identification of the variety of 
ways in which asymmetric information can affect market performance, and the 
second is the detailing of the many mechanisms that the market or government 
can use to reduce these information problems. While this literature certainly 
supports the view that information asymmetries can be a substantial force in 
market performance, it is inconclusive on the appropriate role for consumer pro-
tection policy. Policy responses to information problems usually ~e directly with 
market responses to these problems. The literature to date has very little 
guidance to offer to policymakers who ideally seek to implement policy remedies 
only when they are more efficient than private responses. 
In light of this situation and the needs of the FTC in formulating consumer 
protection policy, this conference was organized with two primary goals: 
(1) To highlight the fact that the economics literature currently contains very 
little empirical research that attempts either to measure the magnitude of infor-
mation problems in consumer markets or to test alternative theories of the 
precise nature of these problems and the effectiveness of possible solutions; 
(2) To bring together a capable and diverse group of economists with varied 
interests in policy and the economics of information to explore empirically the 
effects of current consumer protection policy as well as underlying market 
behavior. 
A selective review of the economics of information literature as it relates to 
consumer protection policy issues is presented in Section II. The conference 
papers are briefly reviewed in Section m. As is clear from the broad range of 
topics covered by these papers, this collection includes some very interesting 
work. Nevertheless, in many cases the papers here are only tentative first steps 
in an effort to understand behavior in markets with costly information; and as 
such, the papers often raise as many questions as they seek to answer. Con-
cluding remarks follow in Section IV. 
We hope that the conference and this volume will interest others in the 
economics of consumer information problems. We especially hope that economic 
researchers will attempt to develop methods that will lead to better measure-
8 Averitt (1981), for instance. reviews some of the legal and political controversies surrounding 
the FTC's unfairness authority. See also Beales. Craswell and Salop (1981) and some of the papers 
cited there. 
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ment and understanding of both market discipline and alternative regulatory 
policies. Policy can be improved only if there is a realistic unders~ding of the 
magnitude of the problems themselves apd the effectiveness and limitations of 
alternative remedies in actual use. 
n. The Economics of Information in Consumer Markets: 
A Brief Review 
The economics literature relating to consumer protection regulation is large 
and growing rapidly; it is impossible to review it adequately here. 9 Instead I 
would like to discuss briefly some of the major developments in this literature 
and to highlight their relationship to problems in consumer protection policy. 
The work dealing with information about prices is covered first; the range of 
research exploring issues created by asynunetric information about product quali-
ty is reviewed in the second section. 
A. Information About Prices 
Lack of information about price is generally taken to be a simpler problem 
to analyze than information about product quality. Historically, it is this problem 
that was addressed first. Stigler's 1961 article, which was seminal in the modern 
literature, observed simply that if consumers did not have costless information 
about firms' prices, some degree of price dispersion would persist even in other-
wise competitively-structured markets. Much work has followed Stigler's paper, 
refining the modeling of the consumer's search process, more carefully address-
ing the seller's role in disseminating information and setting prices, and explicitly 
dealing with the effects of individuals' search cost differences. 10 However, these 
refinements have not changed the primary result of this line of literature: if in-
formation is costly to acquire or to disseminate, prices will be higher than at 
competitive levels, and price dispersion may persist in the market. The magnitude 
of these effects depends fundamentally on the cost of informing consumers. 
The primary impact of this literature on policy has been to increase the scrutiny 
paid to regulations and to private devices that restrict the flow of price informa-
tion. This has been most significant in the area of occupational regulation where 
restrictions on price advertising are gradually being removed. For instance, in 
1978 the FTC passed a trade regulation rule prohibiting states and trade organiza-
tions from restricting price advertising for eyeglasses and related services. The 
published basis for this rulell was essentially the conclusion of this literature: 
9 Reviews of various segments of this literature include Hirshleifer (1973). Hirshleifer and Riley 
(1979). Salop (1978). and Stiglitz (1979). 
10 See. for instance. Butters (1977). Rothschild (1973). Salop (1976) and Stiglitz (1979). 
11 See Statement of Basis and Purpose and Final Trade Regulation Rule for the Advertising of 
Ophthalmic Goods and Services. FTC. 16 CFR Part 456. Federal Register. June 2. 1978. Volume 
(footnote cont' d) 
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that restricted price advertising increased the consumer's cost of acquiring price 
information and thus increased the average price and the dispersion of prices 
in the market. Removal of regulatory prohibitions on advertising by lawyers, 
by dentists and other medical professionals: and by drug stores are other re-
cent examples of this movement. 
This focus on the costliness of price information and its role in setting market 
prices has also had an effect on antitrust policy. 12 It has contnbuted to the general 
diminution of the 'structure-conduct-performance view of markets that had long 
been a foundation of antitrust policy. If in some markets information about prices 
is more efficiently conveyed by large sellers than small sellers (through adver-
tising or reputation, for instance), then a growth in concentration could be 
beneficial to consumers. This would explain the often-observed reality that 
markets characterized by many small sellers frequently seem to perform rather 
poorly, while markets with just a few sellers seem very competitive (see Stiglitz 
(1979), for instance). One of the primary changes in the eyeglass market since 
the removal of restrictions on price advertising, for instance, has been the 
substantial growth of chain retailers - who advertise regularly and who appear 
to have been a substantial force in bringing prices down. 13 
While these developments in the literature have been helpful in understand-
ing regulatory policy, several price information issues have not been address-
ed. A basic premise of the literature to date is that price is immediately and 
objectively verifiable upon inspection. In this sense, these price information 
analyses are equally applicable to all quality characteristics of goods which are 
similarly verifiable - "inspection characteristics" in the Nelson (1970) ter-
minology. On the other hand, this line of literature is not applicable to more 
complex price information. I would like to mention two such situations that have 
arisen in regulatory issues at the FTC: prices of multi-product sellers and "uncer-
tain" prices. 
Multi-product sellers, such as grocery stores, provide the efficiency of col-
lecting a wide variety of goods in one location. This localization of so many goods 
with one seller and the consumer's cost of moving between sellers make price 
competition in these markets fundamentally different from that analyzed in the 
literature to date. The magnitude of the computational task and the stochastic 
nature of purchases from such sellers makes direct price comparisons difficult. 
43. No. 107. This portion of the rule was eventua1ly remanded to the Commission by the review 
courts for evidentiary reasons; however. many state legislatures had enacted the essence of the 
rule in the meantime. 
12 The usual distinction made between "conswner protection problems" and "antitrust problems" 
is that the fonner involve conswner infonnation deficiencies while the latter involve problems that 
would be eliminated by sufficient competition. The issue of price advertising strains this already-
strained distinction. as does any conswner infonnation issue that has implications for the structure 
of markets or the institutional nature of competition in them. 
13 In some states other explicit or implicit restrictions on chains were also removed. making an 
assessment of causality difficult. In November 1984. the FTC opened a new rule making that would 
override remaining state laws that continue to restrict commercial practices of opticians. 
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These infonnation difficulties, I suspect, are largely responsible for the pattern 
often observed in these markets: large amounts of price advertising, significant 
variation in item pricing over time, features, coupons, and substantial variation 
in retail margins across categories and brands of goods. The multidimensional 
and stochastic nature of the problem makes it similar to some of the quality in-
fonnation problems that have been addressed, but the ease with which prices 
can be changed by the seller and the large number of dimensions (creating the 
need for summary measures) make it essentially different from the usual quali-
ty problem. At a minimum, this pricing infonnation problem defies the conven-
tional wisdom that pricing issues are much simpler to analyze than quality infor-
mation issues. 14 
Uncertain prices, that is, prices that are not fixed and lmown at the point of 
sale, also raise unexplored issues. It is traditional in the purchase of life insurance, 
for instance, that the buyer pays a nominal price at the point of purchase but 
that part of this price is later refunded as a" dividend" at the discretion of the 
seller. Similarly, the purchase of durable goods often requires the subsequent 
purchase of replacement parts at prices that are set by the seller. The fact that 
these institutions survive and are not replaced by full pricing contracts at the 
point of sale suggests that some type of reputation mechanism operates to 
discipline sellers. 
The case of uncertain prices seems to fall much more directly into the reputa-
tion and implicit contracts literatures that have developed for product quality 
and labor issues. is Yet even with reputational constraints, it would seem that 
this pricing problem could still be colored by Stigler-type infonnation costs leading 
to the same type of supra-competitive prices and price dispersion. Whether these 
infonnation costs would have differential effects on the different parts of the 
price seems to depend fundamentally on the nature of the reputation mechanism. 
For instance, if the consumer's assessment of the seller's reputation for 
dividends is completely determined by his own experience with dividends, pric-
ing would be less competitive for the second part of the price and dividends 
would fall as the consumer ages. Other reputational assumptions would predict 
different pricing patterns. Because of the concreteness with which the ex post 
price can be measured, this type of market might allow for cleaner tests of both 
14 At the FTC. for instance. issues involving this type of market are repeatedly addressed: what 
deception standard should be applied to grocery stores attempting to claim "lowest prices"? how 
significant is it if too strict a policy is adopted? what merger policy should be adopted for grocery 
chains? are the information issues here significant and how should they enter the analysis? should 
firms be allowed to restrict access to "price checkers" who wish to publish the data? how impor-
tant is it that private property concerns be balanced against the value of improved information in 
these markets? do grocery stores have appropriate incentives to stock sufficient merchandise when 
they advertise price specials (Unavailability of Advertised Specials Rule - currently being 
reconsidered) ? 
For evidence on grocery retail margins across categories, (or instance, see Albion (1983). See 
also Lynch (1983) and Steiner (1984) for discussions of retail pricing issues. 
15 See, for instance, Allen (1984), Cannichael (1984). Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983). 
. 
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the Stigler-type infonnation phenomenon and the effectiveness of reputations 
and the speed with which reputational adjustments are made. 
B. Infonnation About Quality 
The behavior of markets with imperfect infonnation about the quality 
characteristics of goods and services has been the focus of a great volume of 
recent literature. Here it is much more difficult to summarize the major findings 
neatly. The literature has a number of branches, and there is little empirical 
testing to rank these developments. 
The basic "problem" is generally agreed upon: if it is difficult for consumers 
to assess the quality of goods sold by individual sellers in a market, there is 
an opportunity for sellers of low quality goods to attempt to pass their goods 
off as high quality goods. If successful, competition will drive sellers of high quality 
goods from the market. This is true even if consumers can judge the average 
quality available. In the case where it is impossible to assess the quality of in-
dividual sellers' goods, this result is typified by the Akerlof (1970) "lemons" 
model in which, in his example, owners of the best used cars find that their 
cars are worth more than the prevailing market price and therefore do not offer 
them for sale. As a result only the lowest quality cars ("lemons") are sold. 
More general models, as those in which it is costly (rather than impossible) for 
consumers to assess the quality of goods offered by different sellers or where 
infonnation costs differ across' consumers or sellers, would modify the Akerlof 
result as in the case of price infonnation above; at a given price, average quality 
would be lower (though not necessarily at the minimum level) and quality disper-
sion might remain when compared with perfect infonnation results. 
The first two sections below review the purely private approaches to reme-
dying this quality problem: those involving infonnation provided by the producer 
directly and those relying on infonnation provided by others. The third section 
briefly discusses contractual approaches which can be purely private or which 
can rely on judicial enforcement. Finally, the literature on policy approaches is 
very briefly discussed, including the literature on liability rules, policies towards 
deception and fraud, and direct infonnation and product quality policies. 
1. Information Provided By Producers: Signals, Bonds and Reputations 
A premise of the quality degradation "problem" is that consumers do not 
have accurate quality infonnation. One possible source of quality information 
is, of course, producers themselves, since they usually know the expected quality 
they deliver. In the abstract, claims by producers are suspect because of their 
incentive to exaggerate the value of their goods. If producers' claims could be 
made credible, market performance could be substantially improved. 
A primary focus of the recent literature in this area has been the identification 
of conditions under which producers can credIbly make quality claims. The essen-
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tial finding of this effort is that manufacturers' claims can be relied upon if 
manufacturers possess or can purchase other observable characteristics that 
are economically associated with the hidden quality characteristics. 16 This associa-
tion can be derived from some inherent cost or productivity relationship be-
tween the observable characteristic and the hidden quality, or from some bond-
ing mechanism which gives the producer an economic stake in providing the 
promised quality. In the literature, these issues are discussed under the 
somewhat overlapping topics of signals, bonds and reputation. 
In information theory, a signtzl is any bit of information that can improve the 
predictability of a second bit of information. In an economic setting, this predict-
ability is derived from economic forces: for an activity to serve as an economic 
signal of quality, it must be less costly (or more productive) for high quality sellers 
to undertake the activity than for low quality sellers to do so. Spence (1974) 
initially introduced this idea in a labor market setting where higher quality workers 
were able to reveal this fact through an investment in education, because for 
them education was less costly to obtain than it was for lower quality workers. 
The idea has broad potential applicability: the use of warranties by sellers of 
high quality goods who would expect to pay less under the warranty; the amount 
of advertising used to attract new customers by sellers who depend on repeat 
purchase or referrals by satisfied customers (Nelson 1970); and the higher 
deductible amount chosen by low risk insurance buyers who expect to lose least 
from this choice (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976» are standard examples of 
economic signals. 
Bonding devices, or bonds, are capital assets or secured monies which are 
forfeited if the bonded party does not perform as promised. In many market 
settings, voluntary bonding devices act as signals of quality: if the bond is suffi-
ciently large, the presence of the bond reveals that the firm or individual does 
not plan to offer a low quality good or service; the loss of the bond value, once 
the low quality is discovered, is sufficient to make cheating uneconomic. View-
ed in this way, quality-specific investments become information devices (Klein 
and Leffler (1981». For example, designing and furnishing retail establishments 
so that they cannot be easily transfered to other uses acts as an assurance to 
customers that the firm can be relied on to provide the promised quality. In-
vestment in durable brand name recognition, through advertising or other means, 
has the same effect (Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984». 
In general, quality bonds are signals of quality, but not all signals are necessarily 
bonds. To see this, it is important to make a distinction between two different 
types of quality issues: those where cheating can be detected (at least to some 
extent) ex post and those where it cannot. Bonding devices can be used only 
in the first case where "cheating" is detectable, since bonds depend fundamen-
tally on the "punishment" inherent in the loss of the bond value. In contrast, 
non-bonding signals can arise even if low quality can never be detected in in-
16 The arguments in this section apply equally to hidden price characteristics as discussed above. 
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dividual units as long as there is some (known) cost or productivity advantage 
. in acquiring the signal for high quality goods or sellers. In the Spence labor ex-
ample, for instance, education is a non-bonding signal that screens higher abili-
ty workers from the pool of workers on the basis of a cost advantage in acquir-
ing education; it has no bonding effect to prevent shirking by any type of worker 
once employed. 17 
The term reputation is used in the literature, and in common language, to 
capture the idea that a firm's quality claims can be relied upon. In economic 
usage, a firm's reputation is a bond which usually requires some investment 
to acquire. The stock of goodwill inherent in the firm's reputation can be lost 
if cheating is detected. For reputation to induce a firm to continually provide 
high quality goods, the firm's goodwill (like any bond) must be able to generate 
a stream of price premiums which will be lost (at least in part) if the firm cheats 
(Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983». Moreover, this loss must be 
greater than the short-term gain from cheating. The premiums are the market 
return to the reputation asset, and in a competitive setting must be secured 
on the margin by firm-specific sunk costs sufficient to justify this return. 
Policy Issues 
From the perspective of consumer protection policy, the most pressing issue 
in the quality assurance area is the development of a better understanding of 
the market conditions under which producer signals or bonds will be a reasonably 
effective check on quality information problems, and ideally some empirical 
evidence that supports that understanding. 18 From the theoretical developments 
to date, we can draw a few principles to guide policy. I will mention two: 
i) The availability of information about cheating is a critical component of the 
market's use of bonds. 
An essential feature of any quality bond, like reputation, is that cheating must 
be sufficiently discoverable. Otherwise, the bond will have little or no disciplin-
ing effect on the firm's behavior. 19 Because the ability to punish the firm is 
distributed among individual consumers, it is the summation of individual reac-
tions that is ultimately important in disciplining cheating. The ease with which 
cheating is detected and the speed with which this information spreads to future 
consumers should influence the size of the bond (and therefore the price 
premium) necessary to secure perfopnance. 
17 Under different economic assumptions, of course, educational expenses could serve a bonding 
function: for instance, this might be the case where education is specific to an occupation and where 
poor perfonnance or ability is at least somewhat detectable. 
18 Two recent empirical tests of the "lemons" model in product markets are Bond (1982) and 
Lacko (forthcoming). 
19 On this count, Klein and Leffler (1981) assume that any cheating is immediately known by 
all consumers. Shapiro (1983) allows for a lag in discovery and some averaging over time, but again 
the knowledge is held by all consumers. 
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Characteristics of the market and of the particular type of qualitY. involved 
should be relevant here. For instance, for stochastic quality issues involving 
differences in a low rate of defect, only a' small percentage of consumers will 
actually get a defective good, and they will not be able to detennine easily 
whether their breakdown is symptomatic of a higher breakdown rate overall. 
In contrast, a quality issue involving the use of inferior materials and a shorter 
useful life for an units of a good should be more easily diagnosed by a much 
larger segment of the market. To achieve the appropriate incentives in both 
cases, the bond and the premium would have to be much higher in the first case 
than in the second (assuming the same total reduction in value from cheating). 
More generally, reputation or other bonding devices will be more effective 
in cases where infonnation about cheating will spread broadly and clearly; for 
instance, where the quality degradation is widespread among consumers, where 
its cause is easily diagnosed, and where ex post infonnation from other sources 
is widely available. This is the reason that the literature has so consistently focus-
ed on the frequency of repeat purchase as an important detenninant of effec-
tive reputations: more frequent purchase by all consumers improves the develop-
ment and spread of infonnation, should cheating occur. However, it is impor-
tant to an understanding of reputation and other quality bonds that the focus 
be kept on the relevant issue - the spread of accurate infonnation if the firm 
cheats - rather than on one particular way in which that infonnation will spread. 
ii) The availability of sunk cost intensive production and distribution processes 
is necessary for bonding in a competitive setting. 
For reputations or other quality bonds to survive competitive pressures, they 
must be secured on the margin by sufficiently large firm-specific sunk costs. 
In particular, this implies that the firm will adopt a production and selling pro-
cess that is not necessarily cost-minimizing in the narrow sense. Thus, reputa-
tion or other quality bonds will be more effective quality controls when the 
magnitude of the cost implicit in this shift to a more sunk cost intensive process 
is relatively small. In markets where alternative production or distribution 
technologies are readily available which require sufficiently high sunk costs, bon-
ding is a low cost alternative for dealing with this type of information problem; 
but bonds will be a high cost alternative in markets where both production and 
distribution inherently involve no sunk costs. 
The rapid development in understanding these market approaches for deal-
ing with quality infonnation problems has had some impact on consumer pro-
tection policy, especially on economists' views of it. Certainly, the suspect and 
almost hostile view that was held towards advertising and other visible selling 
expenses in the past (see Scitovsky (1950), for instance) has changed dramatically 
in recent years. Proposals that explicitly or implicitly reduce the quantity of adver-
tising, such as mandatory disclosures in advertisements, are treated more 
cautiously today. The focus of advertising regulation is held more tightly to issues 
of deception in the advertisement itself and the costs and benefits of correcting 
that deception. Also, accounting measures of profit in consumer goods industries 
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are more generally questioned because of the difficulty in accounting for reputa-
tion assets. In the practice of antitrust, however, the quality assurance role of 
sunk assets has yet to achieve much recognition;20 here sunk costs and reputa-
tion are generally dealt with in the context of the "entry baniers" debate with 
its focus on the non-informational role of sunk costs in detennining market struc-
ture and innovative activity. 
Finally, in consumer protection policy involving product quality issues direct-
ly, more attention is now given to the issue of whether the market is likely to 
discipline finns adequately, 21 and if the judgment is that it will not, to whether 
narrow information remedies might be sufficient to support otherwise private 
mechanisms. For instance, if quality measures of perfonnance were made 
available even with a substantial lag, the sunk cost requirements to support 
reputations might fall enough to be supportable.22 
2. Information Provided By Others: 
Standards, Certification and Retail Distribution 
Information about quality can also be provided by private parties other than 
the producer. Privately-developed standards and certification procedures and 
independent information providers are the primary examples in this class. 
In the U.S., there are a large number of private organizations that develop 
standards of quality, sizing and compatibility for many product categories. These 
organizations are often non-profit groups set up as part of industry trade associa-
tions and are funded in a wide variety of ways. including fixed membership fees 
and direct quantity assessments. 23 Sizing and grading of lumber, model codes 
for building construction, and toxicity standards for children's crayons are just 
a few examples of privately produced standards. Many of these standards are 
invisible to consumers, effecting their quality improvements through in-
termediaries, but some, such as the Underwriters Laboratory certification. are 
aimed directly at consumers. Despite their prevalence and widespread use. 
private standards have been virtually ignored in the economics literature; there 
are no theories predicting when industry agreements will arise and how the stan-
dards produced will compare with efficiency criteria. 
Certification procedures are. similarly widespread. Independent testing 
laboratories test and certify that products meet specified quality standards. In 
20 The most significant exception might be antitrust cases dealing with vertical issues. 
21 For instance. see the recent FTC policy statement on deception which incorporates this view 
(reprinted at 45 BNA Antitrust and Trade Regulation Reporter 689 (Oct. '2:7. 1983». 
22 For instance. FTC rules and cases in recent years have involved a number of information ap-
proaches: mandatory information disclosures of quality indices as in the R-Value Rule for insulation 
and the Octane Rule for gasoline. direct measurement of quality as in the measurement of tar and 
nicotine for cigarettes. and broader distribution of private information as in cases involving auto 
defects where the firms were required to more widely distribute information about problems as 
they are discovered (CaUee and Ford (1985)). 
23 For a description of some of these organizations. see Hemenway (1975) and FTC (1978). 
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some cases, the producer secures this certification directly as an assurance to 
, his customers that the product meets certain quality standards. For 'instance, 
most electrical product manufacturers display the Underwriters Laboratory seal 
directly on their products. In other cases, retailers (or other large buyers) pur-
chase the testing themselves before allowing the goods on their shelves. 
More generally, it has long been understood (see Stigler (1961), for instance) 
that multi-product retailers can serve a quality assurance role by selecting and 
screening products. In this case, the certification is less formal than that of the 
independent labOratories, but the function is essentially the same. 
Finally, independent information sellers do exist who sell information directly 
to potential buyers. Consumer Reports, Good Housekeeping and some of the auto 
magazines are prominent examples of mass-marketed, quality information pro-
viders. House inspection services for would-be purchasers and antique and 
jewelry appraisers are examples of information providers who give more direct 
quality assessment advice. 
In each of these cases, the information provided is subject to the same types 
of quality problems they are designed to solve. Quality assurance devices, like 
reputation, thus become essential to guarantee the quality of the information 
provider himself. Moreover, the public good nature of the information when it 
is sold separately makes it very difficult for the seller to collect much of the 
value of the information. Some of the public good problem is circumvented when 
information is provided by the producer of the good directly. 24 
One of the relatively unexplored economic topics raised by these issues is 
the allocation of the quality assurance role between the producer and the seller, 
and the effect this allocation has on empirical work done in consumer product 
industries. For instance, the retail margin on the generic (or non-leading brand) 
version of a good is often larger than the margin on the leading brand.25 If this 
difference is determined by the differential quality assurance roles played by 
the retailer and the producer in the two cases, welfare implications related to 
the determinants of manufacturer or retailer returns would have to be carefully 
considered. Much of the advertising-price literature that demonstrates that 
manufacturers' prices are increased by advertising, as summarized in Comanor 
and Wilson (1979), for instance, would be subject to reinterpretation: higher 
advertising levels by manufacturers could simply reflect a shifting of the quality 
assurance role to the manufacturer, requiring a corresponding shift in the price 
premiums that quarantee that quality. Welfare conclusions from other branches 
of the advertising literature would be similarly affected. 
Policy Implications 
The improved understanding of the importance of information providers has 
24 See Beales, Ccaswell and Salop (1981) for a more thorough discussion of these issues. 
2S See Masson and Steiner (forthcoming) for ample evidence of this margin difference in the case 
of prescription drugs. See also Albion (1983) for evidence related to grocery products . 
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yet to have substantial effect on policy, though it is contributing to the growing 
controversy in some areas of antitrust policy and is opening up new areas of 
investigation. The active policy debate on the current per se prohibition on a 
, manufacturer's ability to control retail prices through resale price maintenance 
(RPM)26 is being fueled in part by an understanding that retail margins can af-
fect the quality assurance role provided by certain retailers. For instance, if high 
profile department stores provide a fashion or other quality certification to a 
manufacturer's goods, the manufacturer has a direct stake in ensuring that retail 
margins are sufficient to persuade these retailers to carry his goods. RPM laws, 
in conjunction with the Robinson-Patman prohibition on price discrimination, cur-
rently make this quality certification difficult. 
In the standards and certification area directly, the FTC has recently dropped 
a rulemaking that proposed to regulate all private standard setters and certifiers. 27 
In its place, the agency has opened a program to investigate particular standard 
setters to determine if some individual standards have anticompetitive effects 
in prohIbiting entry or limiting innovation. More generally, the public good nature 
of standards might be used to justify direct public support for standard creation 
(as in the support provided to private standard organizations by the National 
Bureau of Standards) and the development of standards by the regulatory agen-
cies (for example, the mileage ratings by the Environmental Protection Agency 
and the tar and nicotine ratings by the FTC). This public good justification for 
government support and development of standards must, of course, be balanc-
ed against the concomitent political economy problems that inevitably arise. Once 
developed, for instance, government standards often effect a near monopoly 
on the measurement of relative quality, creating powerful incentives for affected 
parties to attempt to influence the development of the standards for their benefit. 
3. Contracting Approaches to Quality Problems 
Contracts are one of the long-standing approaches for dealing with trading 
problems where the quality of the good or service is not apparent at the point 
of sale. The law and, more recently, the economics literature make a distinc-
tion between explicit and implicit contracts. 
Erplidt contracts are usually written promises that specify either what will 
be delivered or the parties' responsibilities in such events as product failure 
or late delivery. In consumer goods markets, explicit contracts are generally 
warranties, although in the services area contracts specifying the good itself 
do arise. Credit contracts and health club agreements are examples of the latter. 
Explicit contracts are usually taken to be legally enforceable in the sense that 
if disputes arise about performance under the contract, the injured party has 
the option of appealing to the courts to enforce the contract. In some consumer 
26 See Overstreet (1983) for a review of the RPM area. 
27 See FTC (1978) or Federal Register of December 7. 1978 - 43 FR 57269 for the statement 
of the proposed rule. 
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contracts, a more private approach is taken where the contract specifies that 
disputes will be first submitted to a private arbitration board, like that run by 
--the Better Business Bureau. -
In the economics literature, implicit contracts are usually contrasted with ex-
plicit contracts in two important ways: implicit contracts are not written, and 
they are not taken to be legally enforceable. The recent use and development 
of the implicit contract idea in economics has taken place primarily in the labor 
literature in an effort to understand employment relationships, 28 but the ideas 
and fundamental issues are directly applicable to product quality problems. It 
is usually argued that implicit contracts are used in cases where the conditions 
and responsibilities under the contract are too difficult or too costly to specify 
for inclusion in an-explicit contract.29 Because the parties to an implicit contract 
do not have legal recourse in the event of breach, implicit contracts must be 
seif-enforcing or must be enforced by reputations. The ease with which a breach 
is discovered and that information spread to future customers again becomes 
a critical issue. 
In consumer product markets, the idea of an implicit contract is therefore sim-
ply an alternative way of conceptualizing the promises a producer or seller can 
credibly make to consumers. In this sense, the discussion of information pro-
vided by producers in section 1 becomes directly applicable. Intuitively, the "im-
plicit contract" label seems more appropriate for performance issues over time, 
as in specifying producer responsibility in the event of product failure, but 
substantively, the producer's credibility for product quality claims and for future 
performance claims involves the same issues. 
The distinction between explicit and implicit contracts is more apparent than 
real in consumer product markets. Consumer lawyers would be quick to point 
-out that some implicit contracts could be legally enforced, for instance, under 
the implied warranty of merchantability or the implied warranty of fitness for 
a particular purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code. More important, I think, 
is the "implicit" nature of most explicit contracts offered for consumer prod-
ucts. Most of these explicit contracts are not worth enforcing should a breach 
occur: the cost of raising the issue legally is much larger than the injury from 
the breach. 30 In these cases, few consumers would be expected to exercise 
28 See, for instance, Azariadis and Stiglitz (1983) and the other articles in that volume for recent 
developments. 
29 While plausible, this argument does raise issues. since the enforceability of contracts often 
depends on a reputation mechanism, which in tum depends on consumer reaction to cheating. If 
contract terms are complex, cheating may be difficUlt to detect and consumer reactions weak or 
hapha2ard. See Newbery and Stiglitz (1983) for further discussion of this point. Implicit contracts 
which are simply too costly to specify, for example, because there are many combinations of condi-
tions which could arise in which behavior would have to be (and could be) specified, do not raise 
this problem. 
30 Warranties on toasters and coffee pots illustrate this point dramatically, but even most automobile 
defects would fall short of covering the legal and time costs of actually enforcing the warranty on 
an unwilling manufacturer. See Priest (1981) for an interesting discussion of consumer warranties . 
. 
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their legal rights if the contract is not honored, making it difficult to argue that 
-legal enforcement is a significant disciplining mechanism in these markets or 
a significant explanation for the explicit contract. 31 
The widespread prevalence of explicit warranties and other consumer con-
tracts in these situations is thus somewhat puzzling in light of the standard 
theories of explicit contracts. Possibly these explicit contracts are offered not 
because they are-legally enforceable, but because they are superior information 
devices for the development and efficacy of reputations. A written warranty, 
for instance, is a more specific articulation of a minimum that the manufacturer 
is willing to promise the purchaser in the event that problems arise with the 
product. If the producer does not honor the contract, all consumers who ex-
perience the problem will be more certain that a breach has actually occurred. 
This improves the clarity and diffusion of information about cheating and increases 
the effectiveness of reputations as a disciplining device in the market. 
Viewed in this way, warranties or other consumer contracts are subject to 
the same quality problems as other goods. The more contracts are made clear 
and explicit, the more they take on the characteristics of experience goods (in 
the Nelson (1974) terminology): the quality of the contract becomes apparent 
after the purchase. Reputation and other bonding devices are more effective 
for experience goods than for goods with more credence-like characteristics. 
Policy Issues 
Our limited understanding of when and how consumer contracts are enforced 
and the almost total lack of evidence on these issues makes policy decisions 
in this area difficult. Even in the simplest case of explicit contracts, for instance, 
the best policy is uncertain. There might be a role for public enforcement of 
consumer contracts in cases where a seller systematically fails to live up to his 
contract and where the cost of each individual bringing a case is large relative 
to the loss. If a public agency can aggregate the claims in a way that reduces 
legal costs sufficiently, public enforcement might be economically justified. 32 
However, this enforcement tends to undermine the value of reputation, since 
consumers no longer need to rely on reputation as much. Whether an equilibrium 
that depends more on public enforcement is better than one that depends total-
lyon private reputations is an empirical question about the efficiency of alter-
native market institutions - a question on which we have virtually no evidence. 
In cases where explict promises are not made, it is even more difficult to sup-
31 The economics literature on warranties generally assumes that all warranties are costlessly 
enforced. The extension of these analyses to costly enforcement is straightforward, and in cases 
where the cost of enforcement is large relative to the loss, this extension would completely under-
mine the value of warranties in these models. See, for instance. Courville and Hausman (1979), 
Grossman (1981), Palfrey and Romer (1982), and Matthews and Moore (1983). 
32 At the FTC, for instance, warranty perfonnance cases are usually justified on this ground. 
This is also the basis on which class action suits were established. 
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port policy initiatives. In particular, the major question of what the implicit con-
tract is must be added to the explicit contract questions. Let me mention two 
types of cases where this issue has arisen in recent FTC actions: the first deals 
with systematic post-warranty failures and the second with finn's post-sale in-
formation obligations. 
In a series of cases beginning in the late-1970s,33 the FTC issued legal com-
plaints against a number of auto and other durable goods manufacturers who 
were alleged to have knowingly sold goods with systematically higher failure 
rates in major components of the good and who were not voluntarily accepting 
liability for the "unexpected" post-warranty failures. The primary legal basis 
for the complaints was a deception charge: namely, that the manufacturer failed 
to disclose material facts that would have affected purchase decisions and use 
and care decisions. Essentially this charge assumes that, absent a disclosure 
to the contrary, consumers expect components of the product to exlubit "nor-
mal" failure rates and "normal" maintenance costs and that they expect "ab-
normal" failures to be the responsibility of the manufacturer. 
In support of this implicit contract theory, proponents point to the fact that 
the major auto manufacturers sometimes extend ad hoc warranty coverage 
beyond the legal warranty on unusual problems and that consumer complaints 
show that consumers expect manufacturers to share in the costs of such repairs. 
However, even if the existence of such an implicit contract is accepted, there 
is currently no way to determine the terms of that contract for enforcement 
purposes and no explanation for why the contract was breached in a particular 
instance when it is honored in other cases. Further, a policy of public enforce-
ment fundamentally alters the concept of an implicit contract as one that is self-
enforcing or disciplined by reputation. To support such a policy requires a move 
into the more nebulous realm of implicit contracts that would be agreed upon 
if enforcement were feasible. 
The second type of case involves the manufacturer's failure to disclose cer-
tain information discovered after the sale. Here the issue typically involves the 
post-sale discovery of a design defect and the identification of some related 
maintenance action that would reduce the expected cost of the problem. In this 
type of situation it is puzzling that manufacturers do not contract with consumers 
to provide the maintenance information to reduce the expected costs of opera-
tion. 34 Of course, a major problem with such a contract is that consumers and 
third parties would find it very difficult to determine when the contract has been 
breached, since the information is discovered and held privately by the manufac-
turer. The argument implicit in the FTC cases of this type is that public en-
forcement is needed to provide the discipline to support otherwise efficient con-
33 See Calfee and Ford (1985) for a brief description of the program and some of the cases in it. 
34 A recent example here is a defect case against International Harvester (FTC Docket No. 9147) 
in which the company was found in violation of the FTC's unfairness statute because it failed to 
disclose a safety problem with the fuel covers on its equipment. and there were cost-effective ac-
tions that owners could have taken to reduce the likelihood of injury. 
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tracts for post-sale maintenance information. There has been very little 
systematic study of issues of this type and no relevant empirical work. The in-
centives for producers to supply information on a continuing basis are not well 
understood. 
Beyond these enforcement and implicit contract issues, a primary focus of 
traditionai consumer protection policy on contracts has been the concern over 
particular contract provisions themselves, often attacked under the legal doc-
trine of unconscionability. 35 Prohibitions on the required use of manufacturer's 
parts as a condition of the warranty (Eisenach, Higgins, and Shugart (1984», 
restrictions on creditor remedies (FTC Credit Practices Rule), and limitations 
on the disclaimer of implied warranties (VCC) are all examples of specific con-
tract term regulations. 
When contracts are viewed as goods, the concern over particular contract 
provisions is essentially a concern over the "quality" of the contract. In this 
sense, the regulatory prohibitions on contract terms could be viewed simply 
as minimum quality standards designed to preclude "low" quality contracts from 
the market. However, the types of contract provisions at issue in these regula-
tions often do not follow unambiguous quality dimensions. Moreover, the move 
away from direct regulatory approaches has been somewhat slower in the case 
of contracts when compared to that for products. In current consumer protec-
tion regulation, direct minimum quality standards are viewed as a rather restric-
tive regulatory approach for product quality problems (in fact, they are general-
ly used only for drugs, food-and safety issues). But minimum quality standards 
are still commonly considered for contract provisions in the regulatory setting 
and are implicitly adopted in the judicial detennination of unconscionability. 
Possibly the fact that there has been very little formal analysis of contracts that 
would parallel even the theoretical analyses of the quality and price of goods 
in markets with information asymmetries has contributed to this more static view. 
4. Policy Approaches to Quality Problems 
(a) Liability Rules 
The economic literature on liability standards has developed substantially in 
the last 10 years. Much of this work has focused on legal liability as a solution 
to third party injury problems, like automobile accidents, and to externality prob-
lems, like pollution. 36 However, liability rules can also be used in some market 
settings to increase product quality. In cases where information problems result 
in products with too low quality, legal liability standards are another policy op-
tion to change the equilibrium market quality. 
The economics literature in this area has generally focused on the relative 
35 See Kornhauser (1976) for a discussion of the history and current Questioning of legal views. 
36 See. for instance. John Brown (1973) and Steven Shavell (1980) for examples of the accident 
literature and Polinsky (1980) for the externality literature. 
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merits of alternative standards of liability, including strict producer liability, 
negligence standards and no liability in cases where product quality is measured 
as a failure rate. 31 Under the premise that consumer beliefs are an exogenous 
function of true quality (in particular, that perceptions are not influenced by other 
actions of sellers), the literature finds that liability standards that shift more liabili-
ty to the producer improve welfare in cases where consumers underestimate 
true product quality and underreact to changes in actual quality. 
This result is in marked contrast with much of the standard policy/legal discus-
sion of product liability where consumer beliefs are assumed to be endogenous. 
In particular, the consumer is assumed to be led to expect a certain product 
quality only to be disappointed with the product that is actually provided - that 
is, liability rules are required because the consumer (justifiably) overestimates 
product quality. In this view, the producer is implicitly assumed to be able to 
influence consumer perceptions of quality and to profit if he can raise beliefs 
above the quality he will actually deliver. With its roots in contract law, liability 
for product failures (or any other measure of low quality) is viewed as a means 
of reducing producer incentives to deceive and of inducing him to provide the 
quality that is actually promised. In contrast with economic models, for instance, 
the policy/legal view would impose no liability if the producer adequately disclosed 
that his product was of low quality. 38 
These divergent perspectives on the role of liability rules for quality problems 
highlight the fact that it is not consumer beliefs per se that are important in deter-
mining appropriate liability rules, but the entire process by which these beliefs 
are formed. The economics literature on liability rules implicitly assumes that 
sellers of higher quality products cannot make credible claims about their higher 
quality. As a result quality supplied in the market falls to too Iowa level reflec-
ting consumers' (exogenously determined) belief process. In this setting, liability 
is used to raise the sustainable minimum quality level. 
In the policy/legal view, liability stems more from the violation of an explicit 
or implicit quality claim than from some derived notion of efficient quality itself. 
In this sense, liability rules are seen to improve the overall credibility of quality 
claims, rather than to increase product quality directly. Thus, in contrast with 
the static consumer belief formation assumption of current economic liability 
models, the legal view is fundamentally premised on the idea that consumer 
beliefs can (and should) be influenced by producers. Liability rules are concep-
tualized as a method for improving the results of this belief formation process. 
Liability Policy Issues 
The idea of tying liability to the quality claims made for a product has signifi-
cant appeal in designing liability standards for policy use. At least theoretically 
37 The primary article in this area is Spence (1977). Articles by Epple and Raviv (1978). Shavell 
(1980) and Polinsky and Rogerson (1982) are closely related. 
38 See. for instance. Posner (1972). 
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this improves the market's ability to offer a range of qualities to satisfy different 
consumer preferences. At a practical level. however. there are many unresolved 
. problems. In complex products, it is not feasible for a manufacturer to mean-
ingfully disclose the "quality" of all component parts, and in a relevant sense, 
the quality of each component does not matter - the overall quality of the prod-
uct does. Yet when "problems" occur, they are usually problems with com-
ponents. It is difficult for the legal system to evaluate a design defect in the 
context of the "whole product" - for example, should a better than average 
steering mechanism and suspension system be considered in deciding liability 
for a defective drivetrain in a car? Yet, if a producer claims that his product 
is "better than average, " failure of any single component means little in terms 
of the overall quality claim. More importantly, if explicit claims are not made 
for the product or particular component, liability must be assigned on the basis 
of an implicit claim. This raises essentially all the issues connected with design-
ing a minimum quality liability standard. 
More generally, moving from a minimum care liability approach to one tied 
to the producer's explicit or implicit claims is essentially a move to legally en-
forceable implicit contracts with all the problems discussed in the previous sec-
tion. Because of the difficulty in effectively aggregating most consumer claims 
and because of the cost of litigating the issues involved, it seems doubtful that 
a large level of activity could be economically justified under either approach. 
However, there is no evidence to support this (or any other) position on the 
merits of product liability laws, and there appears to be a growing volume of 
product liability litigation in the U.S. 
(b) Policies Towards Deception and Fraud 
An alternative policy approach to quality problems is to focus directly on the 
lack of credIbility of sellers' claims that leads to the quality problems. Laws against 
deception and fraud do this by ma1cing it more costly for producers to com-
municate false information (because of the risk of prosecution), and therefore. 
presumably these laws increase the truthfulness and credibility of claims that 
are made. Thus, the laws might be viewed as providing sellers with a more 
credible communications channel to consumers. At a basic theoretical level. the 
issues here are relatively straightforward, and there is general support for some 
policy against deception and fraud. 39 . 
Nevertheless, deception law has become a controversial area of consumer 
protection activity. Most of the recent debate has focused on the FTC' s policies 
towards deceptive advertising: a number of bills have been introduced in Con-
gress that would change the statutory standards applied to deceptive advertis-
ing,40 and there has been sharp disagreement both inside and outside the Com-
39 See, for instance, Darby and Kami (1973), Posner (1979), Pitofsky (1979) and Grady (1981). 
40 Hearings on the FTC's Authoriiy Over Deceptive Advertising, Senate Commerce Committee, 
(footnote cont' d) 
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mission about which changes, if any, should be made. 41 Currently the review 
courts require only a showing that an advertisement has the "tendency or capaci-
ty to deceive" to be in violation of the 'FTC Act;42 for instance, there is no legal 
requirement to show either actual deception or consumer injury from the decep-
tion. Moreover, in understanding the current policy debate, it is important to 
note that most advertising cases involve implicit rather than explicit claims in 
the ads; in'fact, the primary dispute in a deceptive advertising case is usually 
about whether the questionable claim was actually made by the advertiser. 43 
At the heart of this policy debate are some fundamental issues. Those resisting 
the move, towards a more stringent deception standard consider a strong decep-
tion law essential to restrain what they see as finns' powerful incentives to 
deceive consumers. A broad mandate to control deception, subject only to limiting 
exceptions worked out through the judicial process of precedent and appeal,44 
seems to them to put the burden of law where it should be - on the finns who 
can control deception. Even when they agree that current policy does not (and 
should not) take advantage of the full rein of the law, they oppose efforts to 
narrow the legal mandate, preferring to rely on prosecutorial discretion and voting 
requirements at the Commission to control excesses.45 
In contrast, critics of the Commission's past deceptive advertising activity 
generally point to the large number of cases generated under this legal arrange-
97th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. No. 97-134 (1982). The enabling legislation for deceptive advertising 
cases is again Section 5 of the FTC Act. which states that " ... unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in commerce are hereby declared illegal. " See Beales, Craswell and Salop (1981) for a more thorough 
background discussion of deceptive' advertising policy; also Craswell (1984). 
U See, for instance. the FTC majority's "Policy Statement on Deceptive Advertising," reprinted 
at 45 BNA Antitnlst and Trade Reg. Rep. 689 (Oct. 27, 1983) and the dissenting FTC minority 
view in "Analysis of the Law of Deception By Commissioners Patricia P. Bailey and Michael Pert-
schuk." reprinted at 46 BNA.4ntibKst and Trade Reg. Rep., 372 (March 1. 1984). See also "Dingell 
Assails FTC Chief on Deceptive Ad Issue," New York Times. Oct. 27. 1983, p. 16. For a review 
of the recent debate, see Ford and Calfee (1984). 
42 Though most of the debate has focused on the FTC law. some of the same issues are raised 
by private deceptive advertising suits brought under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. 
1125(a) 1976). For a discussion of private remedies, see, for instance, Thomas J. Donegan, Jr., 
"Deceptive Advertising May Be Remedied By Courts," ugal Times of Washington, September 
7. 1981, p. 14. 
43 It might be tempting to argue that deception policy should be limited to explicit claims because 
of the inherent difficulty of judging implied claims. However, this restriction is a very strong one 
legally. For instance, consider an advertisement like: "You have all heard a lot of talk recently about 
the importance of a high fiber. high nutrition diet. To get the most out of life, eat a well rounded 
diet. Next time you visit your favorite grocery store, look for our new Gran-O brand cereal." Even 
if "Gran-O" contains no fiber and is less nutritious than every other cereal on the market, there 
are no false explicit clairns in this ad; it is an implicit cIairn that "Gran-O" is a nutritious cereal . 
... For instance, there are legal precedents that protect non-factual exaggerations or opinions (' 'puf-
fery") from scrutiny under deception law. See, for instance, the FTC's Consumer Information 
Remed~s Policy Review Session (1979) for a discussion of these issues. 
45 See, for instance, the testimony of Commissioners David Clanton. Patricia Bailey and Michael 
Pertschuk at the Senate Commerce Committee Hearings (1982) as cited above. 
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ment where consumer benefits seem quite implausible.46 While earlier critics 
argued for more reasoned case selection at the COnmllssion, some current critics 
favor an explicit narrowing of the FTC's legal authority by including more 
economically-based criteria in the deception standard itself.47 In addition to reduc-
ing the number of questionable cases actually brought, this increased and more 
explicit evidentiary burden for the Commission48 is seen as necessary to cor-
rect the undesirable damping of truthful advertising claims created by the breadth 
and uncertainty of the current legal standard. After an unsuccessful effort to 
narrow the FTC's deception authority in the legislature, in 1983 the Commis-
sion (by a 3 to 2 vote) issued a policy statement on deception that incorporated 
some of these more explicit criteria. 49 
Compared to those favoring the status quo, critics of the current legal stan-
dard generally share a more confident view of the market's ability to control 
most deceptive advertising. In keeping with the recent economic literature's 
analyses of bonds, signals, reputations and competitive infonnation incentives, 
they see much less opportunity for firms to engage in profitable deceptive adver-
tising. They do not share the fear that a narrowing of the COnmllssion's authority 
will unleash strong incentives for firms to deceive the consuming public. 
Moreover, they have a much more sanguine view of consumers' ability to ef-
fectively identify and react to many types of deception that the FTC has pur-
sued in the past. 
Thus, the fundamental issues in the deception policy debate are the 
unanswered empirical questions currently dominating the entire product quality 
infonnation area. There is little systematic empirical evidence that confirms the 
market's ability to police deceptive claims in the circumstances predicted by 
theory. On the other hand, the questionable nature of many past Commission 
cases may indicate that little significant deception occurs. Further, there is no 
evidence with which to judge the deterrent effects of current advertising policy 
or to judge the likely increase in deception claims if the standards are relaxed. 
More subtly, the relationship of policy to the fonnation of consumer beliefs is 
not well understood; for instance, if deception that caused only limited injury 
46 Commonly cited examples are past FTC interpretations that consumers are deceived by celebrity 
endorsements if there is no disclosure that the celebrities are paid for their efforts. that consumers 
interpret claims of savings . 'up to" a specified amount to indicate the average savings for consumers. 
and that advertisements that report the opinions of reputable pUblications are deceptive unless the 
manufacturer has independent tests confirming those opinions. 
'7 See. for instance. Posner (1973). Jordan and Rubin (1979). Grady (1981). Craswell (1984). 
Ford and Calfee (1984). testimony by Commissioners Miller. Douglas and Clanton before the Senate 
Commerce Committee (1982) as cited above. 
<sludges have consistently given the Commission the broadest latitude in judging the deceptiveness 
of advertising claims. Findings of deception by the Commission are rarely overturned. 
49 For instance. the former Bureau Director for Consumer Protection Timothy Muris proposed 
a legal standard of deception that would find an act or practice deceptive "if it would mislead con-
sumers. acting reasonably in the circumstances. to their detriment." See "Memorandum ... on 
Definition of Deceptive Advertising" at 699 BNA AntitTust and Trade Regulation Report 42 (Sept. 
25. 1982). 
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was allowed to persist unchallenged by policy, would the credibility of more 
significant advertising claims suffer? . 
Finally, an issue that is not at the forefront of the current policy debate, but 
is growing in significance, is the policy distinction between affirmative decep-
tion (that is, when explicit or implicit claims are made which are false) and decep-
tion by omission (as when a negative feature of a product is not disclosed). The 
trend in Co~ssion activity in recent years has been towards increased scrutiny 
of deception by omission issues, 50 and - in what comes very close to omission 
cases - broader interpretation of implied claims in ads. This movement in the 
law deviates substantially from the more neutral view of deception law as an 
institution designed to provide sellers with a credible communications channel 
to consumers. Instead, this shifts deception law towards the more active role 
of forcing infonnation into a market that would (presumably) produce too little 
on its own. This issue deserves closer examination on economic grounds. In 
particular, such a trend appears to require acceptance of the proposition that 
even when producers can make (only) credible claims, market incentives are 
not sufficient to induce producers of better products to distinguish themselves 
from lower quality producers. 51 The usual situation offered as problematic in 
this regard is one in which the whole product class has a hidden risk or flaw 
(e.g., the health risks of cigarettes in the 1950s). However, even here there 
seem to be substantial profit opportunities for firms who offer higher quality 
products. 52 
(c) Direct Government Regulation: Mandatory Information 
and Minimum Quality Standards 
Among the policy options for dealing with product quality problems are the 
more direct regulatory approaches: government-mandated quality disclosures 
and minimum quality requirements for the products themselves. Mandated quality 
disclosures address the underlying infonnation deficiency by legally requiring 
firms to reveal the hidden quality dimension. In contrast, minimum quality stan-
dards focus on the equilibrium quality itself. Theoretically, these standards either 
raise the single quality level offered in a "lemons" equilibrium, or, under some 
market conditions where producers have different cost functions, raise the 
50 In a significant departure from this trend: in December 1984 the Commission ovenurned an 
administrative law judge's finding of deception against International Harvester (FTC Docket No. 
9147J for failing to disclose a safety hazard. In a 3 to 1 decision, the Commission ruled that decep-
tion required some fonn of false affirmative representation, which may be either expressly stated 
or implied by the general circumstances surrounding the sale. International Harvester was found 
guilty under the FTC's unfairness authority. 
51 See Grossman (1981). for instance. for a model of how this quality unfolding can lead to full 
disclosure. 
52 In the cigarette case. advertising in the 1950s had begun to address the relative health benefits 
of different brands before the FTC issued •• guidelines" that made it exceedingly difficult for a seller 
to advertise relative health benefits. 
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average quality in the market by directly limiting low quality products, and by 
attracting higher quality products because of the resulting increase in the 
equilibrium price. 53 
There are, of course, a host of practic~ problems in deciding on a measure 
of quality and in selecting an appropriate minimum quality standard when these 
approaches are adopted.S. More fundamentally, however, there is currently only 
very limited discussion in the literature of economic rationales or evidence to 
support the choice of these direct regulatory approaches over the more market-
based approach'inherent in the fraud and deception laws. For instance, in re-
quiring a disclosure of quality, there is an implicit rejection of the market's effi-
ciency in inducing this information from the higher quality firms . Yet if the decep-
tion laws prevent false claims and if there is a credible measure of quality available, 
firms willing to provide higher quality should be able to effectively convey their 
quality to consumers and to profit in doing so. 55 
Casual empirical evidence gives some support to the market's effectiveness 
in such circumstances. Margarine sellers appear to have been quite successful 
in communicating their superiority to butter on the cholesterol issue. Low tar 
and nicotine cigarette sellers have been vigorous in distinguishing themselves 
from the higher tar brands (going far beyond the mandated disclosures in adver-
tisements). High mileage automobiles often feature this fact in their adver-
tisements. Lower calorie foods (especially in the diet soda and frozen food 
categories) have been very successful in conveying their superiority to higher 
calorie counterparts. The same is true for high fiber foods. In this type of case, 
the (admittedly casual) empirical evidence seems to bear out the theoretical work 
which suggests that there is no need for the government to mandate the 
disclosures. 56 
The availability of a clear and credible index of quality is an important compo-
nent of the market's provision of information. Without a credible measure of 
quality, it is more difficult for firms to make quality c1aims57 and for deception 
53 See Akerlof (1970) for the classic "lemons" model and Leland (1980) for the quality distribu-
tion case. 
5< See Beales. Craswell and Salop (1981) for a thoughtful discussion of many of these issues. 
55 See Grossman (1981). Here I am assuming that a measure of quality is available to the firms. 
The incentives to develop such a standard. where it is not available. are more questionable. 
56 It is tempting to argue that there is also little cost to such a mandate and that the potential 
for improved information in the market may make such an approach worthwhile. While this argu-
ment appears plausible for a single quality dimension. the problems of information congestion and 
overload limit its applicability. The choice o(which dimensions to disclose. how aggressively that 
information should be spread. and how the dynamics of the market should be incorporated are not 
currently accommodated by government regulatory mechanisms. 
57 An example here might be the crashworthiness of automobiles. Crashworthiness is a complex 
qUality that is very difficult to summarize in a simple measure. It is thus difficult for individual firms 
to convincingly advertise their superiority along this dimension. General Motors has recently ex-
perimented with advertisements for some of their models based on auto insurance statistics for 
fatal accidents. but these numbers are colored by driver selectivity factors. Other firms resort to 
(footnote cont' d) 
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law to discipline misleading claims. However, the public good nature of such 
standards makes it less likely that firms will individually develop and promote 
quality standards in cases where there are significant costs to doing this. Private 
industry groups appear to overcome this problem to some extent, but we know 
very little about the economics of these standards setting groups. Some govern-
ment support for the development of quality indices, where feasible, thus may 
be a more economically justified area of activity. 
Of course, even with clear measures of quality, there might be a problem 
initially if consumers are not broadly educated on the quality issue; the health 
hazards of sodium or cholesterol consumption might be recent examples of this. 58 
Firms in such a case might be reluctant to initiate a promotion campaign until 
consumers are aware of the basic issue; other firms could free ride on the ini-
tial, costly education process. This problem might justify a government-
sponsored education campaign or some type of limited duration disclosure pro-
gram, but usually not on-going mandatory quality labeling. 59 Other more limited 
approaches may suffice, however; the recent Kellogg's advertising campaign 
on its high fiber cereals is an example where a company simply used government-
sponsored studies and findings to make its point in what appears to be a suc-
cessful advertising campaign. 
In setting minimum quality standards, policy goes further, either rejecting con-
sumers' ability to understand the information if it were given, or judging the 
costs of information disclosure to exceed the inefficiencies usually inherent in 
a minimum quality standard.6O Minimum qualitY standards are more appropriate 
policy choices in cases where quality is particularly difficult to convey to con-
sumers and where there would be little (informed) demand for the level of quality 
below the minimum standard. This, of course, presumes that liability rules and 
market devices like reputations and bonds are less efficient in delivering the 
requisite quality. 
In regulatory matters, there has been some movement away from the use 
of minimum quality standards in favor of information remedies. This is certainly 
advertisements describing structural factors and engineering features that presumably improve 
crashworthiness. The National Highway Traffic Safety Commission has created an index for front· 
end crashes. but this index is often aiticized as being very sensitive to precise test specifications. 
The overa1l difficulty in measuring this quality does appear to limit effective competition along this 
dimension. 
58 In the case of.cigarette smoking, for instance. there is clear direct and indirect evidence that 
it took years for many consumers to understand the risks of smoking. See Ippolito and Ippolito (1984). 
59 Contrary to the theory, most cases where the government has actually mandated disdosures 
have been situations in which clear indices of quality already existed (sometimes developed by the 
government). EPA mileage ratings, octane rating for gasoline, R-ratings for insulation, tar and nicotine 
content for cigarettes are all examples. The exceptions have been the general warnings and con· 
traindication information mandated in cases like cigarettes. saccharin and drugs. 
60 Optimal consumer reactions to newly discovered hazards can be quite varied depending on 
the nature of the risk (Ippolito (1981)). It is quite possible for these reactions to differ substantially 
from policymakers' views of appropriate reactions to risk information. There are also paternalistic 
rationales offered for minimum quality standards. I am restricting my attention to efficiency criteria . 
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of minimum quality standards in favor of information remedies. This is certainly 
the case in consumer protection activities involving product quality· at the FTC. 
However, minimum quality standards are still the dominant approach in many 
areas of regulation; for example, they are common in the labor area (e.g., OSHA 
standards, minimum wage laws, and much of the ERISA pension regulation), 
in food and drug issues (e.g., the FDA's minimum ingredient requirements for 
foods as well as the FDA's drug certification program), in the regulation of pro-
fessionals (e~g., minimum training requirements), and in automobile safety and 
fuel economy matters (e.g., NHTSA's mandatory passive restraints rulemak-
ing and E'PA's maximum fleet mileage rules for auto manufacturers). 
A few of these cases (drugs, for example) may meet economic criteria sup-
porting a minimum quality approach to an information problem,61 but many would 
appear to reflect forces having little to do with efficiency. Moreover, even in 
cases where there are plausible economic arguments for minimum quality regula-
tions, the results are often disappointing. Regulation of professional services, 
for instance, has generally been characterized by minimum requirement regula-
tions on both credentials and on providers' actions, and there may be a theoretical 
basis for such an approach. Yet many of these strictures have come under strong 
criticism from economists in recent years. 62 While the focus of this criticism 
has been the removal or relaxation of the particular standards under study, the 
broader implications of this body of work may be to reveal the greater suscep-
tibility of minimum quality standards to capture by the regulated industry. The 
political economy of information remedies has not been explored by the literature 
to date, and in many cases, this issue may be the most important factor in dic-
tating more efficient outcomes. when government regulation is adopted. 
III. Overview of the Conference Papers 
The volume is organized into four sections that parallel the conference ses-
sions: Quality Issues, Advertising Issues, Experimental Studies, and Econometric 
Studies. The first section begins with the opening remarks of James C. Miller 
III, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, who highlights the Commis-
sion's need for more evidence, including more empirical evidence on the 
magnitude of actual information problems and on the effects of alternative 
regulatory policies. The two papers in this section are econometric studies of 
particular markets where information problems are often suspected to occur. 
John C. Weicher uses an FTC/HUD-sponsored survey of new home pur-
chasers to investigate whether quality problems in new homes are reflected in 
house prices. This data set is particularly well-suited to this question since a 
subsample of the data was verified by professional home inspectors to check 
for any owner response bias in reporting quality problems. Using both deter-
61 Though even here the level of the standards has been questioned by many. See Peltzman (1973), 
for example. 
62 See, for instance, Benham and Benham (1975), Bond et aI. (1980), Cady (1976) and FTC (1984). 
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ministic and stochastic hedonic techniques, the study supports the view that, 
'in the new house market, price does reflect quality, and thus that any informa-
tion problems must be generally corrected by market mechanisms of some type. 
Possible mechanisms include builder reputation and the scrutiny of banking 
intermediaries. 
James E. Anderson and Frank M. Gollop study the effects of state warranty 
laws on the used car market. The study uses an extensive transaction-specific 
data base that includes prices for more than 120,000 retail sales in 1983 col-
lected by the National Automobile Dealers Association. While the study does 
not address the ultimate consumer welfare questions behind the laws, it does 
find that stronger warranty laws increase the price of used cars; preliminary 
estimates from the study indicate that the major warranty laws add about $200 
to the price of the average used car. An additional feature of the study that may 
be of use to other researchers is its collection of a substantial amount of infor-
mation about state warranty laws, published as an appendix to the study. 
The second section, on Advertising Issues, consists of four papers on adver-
tising. The first by Yehuda Kotowitz and Frank Mathewson attempts to for-
mulate testable implications of the Nelson, signalling and persuasive theories 
of advertising. Using published data from the automobile market of the 1960s 
and from the Canadian whole life insurance market of the 1960s and 1970s, the 
authors find that the evidence does not support a pure signalling theory but is 
consistent with a persuasive theory of advertising. The authors then develop 
a model of consumer learning where the content of the ads is at issue and show 
that exaggeration can occur at least during the period when consumers are learn-
ing about the quality of the good: 
The paper by Timothy Bresnahan looks at advertising as a part of the broader 
distribution system in which selling services can be provided in a number of 
ways. Specifically Bresnahan formulates the hypothesis that mass media adver-
tising (whether informative or persuasive) is a substitute for high-service retailing 
and that the growth of mass media advertising over time reflects relative price 
changes in these two approaches to distribution. Using cross-industry data and 
firm-level data from the brewing industry, the study confirms this hypothesis 
with a slight modification: nationwide media (magazines and network TV) are 
substitutes for high-service retailing, but local media (spot TV, newspapers and 
radio) are not. The study also finds that changes in the relative price of (na-
tional) mass media advertising and high-service retailing have created economies 
of scale in distribution, leading to the increased growth of national brands. 
The last two papers in this session attempt to examine the effects of the FTC's 
advertising substantiation program initiated in the early 1970s. Richard Higgins 
and Fred McChesney consider a political economy explanation for the change 
in policy, arguing that support for the program derives from large advertisers! 
ability to gain at the expense of their smaller competitors. They provide 
preliminary tests of this theory with analysis of stock market data for large adver-
tisers and with an analysis of the incidence of FTC substantiation cases. In both 
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tests, they find support for their view . 
. Keith Leffler and Raymond Sauer attempt to examine the effects of the adver-
tising substantiation program on advertising agencies. Their preliminary research 
reported in this paper finds that substantiation was largely a program of the 
mid-1970s. Beyond a small positive effect on mid-sized agencies, they find little 
structural effect of the program. In particular, they find no evidence to support 
the Higgins-McChesney view of a large finn advantage. An analysis of account 
retention by agencie"s who face a substantiation complaint also fails to find any 
significant effect of the program. 
The third section, entitled Experimental Studies, includes three studies that 
use experimental techniques to examine problems in markets with imperfect 
information. The first paper by Charles Holt and Roger Sherman investigates 
the use of bundling to mitigate the effects of quality uncertainty. In a model in 
which individual items of a good have exogenously determined quality, bundling 
by the seller is shown to be an efficient response under certain market condi-
tions. Experiments under two sets of assumptions show a tendency for both 
buyers and sellers to prefer bundled goods in cases where this is efficient. 
The study by Michael Lynch, Ross Miller, Charles Plott and Russell Porter 
examines experimental markets where buyers are uninformed about quality, 
but sellers are not. The study shows that "lemons" equilibria are easily pro-
duced in this experimental setting. A variety of mechanisms to resolve the quality 
degeneration are also examined. Among the major results are: truthful, volun-
tary disclosure and enforced warranties both lead to full information equilibria; 
identification of the seller (to allow for one type of reputation) improved market 
performance but not to full information levels - perhaps because of two exter-
nalities: first, "cheating" in the market with seller identification tended to taint 
other sellers in addition to the seller who actually cheated, and second, sellers 
seemed to be able to "free ride" on high quality markets developed by pioneers. 
Thomas Palfrey and Thomas Romer study a market with uncertain quality 
in which disputes over warranty obligations can arise. In this setting, the rules 
of a dispute resolution mechanism can change the equilibrium outcome in the 
product market itself. Using such an experimental market, Palfrey and Romer 
report evidence that the allocation of the cost of the mechanism affects the market 
price through effects on both the buyer and the seller. Despite the relatively 
complex nature of this experimental market, the"" rational" Bayesian equilibrium 
model predicts prices very well when compared to a model with more myopic 
or limited consumer understanding. 
The final section of the volume, Econometric Studies, contains three empirical 
studies that deal with policy or behavior in markets with potential information 
problems. Gregg Jarrell and Sam Peltzman examine the effects of product recalls 
on the stock market value of finns and their competitors. This provocative study 
finds that for both drug and auto recalls, the reduction in stock value is surpris-
ingly large compared to plausible estimates of the observable direct and indirect 
costs to the finn. For drug recalls, for instance, the mean cumulative excess 
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return (two week interval) is -6.130/0. The study also finds evidence of negative 
spillovers of recalls to other finns in.the industry. Reputational damage from 
the recall seems an unlikely explanation for this large stock market reaction: 
evidence from the study suggests that the probability of future recalls is not 
affected by a past recall, and where it could be tested in autos, that the reduc-
tion in sales is too small and too temporary to be consistent with large reputa-
tional damage. It is unclear whether this implies that there is some other hid-
den cost to recalls, some basic problem with the "event study" methodology, 
or problems with the efficient market hypothesis. 
The study of the retail coffee market by Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro ex-
amines a variety of ways in which consumers and finns respond to costly infor-
mation, including the finns' use of coupons, in-store promotions, price ads in 
local print media, non-price ads on spot and network TV and trial sizes, and 
consumers' responses to these promotional techniques. Such a detailed study 
was feasible, in large part, because the authors had access to cross-section, 
time series data on individuals' coffee purchases collected from grocery stores 
with electronic scanners. The study finds that price ads, which reduce the cost 
of acquiring information, increase the consumers' response to both price in-
creases and decreases; that the evidence on coupon usage is consistent with 
both price cutting that limits stockpiling by regular customers and price dis-
crimination; ,and that in-store displays are taken as a signal of price cuts by con-
sumers, but that this signal is only weakly accurate. Overall, the evidence here 
demonstrates that in markets where consumer shopping and dealer promotion 
are important, aggregate demand estimates that do not account for key non-
price variables may be seriously misspecified. Moreover, this study illustrates 
a case where information about price is a more significant and difficult issue than 
information about quality. 
The final paper by Robert Porter is an econometric study of the cigarette 
market from 1947 to. 1982 based on aggregate time series data. The study ex-
amines the effects of the health information shocks and related government 
policies on the cigarette market. Unlike previous studies that focused exclusively 
on demand reactions, Porter attempts to determine the effects of the informa-
tion on manufacturers' decisions by estimating a simultaneous equations model 
for the market during this period. Overall, he finds that advertising and pricing 
decisions were probably not materially affected by the policies; the exception 
might be the effects of the FCC advertising ban, which is estimated to have 
reduced advertising's effectiveness and thus to have increased prices by 3-60/0. 
IV. Conclusion 
As illustrated by the wide range of issues covered in this review and by the 
conference papers themselves, consumer protection regulation raises a great 
many economic questions for which we currently have only limited answers. 
The theoretical developments in the economics of information area and the 
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emerging micro data sets of purchasing behavior (generated by electronic scan-
ners, for instance) present opportunities for a broad agenda of research. To 
those interested in policy, the most pressing research topics are a better 
theoretic and empirical understanding of the market's ability to resolve infor-
mation problems, and more insight into the actual consequences of regulation 
in this area. "In sponsoring this conference, the FTC hoped to interest other 
economic researchers in the problems at the core of consumer protection policy 
and to stimulate them to conduct further research, especially empirical and fac-
tual research, on the results of current regulatory policies. 
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Opening I.{emarks 
James C. Miller III, Chairman* 
Federal Trade Commission 
On behalf of the Federal Trade Commission - welcome to the Conference 
of the Bureau of Economics on Empirical Approaches to Consumer Protection 
Issues. As the first economist to chair this Commission I am especially interested 
in the outcome of a conference emphasizing empiricism. 
You know, we economists have much to be proud about; but we also have 
much to make us humble. It is said of us, for example, that we have predicted 
ten of the last five recessions - or worse - that an economist is the only one 
who doesn't know why he is standing in the breadline. Yet, each of us, I am 
sure, has enough friends in the so-called "hard sciences" who can relate their 
own horror stories of predictions - and theories - gone awry. And, like it or 
not, today all scientists in every field swear by the empirical method - at least 
if they don't, they should! 
What many don't know, moreover, is that the application of scientific testing 
to public policy issues began with Adam Smith and David Hume - two great 
economist/philosophers of the 18th century. Indeed, one of Smith's and Hume's 
greatest contributions to social progress may have been this substitution of the 
humility of skepticism for the arrogance of certitude - and in the physical as 
well as the social sciences. In so doing, they spawned a veritable explosion of 
knowledge - not only in economic and political science - but in every major field. 
Darwin's theory of evolution, for example, was influenced by Smith's theory 
of market equilibrium. But perhaps it wasn't until Einstein's theories displaced 
Newtonian physics that the revolution begun by Hume and his good friend Smith 
was complete - that scientists would no longer take anything for granted in 
their search for knowledge. 
In any event, I think we're at the same sort of juncture - though perhaps 
not quite as cosmic - in consumer protection theory. The accepted theory is 
that consumers are limited - often extremely so - in their ability to judge 
sellers' claims. But we're not quite sure which kinds of judgments are more 
or less likely to be correct and under what conditions. 
For example, where there is Clear-cut deception or fraud, everyone will agree 
that a sizable group of consumers may be misled to their detriment. And where 
there is clear scientific validation for an express claim - such as Diet Pepsi 
has only one calorie - few will contend any deception is involved, whether or 
not some consumers choose to believe that consuming Diet Pepsi can turn them 
into a model of physical fitness. 
But it's in the borderline cases where it's not always immediately obvious 
"The views expressed are those of former Chairman Miller (1981·1985). They do not necessari· 
ly reflect the \;ews of the other Commissioners. 
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what the advertiser intended, how the claim should be substantiated, and, 
ultimately, what impact it might have-on consumers, that reasonable commen-
tators sometimes become confused and skeptical about their own ability to deter-
mine whether consumers will be misled. Let me cite just one example from 
a galaxy far, far away in a time long, long ago. 
In that galaxy on a planet called Terra in the year 1942 a popular magazine, 
called Reader's Digest, published an article purporting to show scientific evidence 
that different brands of cigarettes have different levels of tar and nicotine con-
tent. The brand with the lowest level of tar and nicotine, "Old Gold," subse-
quently advertised that fact, but did not include the Reader's Digest statement 
that: 
The laboratory's general conclusion will be sad news for the advertising copyrighters but good news 
for the smoker, who need no longer worry as to which cigarette can most effectively nail down 
his coffin. For one nail is just about as good as another. Says the laboratory report: "The differences 
between brand [sic] are, practically speaking, small and no single brand is so superior to its com-
petitors as to justify its selection on the ground that it is less hannful.". . . 
In that country, there was an agency called Federal Trade Commission -
and it found the omission deceptive and halted the brand's advertisements of 
the test results; or so the story goes. The agency's theory of deception was 
if Old Gold were to report the tar and nicotine figures it must also report the 
conclusion of the magazine article and the testing laboratory that any differences 
among the brands were small and insignificant. 
The difference at that time between Old Gold at 2.04 mg. and the worst brand 
at 3.02 mg. was 0.98 mg. of nicotine. By contrast, back in the present era, 
in 1981 over half of the 200 brands tested at our FTC had nicotine content under 
0.98 mg. 
I'm not a physician or medical scientist, so I cannot say whether in this specific 
context 0.98 mg. is significantly different from Old Gold's 2.04 mg., or whether 
the two tests used different metrics that are simply not comparable. But I do 
find it troubling that one Commission found one set of differences highly useful 
and informative and another Commission found another, seemingly similar, set 
of differences highly harmful and deceptive. 
I also find it troubling that our own agency established a set of guidelines in 
the mid-1950s which expressly forbade any mention of the health effects of 
cigarette smoking and any representation of the nicotine, tar, acid, resin or any 
other substance "when it has not been established by competent scientific proof 
applicable at the time of dissemination that the claim is true, and if true, that 
such difference or differences are significant." 
Now it is well and good to require documentation of scientific claims. But the 
blanket prohibition against representations of tar and nicotine content seems 
to imply a very low respect for the ability of consumers to interpret informa-
tion. What's more, it is difficult to believe that even if the variation of tar and 
nicotine content among cigarette brands was insignificant in the early years, that 
. 
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pUblication of test results would not have stimulated competition among cigarette 
companies to reduce their levels of tar and nicotine; and that the reduced levels 
would not have been significantly less hazardous; and that such competition would 
have occurred long before the Commission acted in 1966 to standardize test 
procedures and allow disclosure of information from those tests. 
In other words, I believe the Commission inadvertently suppressed the 
development of a useful market for the dissemination of information whose 
knowledge might have stimulated considerable demand for and competition to 
produce less hazardous cigarettes. And I believe that this action might not have 
occurred if that earlier Commission had known a little more about how conswnerS 
respond to the dissemination of information that is subject to alternative 
interpretations. 
I raise this example not to criticize decisions of a Commission under both 
Republican and Democratic, hberal and conservative, administrations in a bygone 
era. But to point up the clear need for continued research into how conswners 
evaluate the information they receive from sellers. And to express the fervent 
hope that what you are doing here today and tommorow will at least push us 
in the right direction - if not launch a valuable, on-going inquiry into the theory 
of how we should think about conswner protection issues, into the epistemololfj, 
if you will, of consumer protection. 
Let me say also that with the likes of Sam Peltzman in your midst, I can't 
help but be optimistic. 
Again, welcome and good hick! 
. 
. . 
The Market for Housing Quality 
John C. Weicher 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 
Introduction 
This paper analyzes the relationship between the quality of new home con-
struction and the prices paid by new home buyers. In recent years there has 
been substantial and increasing pl,lblic concern with the problems faced by buyers 
whose homes prove to have defects of various kinds, and several government 
agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission, have investigated the prob-
lem. While there has been very little research, most analysts of product liability 
and quality issues have regarded housing as one of the clearest examples of 
a good about which buyers have particularly little information before purchase, 
and therefore the housing market would be one where regulation would 
presumably be most beneficial to buyers, and contnbute to a well-functioning 
market (e.g., McKean [1970], Leland [1979]). 
In response to the perceived problem, private firms have begun to offer war-
ranties and inspection services for existing homes, and warranties for new homes. 
Surprisingly, these services have not found especially wide acceptance in the 
market, even though the purchase of a home is the largest financial decision 
made by the typical consumer. Quality problems appear to be more serious for 
existing homes than new ones, but only about 5 percent of existing homes are 
sold with a warranty against defects. In the new home market, the Home Owners 
Warranty program, established by the National Association of Home Builders 
in 1972, has gradually grown until it covers about 25 percent of new homes pro-
duced each year, but this has come only after heavy promotional activity by 
NAHB. This experience suggests that there is room for research into the im-
portance of quality problems in the new home market. 
The Relationship Between Prices and Repairs 
The main purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that the new home 
market adjusts to the existence of defects in the homes, so that buyers of homes 
with problems pay less for them as a result. If they do, then the lower price 
suggests that the market works even when the individual buyer does not have 
full information about product quality. If they do not, then the market does not 
work efficiently in the absence of full information among home buyers, and some 
sort of mechanism to provide information or protection against problems may 
be appropriate. 
Specifically, I examine the relationship between new home price and repair 
costs incurred by homebuyers after they buy the home and move in. I also in-
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vestigate more briefly the relationship between price and two of the more com-
mon problems encountered in homes. The data source is the most extensive 
data set available concerning quality problems in new homes: a survey of re-
cent buyers conducted by Mathematica Policy Research (MPR) for the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC). This survey contains data on some 90 different 
defects, including descriptions of the problem, the process by which it was 
remedied (if 'it was), the cost of repairing it, and who bore the cost. 1 
Differences from Previous Work 
The project builds on a previous project in which I studied new home defects 
and house prices using the ArulUal Housing Survey (Weicher [1981]). That study 
found that there were very few defects in new homes, and that those which 
did exist did not usually affect the owner's estimated value of a new home, his 
or her evaluation of its quality, actual repairs, or planned repairs. These find-
ings suggested that popular perceptions of the problem are overstated. However, 
there were several limitations which can be addressed in the present study: 
1. Few categories of defects were included in the AHS. 
2. Owners were asked only about their estimate of the value of the home, 
not the price they paid. These are likely to be very close for recent home buyers, 
but the discovery of defects could have led owners to lower their SUbjective 
estimates of value, below the price actually paid. 
3. Owners were asked only about problems they were experiencing at the 
time of the survey, not about any that had been discovered and already resolved. 
4. The AHS reports value only within broad categories of at least $5,000. 
Many defects can be remedied at much lower cost, and thus may not affect price 
or value enough to change the estimate measurably. 
5. Households were not asked about repair costs, but only whether repairs 
had occurred or were planned. 
Another important difference between this paper and the earlier work is that 
I treat problems as stochastic phenomena; previously they were treated deter-
ministically. That is, previously I assumed that the market reacted only to the 
existence of a defect in a particular house; now I investigate the possibility that 
it reacts to the probability of a defect in houses of a particular quality level. 
Organization of the Paper 
The next section briefly describes the recent history of private and public con-
sumer protection activity. I then discuss the data source. The main body of the 
paper reports on the econometric analysis, which takes the form of hedonic 
estimation of new home prices as a function of the attributes of the homes. I 
I This survey is described in detail. and the results summarized. in Kaluzny (1979). 
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first describe the variables included in the analysis, and then report the results, 
stressing the repair cost variables, of the deterministic analysis. Then I explain 
the technique used to construct the pz:obabilistic measures of repair cost, and 
report the results of the econometric analysis in which they are used. 
The Development of Protection for Homebuyers 
Private Programs 
Protection for home buyers against defects began to become available, ap-
parently for the first time, during the 1970s. Around 1972, several firms began 
to issue insurance or to warrant existing homes against specific defects at the 
time of sale. By 1977, there were about a dozen firms in the industry,2 Each 
of them provided coverage for a somewhat different range of problems, such 
as basic appliances, mechanical systems, or basic structural components, at 
premiums ranging from $140 to $300 on a $70,000 house, or about $2 to $4 
per $1,000; rates generally were inversely related to house value .. The individual 
firms are small, and the industry as a whole provided coverage for less then 
5 percent of the existing homes sold annually. A trade association has been fonn-
ed, the National Home Warranty Association. 
In 1974, the National Association of Realtors promulgated standards for war-
ranties which it would recommend to its members. Eleven firms were approv-
ed by NAR as of April 1980, at which point it ceased to recommend specific 
programs, 
The process of developing a warranty program for new homes was also under-
taken by a trade association, the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB), 
in 1972, with the impetus coming in large part from the experience of a similar 
program previously established in Great Britain. The first homes were insured 
under this Home Owners Warranty (HOW) program in 1974; as of December 
1983, some 1.1 million were covered, with 250,000 being added within the 
preceding year. 3 This represented about 25 percent of the homes started dur-
ing the year. 
As these figures indicate, the program has been voluntary. Builders choose 
whether to apply for coverage; their application is reviewed by a local HOW 
Council, itself consisting of builders. A participating builder, however, must enroll 
all houses being built within the territorial jurisdiction of the local council, in-
cluding town houses and low-rise .condominiums (with four or fewer stories). 
About 12,000 builders participate in the program. 
However, the voluntary nature of HOW may be changing. In 1978, New Jersey 
passed a law requiring each builder in the state to participate in HOW, or some 
similar state-approved program. Minnesota has also required builders to offer 
protection, but less specifically patterned after HOW. 
2 A description of the existing home warranty industry is contained in Brewster et aI. (1977). 
J Conversation with Jane Snow of the Home Owners Warranty Corporation, April 9, 1984. For 
a general description of HOW, see Snow (1979). 
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The program provides coverage for one year on workmanship. and materials, 
for two years on mechanical and structural systems, and for ten years on major 
structural defects. It insures the builder's own warranty of the house. If the 
builder fails to satisfy a buyer's claim-or if the builder has gone bankrupt-the 
warranty comes into force. HOW first appoints a conciliator at the request of 
the buyer; it states that 84 percent of complaints have been resolved successfully 
at this stage. If the conciliator cannot persuade seller and buyer to agree, either 
of two procedures may be used: the buyer can request arbitration, which is 
binding·on the builder; or the conciliator can himself become the arbitrator to 
resolve the remaining disagreements. The latter procedure is being used in-
creasingly, to expedite settlement. 
Through December 1983, HOW has incurred $94 million in claims. Of this, 
$51 million has been for major structural defects in the third through the tenth 
year of coverage; the remainder is for items covered during the first and se-
cond years, which may include structural defects if the builder has failed to per-
form on his own warranty. Some 6,000 claims for structural defects have been 
incurred, at an average cost of about $8500. The premium charged was originally 
$2 per $1,000. When this failed to cover claims, HOW adopted a sliding scale 
of discounts and surcharges varying by location, and now has established a system 
of differential premiums for individual builders, based on the builder's claim ex-
perience with HOW. 
Th£ Government Role 
While there has been some federal government concern with housing defects 
since the mid-1950s, it has accelerated within the last nine years, at the same 
time that private programs have developed and expanded. Until very recently, 
federal actions were limited to homes where the mortgages were insured by 
the Federal Housing Administration. In 1964, FHA was authorized to pay the 
cost of repairing substantial defects in new FHA-insured homes, provided the 
claims were made within four years;4 in 1970, similar protection was extended 
to buyers of existing homes insured under certain programs between 1968 and 
1972, if the claim was made by 1976.5 Few claims have been paid under either 
statute. 
Congress began to consider a possible expansion of the federal role in 1976, 
when it directed the Department of Housing and Urban Development to study 
the need for a national home inspection and warranty system, for conventional 
as well as FHA-insured homes, to be operated by the government. This study, 
conducted by Mathematica Policy Research, concluded that demand would be 
• Section 518(a) of the National Housing Act of 1937, enacted as P.L. 88-560, Housing Act of 
1964, Sec. 12l. 
5 Section 518(b) of the National Housing Act of 1937, enacted as P.L. 91-609, Housing and Ur-
ban Development Act of 1970, Sec. 104. This section applies only to homes insured under Section 
235 (i.e., subsidized homes for low-income families), and to those insured under Section 203 and 
221 and "located in an older, declining urban area." 
. 
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low for any of several kinds of home inspection and warranty programs, and 
that voluntary programs for FHA-insured buyers were not feasible without sub-
sidy (Brewster, et al. [1977]). 
At about the same time, the Federal Trade Commission began to be interested 
in new home defects, under the authority of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975, which extended its 
jurisdiction to matters affecting, as well as in, interstate commerce. In 1978, 
"housing-related issues" occupied 6 percent of total FTC attorney staff time, 
or between 40 and 50 attorney man-years.6 
The Commission has proceeded on the basis of case-by-case enforcement, 
rather than rule-making. Its policy can perhaps best be illustrated by a speech 
given by retiring Commissioner Elizabeth Hanford Dole in January, 1979, to the 
NAHB convention. She urged the NAHB and the building industry generally 
to expand and strengthen the HOW program as the most desirable means of 
meeting the growing public demand for protection from quality problems in new 
homes. She also indicated that the FTC might decide to devote additional 
resources to specific instances of companies ,. engaging in especially disreputable 
homebuilding practices" (Dole, 1979). 
The Commission's first case, against Kaufman and Broad of Chicago, con-
cerned non-performance on the builder's warranty and was settled in 1978 by 
a consent decree in which Kaufman and Broad agreed to join HOW, as well as 
make repairs. In 1979, the FTC established a new home construction defects 
enforcement program and has since pursued a number of other cases. The only 
current case in which the FTC has entered a complaint is against Ward Homes 
of the Washington, D.C. area; it also involves non-performance on the builder's 
warranty. This case has very recently been withdrawn from adjudication, as 
the FTC staff and the company have agreed on the terms of a consent decree. 
The Commission is also pursuing other cases, on which ·complaints have not 
been filed; some have been closed without proceeding. Apparently the Com-
mission has never seriously considered rule-making, such as requiring all builders . 
to join HOW or establish similar programs, as New Jersey and Minnesota have 
done. 
Data 
The data source for this study is a survey conducted in the fall of 1979 by 
Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., under contract to the FTC and HUD. 7 This 
survey sought to ascertain the experience of recent new home buyers with 
defects in their homes: how many and what sorts of defects occurred, if and 
how the defects were repaired, how much it cost to repair them, and who paid 
for the repairs. 
6 For a discussion of federal involvement. with emphasis on the FTC. see Stanton (1979). 
7 For a tun description of the survey. see Kaluzny (1979). chapters I and V and appendices A and C. 
Page 44 FTC CONSUMER PROTECTION CONFERENCE 
The study had two components. The first was a telephone survey of 1,812 
households that had bought new homes between April 1977 and October 1978, 
between 12 and 30 months prior to the survey. The second was a subsequent 
inspection of the homes for 299 households participating in the survey. Inspec-
tors from Certified Homes Corporation, Inc. (CHC) were sent to these homes. 
They were asked to verify the problems reported by the homebuyer, and 
estimate the cost of repairing those in which they concurred with the owner 
that a problem existed. They were also asked to look for additional problems 
which the homeowners had not found, and estimate the cost of repairing them. 
CHC is a large home inspection firm, located in Columbia, Md. 
The smaller sample is used in the present study because of the greater infor-
mation it contains about repair costs. It also has more information about the 
location of the home, which was provided by MPR separately to the FTC. 
The telephone survey was a national sample of new home buyers that cor-
responds fairly closely to the geographic distribution of new home permits by 
Census region and division, with some underrepresentation of the West region. 
The subsequent field inspection included only homes in 28 states and the District 
of Columbia, nearly all of them being states in which CHC had inspectors. This 
smaller sample, as used in the present paper, overrepresents the East North 
Central and Mid-Atlantic Census divisions (from New York and New Jersey to 
Wisconsin and Illinois), as well as underrepresenting the West. The mean sales 
price is close for the two samples; both are about 10 percent higher than the 
national average sales price for 1977 and 1978 combined. The sample used in 
this paper also consists of somewhat larger houses than the national average, 
as reported by the Census Bureau, perhaps because I excluded town houses 
from the sample. 
The MPR survey reports about two defects per home, on average. This is 
many more than HOW (two-thirds of a defect) or the AHS sample used in my 
previous paper (one-third of a defect). The differences between the MPR and 
AHS surveys may occur partly because the former is explicitly designed to col-
lect information on defects, and does not limit the range of responses; some 
90 categories are listed in the MPR report. The AHS includes ten specific ques-
tions about housing conditions that could be regarded as building defects. But 
this does not account for all ,of the difference. There are two defect questions 
which are identical Oeaky roofs and wet basements), and in both cases MPR 
reports a much higher incidence: 6.1 compared to 2.5 percent for roofs, and 
32.1 compared to 18.2 percent for basements. Both proportions are different 
at much better than the 0.1 percent level of statistical significance. 
Households in both surveys are also asked to rate the overall quality' of their 
house. Those participating in the MPR survey tend to rate their homes lower; 
the mean rating was 4.04 on a scale of 5, just above "somewhat satisfied," 
while AHS respondents gave an average rating of 3.66 on a scale of 4, closer 
to "excellent" than to "good." 
There are a number of possible explanations for these differences between 
) 
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the two surveys, which I do not attempt to pursue in this paper.s 
Hedonic Analysis of New Home Prices 
Specification of Functional Form 
This section describes the basic hedonic regression equation used to estimate 
the relationship between new home price, measures of quality, and other at-
tributes. Although participants in this conference are probably not primarily in-
terested in the hedonic estimation of home prices, nonetheless it may be useful 
to begin with a brief enumeration of the variables included in the analysis, other 
than quality and repair cost. 
The fonn of the hedonic equation is: 
n m 
lnP = E biXi + E bjDj (1) 
i=1 j=1 
where lnP is the natural logarithm price paid for the house, adjusted to 1978 
dollars, the Xi are the attributes of the house (such as measures of size, 
amenities, and location), and the OJ are measures of defects experienced, or 
costs of repairing the defect. Most of the attributes, and the defect measures, 
take the fonn of dummy variables; the size and repair cost variables are measured 
continuously. 
The semi-Iogaritlunic fonn of equation (1) was chosen because it has proven 
to be the most appropriate in previous analyses of the Annual House Survey 
and other housing microdata sets.9 Others which were tested include the linear 
fonn, which did not work as well; the coefficient of determination was significantly 
smaller and fewer variables were significant. The semi-logarithmic fonn implies 
that the dummy variables, including the defects, have the same percentage ef-
fects on the prices of all houses; that is, they have a greater dollar impact on 
more expensive homes. It also implies that each additional dollar of repair cost 
has a slightly smaller effect on house price, but in the range of house prices 
and repair costs in this data set, the deviation from a linear relationship is 
ne gligible . 
Independent Varz'ables: House Attributes 
The characteristics of houses included in the analysis can conveniently be 
grouped into eight categories. These are: 
(1) Measures of size: number of rooms, number of bathrooms, square feet 
of floor space in the house, presence of a basement. 
8 For extensive discussion of the differences. see Weicher (1981), pp. 373-374. 
9 See Follain and :-'1alpezzi (1978) for an extended discussion of the choice of functional form. 
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(2) Systemic attributes: type of heaf (electric, gas, oil, "other," or none), 
presence of central air conditioning, connection with public sewers or septic 
tanks, presence of gutters and downspouts. 
(3) Structure type: basic layout (one floor, two or more floors, or split level), 
exterior building material (brick, aluminium siding, concrete, wood or "other," 
which appears to be mostly stucco). 
(4) Location: Census Division (nine categories), 1977 population of the Stan-
dard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) in which the house is located, distance 
from the centroid of the Zip Code in which the house is located to the center 
of the Central Business District of its SMSA. 
(5) Date of purchase, measured as the month of closing, between April 1977 
and October 1978. 
(6) Terms of sale: cash purchase or mortgage type (FHA, VA, conventional 
or other) .10 
(7) Tract: whether the home is located in a tract. 
(8) Warranty: whether the home carries a warranty and if so, the type (Home 
Owners' Warranty-HOW-of the National Association of Home Builders, 
builder's warranty, seller's/agent's warranty, other, or none). 
Compared to other microdata sets, the FTC survey has some strengths and 
wealmesses which may be worth mentioning. Notably, it includes a more specific 
measure of house size than is customarily available, namely the number of square 
feet of space within the house. This is so rarely available in other data sources 
that it has been the subject of some concern and analysis (Ozanne, et al. [1979]). 
Other characteristics which are not available in the AHS, and were therefore 
excluded from my previous analysis, include presence of gutters and downspouts, 
presence of heat pump, all of the structure type variables, the location within 
the SMSA (distance from CBD), and the tract and warranty variables. (The sale 
terms were available but not used.) The distance variable has been available 
in micro data sets for individual SMSAs assembled by local researchers. 11 
The most important variable missing from the FTC data, based on its impor-
tance in other research, is the presence of a garage or carport. The second 
most important is the quality of the neighborhood in which the house is located. 
Others used in my previous work or that of other analysts of the AHS which 
are sometimes significant and iinportant include the type of furnace (especially 
built-in wall furnaces in the South and California), the cooking fuel (gas or elec-
tricity), and, occasionally, specific neighborhood attributes, such as convenience 
of shopping facilities. 12 Size of the lot on which the house is located has proven 
10 There were no homes in the data sample reporting mortgage financing through the Fanners 
Home Administration. 
11 See Miller (1982) for a summary of hedonic studies. 
12 See for example Follain and Malpezzi (1978). Weicher and Hartzell (1982) and Malpezzi et al. 
(n.d.). Weicher and Hartzell is the only study analyzing only new home prices. and therefore the 
one used most to evaluate the importance of omitted variables. The presence of a garage or car-
port is important in all of these studies. 
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has proven useful when it was available, but that is not often. 
An important difference between the present and the earlier study occurs with 
respect to measures of location. In my work with the AHS, I used samples in 
which all of the homes were located in 59 SMSAs, about 20 in each of three 
samples by year of survey (1974, 1975 or 1976). I then used dummy variables 
fer the specific SMSA, and, where available, location inside or outside of the 
central city, and the county or group of counties in which the house was located. 
This approach was dictated by the Census requirement that information not be 
divulged for any observation within an area of less than 250,000 population. 
The MPR data are much closer to a national sample, with few observations 
in anyone SMSA. However, the data include the zip code in which the house 
is located, and that information has been used by MPR to identify distance from 
CBD, size of SMSA, and apparently also population of the zip code itself. I have 
used the location of the house by Census Division, the size of SMSA, and the 
distance from the CBD, to measure location, rather than the dummy variable 
technique of my earlier study. 
Data 
As mentioned previously, the data set used in this analysis is the file of 299 
new homes which were inspected by CHC after participating in the telephone 
survey. However, the regressions include only 170 observations, rather than 
299. The reason is that there are a large number of missing values, particularly 
for several key variables. Some 60 do not report the price of the home; an addi-
tional 33 do not report the size of the house in square feet; a further 26 do 
not have the locational variables, distance to CBD and population size.13 Thus 
the sample used in this analysis is significantly smaller than the number of homes 
inspected by CHC. Kaluzny used almost the entire CHC data set (294 of the 
299 observations) in his analysis of defects and repairs, and also weighted the 
sample to achieve the same distrIbution as the larger sample of the telephone 
survey. His weights were based on problem resolution experience and Census 
division. I have not attempted to weight the observations in my sample. It may 
be worth noting that mean unweighted repair costs in my sample are close to 
those reported by Kaluzny: within $50 or 5 percent for problems reported by 
the owners and resolved by them, and within $10 or 1 percent for all problems 
verified and discovered by CHC inspectors. Geographically, my sample under-
represents that West Census region, and to a lesser extent the South, and over-
represents the North Central and to a lesser extent the Northeast, compared 
to Kaluzny's weighted sample. 
Regression Results 
Table 1 contains the results of a hedonic regression which omits all measures 
13 This infonnation comes from a separate tile on the data tape provided to me by the FTC. The 
tile omits 30 of the original 299 observations. 
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of defect and repair costs. This regression is presented in order to provide some 
information on the structure of the basic regression equation. The next section 
will present results for defect and repair cost variables. Most of the results 
reported in Table 1 are essentially unaffected when these variables are includ-
ed; any note~orthy differences will be reported. In terms of equation (1), the 
results reported here are for a regression of the form 
n 
lnP = E bjXj, 
i=1 
omitting the defect (OJ) variables. 
(2) 
I also experimented with several different specifications of the dependent 
variable: real dollar price, log of the midpoint of the $5,000 interval in which 
the real price fell (e.g., if price was reported as $59,000, the dependent variable 
was coded as ln57,500 = 10.95954), and natural log of the midpoint of the price 
intervals used by MPR for those observations where the interviewee could not 
specify the price. Real dollar price proved less satisfactory than the natural log; 
the coefficient of determination was 6 percentage points lower, and most of the 
significant variables in Table 1 had smaller and less significant coefficients, in-
cluding the size variables. The MPR price-interval variable was used because 
this is the only form of price ·data available in the AHS, and I wanted to see 
if the difference in data might explain the pattern of insignificance in my earlier 
study. Apparently it does have some effect; the coefficient of determination was 
9 points lower for the interval-estimate prices, the coefficient of the square foot 
variable was cut in half, the coefficient of SMSA size was reduced by a third, 
and the air conditioning variable became insignificant. However, this appears 
to be an artifact of the large price intervals used; when the natural log of the 
$5,000 interval midpoint is the dependent variable, the results are virtually iden-
tical to those in Table 1. 
Most of the coefficients in Table 1 are reasonable, or at least not unreasonable. 
The most significant variable is square feet of floor space in the house. Others 
which are conventionally significant include four Census divisions, presence of 
a heat pump, FHA insurance, and location within a tract development. 
The importance of the square footage variable is manifested in two ways: its 
inclusion raises the coefficient of determination by 20 percentage points. and 
reduces the significance of the number of bathrooms, and particularly the number 
of rooms. In the absence of square footage, both room variables are conven-
tionally significant and their coefficients much larger: twice as large for bathrooms, 
five times as large for rooms. 
Most of the other variables take the form of dummies, and their coefficients 
can be interpreted as rough approximations to the percentage change in price 
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that results from the presence of the characteristic. 14 Gas heat, oil heat, and 
electric heat with a heat pump have about the same value; electric heat in the 
absence of a heat pump reduces the price of the home by over 10 percent. (Only 
two homes report some other heating fuel, and only one reports no heat.) Cen-
tral air conditioning is significant at the 10 percent level, adding almost 10 per-
cent to the pnce. Structure type and building material have no effect on price. 
The location variables gave a somewhat unexpected pattern. The omitted Cen-
sus division is the Pacific, consisting of Washington, Oregon, and California; it 
has the highest prices. New England is nearly as high. The lowest, unexpectedly, 
occur in the Mid-Atlantic division, comprising New York, New Jersey, and Penn-
sylvania. Other low-cost areas are the West South Central (Texas, Oklahoma, 
Louisiana and Arkansas), the South Atlantic (Delaware, Maryland and West 
Virginia south to Florida), and the West North Central (the northern states be-
tween the Mississippi River and the Rockies). This pattern is mostly consistent 
with previous work, but with one glaring exception: the Mid-Atlantic region is 
generally one of high home prices. My best explanation for this is that most 
of the homes in this region are located near New York City, and the SMSA 
size variable may be picking up higher prices in this region. In my previous work, 
I also found Philadelphia to have rather low prices. 15 The size variable is signifi-
cant at the 10 percent level; it implies that prices rise by about $105 for each 
additional 100,000 residents of the SMSA. The measures of distance from the 
CBD have the expected signs, and imply a negative-exponential rent gradient, 
but are clearly insignificant; my judgment is that the insignificance is not sur-
prising. Studies of density gradients across cities find wide differences, which 
are only partly explained by SMSA size and region (e.g., Muth [1960], Mills 
[1972]). 
The insignificance of the date of sale implies that real home prices did not 
rise during the survey period. This is not consistent with other evidence. The 
Census Bureau's "Price Index of New One-Family Houses Sold" rose much 
faster than the GNP deflator or the CPI between the second quarter of 1977 
and the third quarter of 1978; relative to the GNP deflator, for example, it rose 
by 8.7 percent. Even taking the point estimate in Table 1 at face value, it im-
plies a real price increase of only 0.5 percent during the period. 
The fact that FHA and VA homes are worth less than others of similar size 
and location is consistent with the mandate of these agencies to insure or 
guarantee lower-priced homes, but I am surprised by the magnitude of the FHA 
14 Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) have shown that dwruny variable coefficients in semi-logarithmic 
regressions cannot be interpreted as percentage changes. This effect. however. is practically im-
portant only for fairly large coefficients. of which there are few in Table 1. For example. the error 
is less than 112 a percentage point for coefficients up to about .10 in absolute value, less than 1 
percentage point up to about .14. and less than 2 percentage points up to about .19. The actual 
error depends on the estimated house price as well as the individual coefficient. 
15 This assertion is based on the unpublished appendix to my earlier study (Weicher [1981]). Prices 
in Philadelphia were lower than in all but two SMSAs of the 21 included in the 1975 AHS wave 
of Selected SMSAs. The only ones lower were Kansas City and Colorado Springs. 
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coefficient in particular. 
Warranties an9 Home Prices16 
The coefficients of the home warranty variables are all insignificant. Further-
more, the coefficient for the HOW program is negative, with a value of about 
5 percent of sales price. This is not significantly different from, but also not 
very close -to, the rate of 0.2 percent that was actually being charged during 
1977 and 1978 by HOW. Builders' warranties are worth literally nothing, com-
pared to no warranty at all; in some regressions, not reported in Table 1, this 
coefficient turns very slightly negative. "Other" warranties do have a positive 
and rather large coefficient, but only 4 of the homeowners in the sample reported 
having such warranties. Taken at face value, these results do not suggest that 
there is much market demand for new home warranties. 
There are several possible explanations for the results. In 1981 and 1982 the 
homes that HOW insured were less expensive than average, so they may have 
been of lower quality. If this was also true in 1977 and 1978 the coefficient may 
therefore simply measure a quality difference associated with participation in 
the HOW prograln, rather than a market evaluation of the warranty itself. This 
is similar to the FHA result mentioned previously. Essentially, there may be 
a problem of adverse selection for HOW. The unexpectedly high claims incur-
red during the early years of the program provide some support for this 
hypothesis. 
An alternative explanation is that HOW appeals to those builders who are less 
well established-smaller, newer firms-and whose houses therefore are less 
valued in the market. If that is true, and if the warranty is not perceived as 
a "sufficient" guarantee of quality equal to the "best" builders, then the coef-
ficient could be negative even though the warranty has value; the coefficient 
may measure the joint effect of the warranty and the fact that the builder has 
a lesser reputation. A further implication is that the model may be misspecified. 
The markets for warranties and for new homes may be interrelated. Either or 
both the demand and supply of warranties may depend on the price of the house, 
as well as the price at which a house is supplied being a function of whether 
it carries a warranty. My judgment is that any such bias in the results is small. 
but I have not tested for it. 
It is also possible that the variables fail to capture the effects of warranties. 
Homebuyers may have statutory implied rights, in the absence of any warran-
ty. A warranty may therefore only define the buyer's rights, rather than expan-
ding them. and may not be of value to the buyer (although it might be to the 
seller). This hypothesis also suggests a more elaborate modelling of the rela-
tionship between warranties and house prices, though it does not necessarily 
imply simultaneous-equations bias. 
16 This section has benefitted from the comments of Robert Crandall of the Brookings Institution 
and Edward Manfield of the FTC. The second and third hypotheses were suggested by them at 
the conference. 
. 
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Defects, Repairs, anti Home Prices 
This section reports the empirical results for the defect and repair cost 
variables. These results are taken from regressions which have all the variables 
reported in Table I, plus the measures of defect and repair cost. 
Incidence of Defects 
As previously mentioned, the MPR survey includes some 90 types of defects. 
It would be possible to include each of these as dummy variables in a hedonic 
regression, but I did not choose to do so for several reasons. Most fundamen-
tally, the dummy variables for the incidence of a problem are less precise 
measures of problem severity than are the costs of repairing them. Even with 
90 categories, not all problems in a given category are equally serious. 
There are additional problems arising because of my choice of the CHC sam-
ple for the analysis. With 90 categories and 170 observations, there would be 
problems with degrees of freedom, and with categories for which only one or 
two homeowmers reported problems (as for instance with the "no heat" variable 
in Table 1). These problems might be circumvented by using the larger telephone 
survey sample. But others would remain. One involves the structure of the 
survey. The various defects are not reported in the same manner for each 
household. Instead, the respondent is asked to list up to six problems, essen-
tially in order of importance, and each is then the subject of 60 questions. A 
given problem may be the first for one household, the third for another, and 
so on. The information about that problem will therefore appear in a different 
location on the computer record for each household. In order to assemble that 
information in the same place for each of the 90 problems, a substantial recoding 
of the computer tape would be required. This could be done, but the end result 
would still be inferior to the repair cost data. 
The main reason for conducting any analysis of the incidence of defects is 
for purposes of comparison with the results of my earlier work. This is perhaps 
of some interest, but not worth a major effort. Fortunately, the MPR survey 
does have questions on two specific defects-wet basements and roof leaks-
which are phrased in exactly the same way as the corresponding questions on 
the AHS, and indeed were included for comparability. These do not require 
recoding. I therefore estimated regressions using them. One is reported in Table 
2. It does not suggest that defects have a strong relationship with house price. 
A wet basement is slightly more valuable than a dry one, but neither variable 
is significantly different from zero (no basement) or from each other. A leaky 
roof is associated with a 10 percent reduction in price, but the coefficient, while 
large, is not significant at the 20 percent level. These results are not very dif-
ferent from those in my earlier work. They did not suggest that high priority 
should be given to estimating regressions with other defect measures. 
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Repair Costs and Home Prices 
Before discussing the relationship between repair costs and home prices, I 
want to define the repair cost concepts. The telephone survey asks respondents 
to report both the cost of the repair and the payer. In the event that the owner 
has borne the cost, or the problem has not been resolved, the respondent is 
asked if the builder was contacted, and if not, why not. The measures of repair 
cost used in this study include only the costs of repairing problems concerning 
which the builder was contacted, but did not resolve the problem. These are 
the actual costs paid by the homeowner for those problems which he or she 
resolved, and the estimated costs of repairing those problems which were 
unresolved at the time of the survey.17 If the builder took care of the problem 
at his own expense, or the homeowner did not contact the builder, the costs 
of repair are not included. 
A second cost measure is based on the home inspections. It includes the 
owner's costs for those problems verified by the CHC inspectors and considered 
to be problems which are the builder's responsibility, and also those additional 
problems identified by the inspector which were not noticed by the homeowner. 
It happens that the average total costs reported by the owners and the inspec-
tor are quite similar ($895 and $944, respectively), but the inspectors disallow-
ed about half the costs reported by the owners, while finding many new prob-
lems. The distribution of costs across the sample of houses is quite different. 
The simple correlation between the two cost estimates is only +.23, and there 
are some perfectly extraordinary differences for specific houses-in one case, 
more than $14,000! 
Table 3 reports the regression results for these cost measures. For conve-
nience, I have converted the regression coefficients to price changes associated 
with each $100 increase in repair costs. The semi-logarithmic functional form 
forces each additional $100 to have a smaller impact on cost, but the effect is 
negligible-less than $1 for each of the coefficients reported in the table. For 
all practical purposes, it is appropriate to consider the relationship to be linear, 
and I do so. 
The results are quite different and much stronger than those for the defect 
measures. Each $100 in actual or prospective repair costs incurred by the owner 
is associated with a $163 reduction in the price of the house. Each $100 verified 
or anticipated by the inspector is associated with a $137 price reduction. Both 
coefficients are significant at the two-tail, 10 percent level. Put differently, a 
buyer who paid $69,000 for the typical house (measured by the attributes in 
Table 1) could expect to incur no repair costs. A buyer who paid $67,500 for 
the same house could expect to incur about $900 in repair costs during the first 
21/2 years. These are reasonable magnitudes; they indicate that buyers incur 
non-pecuniary costs of repairs, such as time spent in finding a repair firm and 
17 The survey includes a category of "disputed" problems as well as "unresolved" ones; none 
of the homeowners in my sample reported any such problems. 
WElCHER Page 53 
the annoyance of putting up with the problem before the repairs are made. 
Table 3 also reports the time pattern of repair costs reported by the owner. 
Problems occurring in the first and last six months of the 2112 year period are 
unrelated to value; those during the second year have a large and significant 
relationship. This is interesting because homes included in the survey could have 
been occupied for as short a period as one year. IUs likely that some of the 
difference between the owner's and inspector's cost estimate occurs because 
the latter is anticipating problems that the former has not yet experienced. The 
CHC cost variable may therefore be the better measure. 
Information is also available on the repair costs incurred by the builder, as 
reported by the owner and also as estimated by the CHC inspector for the same 
problem. This variable proved to be unrelated to home prices; the owner's 
estimate has a very large positive coefficient and the inspector's estimate a small 
negative one, but neither is as large as its standard error. 
Quality, Repair Costs, and Home Prices 
Besides the specific characteristics reported in Table 1 and the specific prob-
lems and costs encountered, the MPR survey also includes the owner's sub-
jective rating of the quality of his or her home, on a scale of one to five. This 
measure, which was also available for the AHS, is worth some separate atten-
tion. I first included it as an additional independent variable in a regression similar 
to Table 1. It was moderately important; each one-step rise in quality was 
associated with about a 2.5 percent rise in price, but the coefficient was not 
quite significant at the 10 percent level; the t-ratio was 1.5. The other variables 
were essentially unaffected. I then re-estimated the regression in Table 1 with 
the quality rating as the dependent variable. The results were very poor; the 
overall regression did not pass the F -test for significance at the 5 percent level. 
the coefficient of determination was .19, and the only significant variable was 
air conditioning, with the wrong sign. Further investigation showed that the quali-
ty ranking is much more closely correlated with the repair cost variables than 
with the attributes of the house; it has a simple correlation of -.46 with the 
owner's estimate, for example. As might be expected, the correlation with the 
CHC estimate is smaller, -.18, but this is statistically significant; it is also larger 
than for almost any of the basic attributes of the house. The correlations with 
the two defects variables are -.12 with wet basements and -.15 with leaky roofs. 
Both are just below the conventional significance level. It appears that 
homebuyers are satisfied with their houses if they do not incur problems after 
moving in. That seems reasonable; the buyer mows the size, structure type 
and amenities before buying, and if dissatisfied with these features, is after all 
not required to buy. 
The preliminary investigation of the quality rating suggested that it might serve· 
as a proxy for problems. I therefore re-estimated the regression in Table 2. 
including the quality rating. The results, shown in Table 4, were not very dif-
ferent, either for quality or defects. Wet basements were still worth more than 
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dry ones. A greater difference occurred when I re-estimated the repair cost 
regressions with the quality rating. The coefficients for both quality and total 
cost were smaller and less significant, as appears in Table 5. 
In my earlier work, I used a similar quality rating and found that it was fre-
quently related to the owner's subjective estimate of the value of the house; 
but it was not often related to the reported incidence of specific defects. Nor 
was it related to actual or planned repairs, which were also measured as dum-
my variables. These with other results led me to conclude that the value was 
unaffected by defects. The present results suggest that I might have had a 
stronger relationship had I been able to use actual repair costs instead of mere-
ly the fact that repairs occurred or were planned. 
The Stochastic Nature of Problems 
So far, this paper has assumed that the actual occurrence of a defect, or the 
actual repair cost, is what affects the price of the house. Stated sequentially, 
the buyer of a "cheap" house is buying a lower-quality house, and will have 
problems and incur repair costs in the future, which the builder will not pay for. 
But this oversimplifies the relationships among defects, home quality, and 
prices. Defects occur-and fail to occur-in both high and low quality houses. 
Not all low quality homes develop expensive problems; some develop no prob-
lems at all. Similarly, some high quality homes turn out to have defects. The 
relationship is stochastic rather than deterministic. The buyer of a low-priced 
house is accepting a higher probability of problems, and higher expected repair 
cost, not a certainty that something will go wrong. The buyer of a high-priced 
home is purchasing some assurance that he is not likely to have problems, or 
that the builder will fix them if they arise, not a guarantee that none will occur. 
Buyers and probably builders cannot know in advance exactly which homes will 
turn out to have problems, but the quality of materials and workmanship can 
be observed and should be relevant. Thus it is the probability that a defect will 
occur, or the expected cost or repairs; which will affect the market price of 
a home. The use of the actual incidence of defects or repair costs, as in this 
and previous research, will therefore result in a downward bias in the regres-
sion coefficients for defects and costs, and an upward bias in their standard er-
rors. This is certainly consistent with the weak relationships between defects 
and prices or rents in most studies using the AHS. 
This phenomenon was first pointed out and investigated by Kenneth Wieand 
(1983). He also developed a technique for calculating the "quality" of.a house 
and the corresponding probability that it will experience a given defect. This 
study uses his methodology. 
Computing the Probability of Defects 
Wieand begins by assuming that the price of a house is a function of its 
characteristics (size, amenities, location) and the expected probability of a defect 
. 
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or expected cost. Symbolically, 
n m 
InP = bo + .E boXi + .E bjE(D) (3) 
;=1 j=1 
where E(D) is the probability of a defect. This assumes that buyers judge the 
quality of various attributes in terms of the expected costs of repairing them; 
the bj measure total repair costs, including non-pecuniary costs, incurred by 
the owner. It also assumes that the various defects are independent, and that 
defects and attributes are also unrelated. Buyers are assumed to be risk-neutral; 
the change in price is linear with respect to the probability that problems will 
occur and the expected cost of repairs. 
To determine E(O), Wieand first estimates a hedonic regressiQn with no quali-
ty, defect, or repair variables, such as equation (2) and Table 1. But this now 
has a somewhat more complicated interpretation: 
n 
1nP = b~ + .E boXi + e* 
;= 1 
where the constant term b~ is in reality 
-
m 
bo + .E b/Dj , 
j=1 
(4) 
Dj being the average probability of defects or the average level of repair costs. 
and thus the constant term for average quality units in the sample; and e * is 
m 
.E bj(Dj - D) 
j=1 
+ e. 
Thus the error term in equation (4) is a function of the difference between the 
actual and the expected incidence of defects or repair costs. The expected value 
of the error term will be negative if the probability of defects is above average, 
and positive if it is below average. A negative error term in equation (4)-and 
therefore in equation (2) and Table I-is likely to indicate a lower quality house. 
meaning one with a higher probability of defects or higher expected repair costs. IS 
18 At the conference Richard Duke of the FTC raised the possibility that building codes may af-
(footnote cont' dl 
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This means that the residuals from Table 1 are themselves a measure of home 
quality, and can be used to construct probabilities of defect or expected repair 
costs. To do so, the residuals are grouped into intervals, ranging from large 
negative to large positive. I created lO such categories, each with about 17 obser-
vations, but with the endpoints of the intervals being set where natural breaks 
in the residual distnbution occurred as much as possible. 19 The number of units 
in each class with specific defects-wet basements or leaky roofs-is then 
calculated: The incidence of each defect becomes the measure of EeD}) for that 
defect. Similarly, the average repair cost incurred by owners of units in each 
interval, and the average estimated by the CHC inspector, are also calculated 
and used to measure expected repair costs. These averages are then added 
to the variables for each observation in the sample, with the EeD}) for the obser-
vation being the average for that observation's residual class. Finally, equation 
(3) is estimated with the new expectationai variables included instead of the ac-
tual occurrence of a problem or the actual repair costs. 
Empirical Results 
The results of this procedure are shown in Tables 6 and 7, corresponding 
to Tables 2 and 3. The differences are dramatic confirmation of Wieand's in-
sight. In Table 6, the coefficients are large and very significant indeed. For ex-
ample, a 10 percentage point increase in the probability of a leaky roof is 
associated with a 42 percent reduction in house price, or $28,000 for the typical 
house. Since a leaky roof is highly unlikely to cost $28,000 to repair, I hypothesize 
that this variable is correlated with other quality problems not identified separately 
in the MPR survey. A leaky roof is a rare phenomenon in a new home; the 
incidence in my sample was 6.5 percent (11 observations) and the probabilities 
ranged only from zero to .11. A 10 percentage point increase in the probability 
of a wet basement is less serious; wet basements are more common, occurring 
in 34 percent of all sample homes with basement, and having a probability range 
of zero to .75 for residual classes. However, in this formulation wet basements 
do have the expected negative sign and are significant. 
A similar pattern occurs for the measures of owner's repair costs in Table 
7. Whereas neither the owner's or the CHC inspector's estimate was quite con-
ventionally significant when the actual costs for the home were used, both are 
now highly significant. The coefficients are also somewhat larger than Table 3. 
Buyers who paid $100 less for the typical house could expect to incur $38 to 
$50 in repair costs. Since the' cost estimates are quite a bit less than $100, 
feet e·. Houses in jurisdictions with stringent building codes may have negative error tenos. because 
builders are forced to build higher quality houses than would be preferred by buyers in an unregulated 
market. My view is that the effect of building codes on house prices is slight, but 1 have not attemp-
ted to investigate their possible impact in this paper. 
19 1 actually created two residual distributions. one giving more weight to equality of observations 
by residual category, the otherto "natural" boundaries between categories. Results for both were 
similar. The paper reports the latter. 
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it seems likely that they could also expect some aggravation, and perhaps some 
further repair costs later on, after 2112 years. 
It is perhaps also worth mentioning that the coefficients of determination in 
these regressions increase sharply. The difference between Table 2 and Table 
6 is 16 percentage points, from. 73 to .89. The increases for the repair cost 
regressions are six percentage points (.73 to .79) for the owner's estimate, 
and 11 (.71 to .82) for the inspectors. Many of the other independent variables-
the Xi-alSO become more significant. In all three regressions, this is true for 
rooms, bathrooms, air conditioning, electric heat (without heat pump) and most 
of the regional dummies, and for FHA financing. It is also true in one case for 
the HOW variable. In the CHC cost regression of Table 7, the HOW variable 
has a coefficient of -.09 and a t-ratio of 1.8. 
Conclusion 
Although many economists have expected the opposite, the housing market 
seems to work. Buyers may not be able to evaluate the quality of new homes, 
but the market apparently does. Homes which turn out to be lower in quality 
do initially sell for less. And the magnitudes of the relationships between initial 
price and later repair costs are quite plausible; future repair costs are less than 
the initial price difference, allowing for non-pecuniary costs of arranging for 
repairs. 
The market may work because home buyers and builders are not the only 
actors in it. There are at least two others with technical expertise, one on each 
side of the market. Construction lenders verify each stage in the building pro-
cess by inspection, before advancing further funds. Appraisers evaluate homes 
for the purpose of advising mortgage lenders. who then determine how much 
and one what terms they will loan money to buyers. Their expert knowledge 
should contribute to the effective operation of the new home market. In addi-
tion, builders do acquire reputations for quality, even though entry and exit is 
easy and frequent in the homebuilding industry; bankruptcies are high in every 
recession. By whatever process, consumer protection for new home buyers 
appears to be provided by the market .. 
It is still possible for a buyer to get a "lemon," because quality problems 
are stochastic phenomena. Judging by the CHC inspections, some of the buyers 
in this sample will get stung, or perhaps they already have (since the inspec-
tions occurred in 1980). Thus warranties would appear to be desirable; the 
market price is a guide to the expected quality of the home, but it is not an 
infallible predictor. Buyers, however, don't seem to be too worried about 
"lemons." None of the warranty variables were significant in any of the regres-
sions; most were negative. Buyers were apparently willing to take their chances. 
These findings are of course rather tentative. They are limited by the nature 
of the data on which they are based. The MPR survey omits some characteristics 
which have been found to be important in other studies, especially the presence 
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of a garage. On the other hand, it includes the square feet of floor space within 
the house, which is acknowledged to be important but is infrequently available 
in housing data. I do not see any reason why the omitted variables should bias 
the results for the defect and repair cost variables, but it might have happened. 
More important is the fact that the sample is small, and covers metropolitan 
areas in many parts of the nation. Housing markets in fact are local rather than 
national, and my attemps to insure comparability within the sample may be in-
adequate. Also, the sample was designed to overrepresent houses where the 
owner reported problems. It may be worthwhile to replicate this study with 
the much larger telephone sample, despite the lack of eHe inspection data and 
the need to create the SMSA size and distance variables. 
.. ) 
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Table 1 
HEnONIC REGRESSION OF NEW HOME PRICES, EXCLUDING DEFECTS 
(dependent variable is natural log of real purchase price, measured in 1979 dollars) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-RATIO 
CONSTANT 10.4697 0.1767 59.24 
BATHS 0.0645407 0.04082 1. 581 
ROOMS 0.0197372 0.01980 0.9970 
SEWERS 0.0196898 0.05248 0.3752 
BASEMENT O. 0348645 0.05829 0.5981 
ELECTRIC -0. 110443 0.06403 -1. 725 
Oll.HEAT -0.0272517 0.09051 -0.3011 
NOHEAT O. 232760 0.2525 O. 9217 
OTHERHEAT -0. 291775 0.1841 -1. 585 
AC 0.0872141 0.05370 1.624 
GUTTERS . O. 00376099 0.05175 O. 07268 
ONE FLOOR -0. 0375809 0.06196 -0.6066 
TWOFLOOR -0.0388662 0.06587 -0.5900 
HEATPUMP O. 147055 0.06869 2. 141 
BRICK -0.0480017 0.07160 -0.6704 
CONCRETE -0.0145247 0.1160 -0. 1253 
WOOD -0.0404680 0.06427 -0.6297 
ALUMINUM 0.0174916 0.07513 O. 2328 
DATE O. 000285692 0.004311 0.06627 
HOUSIZE O. 000303211 4.115E-05 7.368 
DISTANCE -0. 000162270 0.0006671 -0.2432 
SQDISTANCE 2. 34735E-07 1.587E-06 O. 1479 
POPCORR77 1. 57189E-05 8.763E-06 1. 794 
NEWENG -0.0825823 0.1379 -0. 5989 
MIDAn -0.337707 0.1024 -3. 298 
ENORCEN -0. 169749 0.08784 -1. 932 
WNORCEN -0.222571 0.1233 -1. 805 
SOUATL -0. 235334 0.08175 -2. 879 
ESOUCEN -0. 191945 0.09300 -2. 064 
WSOUCEN -0.297285 0.1207 -2. 463 
ROCKIES -0. 144414 0.1035 -1. 395 
CASHSALE 0.0786091 0.08029 0.9791 
FHA -0.232838 0.08607 -2. 705 
VA -0. 128420 0.06666 -1. 927 
OTHERMOR -0. 142212 0.2564 -0. 5547 
TRACT -0. 165061 0.05010 -3.295 
HOW -0. 0499141 0.06097 -0. 8187 
BUILDWAR O. 00135233 0.05017 O. 02695 
OTHERWAR 0.0940759 0.1340 O. 7018 
R2 = .725 
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Table 1 (cont'd) 
Description of Variables: 
Baths 
Rooms 
Sewers 
Basement 
Electric 
Oilheat 
Noheat 
Otherheat 
Ac 
Gutters 
Onefloor 
Twofloor 
Heatpump 
Brick 
Concrete 
Wood 
Aluminum 
Date 
Housize 
Distance 
Sqdistance 
Popcorr77 
Neweng 
Midatl 
Enorcen 
Wnorcen 
Souatl 
Esoucen 
Wsoucen 
Rockies 
Cashsale 
FHA 
VA 
Othennor 
Tract 
HOW 
Buildwar 
Otherwar 
Number of bathrooms 
Number of rooms, excluding bathrooms, halls, porches, unfinished attics or 
basements 
Dummy variable for connection with public sewer system 
Dummy variable for presence of basement 
Dummy variable for electric heat 
Dummy variable for oil heat 
Dummy variable for absence of any heating system 
Dummy variable for other heat (omitted category is gas heat) 
Dummy variable for presence of central air conditioning 
Dummy variable for presence of gutters and downspouts 
Dummy variable for houses having only one floor (excluding basements and attics) 
Dummy variable for houses having two or more floors (omitted category is split level) 
Dummy variable for houses with electric heat and heat pump 
Dummy variable for houses with brick as primary material of exterior walls 
Dummy variable for houses with concrete as primary material of exterior walls 
Dummy variable for houses with wood as primary material of exterior walls 
Dummy variable for houses with aluminum siding as primary material of exterior 
wa1ls (omitted category is "other," apparently mostly stucco) 
Month in which closing occurred (March 1977 - 0; October 1978 - 19) 
Number of square feet of living space within the house 
Distance of the centroid of the zip code in which house is located from the Central 
Business District of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area in which it is located 
Square of "distance" variable 
Population of SMSA in 1977 (as corrected by author) 
Dummy variable for location in New England Census Division 
Dummy variable for location in Mid-Atlantic Census Division 
Dummy variable for location in East North Central Census Division 
Dummy variable for location in West North Central Census Division 
Dummy variable for location in South Atlantic Census Division 
Dummy variable for location in East South Central Census Division 
Dummy variable for location in West South Central Census Division 
Dummy variable for location in Mountain Census Division (omitted category is Pacific 
Census Division-Alaska and Hawaii excluded from sample) 
Dummy variable for house purchased without a mortgage 
Dummy variable for house purchased with FHA-insured mortgage 
Dummy variable for.house purchased with VA-guaranteed mortgage 
Dummy variable for house purchased with mortgage other than FHA, VA or Farmers 
Home Administration (omitted category is conventional mortgage) 
Dummy variable for house located in tract development 
Dummy variable for house with Home Owners Warranty 
Dummy variable for house with builder's warranty 
Dummy variable for house with sales agent's or other warranty (omitted category 
is no warranty) 
. 
4 
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Table 2 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFECTS AND HOME PRICES 
DEFECT COEFFICIENT T-RATIO 
Dry basement +.026 (0.4) 
Wet basement +.048 (0.7) 
Leaky roof -.100 (1.2) 
R2 .728 
Note: Other variables in the regression are those shown in Table 1 
Table 3 
REpAIR COSTS AND HOME PRICES 
REGRESSION 
COST MEAsURE (l) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ownertotal -$163 
(1. 7) 
Owner-6 -$56 
(0.5) 
Owner-12 -$297 
(1.3) 
Owner-24 -$1126 
(2.7) 
Owner-30 +$ 7 
(0.0) 
CHCtotai -$137 
(1.6) 
Owner/builder +$1031 
(0.4) 
CHClbuilder -$61 
(0.3) 
R2 
.731 .755 .730 .737 .730 
Note: Dollar figures are changes in new home price for each $100 of repair costs. Nwnbers in paren-
theses are t-ratios of regression coefficients. Other variables in the regressions are those shown 
in Table 1. 
Description of variables: 
Ownertotal Telephone sW'Vey: total costs incurred by owner on problems not resolved by builder, 
or if builder was not contacted (in 1978 dollars) 
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Table 3 (cont'd) 
Owner-6 Telephone survey: amount of "ownertotal" for problems incurred in first six months 
of occupancy 
Owner-12 .Telephone survey: amount of "ownertotal" for problems incurred in second six 
months of occupancy 
Owner-24 Telephone survey: amount of "ownertotal" for problems incurred in second year 
of occupancy 
Owner-3~ Telephone survey: amount of "ownertotal" for problems incurred in 25th through 
30th month of occupancy 
CHCtotai CHC inspection: total costs estimated by inspectorfor problems included in "owner-
total" and verified by inspector, and additional problems discovered by inspector 
Ownertbuilder Telephone survey: owner's estimate of total cost incurred by builder in resolving 
problems (in 1978 dollars) 
CHClbuilder CHC inspection: inspector's estimate of total costs of repair builder-resolved pro-
blems listed by owner 
Table 4 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN QUALITY RATING, DEFECTS, AND HOME PRICES 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-RATIO 
Dry basement +.012 (0.2) 
Wet basement +.053 (0.8) 
Leaky roof -.088 (1.1) 
Quality rating +.025 (1.4) 
Rl 
.810 
Note: Other variables in the regression are those shown in Table 1 
. 
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Table 5 
QUALITY RATING. REPAIR COSTS. AND HOME PRICES 
VARIABLE 
Quality rating 
OwnertotaJ 
Owner-6 
Owner-12 
Owner-24 
Owner-30 
CHCtotaJ 
(1) 
+.014 
(0.7) 
-$121 
(Ll) 
.732 
REGRESSION 
(2) 
+.006 
(0.3) 
-$39 
(0.3) 
-$278 
(1.1) 
-$1089 
(2.5) 
+$48 
(0.4) 
.745 
(3) 
+.020 
(Ll) 
-$111 
(1.3) 
.732 
),"ote: Dollar figures are changes in new home price for each $100 of repair costs. Numbers in paren-
theses are t-ratios of regression coefficients. Other variables in the regressions are those shown 
in Table 1. Description of variables is the same as in Table 3. 
Table 6 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPECTED DEFECTS AND HOME PRICES 
DEFECT 
Wet basement 
Leaky roof 
R2 
COEFFICIENT 
-.029 
-.549 
.891· 
T-RATIO 
( 4.2) 
(13.9) 
:-.lote: Coefficients represent changes in the natura! log of price associated with a 10 percentage 
point increase in the probability of the defect. Other variables in the regression are the same as 
those in Table 1. 
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Table 7 
EXPECTED REPAIR COSTS AND HOME PRICES 
REGRESSION 
COST MEASURE (1) (2) 
E(Ownertotal) -$202 
(6.4) 
E(CHCtotal) -$263 
(8.4) 
R2 .791 .821 
Note: Dollar figures represent changes in price associated with each $100 of expected repair costs. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios of the regression coefficients. Other variables in the regres· 
sions are the same as those in Table 1. 
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The Effect of Warranty Provisions on Used Car Prices 
James E. Anderson and Frank M. Gollop· 
Boston College 
A 1974 House Subcommittee report concluded that warranties generally did 
more to limit sellers' obligations than to protect or enhance buyers' rights. 1 
If true, a warranty would be expected to reduce a seller's expected liability and 
consequently the marginal cost of the warranted good. 
Ten years have passed since that report was released. During those years 
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act was passed and many states have enacted 
or embellished Uniform Commercial Code warranty provisions and/or Unfair 
and Deceptive Acts and Practices statutes. Consumer protection divisions within 
state attorney generals' offices are now commonplace. 
It thus seems reasonable to ask whether warranty legislation and enforce-
ment have made a difference. The economic criterion is dear. If warranties mean-
ingfully protect consumers, then the marginal cost and consequently the price 
of a warranted good should be positively associated with legally protected war-
ranty provisions. If warranty laws and legal action are responsible, then the price 
of an otherwise homogeneous good should vary systematically with each state's 
commitment to warranty protection both through legislation and enforcement. 
This study tests this hypothesis for the used car market and estimates the 
dollar cost of legally imposed warranties on the sale of used cars. The method 
is essentially to compare priceS" of identical used cars sold in states with differ-
ing warranty provisions while controlling for other variables influencing car prices 
over states. Two factors make this approach promising. First, there are good 
reasons for believing that the structure of production and demand conditions 
in the used car market are quite simple. An economic model of dealer behavior 
need not be complicated. Second, the National Automobile Dealers Association 
has made available a transaction-specific price data base covering more than 
120,000 retail car sales during the June to August 1983 period. Thus we can 
propose a model where identification is reasonably straightforward and the data 
extremely well-suited to the analysis. 
A short run model of producer behavior is derived in section 1. Used car dealers 
are assumed to exist in monopolistically competitive markets where spatial dif-
ferentiation is the presumed principal dimension of product heterogeneity. 
Marginal cost is assumed constant out to a short run capacity constraint that 
is assumed to be non-binding. Variable production costs include the wholesale 
• We wish to thank Shawn Duff and Jim Platteter for able research assistance. We especially 
aclmowledge the contribution of Joshua Zissman who provided invaluable assistance both in our 
understanding of the warranty laws and in the development of the warranty variables. 
1 Staff of House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. Subcommittee on Commerce and 
Finance. 93d Congress. 2d Session. Report on GtmSUmtr Produd Wamzmw (1974). 
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price of the used car to the dealer, labor and fuel/electricity expenses, and the 
dealer's expected warranty costs. This last term equals the product of the pro-
bability of the car's "failure," the probability that the buyer will bring a suc-
cessful warranty claim, and auto repair costs. A cross section model across states 
and car makes ·is developed. All necessary data are described in section 2. 
Warranty provisions mandated by state law and state enforcement efforts vary 
substantively by state. The Appendix details our characterization of the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MM), Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC), and the Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices. statutes (UDAP) as 
applied in each state to used car transactions. Nine indicator variables summarize 
the interstate variability in the economic severity of warranty legislation and 
enforcement under the consumer protection laws. These dummy variables proxy 
the central probability affecting the expected cost of warranty: the probability 
of a successfully enforced claim. 
Dealers voluntarily offer warranties and voluntarily comply but the model 
developed below suggests that dealers only offer the minimum required war-
ranty and voluntarily comply so as to bring costs of compliance and noncompliance 
into equality. Both are driven by the above legislative and enforcement variables. 
The econometric results are presented in section 3. Some warranty provi-
sions have statistically significant effects while others do not, but all statistically 
significant legislative coefficients have the expected signs. State enforcement 
efforts, in addition, appear to be quite important. The results indicate that, taken 
as a whole, enforced consumer protection legislation adds slightly more than 
$200 to the retail price of a representative late-model used car. This amounts 
to about 3.5 percent of the average purchase price of the used car models ex-
amined in this study. The magnitude of the effect may be sensitive to further 
modeling refinements. However, the basic finding that the overall effect of war-
ranties is statistically significant and has the anticipated positive sign appears 
robust. We can conclude (1) that buyers and sellers take the warranty statutes 
seriously and (2) that used car dealers charge a non-trivial sum for the insurance 
policy they are required to extend to buyers. 
1. The Model of Used Car Prices 
We build a simple model of the price of used cars based on profit maximizing 
behavior of dealers in a monopolistically competitive environment. "Good will" 
is a fixed factor in the short run and a representative dealer faces a downward 
sloping demand curve for his product based on location. The cost function is 
linear (there are fixed coefficients in production) in the relevant range of factor 
prices, which allows a particularly simple form for the short run profit maximiz-
ing price. In the long run, with constant returns, this model will produce an 
equilibrium identical to the competitive equilibrium. 
Assume the demand curve facing the representative dealer is a linear func-
tion of price (P). income m. and the number of licensed drivers per dealership 
(LPD). Short run marginal (average) cost is a linear function of the price of 
ANDERSON AND GOLLOP Page 69 
used cars at wholesale (w",), energy costs (WE), salaries per employee in dealer-
ships (wL ) , and warranty costs (ww). The profit maximizing price is 
(1) 
Using the linear demand (P = a1 Y + a2LPD - aJQ = a - aJQ) and cost functions 
in parametric form, (1) is solved for P. Note that -P QQ = -P + a. Then (1) is 
replaced by 
Trivially, C. = 1 (a warranty is required on each car sold). It might at first blush 
also be reasonable to require C1 = 1 (a car out requires a car in). In fact, the 
assumption C1 = 1 can be rejected. Ideally, w'" measures the opportunity cost 
of used cars at wholesale. The NADA wholesale price data, however, add only 
some new information to the dealer's forecast of each model's opportunity cost. 
The constant term Do thus picks up part of the influence of w",. 
We should note that (2) approximates (1) even in the nonlinear demand case 
where -PQQ remains a function of endogenous variables. The right-hand side 
of (2) uses instruments for the endogenous variables. The interpretation of the 
coefficients is of course blurred, but it can be shown that the signs will be 
preserved. 
A more serious specification problem with (2) is that the warranty term may 
affect the demand curve. We expect that the better the warranty, the greater 
the consumers' willingness to pay. Thus C4 = 1 + e, e > 0, where e represents 
the consumers' valuation of the warranty. This possibility may be rather remote 
when one considers that it requires consumers to be sensitive to the nuances 
of law as they vary across states in the manner detailed in the Appendix. Never-
theless, if e > 0, it means that not all the "cost of warranty" identified below 
is in fact a cost to dealers. 
The warranty cost variable Ww is the most interesting term. All dealers are 
assumed to offer voluntarily only the minimum required warranty. This in fact 
appears to be the case based on a very casual sampling. Disregarding risk aver-
sion for the moment, a fair premium for a warranty is the probability of paying 
out times the amount which must be paid. The amount to be paid depends on 
what fails and on the expense of fixing it. Suppose the expense varies by state, 
proxied by a labor cost variable for repair shops, wR • The probability of a failure 
necessitating an expense of WR varies by make/vintage, but not by state. The 
probability of payment equals the probability of failure times the probability of 
a successful claim. The probability of an effective claim depends on state-specific 
warranty legislation and enforcement efforts. Profit-maximizing behavior implies 
that, in eqUilibrium, the value of the dealers' strategies of voluntary compliance 
and resistance are the same. At the margin, the enforceability of the claim deter-
mines the value. and this varies by state but not by make/vintage. Thus, our 
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model of warranty cost is 
Ww(v,s) 7I"(d(s»11'"(v)a(v)wR(s), (3) 
where s denotes state s, v identifies make/style/vintage v, 71" represents the 
probability of an enforceable claim, 11'" denotes the probability of failure of model 
v, and des) is a vector of dummy variables representing the strength of warran-
ty provisions. Note that des) varies by state. a(v) is the labor requirement to 
fix the failure. In practice, it is not possible to separately identify 11'" and a. 
Equation (3) is made parametric by imposing the logistic cumulative density 
function on 7r and 11'". This function closely approximates the nonnal but is far 
easier to use. We justify the use of the nonnal by appeal to the law of large 
numbers. The probability of an enforceable claim, 7r(d(s», using the logistic 
function is L(X(s» = 11(1 + exp(-X(s» where Xes) = l: B;d;(s) + Bo, a linear 
function of state characteristics. While we eventually plan to use the true logit 
function, the results below are based on the first-order approximation to it ex-
'" panded about Xes) = 0; i.e., L(X(s» = 1/2 + 1/4X(S). For the probability ofiailure, 
a longer range research objective is to make 11'" a logistic function of the Con-
sumer Union reliability ratings. There are five Consumer Union categories, which 
translate to five dummy variables, riv). Thus the probability of failure, 11'"(v) 
= L(y(v», where y(v) = l: Djriv). For the results reported below, the sample 
is stratified by reliability class as described in Part 2. No effort is made to iden-
tify 11'"(v). 11'"(v) and a(v) are set-using external infonnation with considerable ar-
" bitrariness. This affects the scale of the tenns in L(X(s». 
The model above is certainty equivalent, which is appropriate for small variance 
cases. We now examine this assumption. For a large enough volume of insurance 
transactions, each with independent risk drawn from an identical distribution. 
the variance vanishes. An effectively certain proportion of the insurance policies 
result in claims. F onnaily, let Z be the variance associated with the individual 
risk. For N policies insuring identical independent risks, the variance for the 
pool is Z/N. For the representative used car dealer, the issue is whether N 
is large enough so that Z/N is too small to matter. For finite N, the standard 
analysis of the behavior of risk averse agents tells us that the fonnula for W 
must be amended to 
Ww(v,s) = 7r(s)11'"(v)a(v)wR (s) + (1f2)Az(v ,s)/N(s), (3') 
where A is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of the representative dealer, 
assumed the same across states. N(s) is the average volume of sales, and z(v,s) 
is the variance of the payout: 
z(v,s) = 7r(s)11'"(v)[l-7r(s)11'"(v)](a(v)w(s) 12. (4) 
It would be useful to test (3'). 
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The main eccentricity of the model is that no allowance is made for adverse 
selection phenomena. There are two justifications. First an empirical study of 
the used pickup truck market (Eric Bond, American Economic Review, Sept., 
1982) found no evidence of adverse selection. Second, despite the prestige of 
Akerlof's seminal paper on adverse selection, a paper which relied on the used 
car market as ·a motivating example, we believe asymmetric infonnation between 
ultimate buyer and ultimate seller is a trivial problem in that market. "Lemons" 
are quite rare, and the main uncertainty is over failure of systems whose 
likelihood of failure is known by a number of infonned buyers and sellers. If 
adverse selection is in fact at work, it will mean that weaker warranty states 
will tend to sell worse cars. Consumers will discover this, the price will drop, 
and the price difference between the strong and weak warranty states, ceteris 
paribus, will not give a true measure of the cost of the warranty. In a limiting 
case, the price difference will reflect adverse selection alone with warrantied 
cars being failure-free, and the cost of the warranty being zero. Thus our assump-
tion on adverse selection is critical. Unfortunately, since there are no data for 
cars like the pickup truck data used by Bond, there is no way to check this 
assumption. 
2. The Data 
The central feature of this paper's data set is the transaction-specific used 
car data collected by the National Automobile Dealers' Association (NADA). 
The Association surveys hundreds of car dealers and auction companies month-
ly to obtain infonnation for its publication, The NADA Official Used Car Guide. 
Each respondent is asked to identify itself by name and geographic location, 
to describe each sold vehicle's physical characteristics (make, year, series, body 
style, non-standard equipment, and condition), to report the transaction price 
gross of any trade-in allowance, and to identify whether the sale was retail or 
wholesale. NADA constructs a record for each transaction, but only after deleting 
the respondent's name and any description of the vehicle's condition and non-
standard accessories. 
NADA kindly made available the monthly data tapes for June, July, and August 
1983. The tapes collectively contain more than 300,000 observations for retail 
and wholesale transactions in used cars and trucks. The 126,000 retail car records 
fonn the basis for the retail price variable P. 
Observations were grouped by make, year, series, and body style and then 
allocated to states on the basis of the transaction state codes. The variable 
P(v,s) defines the mean retail price of the vth model in state s. It is important 
to note that the NADA price data measure net prices. NADA asks its respond-
ing dealers to submit sale price data net of any sales and excise taxes. license 
fees, and dealer preparation charges. 
A sample of 33 car models was selected for this study. They are identified 
in Table 1. Each model is represented on the NADA tapes by at least 50 trans-
actions spanning no fewer than 25 states. The actual number of retail sale NADA 
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Table 1 
MODEL SUMMARY 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS FREQUENCY 
MODEL RETAIL WHOLESALE OF REpAIRS-
1977 Chevrolet Monte Carl~ V8 
Coupe (2d.) "S" 194 1119 A 
1978 Chevrolet Monte Carl~V8 
Sport Coupe (~.) 236 1012 A 
1978 Chrysler Cordoba-V8 
Hardtop (2d.) Specialty 77 110 A 
1978 Ford Thunderbird-V8 
Hardtop (2d.) 294 1025 A 
1978 Pontiac Grand Prix-V8 
Coupe (2d.) SJ 265 695 A 
1978 Honda Accord 
Hatchback (3d.) FWD 538 216 A 
1978 Honda Civic 
Sedan (2d.) FWD 268 205 A 
1979 Cadillac Deville 
Sedan (4d.) 209 646 A 
1979 Chevrolet Camaro-V8 
Spt. Coupe (2d.) 99 321 W 
1979 Chevrolet Monte Carl~V8 
Sport Coupe (2d.) 276 1043 A 
1979 Chevrolet Monza-U 
Coupe (2d.) H'back Spt. 2'2 76 132 W 
1979 Dodge Omni-4 cyl. 
Hatchback (4<1.) 90 109 W 
1979 Oldsmobile Cutlass Supreme-V8 
Coupe (2d.) 234 812 A 
1979 Plymouth Horizon-4 cyl. 
) Hatchback (4<1.) 232 320 W 
1979 Pontiac Grand Prix-V8 
Coupe (2d.) SJ 273- 160 A 
1979 Honda Accord 
Hatchback (3d.) 5 speed 485 207 A 
1979 Honda Prehlde 
Coupe (2d.) 5 speed 368 96 A 
1979 Mazda Rotary Engine RX7 ) 
Coupe (2d.) "S" 563 153 B 
1980 Buick Skylark-V6 
Sedan (4d.) 66 147 W 
(Continued) 
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Table 1 (cont'd) 
MODEL SUMMARY 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS FREQUENCY 
Model Retail Wholesale of Repairs· 
1980 Cadillac Deville 
Coupe (2d.) 73 156 A 
1980 Chevrolet Monza-LA 
Coupe (2d.) H'back, Spt. 2 + 2 116 125 W 
1980 Ford Thunderbird-V8 
Hardtop (2d.) 276 870 A 
1980 Plymouth HOrlzon-l cyl. 
Hatchback (4d.) 92 100 W 
1980 Pontiac Phoenix-LA 
Coupe (2d.) 79 SO W 
1980 Pontiac Sunbird-LA 
Spt. Coupe (2d.) 395 320 W 
1980 Honda Accord 
Hatchback (3d.) 5 speed 416 171 B 
1980 Mazda Rotary Engine RX7 
Coupe (2d.) "S" 404 109 B 
1980 Toyota Celica 
Sport Coupe (2d.) SJ 318 342 B 
1980 Toyota Corolla 
Sedan (2d.) Deluxe 183 43 B 
1980 Toyota Pickup 262 177 B 
1981 Honda Accord 
Hatchback (3d.) 377 209 B 
1981 Toyota Corolla 
Sedan (2d.) Deluxe 191 59 B 
1981 Toyota Pickup 4 speed 253 158 B 
• A = average 
B = better than average 
W = worse than average 
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.records corresponding to each model is presented in Table 1. 
The short run unit cost function is defin~d in terms of the wholesale prices 
of used cars (Will), the prices of labor (w L) and energy (WE) inputs, and warranty 
costs (Ww). State-specific energy and labor prices are measured, respectively, 
as electricity plus fuel costs per MBTUs and annual salaries per employee in 
car dealerships selling both new and used cars (SIC 551) or used cars exclusively 
(SIC 552). The former is reported in the Annual Survey of Manufadures2 ; the 
latter is found in County Business Pattems3 • Both documents are published by 
the Census Bureau. The wholesale price WIII(V,S) measures the material cost 
of the vth model car to the representative dealer in state s. Mean wholesale 
prices across models and states are derived from the NADA tapes in exactly 
the same manner as is P(v,s). The number of wholesale transactions on the 
NADA tape for each model is given in Table 1. 
The wIII(v,s) variable not only provides the necessary wholesale price data 
but also provides a partial control for variation across states in used car condi-
tionand accessories, physical properties that are not available from the NADA 
tapes. Cars sold in either retail or wholesale markets in, for example, Arizona 
or Georgia are unlikely to have been undercoated or to have decayed through 
exposure to road salt but are likely to be equipped with air-conditioning. The 
opposite most probably holds in Montana and Maine. 
Per capita personal income (Y) and licensed drivers per dealership (LPD) 
together with P form the arguments of the demand function facing the represen-
tative used car dealer. Values for Y by state are taken directly from the Statistical 
Abstract'. This variable serves the familiar role of any income variable in a de-
mand function. The LPD variable identifies the extent of the representative 
dealer's geograhic market area. Spatial differentiation, recall, is the presumed 
principal dimension of the product heterogeneity present in the monopolistical-
ly competitive industry. It is measured as the ratio of licensed drivers reported 
in the Statistical Abstract to the number of dealer establishments reported in 
County Business Pattems5 • 
The probability that an abused consumer will bring a successful warranty claim 
against a used car dealer is a function of the state's commitment to warranty 
protection through both legislation and enforcement as well as the consumers' 
awareness of the state's commitment. The latter is proxied by dED , the fraction 
of each state's adult population with 1-3 years of conege as reported in the 
Statistical Abstract6. The former is measured by a vector of nine indicator 
variables. Eight characterize the stringency of warranty laws across states. The 
ducc, duCC'OP, dNEGD , and dNOD variables summarize the scope of each state's VCC 
2 Bureau of the Census (1982a), Table D, page 10. The most recently available data refer to 1980. 
~ Bureau of the Census (1983), Table 3 of each state report. The most recent surveys report 
1981 data. 
, Bureau of the Census (1982b), p. 427. The data refer to 1981. 
5 Ibid., p. 614 and Bureau of the Census (1983), T~ 3 of each state report. The data refer to 1981. 
6 Bureau of the Census (1982b), p. 144. The data refer to 1981. 
. 
• 
ANDERSON AND GOLLOP Page 75 
provisions; dup , dpA , dTD and dMD describe the states' UDAP statutes: 
ducc = UCC express and implied warranty provisions applicable 
to transactions in used goods; 
duccop = UCC implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose 
interpreted to mean fitness for an ordinary purpose; 
dNEGD = UCC implied warranty disclaimer allowed but only if 
pre-negotiated; 
dNoD = no UCC implied warranty disclaimer allowed; 
duup = UDAP prohibits unfair and/or unconscionable as well as 
deceptive acts and practices; 
dpA " private action is allowed under UDAP; 
dTD = UDAP provides for treble damage awards; and 
dMD = statutory minimum damages may be recovered under 
UDAP. 
The variables take unit values for those states having UCC or UDAP legislation 
exhibiting the corresponding property. The final warranty variable d.sE (strong 
enforcement) takes a unit value for each state having consumer protection agen-
cies with above median per capita budget and manpower resources and used 
car complaint activity. The appendix presents a formal discussion of these nine 
variables and argues why they collectively summarize the critical dimensions 
of warranty protection across states. The values of the nine variables are 
presented in the table to the appendix. 
The independent probability that an individual car model will experience some 
defect or failure, T(V), is set at .25. This estimate was derived from a telephone· 
survey of dealers who reported that, on average, two to three cars out of every 
ten sold are returned for some repair work with costs borne by the dealer. The 
probability of failure undoubtedly varies across models. The model developed 
in section 1 is presently not rich enough to parametrically control for variation 
in 'lr. Consequently, the sample of cars is divided into three groups based on 
the auto reliability ratings published by Consumer Union (1984).7 Subsamples 
of cars with average (A), much worse than average (W), and much better than 
average (B) repair histories are formed. The subsample assignment of each car 
model is indicated in the last colunm of Table 1. 
The joint probability of car failure and a successfully pursued claim under state 
7 Consumer Union (1984). pp. J40..56. Consumer Union di1ferentiates five "frequency-of-repair" 
groups: average, better than average, much better than average, worse than average, and much 
worse than average. The "average" (A) group constructed for this study combines all cars assign-
ed by Consumer Union to the average and above and below average groups. 
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warranty laws premultiplies the auto repair cost variable WIl(S). The base na-
tional estimate of auto repair cost is the "typical auto repair bill" r~ported in 
the 1972-73 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) published by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, brought to its August 1983 level ($347) by the seasonallyad-
justed "maintenance and repair" CPI. 8 State variation in auto repair costs is 
generated by multiplying the base CES 1983 estimate by an auto repair labor 
cost index formed from a payroll per employee ratio for laborers in auto repair 
shops (SIC 753) as reported in County Business Patterns. 9 
3. Results 
Tables of results are presented for three major divisions, one for an average 
range frequency-of-repair group of models, and one each for the two extremes 
of much better and much worse than average frequency-of-repair model 
categories. Each car make is allowed a model-specific intercept, but model ef-
fects are otherwise ruled out. Model slope dummies were tested and found in-
significant once the three-part grouping was imposed. 
The model tested is the linear approximation to the logit, expanded about the 
point xes) = 0 (probability of enforced claim = 112). The results below indicate 
the approximation is poor in that the estimated probability for the strongest 
possible warranty state (.5 + SUM2 in the tables)10 is outside the zero-one 
4 
interval, though it is not statistically different from unity. 
Our inability to separately identify 1I"(v) and a(v) by model and any mismeasure-
ment of the repair cost variable Wlf are potential problem sources. To the ex-
tent the certainty equivalence assumption is inappropriate, some part of the ef-
fect of risk aversion may well be appearing in the warranty coefficients. Con-
siderable work remains to be done. The eventual solution is the estimation of 
the logit rather than the approximation, but this involves time- and budget-
consuming nonlinear estimation. 
An additional complication in the econometric model is a correction for 
heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is a retail transactions average price' 
for model v in state s. The number of retail transactions in the sample differs 
by state, hence the error variance associated with the average price differs by 
state according to the formula ZIN(s,v), where Z is the population variance for 
model v retail price (assumed identical for all v) and N(v, s) is the number of 
observations of retail sales of model v recorded in state s. The appropriate cor-
8 Bureau of Labor Statistics (1978). Table 1, p. 40 and Bureau of Labor Statistics (1983). Table 
2, p. 11. The CES "tYJical ~uto repair bill" is defined as out-of-pocket expenses. Because it ex-
cludes all repair costs covered by insurance, it provides a good measure of both the financial incen-
tive to a consumer considering a warranty claim against a used car dealer and the cost to be incur-
red by a dealer if the consumer's claim is successful. 
9 Bureau of the Census (1983), Table 3 of each state report. The most recent reports present 
data for 1981. 
10 Su the derivation of the approximation to the logit on page 70. 
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. rection for heteroskedasticity of this type is to multiply both sides of equation 
(2) by the square root ofN(v,s). The results below incorporate this correction, 
effectively giving more weight to observations based on larger samples. 
It is also quite possible that Z is not constant across models and, even more 
importantly, that there is correlation between the error terms for various models. 
The appropriate correction for this type of disturbance structure is Zellner's 
seemingly unrelated regression procedure. We have not tlrus far used it since 
it can make unrelated regression procedure. We have not thus far used since 
it can make uncovering specification problems very difficult. On this ground, 
our estimates are probably inefficient, but consistent. 
The results reported in the tables are reasonably in accord with expectations 
and show that warranty variables do make some difference statistically. The 
magnitudes of the warranty effects are rather suspect at this stage of our in-
vestigation, for reasons given above. The results are more reasonable for the 
average and much above average range groups than for the much below average 
group. This and related grouping difficulties teach us that more work needs to 
be done to explain model effects. Also, only in that context can a successful 
attack be made on modeling the probability of failure. 
For the average group, as for the others, much of the variation is explained 
by the model specific intercepts. The magnitude of these numbers indicates this 
largely reflects a uniform national wholesale price expectation. Local variation 
in wholesale price is insignificant, save for the much worse than average group. 
None of the other dealer cost terms is significant. The income terms are all 
insignificantly different from zero, but their negative sign is in accord with intui-
tion suggesting that used cars are an inferior good. The competition term LPD 
is never significant. 
The group of warranty terms are more interesting. For the average range 
group, the warranty slope terms as a group are statistically significant. The key 
elements in this are UCC, treble damages (TD) under UDAP, and the strong 
enforcement variable SE. In addition the education variable ED is marginally 
significant. Each of these coefficients has the expected positive sign. 1\ 
T~e numerically largest and by far the most significant estimates are Bucc 
and BSE• The importance of a state's enforcement efforts is not surprising and 
is reassuring. The same holds for Bucc, a coefficient associated with a variable 
having a particularly wide interpretation. As explained in the appendix, a unit 
value for the UCC variable (46 states plus Washington, D.C.) suggests that 
buyers are protected by all three UCC warranties (its express warranty and 
two implied warranties) as well as the MM prohibition against limiting the dura-
tion of any UCC implied warranty to less than the term of the product's written 
warranty. The estimates suggest, however, that the marginal effect ofUCCOP, 
NEGD, and NOD embellishments is inconsequential. 
The importance of the basic UDAP statute prolubiting deceptive practices 
cannot be determined unambiguously from the results. A UDAP statute exists 
in every jurisdiction and therefore has its effect included, along with other 
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, unspecified ubiquitous effects, in the warranty constant Bo. What we can say 
is that the extension of basic UDAP statutes to. cover unfair and/or unconscionable 
acts is too subtle an enhancement to make any statistically significant difference. 
Not so, however, for the treble damage penalty provision. 
If the magnitudes of the warranty terms were taken seriously, the overall 
effect of going from the weakest possible state to the strongest possible state 
adds about $237 to the price of a representative used car in a state with average 
repair costs. This is the product of the sum (SUM! in Table 2) of the slopes 
(5.48), the assigned probability offailure (.25), the average repair cost ($347), 
and 112, the scaling term required by equation (2). This figure is at least of plausible 
order of magnitude. It amounts to nearly 3.5 percent of the retail price of the 
representative used car in the average model group. 
Neither the individual warranty coefficients nor their sums are significant in 
either the much above or much below average groups. This result is consistent 
with our expectation for the much above average group. The group's history 
of infrequent and trivial repairs indicates that the presence of warranties should 
have little effect on a dealer's marginal cost and therefore on a used car's retail 
price. The opposite, however, was expected for cars in the IlUlch below average 
group. We suspect that model-specific effects are creating specification bias. 
Note, this latter group was the only one for which the wholesale price coeffi-
cient was significant, suggesting that model-specific effects are quite important 
in this reliability class. 
In future work several major refinements are advisable. First, it-is important 
to do a better job of controlling for model-specific effects. The variation in price 
of gasoline over jurisdictions clearly alters the desirability of guzzlers vs. 
econoboxes in a way not yet controlled for in our model. Other features will 
no doubt also be important. Second, risk aversion should be incorporated into 
the model. Its importance should not be underestimated. If used car dealers 
are risk averse, the measured marginal cost of warranty provisions reported 
above may well exceed the dealers' true outlay for warrantied repairs. Third, 
it would be worthwhile to attempt to model the probability of failure parametrical-
ly. Fourth, both the probability of failure and the probability of enforced claim 
should be estimated for the true logit form. Fifth, we may finally reach a stage 
of confidence where application of the Zellner-efficient technique seems 
reasonable. Finally, if additional data could be found (on quantity demanded or 
possibly on private market prices), it might be possible to address the issue 
of the value consumers place on warranties. Given identification of the demand 
structure, it would be possible to undertake incidence analysis to answer the 
question whether mandated warranties are welfare improving. 
. , 
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Table 2 
REGRESSION STATISTICS FOR AVERAGE FREQUENCY OF REpAIR SET 
RIGHT-HAND EsTIMATED STANDARD 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR T-STATISTIC 
MODEL SPECIFIC 
lNTERCEPTS 
F2 8691.12 472.586 18.3906 
F7 3603.41 452.314 7.96660 
F8 4839.09 451.991 10.7062 
F12 4754.49 451.265 10.5359 
F13 6477.32 459.611 14.0931 
F14 6072.99 462.982 13.1171 
F20 5078.66 452.651 11.2198 
F26 3140.37 452.692 6.93710 
F27 4165.29 452.008 9.21508 
F3 10520.1 500.547 21.0172 
F9 5565.15 455.208 12.2255 
FlO 3941.51 479.221 8.22483 
F21 5942.07 457.681 12.9830 
F28 4748.88 452.728 10.4895 
F29 5767.46 458.247 12.5859 
WHOLESALE PRICE 0.507262E-02 0.272112E-01 0.186417 
ENERGY PRICE -58.0303 42.8517 -1.35421 
LABOR PRICE -O.456973E-01 0.413736E-01 -1.10450 
INC -O.506711E-01 0.409077E-01 -1.23867 
LPD 0.541304E-01 0.709742E-01 0.762677 
WARRANTY PARAMETERS 
BO -1.60984 6.29161 -0.255871 
NOD -0.855200 0.973471 -0.878506 
NEGD -0.371493 0.792148 -0.468969 
UCC 3.60679 l.09641 3.28964 
UCCOP 0.614640 0.739942 0.830659 
UUP 0.146371 0.810009 0.180702 
PA -1.08411 l.92561 -0.562998 
TD 1.32988 0.719597 1.84809 
MD -0.266768 0.655034 -0.407258 
SE 2.36477 0.697598 3.38988 
----...... - ... -----_ ...... -... 
--------------
ED 0.121894 0.699469E-01 1.74267 
R-sQuared = 0.969625 NOBS = 476 
R-bar-sQuared (adj for DF) = 0.967504 Mean of Dependent Variable .. 11395.2 
Analysis of Warranty Effects: SUM1 .. all but ED and constant 
SUM2 - all 
Right-hand Estimated Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error T -Statistic 
SUM1 5.48488 2.92863 1.87285 
SUM2 3.99693 6.28597 0.635850 
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Table 3 
REGRESSION STATISTICS FOR MUCH BETI'ER THAN AVERAGE 
FREQUENCY OF REpAIR SET 
RIGHT·HAND . ESTlMATED STANDARD 
VARIABU COEFFICIENT ERROR T·STATISTIC 
MODEL SPECIFIC 
INTERCEPTS 
F24 7937.94 1118.65 7.09603 
F25 8929.25 1126.91 7.92369 
F30 6448.15 1088.34 5.92473 
F31 7482.57 1107.04 6.75905 
F32 5960.64 1080.04 5.51890 
F33 6424.79 1075.12 5.97587 
F34 7275.55 1098.15 6.62525 
F35 6722.12 1094.48 6.14186 
F36 7595.93 1088.25 6.97995 
WHOLESALE PRICE -O.564616E-01 0.505174E-01 -1.11767 
ENERGY PRICE 27.6546 110.270 0.250790 
LABOR PRICE 0.432324E-01 0.102507 0.421750 
INC -O.375551E-01 0.981201E-01 -0.382746 
LPD -0. 251984E-01 0.184725 -0.136410 
Warranty Parameters 
BO -16.1059 14.2239 -1.13231 
NOD 4.08582 2.38345 1.71425 
NEGD 1.55998 2.13118 0.731980 
UCC 0.913526 2.10263 0.434469 
UCCOP 0.803027 1.79457 0.447475 
UUP 0.575938 2.09904 0.274381 
PA -1.77821 6.61867 -0.268665 
TO -0.856147 .1.52884 -0.559997 
MD -O.836791E-01 1.57316 -O.531917E-01 
SE 0.767001E-01 1.47273 0.5208O3E-Ol 
---_ .. - ..... _-_. __ . 
------
ED 0.370701£-02 0.158879 0.233327E-Ol 
R·squared - 0.977769 NOBS .. 231 
R·bar·squared (adj for DF)- 0.975058 Mean of Dependent Variable = 16504.7 
Analysis of Warranty Effects: SUMI - all but ED and coostant 
SUM2 - all 
Right·hand Estimated Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error T ·Statistic 
SUMl 5.29696 9.10265 0.581914 
SUM2 -10.8052 14.1984 -0.761017 
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Table 4 
REGRESSION STATISTICS FOR MUCH WORSE THAN AVERAGE 
FREQUENCY OF REPAIR SET 
RIGHT-HAND ESTIMATED STANDARD 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR T-STATISTIC 
MODEL SPECIFIC 
INTERCEPTS 
F1 4372.60 644.253 6.78709 
F4 3264.72 622.974 5.24054 
F5 3631.49 621.815 5.84014 
F6 4846.05 669.676 7.23642 
F11 3233.56 619.040 5.22351 
F15 3208.43 607.372 5.28247 
F18 4142.86 656.228 6.31314 
F16 3759.00 624.854 6.01581 
F17 3695.49 623.375 5.92820 
WHOLESALE PRICE 0.194705 0.728284E-0l 2.67348 
ENERGY PRICE 69.0252 56.9529 1.21197 
LABOR PRICE -0. 164304E-01 0.568330E-01 -0.289099 
INC -O.943782E-01 0.561015E-0l -1.68227 
LPD -0.111966 o .836717E-01 -1.33816 
WARRANTY PARAMETERS 
BO 7.67495· 7.70139 0.996567 
NOD 1.32952 1.10175 1.20673 
NEGD 0.554139 0.861152 0.643486 
UCC -0.484589 1.45057 -0.334069 
UCCOP -1.11982 0.879125 -1.27379 
UUP -0.196267 0.931884 -0.210614 
PA 1.66271 3.20440 0.518885 
TO -1.08911 0.915465 -1.18968 
MD 0.966949 0.842706 1.14743 
SE -0.756409 0.970684 -0.i79254 
----------- ...... _------................... - ...................... _-..... _-----...... --_ ...... --- ......... __ .. ----- ........... _------_ ...... _--- ......... _ ...... _-----..... -.. _------... ------
ED 0.108018 0.960886E-01 1.12415 
R-Squared = 0.968873 NOBS = 193 
R-Bar-Squared (adj for DF) = 0.964213 Mean of Dependent Variable = i984 .82 
Analysis of Warranty Effects: SUM1 = all but ED and constant 
SUM2 = all 
Right-hand Estimated Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error T-Statistic 
SUM1 0.867124 4.18984 0.206959 
SUM2 8.65009 7.68338 1.12582 
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Appendix 
Wa1Tanty Protectu,n Under the Law 
Consumers can seek relief for used car warranty violations under any of three 
consumer protection laws: the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MM), Article 
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (VCC), and state unfair and deceptive acts 
or practices statutes (UDAP). Other legislation applies to used car transactions 
but only these three laws have direct implications for warranties. 1 
Consumer rights under these acts are not unifonn across states. Not an states, 
for example, have enacted article 2 of the UCC and those that have adopted 
it have drafted laws that differ in important dimensions, especially as to the type 
of goods covered under the law and the conditions, if any, under which the seller 
may disclaim the buyer's warranty rights. Similarly, while all states have UDAP 
statutes, variability is substantial in the scope of covered practices, procedural 
matters, and the treatment of damages. Even MM, a federal statute, does not 
apply uniformly across jurisdictions. Consumers within a state are protected 
under the implied warranty liability provision of MM only to the extent that a 
UCC implied warranty exists under state law. 
The objective of this abstract is to highlight those provisions of the consumer 
protection laws which create interstate variability in the economic severity of 
the statutes as applied to used cars. These differences, if truly important, should 
result in different economic behavior among sellers and ultimately in different 
transaction prices. 
The following discussion is thus an economic description of the laws and is 
intended to be neither an exhaustive nor a legal treatment. Complete, legal 
descriptions of MM, UCC, and UDAP statutes appear in Rigg and Alpert (1982) 
and Sheldon (1982a), two texts pUbli<;hed by the National Consumer Law Center. 
The material presented below draws heavily from these volumes. 
MAGNUSON-MOSS. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act was passed by Congress 
on July 4, 1975.2 The law applies to transactions in consumer goods, not ser-
vices. The transaction can involve new or used products but the product must 
have been initially manufactured or substantially modified after July 4, 1975. All 
used cars examined in this research project were manufactured after 1976 and 
therefore qualify for MM protection. The Act does not require that a product 
I Motor vehicle disclosure, safety inspection, and odometer disclosure laws also protect buyers 
of used cars. D6cJosure regulations regarding the vehicle's pri<r use, accident record, flood damage, 
repair history, and odometer reading are designed to ensure that the buyer and the seller possess 
the same infonnation at the point of sale. These regulations, however, do not enhance the buyer's 
warranty protection. State safety inspection rules determine the vehicle's conionnity with minimum 
safety requirements but, as Rigg and Alpert (1982) argue, with the possible exception of Wiscon-
sin's very stringent inspection law which sets minimum merchantability standards, "state standards 
are not intended to be staOOards of mininulm quality" (p. 292). Also, see note 64 below. 
2 15 U.S.C. sec. 2301-32l3 (Supp. 1975). 
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be warranted, that a warranty be in writing, or that it have a prescribed dura-
tion: It only provides that if the sale of a product ~s accompanied by a "written" 
warranty, then (1) the warrantor must' 'fully and conspicuously disclose in sim-
ple and readily understood language the terms and conditions of such warranty' '3 
and (2) certain prohibitions will apply. The FTC is specifically designated as the 
source for interpretation of the Act and as its enforcement agency. The FTC 
may bring action as can consumers who, individually or as members of a class, 
can sue for damages and attorney fees. 
The Act establishes two important prohIbitions. First, MM disallows the 
disclaimer ofUCC implied warranties when a "written" warranty is given.' Se-
cond, the seller may not tie the consumer's purchase of another product or ser-
vice to the issuance of its written or implied warranty. Only the former is of 
relevance to this study and it, as Rigg and Alpert (1982) point out, "may be 
the most significant provision of the Act":5 
Anyone who warrants a product ... within the Act' 5 scope is prohitited from disclaiming or modi-
fying the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose when they arise 
as a matter of state law. The Act does not, however, impose implied warranty liability on a party 
who gives a written warranty but who does not, under state law, make an implied warranty. 6 
The important implication is that, although MM is a federal statute, the ap-
plication of its disclaimer prohibition is not uniform across states. While its "sim-
ple and readily understood" disclosure requirements apply to transactions in 
all jurisdictions, its implied warranty disclaimer prohibition is operative for trans-
actions in used cars only in those states both having adopted the UCC and in- . 
terpreting it as applicable to sales of used goods. 7 
Another condition limiting the applicability of the MM disclaimer prohibition 
is that MM covers transactions only when a "written" warranty is given, where 
the word "written" has a particularly narrow interpretation. In brief, a written 
warranty under MM means 
(a) "any written affirmation of fact or written promise that ... such material 
Qr workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over 
a specified period of time, or 
(b) "any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of 
a consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action 
with respect to such product in the event that such product fails to meet the 
specifications set forth in the undertaking.' '8 
A warranty promising a defect-free product seldom accompanies the sale of 
3 Ibid., sec. 2302(a). 
4 Ibid., sec. 2308(a). 
5 Rigg and Alpert (1982), p. 227. 
6 Ibid. 
7 This has important implications for the interpretation of the "vcc .. variable described below. 
8 15 V.S.C. sec. 2301(6) (Supp. 1975). 
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a used car. More typically, the buyer's bill of sale includes, if anything, a state-
ment that the car is warranted "for 30' days" or "for 30 days or 1000 miles 
whichever comes first" or perhaps is covered by a "30-day 50-SO warranty 
on parts and labor." Rigg and Alpert (1982) suggest that these phrases arguably 
fall within the section 2301(6b) definition of "written warranty."9 Any lesser 
statement, however, most likely removes the transaction from MM protection. 10 
For purposes of this study, MM is assumed to apply to all used car transac-
tions. The dealerships responding to the NADA data requests are generally 
medium to large size dealerships which sell both new and used cars. These 
dealers typically offer one of the above variants of the 30-day warranty which, 
it appears, can be interpreted as a "written" warranty under MM.ll 
The MM disclaimer prohIbition, however, has only a brief duration in used 
car transactions. For limited (as opposed to 'full") warranties, MM section 
2308(b) pennits "implied warranties (to) be limited in duration to the duration 
of a written warranty of reasonable duration. "12 In effect, the MM disclaimer 
prohibition on a used car transaction accompanied by a limited written 30-day 
warranty is operative only within that 30-day window. 13 Presuming the seller 
has taken advantage of the MM provision that (s)he may restrict the duration 
of the implied warranty, the MM no disclaimer provision is not available to the 
buyer beginning on the 31st day after the sale. At that point, the buyer will 
have to rely on the specific implied warranty disclaimer provisions of his/her 
state's UCC statute. 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. The current version of the UCC is dated 1967. 
It creates certain buyers' rights and sellers' obligations. Like MM, Acticle 2 
of the UCC applies only to "transactions in goods. " Commercial transactions 
such as real estate, insurance, and services are excluded. Importantly, the defini-
tion of "goods" does not limit the term to new goods. 14 However, the presence 
of the word "transactions" in section 2-102 has created some confusion. Other 
9 Rigg and Albert (1982), p. 230. 
10 It should be noted that damages and attorney fees are not limited to written warranties WIder MM. 
11 The authors verified by telephme survey that some form of a 30-day warranty is the typical 
warranty given by medium to large size used car dealers. 
12 15 U.S.C. sec. Z308(b) (Supp. 1975). Rigg and Alpert (1982) point out that the section 2308(b) 
language is confusing since there is no duration associated with an implied warranty. Implied war-
ranties apply only at the time of sale. "The only logical interpretation of this reference to duration 
then is that duration refers to the time during which the buyer must notify the seller of the defect" 
(Rigg and Alpert (1982), p. 232). 
13 That the typical written used car warranty is a "limited" (as opposed to "full") warranty is 
important. MM allows sellers to restrict the duration of an implied warranty associated with a limited 
warranty, but section 2304(a)(2) expressly di1iallows any limitation on the duration of an implied 
warranty when a full warranty is given. U used auto warranties were considered full warranties, 
as defined by Rigg and Alpert (1982) p. 234, the UCC and NOD variables defined below would 
be perfectly collinear. 
14 UCC sec. 2-105(1) defines "goods" as "all things which are made at the time of identification 
to the contract for sale." 
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- sections of Article 2 refer not to transactions but to "sales," "sellers," and 
"buyers." Clearly all sales of goods are covered by the UCC, but "transac-
tions" is a broader concept than "sales." 
No confusion arises, however, regarding the Code's distinction between the 
notions of "seller" and "merchant." The fonner includes private parties while 
the latter does not.1S The distinction is crucial since important UCC sections, 
including the implied warranty of merchantability, apply only to sales by mer-
chants. Fortunately, there is no ambiguity regarding the full applicability of the 
UCC to the used car transactions examined in this study. All are "transactions 
in goods" as required by Article 2. Furthennore, all recorded auto transactions 
used here are sales by merchants. 
Not an states have adopted Article 2 and its applicability to used car purchases 
is questionable in some. Court cases in Alabama (1976), Georgia (1971), and 
Texas (1973) suggest that used goods are not covered by Article 2.16 The state 
of Louisiana, moreover, has not adopted ArtX:1e 2 as statutory law. Consequently, 
the only recourse available to consumers in these jurisdictions may be to sue 
for negligence which, of course, requires proof of seller misconduct. In UCC 
jurisdictions, in contrast, the seller may be liable regardless of fault. The extent 
of liability, however, is limited to contract damages. Neither punitive damages 
nor attorney fees are recoverable under Article 2.17 
The UCC establishes three major types of warranties: express warranties, 
the implied warranty of merchantability, and the implied warranty of fitness for 
a particular purpose. All apply to used car transactions. 
Article 2 establishes a number of types of express warranties. The fonn im-
portant to transactions in used cars is the •• express warranty by affirmation of 
fact or promise." According to Rigg and Alpert (1982), "the four elements of 
an express warranty by affirmation of fact or promise are: (1) any affirmation 
of fact or promise, (2) made by the seller to the buyer, (3) which relates to 
the goods, and (4) becomes part of the basis of the bargain. "18 The warranty 
can be written, oral, or inferred from advertising, pictures, or product labels. 
The typical 30-day warranty accompanying a used car sale is such an express 
warranty .19 
UCC section 2-316(1) prohIbits the subsequent disclaimer of express warran-
ties: 
15 UCC sec. 1-204(1) states: "Merchant means a person who deals in goods of the kind or other-
wise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or 
goods involved in the transaction." 
16 Truk. Iru:. v. Tidmon. 531 So. 2d 275. 19 UCC REP 92 (Ala 1976); General Motoral Corp. 
v. Haleo Instnlments. Inc .• 124 Ga. App. 630. 184 S.E. 2d 619. 9 UCC REP. 1193 (1971); Chaq 
Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp .• 500 S.W. 2d 877. 13 UCC REP. 806 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). 
17ln addition. "Maryland. Massachusetts. and West Virginia have added provisions to their ver-
sions of the UCC specifically restricting the ability of warrantors to limit or modify remedies for 
breach of warranty in sales of consumer goods" (Rigg and Alpert (1982). p. 223). This latter dimension 
of state variability is judged to be too small to warrant an additional indicator variable. 
II Rigg and Alpert (1982). p. 29. 
19 Ibid. 
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. -·Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or conduct tending 
to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever .reasonable as consistent with each other; 
but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence, negation or limitation 
is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.20 
The section refutes the standing of "as is" sales. 
The important implication for this project is that the 30-day warranty on used 
car sales is considered an express warranty under the uee and therefore can-
not be disclaimed in those jurisdictions in which the vee is applicable to trans-
actions in used goods-i.e., in all jurisdictions but Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, 
and Texas. 
The implied warranty of merchantability arises under section 2-314 and is 
perhaps "tfte most important warranty in the uee.' '21 As Rigg and Alpert (1982) 
note: 
It ... guarantees a basic standard of quality. The premise is that a buyer bas a reasonable expecta-
tion that professional sellers will sell goods of at least minimally adequate quality. The law implies 
a warranty to protect that expectatiCil interest. The warranty arises without any language or con-
duct by the seller relating to warranties, the goods, or promises; reliance by the buyer is 
unnecessary .... 
Merchantability does not depend on the seller's personal fault. The implied warranty of merchan-
tability is a "no-fault" or strict liability concept; the warranty is breached, when the goods are 
of insufficient quality, regardless of the interest, knowledge, or thoroughness of the seIler .... (A) 
merchant is not absolved of liability if the defect was undiscoverable or unpreventable.22 
Unless disclaimers are allowed in a jurisdiction, it is difficult not to establish 
an implied warranty of merchantability. All that is required is that a sale of a 
good occur and that the seller be a merchant: "Unless excluded or modified 
(disclaimed), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a 
contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that 
kind. ,. 23 It follows that, unless disclaimed, an implied warranty of merchantability 
is certainly created in any used car transaction between a consumer and an 
automobile dealer.24 
This latter statement holds in all jurisdictions except Alabama, Georgia. Loui-
siana, and Texas. The indicator variable uee in the Appendix Table is assigned 
a unit value in all but these four states. The unit value signifies that the uee 
express warranty and implied warranty of merchantability hold in these jurisdic-
tions and therefore that MM provisions regarding the disclaimer of implied war-
20 Since the used car transactions examined in this study typicaDy occur under written 30-day 
warranties, the parol or extrinsic evidence provisions in section 2-316(1) are relatively unimportant. 
21 Rigg and Alpert (1982), p. 45. 
22 Ibid. Also set uee conunent 1 to sectiCil 2-313. 
23 uee sec. 2-314(1). 
24 uee sec. 2-314(2) lists the six criteria defining merchantability. The criterion most applicable 
to auto transactions is that the "goods to be merchantable rrDlst be at least such as are fit for the 
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." 
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ranties apply as well. 25 
. ,Article 2 of the Code also establishes a second wholly independent implied 
warranty, the implied warranty of fitness for a .particular purpose. This warran-
ty takes effect when the seller has reason both to know that the buyer is pur-
chasing the good for a particular purpose and to know that the buyer is relying 
on the seller to provide a good that will meet that purpose.26 The sale and 
therefore the implied warranty promise that the goods at time of sale are fit 
and suitable to serve the buyer's particular purpose. The warranty, like its com-
panion implied warranty of merchantability, promises that the goods are suitable 
at delivery. Defects occurring later are not covered. 
The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, however, has some 
marked advantages over the implied warranty of merchantability: 
First, the implied particular purpose warranty is not limited to transactions with merchants. Se-
cond, a higher standard is placed on the goods; the implied partialIar purpose warranty may be 
breached if the goods do not satisfy the buyer's particular purpose, even though the goods are 
fit for their ordinary purpose. Third, breach of the particular PUIllOse warranty is often easier to 
prove than breach of the implied warranty of merchantalility. 27 
Since the used car transactions investigated in this study reflect purchases made 
from merchants, the first advantage is moot. The second and third, however, 
are substantively important for differentiating the stringency of UCC provisions 
across jurisdictions. 
Rigg and Alpert (1982) elaborate the particulars of these latter advantages: 
Although proof of breach is in some respectS similar to that required for the implied warranty 
of merchantability, the implied partiI::uIar purpose warranty has important proof advantages over 
the implied warranty of merchantability. Goods may be unsuitable for the buyer's particular job 
even though they are not defective and operate exactly as designed .... 
A second proof advantage .. .is that it can be a performance warranty. A buyer is protected by 
an implied particular purpose warranty if the goods do not perform, that is, do the buyer's job, 
as impliedly promised by the seller. The buyer need not show that the problem existed at delivery, 
other than by testifying to proper use. Importantly, facts giving rise to an implied warranty of fitness 
also create a future performance express warranty, which cannot be disclaimed.21 
Given these important advantages, the principal issue is the determination 
of the boundary between a good's "ordinary" and "particular" purposes. Fitness 
of goods for ordinary purposes is the domain of section 2-314, the implied war-
ranty of merchantability. Fitness for a particular purpose is covered by section 
2-315, the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Those jurisdic-
tions interpreting' 'particular purposes" to mean general or ordinary purposes 
Z5 See the above discussion of MM provisions limiting the seller's ability to disclaim an implied 
warranty when a written warranty is present. 
26 UCC sec. 2-315. 
27 Rigg and Alpert (1982), p. 53. 
21 Ibid., p. 126. 
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are effectively providing buyers with a much stronger set of vee arguments. 
For used cars the relevant question is whether purchasing an auto for travel 
on normal roads and highways is a particular purpose under section 2-315 as 
well as an ordinary purpose under section 2-314. 
Rigg and Alpert (1982) list a munber of case law instances where purchases 
for unambiguously ordinary purposes (including a used car for normal transpor-
tation) have been interpreted by state courts as falling within section 2-315 pro-
tection.29 TIie represented states include Arkansas, eolorado, Dlinois, Indiana, 
Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North earolina, Oklahoma, and West 
Virginia.30 As Rigg and Alpert (1982) note: 
This line of cases is based on the theory that the key to section 2--315 is the seller's affinnative 
conduct of selecting or furnishing goods to satisfy the buyer, with reason to know the buyer's needs 
and the buyer's reliance. This affirmative conduct to induce a sale and the buyer's reliance exist 
regardless of whether the buyer's need is characterized as particular or ordinary.l1 
The important conclusion is that sellers in these states have less protection 
under the vee than do merchants in other vee jurisdictions. As a result, the 
indicator variable veeop ("Vee ordinary purpose") takes a unit value in the 
Appendix Table for these ten states. All other states (except Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, and Texas) are assumed to interpret' 'particular purpose" more nar-
rowly. Whatever impact the more limited application of section 2-315 has on 
used car transactions will be captured in the more general vee variable. The 
coefficient associated with veeop measures the mar~ effect of broadening 
the application of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose to fitness 
for ordinary purposes. 
Not only does the interpretation of "particular purpose" vary across states 
but vee disclaimer provisions vary as well. Though an express warranty under 
the vee cannot be disclaimed, section 2-316 allows disclaimers and modifica-
tions of vee implied warranties. Because of the basic vee policy disfavoring 
disclaimers, however, a discIaimer typically will be successful only if a number 
of important conditions are met. A partiaI list of the more important restrictions 
applying to used car transactions includes the following: (1) the implied warran-
29 The following case references are found in Rigg and Alpert (1982), p. 55, notes 21 and 28 
as supplemented in Rigg and Alpert (1983). Sticlmey v. Fairfield's Motors, Inc., 9 UCC REP. 236 
(N.H. Super. Ct. 1970). See also Karczewslti II. FrnTi Motor Co., 382 F.Supp. 1346.15 UCC REP. 
605 (N.D. Ind. 1974) ("particular purpose 'of a passenger automobile is to drive on the public streets 
and highways safely without uncontrolled and unsafe behavior"). Nelson II. Wilkins Dodge, Inc., 
256 N.W. 2d 472, 21 UCC REP. 1001 (Minn. 1977). 1'1IDmas II. Ford Motor CrtdiI Co., 48 Md. 
App. 617, 429 A. 2d 277. 31 UCC REP. 1265 (1981). 
30 Cases reaching similar condusions can also be found in the case law in Massachusetts. Mississippi. 
New York. and Tennessee but subsequent cases by higher state courts interpreted "particular 
purpose" as meaning a purpose that is special in some way. Set the case law referenced in Rigg 
and Alpert (1982). pp. 55-57. n. 19-41 and Rigg and Alpert (1983). pp. 15·16, n.21. 28.1. 29.1. 
and 30. 
31 Rigg and Alpert (1982). p. 55. 
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ty disclaimer must be conspicuous,32 (2) the disclaimer must be made available 
to the buyer before the contract is signed, (3) a disclaimer of the implied war-
ranty of merchantability typically must use the word "merchantability, "33 (4) 
an "as is" disclaimer will apply only if the buyer can be shown to be unmistakably 
aware that no implied warranty is being offered, (5) the disclaimer cannot be 
unconscionable,34 and (6) the disclaimer cannot shield the seller from liability 
for lack of good faith. 
Most states simply adopt section 2-316 with its list of conditions limiting the 
scope of implied warranty disclaimers. Others, however, impose a more stringent 
condition requiring that the contract disclaimer either be actually negotiated with 
the buyer prior to the sale or be specifically brought to the buyer's attention 
(rather than simply made available to the buyer) prior to the sale. Rigg and Alpert 
(1982) point to the case law or statutes revealing this tightening of disclaimer 
provisions in sixteen states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, 
Dlinois, Indiana, Iowa, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.35 In addition, six jurisdictions-Kan-
sas, Maryland, Massachusetts, West Virginia, New York City, and Washington, 
D.C.-prohibit disclaimer altogether.36 Interestingly, Mississippi has chosen not 
to enact section 2-316, intending, according to Rigg and Alpert (1982), "to pro-
hibit the exclusion of implied warranty authority by section 2-316. "37 
The interstate variability in disclaimer provisions is modeled through the NEGD 
(' 'negotiated disclaimer' ') and NOD (' 'no disclaimer' ') variables in the Appen-
dix Table. The former variable takes a unit value for the sixteen states requir-
ing negotiated disclaimer. Unit values are assigned to the latter for Kansas, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, West Virginia, and Washington, 
D. C. 38 Zero values appear elsewhere. 
The four UCC related columns in the Appendix Table provide a useful sum-
mary of warranty protection under Magnuson-Moss and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. Those jurisdictions (4) with zero entries in all columns have neither 
MM nor UCC warranty protection for used car transactions. Buyers in jurisdic-
32 Comment 1 to UCC sec. 2-316 states that this requirement "seeks to protect a buyer from 
unexpected and unbargained language of discJaimer by ... permitting the exclusion of implied war-
ranties only by conspi:uous language or other circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise." 
33 Exceptions are noted in Rigg and Alpert (1982), p. 76. 
34 A discJaimer will be held to be Imconscionable if. e.g .• the buyer has only a limited understand-
ing of English. See Rigg and Alpert (1982), pp. 77-78. 
35 Ibid., p. 75. 
36 Kansas statute sec. 50-639(1) (1976); Maryland Com. Law Code Ann. sec. 2.316.1 (1975); 
Massachusetts Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 106. sec. 2.316A (west 1973); West V"n-ginia Code sec. 46A-6-107 
(1980); New York City Ad. Code ch. 32. art. 19. sec. 8(a)(3) (1962); and Washington. D.C .• Code 
Ann. sec. 28:2-316.1 (1982). Maine has a similar law though it applies only to new cars. Used car 
sales in Maine are exempt under the Used Car Information Act. 
37 Rigg and Alpert (1982). p. SO. 
3S Though New York state does not prohibit disclaimer. the state is assigned a unit value for 
the NOD variable since it is assumed that most used cars in the state are purchased in New York 
City. a jurisdiction that disallows any discJaimer. 
. 
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tions (47) with "ones" in the VCC column have available a number of protec-
_ tive statutes. MM requires that a 30-day written warranty cannot subsequently 
be disclaimed and prolubits a seller from limiting the duration of a VCC implied 
warranty to less than the term of the limited written warranty. Furthermore, 
all three VCC warranties (the express warranty and the two implied warran-
ties) are applicable, though "particular purpose" is not equated with "ordinary 
purpose." Consumers in those jurisdictions (10) with a unit value in the VCCOP 
column additioruiny have the advantage of having the implied warranty of fitness 
for particular purpose applicable to goods purchased for purely ordinary pur-
poses. Vnit values in the NEGD (16) and NOD (7) columns identify jurisdic-
tions that, respectively, require prenegotiation of implied warranty disclaimers 
or disallow disclaimers altogether. 
It is clear from the table that VCC and MM protection varies considerably 
across states. Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas represent one extreme; 
Maryland and West Virginia identify the other. Vsed car consumers in the former 
set of states have neither MM nor VCC warranty protection. The latter two 
states not only disallow any disclaimer of express or implied warranties but fur-
ther permit consumers purchasing used cars for general transportation to sue 
sellers violating implied warranties under either the VCC implied warranty of 
merchantability or its implied warranty of particular purpose. 
UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES. State UDAP laws provide an 
additional array of possible remedies for' 'marketplace misconduct and consumer 
abuse. "39 Most statutes contain the FTC Act section 5(a)(l) language prolubiting 
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices," explaining why VDAPs are commonly 
referred to as "mini-FTC Acts. "40 
Individual state laws have been constructed so as to allow broad and flexible 
interpretations in response to new forms of seller misconduct. This not only 
leads to substantial variation in UDAP provisions across states but also makes 
VDAP a unique tool for consumer protection. Where a practice has not been 
previously banned, regulated, or otherwise recognized as abusive, VDAP can 
be used to bring that practice under such control. "Almost any abusive business 
practice aimed at consumers is at least arguably a UDAP violation, unless the 
trade practice falls clearly outside the scope of the statute. "41 
Many VDAPs identify particular trade practices as per se violations though 
other unfair, unconscionable, and/or deceptive practices are typically proscrib-
ed in more general terms. What differentiates the UDAP from common law fraud 
is that most VDAPs do not require "consumer reliance, damage, or even ac-
tual deception" and none requires the "proof of seller's fraudulent intent or 
39 Sheldon (1982a), p. 3. 
40 Sheldon (1982a), p. 3 notes that the "mini-FTC label is only precise for those statutes that 
parallel the FTC Act and prohibit 'unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.' .. 
41 Ibid. 
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knowledge. ' '42 . 
Sheldon (1982a) descnbes the set of model UDAP Acts on which individual 
state laws are based.43 The FTC Act forIns the primary model. Three states, 
for example, have laws modeled directly on the FTC Act. Twenty-four others 
follow the 1967 Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (amend-
ed in 1970) which itself was drafted by the FTC and is based largely on the 
FTC Act. The' most popular version (15 states) is patterned directly on the FTC 
Act prohIbition of unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts 
and practices. An alternative form (9 states) enumerates thirteen specific of-
fensive practices but typically includes a general prohIbition against any other 
unfair or deceptive practice. 
The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, first adopted in 1964 by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is "presently law 
in seven states and forms the basis for UDAP statutes in six other states."44 
The act originally was intended for applications in commercial transactions, but 
its language has been interpreted so broadly that it has had application in con-
sumer transactions. The act identifies eleven per se deceptive practices and 
includes a general prohIbition against engaging in conduct which "create(s) a 
likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding. "45 
Three states have adopted the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act issued 
in 1971 by the National Conference on Uniform Laws and the American Bar 
Association. It applies only to consumer transactions and prohibits wx:onscionable 
and deceptive acts or practices, including a particular list of practices. 
Seven states have their own Consumer Fraud Acts. They typically proscribe 
"deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or know-
ing concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact with intent that 
others rely. "46 
All states and the District of Columbia have enacted one or more of these 
UDAP models though amendments to the basic models are not uncommon. Most 
laws were adopted in the period spanning the mid-l960s to the mid-1970s, though 
the range of years over which individual states enacted such laws is substantial. 
Utah appears to have been the first state proscribing "unfair methods of com-
petition" in an Act passed in 1937, thus predating even the 1938 Wheeler Lea 
Amendments to the FTC Act.47 Alabama was the last, enacting a UDAP statute 
in April 1981.48 
The language of the state laws differs in important respects. Some preserve 
the most general FTC language, prohibiting all "unfair or deceptive acts and 
42 Ibid. 
43 See Sheldon (1982a), pp. 4-5 for a full description. 
44 Ibid., p. 5. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Utah Code Ann. sec. 13-2-11. 
48 Alabama Code 8-19-5 
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practices. " Others itemize specific prohibited practices. Some exempt specific 
practices including unlmowing acts in debt-collection activities or in credit, real-
ty, and landlord-tenant transactions. Some exempt particular trades, most usually 
utilities, printers, publishers, and broadcasters. Others exempt transactions not 
involving final consumers. Importantly, however, all apply to consumer trans-
actions. None. exempts used car sales. 
The state laws vary in substantive dimensions to be discussed below, but all 
are designed to combat abuses in the marketplace. Deceptive practices are pro-
hibited in every state.49 Most practices of concern in used car transactions typical-
ly fall within the definition of deception. In particular, failure to disclose material 
facts is generally deceptive. State courts, for example, have found deceptive 
"a warranty failing to disclose that significant costs for parts would be charg-
ed, ... the failure to disclose a defective car engine at the time of the car's sale, 
the failure to disclose ... that the vehicle was a racing car, .... a car dealer misrepre-
sent(ing) a car's condition, mileage, and warranty, .... misrep-
resent(ing) an express warranty, such as claiming a warranty is unconditional 
when there are conditions specified, ... disclaim(mg) an oral warranty with an 'as 
is' warranty, .... and fail(ing) to comply with offered or implied warranties."50 
More generally, a number ofITe cases conc1uded:"To ten less than the whole 
truth is a well known method of deception. "51 State laws typically follow suit.52 
Thirty-four states go much further, prohibiting unfair and/or unconscionable 
conduct as well as deceptive practices: 
An W1fair practice need not be deceptive. but can apply to contexts where the conswner is taken 
advantage of through the seller's superior position or oppressive sales methods. Unfairness is a 
dynamic concept and offers opportunities to prohibit various abuses never touched by common law 
fraud .... 
Unconscionability is a broader concept than deception. somewhat akin to Wlfairness.53 
Unfair practices are proscribed in 29 states. Twelve prohibit unconsciortabl~ 
seller conduct. 
The standards of unfairness or unconscionability have particularly wide ap-
plication to used car transactions. The standards can become operative simply 
because of the "imbalances of knowledge" between the buyer and seller regard-
49 Sheldon (l982a) notes that Indiana; Oklahoma. and Washington. D.C .• statutes "enwnerate 
specific deceptive practices but do not prohibit deception more generally" (p. 6. n. 25). Reviewing 
the statutes. however. reveals that the itemized practices include all those typically relevant to 
auto transactions. 
50 Sheldon (1982a). pp. 32. 40. and 56. 
51 The following FTC case law references are found in Sheldon (1982a). p. 31. n. 62: P. Lorillard 
Co. v. FTC. 186 F.2d 42.58 (4th Cir. 1950); BennIS Watch Co. v. FTC. 352 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 
1965). cert. denied. 384 U.S. 939 (1966); BtmIItt v. FTC. 200 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Bockenstdtl 
v. FTC, 134 F.2d 369 (lOth Cir. 1943). 
52 See Sheldon (1982a). p. 31 for examples. 
53 Ibid .. p. 6. 
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ing product attributes or contract tenns. Deception, intended or not, is not re-
quired. This broad standard of unfairness. follows from the Supreme Court deci-
sion in FTC v. SjJen'y and Hutchinson Company in which the Court affirmed 
the FfC criteria for determining whether a practice is "unfair." The FfC criteria 
especially relevant to used car sales require determining: 
(a) whether the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous and 
(b) whether the practice offends public policy. Is it within at least the penumbra of some common 
law, statutory, or other established concept of fairness?" 
State courts, according to Sheldon (1982a), give content to the Supreme Court 
directive by looking to section 2-302 of the UCC. The official comment to the 
section announces the following test for unfairness: 
The basic test is whether, in light of the general cormnercial background and the commercial needs 
of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-siied as to be unconscionable at 
the time of making of the contract .... The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair 
surprise ... and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power. 
This UCC authority has been relied upon in a number of UDAP cases to ef-
fectively prevent warranty disclaimer or modification. Examples include "un-
fair surprise resulting from consumer ignorance and seller guile, such as the 
consumer's lack of education and seller's use of virtually incomprehensible fine-
print standard-form contract provisions, ... the seller binding the buyer to addi-
tional written terms after the cOntract is signed, switching contract documents 
at the last moment to include non-negotiated, one-sided terms, (and) sellers' 
use of one-sided contract terms that are standardized throughout the industry 
giving the consumer no opportunity to negotiate. ' '55 It is important to emphasize 
that this broad application of UDAP holds only in those states prohibiting unfair 
or unconscionable, not just deceptive, practices. 
The list of 34 states having UDAPs with such expansive language is identified 
in the Appendix Table in the column headed UUP (' 'unfair or unconscionable 
practices"). The variable UUP is assigned a unit value for these 34 states, in-
dicating that the scope of UDAP applicability is much broader in these states 
than in the remaining 17 jurisdictions. A zero value for UUP, note, does not 
imply the absence of a UDAP statpte but does identify the corresponding jurisdic-
tion as one limiting the application of its UDAP statute to deceptive practices. 
UDAP statutes are state laws enforced by state agencies. The state attorney 
general's office typically has enforcement authority, though it is not uncommon 
to find local prosecutors possessing this authority as well. 56 State agencies often 
54 Ibid., p. 32. 
ss Ibid., p. 35. 
56 "In 20 states, local prosecutors, such as county or district attorneys, also have enforcement 
authority" (Sheldon (1982a), p. 7). 
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mediate complaints but can seek judicial remedies as well as injunctions and cease-
and-desist orders. Thus, consumers can rely on state actions on their behalf. 
What most differentiates consumer actions across states, however, is the right 
to private action and, subsequently, to injunctions and/or to remedies beyond 
actual damages. Most states authorize a private UDAP right of action. The on-
ly exceptions are Arlcansas, Iowa, Nevada, and North Dakota.57 Sellers in private 
action states face an effectively more stringent UDAP statute for three reasons. 
The seller not only faces the very real possibility of private damage action but 
also, should its defense fail, will at a minimum be liable for the buyer's actual 
damages and attorney fees. 58 In addition, there is the non-trivial threat of private 
injunctive action: 
One of the potentially most effective UDAP remedies against wiiespread marketplace miscon-
duct is for a private individual to seek a court ordered injunction preventing the seBer from engag-
ing in specified conduct in the future. A merchant may treat occasional damage awards, even if 
trebled or increased with punitive damages, as an acceptable cost of business, not deterring future 
misconduct. But a properly framed injunction can eliminate the seller's use of the challenged prac-
tice against all future customers. 51 
It appears then that the right to private action substantially strengthens a 
state's UDAP legislation. Consequently, the PA ("private action") variable in 
the Appendix Table takes a unit value for the District of Columbia and for the 
46 states providing consumers with the private action option. It is interesting 
to note that those four states without a right to private action also exhibit weak 
legislative provisions in other consumer protection areas as well. 
Remedies in private action jurisdictions often go beyond the award of con-
tract damages and attorney fees. Treble damages are available to successful 
plaintiffs in nineteen jurisdictions. Statutory minimum damages ranging from $25 
to $2000 are authorized in nineteen states, with the most common statutory 
award falling in the $100 to $200 range.60 The two sets of jurisdictions providing 
access to these respective private damage remedies are identified in the Ap-
pendix Table with unit values for either the TD ("treble damage") or MD 
57 Arizona's UDAP statute does not explicitly authorize a private UDAP right of action. However, 
the state's Supreme Court ruled in SeUi"",.". Fneway Mobile HOtM Sales, Inc., that while the 
state's UDAP does oot contain explicit language granting a private right of action, such a right is 
granted inferentially (Sheldon (1982a), Pl>. 73-74). 
58 According to Sheldon (1982a) p. 7, "virtually every state UDAP statute with a private right 
of action authorizes the award of attorney fees." 
5,9 Sheldon (1982a), p. 92. Private injunctive actions are explicitly authorized in 30 states and, 
according to Sheldon (1982a), p. 93, may also be available in other states granting private damages. 
60 /bid., p. 7 and Sheldon (1983), p. 1. Sheldon (1982a), p. 7 also notes that "nine UDAP statutes 
explicitly authorize punitive damages." Interstate differences in allowances for punitive damages 
are not considered in this study because, as Sheldon (1982a), p. 90 later notes: "Punitive damages 
are appropriate when an act involves a particularly aggravated disregard for the rights of the victim 
or a grievous violation of societal interests." Should this definition apply to a used car transaction, 
the offending practice arguably could be reached under the common law, an ubiquitous consumer 
protection. 
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("minimum damage") variables. 
The importance of the minimum damage provision should not be 
underestimated. As Sheldon (1982a) points out: 
Statutory provisions for minimum damages allow consumers to recover a speci.lied damage amount 
based solely on evidence that the seller has violated the statute. Since a tendency or capacity to 
deceive, and not actual deception, may be sufficient to prove deception, actual damage may not 
otherwise be an element of a UDAP action .... 61 
Consequently, not only can a plaintiff recover minimum damage that in fact ex-
ceeds his/her actual damage but the burden of proof required to obtain the 
damage award is considerably lower in minimum damage states relative to other 
private action jurisdictions. 
Some states, however, do require that claims for statutory minimum damages 
first demonstrate that the plaintiff suffered some damage, however minimal. 
Sheldon (1982a), however, notes: 
Statutory requirements that the consumer suffer loss of money or property do not specify the 
amount of damage that must be proved. Consumer litigants should be able to meet this require-
ment by proving minimal injury. Thus litigants have successfully alleged that a long distance telephone 
call was sufficient damage to allow an action to proceed that was based on a creditor's initiating 
collection action in an inconvenient forum. 62 
Application to unfair practices, availability of the right to private action, and 
provisions for treble and/or minimum statutory damages summarize the impor-
tant dimensions differentiating UDAPs across states. The base case, however, 
is not unimportant. All states and the District of Columbia have UDAPs. All 
UDAP statutes prohibit deceptive practices and authorize some state agency 
to proceed against offending merchants. Whatever effect these ubiquitous UDAP 
provisions have on seller behavior is captured in the constant tenn Bo defined 
in the text. 
The placement of zeros and ones in the UUP, PA, TD, and MD columns in 
the Appendix Table identifies the combination of UDAP embellishments, if any, 
available to consumers in each jurisdiction. The interstate variation is substan-
tial. Most jurisdictions have enriched the basic UDAP provisions in at least one 
dimension, but a handful of states deserve note. Consumers in seven states-
Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Montana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania-
have the broadest UDAP protection and the greatest incentive for UDAP ac-
tion. Unit values are displayed in all four columns. In contrast, all UDAP in-
dicator variables equal zero in Arkansas, Iowa, Nevada, and North Dakota. UDAP 
options for consumers in these states are quite limited. 
It is important to note, however, that state-specific conditions change fre-
quently, as evidenced by the National Consumer Law Center publication Un-
61 Sheldon (1982a). p. 83. 
62 Ibid. 
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fair and Deceptive Acts and Practices and its now two annual supplements. Prior 
to 1981, for example, Alabama was the only state without any UDAP statute. 
It now appears in the select list of seven jurisdictions promising its consumers 
the widest possible UDAP consumer protection and procedural incentives. 
STATE ENFORC·EMENT. State adaptations of the UCC, state UDAP laws, and 
MM authorize state agencies, usually the state attorney general's office, to in-
vestigate and enforce violations. The preceding sections describe the legislative 
provisions of each statute. This section focuses on enforcement. 
There are, to begin with, many dimensions to effective enforcement. The 
dollar and manpower resources available to the attorney general's office to handle 
consumer complaints is one. The extent of complaint activity is another. The 
frequency of successfully mediated or litigated complaints is yet a third. 
The consumer protection office in each state was contacted. In most instances 
the office is a branch of the attorney general's office. Information regarding the 
number of successfully mediated or.litigated complaints typically was unavailable. 
However, wherever available, states willingly supplied information regarding 
the size of the office's consumer protection budget, the number of professional 
staff allocated to consumer protection, the number of overall consumer. com-
plaints, and, given the particular interest of this study, the number of complaints 
related to used car transactions.63 Information in all four areas was supplied by 
forty jurisdictions. Eleven states were unable to provide the requested budget 
data, most often because consumer protection activity was not a separate item 
in the attorney general's budget. Fiscal 1983 data were requested. Most states 
complied. Seven forwarded fiscal 1982 or 1984 data. 64 
Responses in each subject area were converted to a per (adult) capita basis 
and then ranked in ascending order. Within each of the four response categories, 
states providing information were divided into above andbe10w median groups. 
Any state occurring in the above median group in at least three response areas 
was considered a strong enforcement jurisdiction. 65 Twenty-one states and the 
District of Columbia met this criterion.66 For these jurisdictions, a unit value 
63 Nearly all states define complaints only as those submitted as formal. written statements. Only 
Alabama and Delaware do not distinguish between phone and written complaints. 
Sf The state agencies were extremely cooperative. Generally, information was provided in writing 
or over the course of two or three telephone conversations. The average lag between initial con-
tact and a full response was about one week. The notable exception was Wisconsin. Our research 
assistant was provided answers to his questioos by a staff person who simply coded his questions 
into a terminal located at his desk. 
65 A mandatory auto inspectico system intended to establish a standard of minimum quality rather 
than merely conformity with minimum safety requirements is an additional dimension defining en-
forcement. However, Wisconsin is the only state with such a role for auto inspections and even 
without considering its inspection statute, already is among the strong enforcement states as defin-
ed here. No separate indicator variable for Wisconsin's inspection statute is included in the model. 
Whatever effect this inspection system has is captured in the state's enforcement variable. 
68 The eleven states providing information in only three of the four areas typically had below me-
(footnote continued on next page) 
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was assigned to SE ("strong enforcement"), the final indicator variable in the 
Appendix Table. The variable takes a zero value for all other states.67 
The SE variable is admittedly imprecise. Nonetheless, given its discrete form, 
the variable is probably a reasonably accurate qualitative indicator of the relative 
intensity acros.s states of enforcement activity in consumer protection areas in 
general and in used car transactions in particular. 
SUMMARY. The three sets of laws discussed above do not displace one another. 
Indeed, they augment each other, providing consumers with cumulative rights 
and remedies. Their legislative language assures this. 68 
Cumulation of rights and remedies is important for three reasons. At a 
minimum, it first means buyers are generally protected by two or more statutory 
schemes. Therefore, even if one law does not provide a mechanism to bring 
suit, another may. For example, most MM provisions apply only when a writ-
ten warranty is given. It does not cover oral warranties or express warranties 
based on samples or models. All these, however, are covered by the UCC. 
Similarly, a state UDAP statute may apply when a UCC action is not available 
because, say, the UCC statute of limitations has expired or product rejection 
was accomplished improperly. Second, cumulation implies that when there is 
an apparent conflict between any two statutes, the law with more specific pro-
visions will apply. For example, though a state's adaptation of the UCC may 
not specifically disallow important warranty disclaimers, MM prohIbits any such 
disclaimer for the term of a limited written warranty. Third, cumulation of 
remedies means that abused consumers have a variety of remedy options. For 
example, the UCC· permits cancellation of the sale and recovery of actual damages 
while MM and UDAP statutes provide for attorney fees and UDAPs often fur-
ther offer statutory minimum or treble damage awards. Consumers, therefore, 
can pursue remedies under all three statutes, if applicable. 
The important implication for this study is that a state's warranty protection 
statutes are not to be viewed as a set of discrete options such that a consumer, 
selecting one, forecloses proceeding under another. A state's warranty protec-
tion statutes are best considered, as in this study, as an interdependent whole, 
possessing a constellation of attributes that together define the stringency of 
the state's warranty-related laws .. 
dian per capita measures in those three categories. In short. these states' consumer protection 
budget information. had it been supplied. would not have changed the states' enforcement rating. 
67 It might be argued that our survey data should be used directly to construct a continuous measure 
of enforcement across states. Our procedure to convert it to a dummy variable effectively throws 
away information. This is a deliberate strategy on our part to emphasize the audity of our informa-
tion relative to the attribute we wish to measure. First. enforcement is multi-faceted. It is not ob-
vious which dimensions to choose to model enforcement efficiently. Second. while most would agree 
that each state's per capita consumer protection expenditure is perhaps the best single candidate 
for a continuous enforcement variable. the necessary information. as explained in the text. is 
unavailable for eleven states. 
68 See Rigg and Alpert (1982). p. 14. 
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Viewed this way, the following states appear to offer buyers the least legislative 
protection: Arkansas, Delaware, Iowa, MisSouri, Nevada, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, and Wyoming. Each has no more than two indicator variables with unit 
values. Nevada stands out. It has only the most basic UCC and UDAP statutes. 
In contrast, fifteen states-California, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire~ New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Utah, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin-promise strong legislative protec-
tion. Each has unit values for at least five of its eight indicator variables, with 
no fewer than two in each UDAP and UCC subset. Massachusetts, Ohio, and 
West Virginia are notable. Each has unit values in six of eight columns. Once 
the important role of enforcement is recognized, however, the list of fifteen 
collapses to six-California, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Wash-
ington, and Wisconsin. 
It is important to conclude this appendix with a disclaimer of its own. The 
discussion presented in this appendix is not an exhaustive description of con-
sumer protection legislation across states. Its scope is limited in two important 
ways. It focuses only on the consumer protection statutes' warranty provisions 
and, moreover, only on those that are relevant to merchant-buyer transactions 
in used cars. Nonetheless. the appendix description and especially its summary 
table provide a concise overview of the variability across states in the commit-
ment to used car warranty protection both through legislation and enforcement . 
. 
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ATIRIBUTES OF WARRANTY PROTECTION LAWS RELEVANT TO USED CAR TRANSACTIONS, BY STATE 18 
UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 
STRONG 
BASIC ORDINARY NEGOTIATED No UNFAIR PKlVATI ruBLE MINIMUM ENFORCE-
PROVISIONS PURPOSE DISCLAlldER DISClAIMER PRACTICES ACTION DAldAGES DAldAGES MENT 
(UCC) (uCCOP) (NEGD) (NOD) (UUP) (PA) (fD) (MD) (SE) 
ALABAMA 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 ~ 
ALASKA 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 () 
ARIzONA 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 () 
ARKANSAS 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Z 
CAUFORNIA 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 (f) 
COLORADO 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 ~ 
CONNECTICUT 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 ~ 
DELAWARE 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 "tl ~ 
FLORIDA 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
GEORGIA 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 >-l t'I1 
HAWAII 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 B 
IDAHO 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
ILUNOIS 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 Z 
1 0 0 1 0 0 
() 
INDIANA 1 0 0 
IOWA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 ~ 
KANSAS 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 t'I1 
KENTUCKTY 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 ~ Z 
LOUISIANA 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 () t'I1 
MAINE 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 ~ MARYLAND 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 MASSACHUSETTS 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 t<l 
MICHIGAN 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 f}l 
MINNESOTA 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 Z 
MISSISSIPPI 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 ~ MISSOURI 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
MONTANA 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 8 NEBRASKA 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
NEVADA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 b 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 '"Il 
NEW JERSEY 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
NEW MEXICO 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
NEW YORK 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
NORTH CAROlINA 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
NORTH DAKOTA 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
OHIO 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
OKLAHOMA 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
OREGON 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
PENNSYLVANIA 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
RHODE ISLAND 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
SOUTH CAROLINA 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
SOUTH DAKOTA 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
TENNESSEE 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
TEXAS 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
UTAH 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
VERMONT 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
VIRGINIA 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
WASHINGTON 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
WEST VIRGINIA 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 '1:1 I» 
WISCONSIN 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 (JQ (1) 
WYOMING 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 ..... 
WASHINGTON. D.C. 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 ..... 
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Comments 
Robert W. Crandall 
Brookings Institute 
John Weicher has provided us with a very nice empirical paper on the opera-
tion of the housing market, concluding that the market works to discount the 
value of houses with high prospective repair costs. In addition, he finds that 
buyers appear unwilling to pay for new-home warranties, presumably because 
they do not need them to protect against a risk that they or others can identify 
with some precision before buying the houses. 
The housing market provides a number of interesting" consumer protection" 
issues for an economist: 
i. Is there asymmetrical information in the market between buyers and sellers, 
and if so, is full seller liability the appropriate policy choice to assure effi-
cient operation of the market? 
ii. Does seller liability for defects in a long-lived asset, such as a house, re-
quire third-party insurance of the seller's obligation? 
iii. Do the potential moral hazard problems in the operation of a market with 
full seller liability negate the benefits of warranties or other mechanisms 
for enforcing seller liability for defects? 
IV. Do seller warranties present further problems of adverse selection, with 
the higher risk houses being insured while houses with a lower probability 
of defects go uninsured? 
v. Can full seller liability allow the operation of a market with a sufficient range 
of price-quality trade-offs to yield a reasonably efficient allocation of 
resources? 
Obviously, the possible questions are endless, but we do not have even the 
barest hints of empirical answers to most to them. Weicher has now provided 
us with a provocative answer to (i), and his results may provide some insights 
into some of the other issues. 
Defects and Repair Costs. It is Weicher's conclusion that once one 
acknowledges the essentially stochastic nature of product -quality risks in houses, 
the market appears to discount future excess repair costs very well. His analysis 
of a national sample of 170 houses suggests that the discount in the price of 
a new home occasioned by anticipated excess future repair costs exceeds the 
expected value of these repair costs by a substantial amount - an amount he 
believes consistent with the transactions costs and frustrations required in seek-
ing repairs. This result is almost too good to be true, particularly given the dif-
ficulty in standardizing new-home prices for location - both across states and 
within individual metropolitan areas. One can only ask that Weicher's test be 
repeated on additional samples of home sales to see if this sample has not un-
covered an unusually large number of shrewd or prescient home buyers. 
103 
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Wa7Tanties. Weicher cannot identify a positive value for new-home warran-
ties, but he admits that there are problepls with this result. If warranties serve 
as a reassurance of product quality for smaller, less experienced builders who 
lack a reputation with prospective home buyers, the wmanties will only restore 
the value of these builders' homes to equality with those homes offered by 
builders with a more long lasting reputation for reliable homes. Thus, warran-
ties may be offered by a group of builders with a limited record while the 
established builders choose to self insure. In fact, warranties may be required 
to assure that the builder has not dic;appeared or gone bankrupt before defects 
begin appearing in the house. Home buyers may not require much assurances 
from established builders. 
In addition, there is clearly a problem of adverse selection in home warran-
ties just as in any insurance contract. In the early years of the HOW Corpora-
tion, this adverse selection was surely present in the state of Colorado in areas 
of expansive soils where enrollment rates were among the highest in the coun-
try, Under this situation, even the most insensitive buyer might discount the 
value of a house for potential foundation problems despite the presence of a 
warranty. Pursuing a warranty claim is not completely costless nor riskless to 
the prospective buyer. 
In summary, I think that Weicher has given us a very useful set of results 
on the operation of the housing market. His analysis of new-home warranties, 
however, would be improved if he could develop a simultaneous equations model 
of both the demand for and supply of home warranties. 
. ) 
Comments 
James Langenfeld-
General Motors Corporation 
Both of these papers are extremely useful first steps in understanding how 
warranty regulations affect the housing and used car markets. Although I focus 
my comments on Anderson and Gollop's analysis, the strengths and wealmesses 
of this paper exemplify those of Weicher's and many of the papers presented 
in this volume. 
Anderson and Gollop begin their analysis with a simple profit maximization 
model of used car dealers. From this economic model, the authors derive 
econometric tests to estimate the impact of state warranty laws on the price 
of used cars. Their estimator is a variant of the hedonic technique, which is 
a standard tool of economic research in the automobile industry. Unlike most 
hedonic regressions, however, Anderson and Gollop's approach does not use 
individual automobile characteristics such as horsepower or weight, 1 but instead 
tries to measure the impact of dealer costs and gross demand characteristics 
on price. This particular approach has a great deal of potential, and similar ap-
proaches have been used successfully in other research. 2 
Despite my favorable impression of the paper, I have some reservations. First, 
assuming the authors are correct that enforcement of consumer protection 
legislation adds about $200 (or 3.5 percent) to the price of a used car, inter-
preting this result is difficult and offers limited guidance for policy makers. Se-
cond, the estimation of $200 figure has some technical problems, so the figure 
should be viewed as an approximate upper limit. 
To illustrate the interpretation problem, consider the central hypothesis of 
the paper: Have warranty laws affected the price of used cars? The answer, 
subject to some caveats discussed below, is yes for used automobiles with 
average frequency of repair records and no for used cars with good or bad fre-
quency of repair records.3 The authors hypothesize that warranty laws may raise 
the dealer cost of selling used cars, thus forcing up the price of used cars. 
However this explanation tells us nothing about the value consumers place on 
the warranties. For example, consider for a moment that some states pass a 
"Fonnerly an Economic Advisor to Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission. 
1 Dummy variables that represent panicular automobile models are used to capture the net im· 
pact of these physical characteristics. 
2 For a similar approach that measures the impact of environmental and safety regulations on 
new cars, see Langenfeld (1983). 
3 The only significant results regarding warranty proxies are in the average frequency of repair 
groups. This limits the genera1ity of the results and rnmes questions about biased estimates. especially 
considering that every car in the low frequency of repair group was made in Japan and every car 
in the high frequency of repair group was made in the U.S. 
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law requiring "Hell on Wheels" be painted in large block letters on the side 
of all used cars. This would increase the cost of dealers preparing cars for sale, 
and therefore increase price. However it is doubtful that many consumers would 
feel they benefited from such a law, so the price increase would reflect only 
an increase in cost to dealers. 
Now consider the opposite extreme. Assume some states pass laws man-
dating that new tires be put on all used cars and that the cost of these tires 
be completely underwritten by the state. In this case, used cars would become 
more desirable relative to new cars, and we would expect the price of used 
cars to be bid up in response to increased consumer demand.4 There would 
be clear benefits to used car buyers from such a law (although tax payers in 
general may have reason to object). Dealers would experience no increase in 
costs, except scarcity rents. Any price increase, therefore, would exclusively 
reflect the benefits of the law. 
With warranty laws, we expect both of these effects to be present. However, 
it is impossible to detennine whether the price increase estimated in Anderson 
and Gollop' s work reflects increased costs of warranties to dealers and no 
associated benefits (the "Hell on Wheels" case), increased consumer demand 
for cars with a minimum cost to dealers (the "free wheels" case), or some 
combination of both. If we believe the authors' simple theoretical model,s then 
they measure increased dealer cost. But even under these circumstances, Ander-
son and Gollop do not answer the larger question of whether warranty rules 
are desirable. This can lead to some strange policy recommendations. 
Consider the impact on price of Anderson and Gollop' s variable for the en-
forcement activity of state governments. The authors find that the price of used 
cars increases when consumer protection agencies spend more than average 
on used car complaint activity. Given this result, the best way to increase con-
sumer welfare would be to cut consumer protection enforcement budgets. After 
all, absent any evidence of benefits from warranties, cutting the budget would 
at least benefit consumers by the amount that used car prices drop. 
Moreover, the only highly significant dummy variable6 of the eight used by 
Anderson and Gollop to measure state Uniform Commerical Code provisions 
or state uniform deceptive practices acts provisions is zero in only four of the 
50 states and the District of Columbia. These states are Alabama, Georgia, Loui-
siana and Texas, so the dummy may be measuring the impact of warranty pro-
visions or, alternatively, may be picking up some other common regional at-
tribute of these states. This problem is highlighted by Anderson and Gollop's 
use of the total sale price rather than net price. The real price of cars to con-
sumers is usually affected by the trade-in price of cars, and this may bias Ander-
4 The bidding up of prices is likely in the used car market where the fixed number of each make, 
model, and year of car ensures that at least a portion of the supply curve is vertical. 
S The authors assume constant marginal cost in a competitive market for used cars. But see Foot-
note 4 on the marginal cost assumption. 
6 That is, statistically different from zero at the 95 percent (or greater) confidence level. 
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son and Gonop's results. In particular. dealer trade-in policies in the four southern 
states may systematically differ from policies in other states. or trade-ins may 
simply be worth less in these states due to (say) a greater preference for new 
cars relative to the rest of the country. Moreover. there may be a problem of 
adverse selection. i.e .• poor quality cars may migrate to the four states that 
have more lax warranty laws. 7 If these or any other relevant phenomena are 
unique to the four southern states. then we would expect the authors to find 
lower prices. without warranties having any real affect on the price of used cars. 8 
Some of these problems can be solved if data on the quantity sold of each 
model used car can be obtained. so a simultaneous equations model of supply 
and demand could be used to separate the cost of warranties (i.e .• the supply 
effect) from the value consumers place on these laws (i.e .• the demand effect). 
Absent these data. supplemental research is necessary to measure the impact 
of regulations on cost (rather than price) or on benefits of these regulations. 9 
The problem of imperfect measures of warranty laws will be more difficult to 
correct. More institutional knowledge of the four southern states. however. 
will help to determine how serious the problem is. 
In sum. the paper makes significant progress in answering the question "Do 
warranty laws have any effect?" However. it leaves completely unanswered 
the question whether warranty laws are desirable. This is indicative of the 
relatively undeveloped state of most empirical research in consumer protec-
tion. and highlights a key question that needs to be answered in future research. 
References 
Judge. George G.; Griffiths. William E.; Hill. R. Carter; and Lee. Tsoung-Chao. 
The Theory and Practice of Econometrics. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
1980. 
Langenfeld. James. Federal Automobile Regulations. Ph.D. dissertation. Wash-
ington University in St. Louis. 1983. 
7 One way to check whether this is a significant problem is to obtain data on interstate used car 
wholesaling. If the flow of used cars is not unusually high between stricter warranty states and 
more lax warranty states. then the problem is unlikely to be significant. 
8 To ascertain whether not using net price has biased the estimates. additional information about 
used car prices is needed. 
9 In fact. the authors suggest that seemingly unrelated regression techniques may be superior 
to the simpler pooling procedure they use. There are tests that indicate whether pooling is ap· 
propriate. and the authors should employ those tests. See Judge et al (1980). pp. 323-373. 
· 4 
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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the impact of advertising on consumer demand. Extant 
theories postulate that higher advertising expenditures signal either best buys 
or more experience quality embodied in the product or, alternatively, that per-
suasive advertising can be a substitute for experience quality. Based on the 
equilibrium relationships in these theories between price premia, advertising 
and marginal costs, regressions are run for two industries, automobiles and life 
insurance. The results offer little support for the signal proponents but are con-
sistent with the substitutability notion. 
These results suggest that, counter to the pure signaling theory, advertising 
content matters in understanding the economics of advertising. We proceed to 
analyze content in a stylized model of consumer learning with two brands. What 
limits the claims of firms for their products? This is the question we address; 
we identify several important margins. Ancillary empirical evidence supports 
our contention that advertising may mislead consumers, at least in the short 
run, and that the pure signaling theory alone does not explain adequately the 
empirical evidence. 
1. Introduction 
An understanding of the effect of advertising on consumer demand is essen-
tial for any analysis of the economics of advertising. Some economists proceed 
by permitting advertising to alter consumer tastes (e.g., Dixit and Norman, 1978); 
most analysts assume that advertising affects demand either directly by supply-
ing information about product characteristics or indirectly by signaling qUality 
through the committed (sunk) nature of brand advertising. When direct infor-
mation is provided, the consumer learning process (frequently one period) 
disciplines firms to reveal only truthful information. When advertising expen-
ditures are brand specific and sunk, then a quasi-rent in the form of a price 
premium (margin of price over marginal cost) for honesty is a sufficiently large 
incentive to deliver the perceived quality: dishonesty never pays. Furthermore. 
the sunk advertising expenditures are sufficiently large that the price premium 
in equilibrium permits firms to earn normal rates of return. Advertising expen-
ditures are an accurate signal of the embodied (experience or credence) quali-
ty. Chiseling by advertisers is unprofitable. Rational expectations characterize 
the equilibrium. 
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Casual observations such as court ~onvictions for false advertising suggest 
that, at least in the short run, chiselers do exist: advertising need not be a signal 
of quality; some firms do mislead and exaggerate product claims. One difficulty 
with the message that sunk advertising expenditures alone signal a price premium 
for honesty is that it offers no explanation for advertising content: any sunk ex-
penditure-that consumers (correctly) interpret as a quality signal could poten-
tially yield an equilibrium. If advertising content as opposed to expenditure is 
unimportant, why do finns frequently resist so vigorously FTC content rules? 
Is the advertising commitment theory consistent with the empirical facts? If 
not, is it possible to reconcile rational expectations with observations of 
misleading advertising? How do consumers incorporate possibly suspect infor-
mation into their purchase decisions? What are the market forces that discipline 
advertising content? Do the answers to these questions lead to testable implica-
tions? These are the issues that motivate this paper. 
In the next section of this paper, Section 2, we test the competing explana-
tions of advertising for two industries characterized by experience (or even 
possibly credence) quality. These competing hypotheses for experience quality 
may be succinctly stated: (i) greater advertising expenditures as a signal indicate 
"best buys" -those products with a lower price premium <Nelson 1970,1974); 
(iI1 greater advertising expenditures as a signal indicate higher experience quality 
whose delivery is guaranteed in equilibrium through a larger price premium (Klein 
and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983; Kihlstrom and Riordan 1984); (iii) greater adver-
tising expenditures can be a substitute for lower product quality conditional on 
the rate oflearning by consumers (Kotowitz and Mathewson 1979; Shapiro 1982). 
Our tests indicate the need for a further explanation of advertising content with 
explicit consumer learning. This we tackle or at least begin to tackle in Sections 
3 and 4. Section 5 examines ancillary evidence to see if our results find addi-
tional empirical support. Finally, Section 6 contains our sununary and conclusions. 
2. Empirical Evidence on the Extant Theories 
For empirical purposes, the extant theories present a logical grouping. Nelson 
(1974) argued that those firms whose products have a smaller price/marginal 
cost differential-best buys-will advertise the most. 1 Klein and Leffler (1981) 
argue that those firms whose products have larger embodied experience quali-
ty will command a larger price premium and advertise more, so that, in con-
trast, larger price premia are associated with larger advertising 
I Nelson defines p. as the price per unit of utility of the brand. He argues that·· ... firms vary 
in their efficiency in producing the utility that consumers seek. Some firms produce brands that 
yield more utility to the consumer for a dollar of production cost than do other brands. In general. 
a firm that has lower costs relative to the utility of its brand than other firms will find that it pays 
to expand its output by both increasing advertising expenditures and decreasing p •. This behavior 
of firms by efficiency generates a negative association between advertising and p. by brands." 
(Nelson 1974: 732). 
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expenditures-advertising signals quality. This would also hold if advertising were 
a substitute for experience quality-persuasive advertising. 
If q represents experience quality, c(q) represents the per unit costs of quali-
ty (with cl > 0), P represents the equilibrium price and A represents the level 
of advertising exepnditures, then the first critical relationship for these theories 
may be written as: 
P - c(q) = f(A) (1) 
where f' < 0 in the "best-buys" argwnent,2 
while f' > 0 in the "signal" and "persuasive" arguments. 
There are two additional tests to differentiate between the "signal" and "per-
suasive" theories of advertising in experience quality markets. According to 
the "signal" proponents, in equilibrium, higher levels of experience quality are 
associated with higher levels of advertising; the "persuasive" proponents argue 
the converse. In symbols, this may be written as: 
c(q) = g(A) (2) 
where gl > 0 in the "signal" theory and gl < 0 in the "persuasive" 
theory. 
As well, the "signal" proponents argue that the price premia are larger when 
the experience quality is larger; for "persuasive" proponents, the converse 
holds. In symbols, this may be written as 
P - c(q) = h(q) (3) 
or in terms of observable per unit costs 
P - c = h(q-l(c» (3 /) 
where hI > 0 for the "signal" theory and hI < 0 for the "persuasive" 
theory. 
Two comments are in order at this point. First, by substituting (2) into (3) 
and considering the sign restrictions, both the "signal" and "persuasive" 
theories would predict that f' = hI • [W-1)1 • "'(I > 0 (as (q-l)1 > 0). Therefore, 
(1) cannot discriminate between these hypotheses. 
Second, these structural relationships hold in equilibrium; tests however do 
2 If U(q) defines consumer utility as a function of product quality, then p ... P/U(q) ; Nelson's 
hypothesis (cited in in. 1) directly implies that (P-c(q»IU(q) "' f(A) where f' < 0 or in(P-c(q» 
• in U(q) = in f(A) . We assume that In U(q) is linear in product quality characteristics; this expres-
sion appears subsequently in our test of the "best buys" hypothesis (equations (5) and (6» . 
. 
• 
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not constitute anything beyond correlations. (There are no exogenous variables 
driving variation in these relationships.) Nevertheless, available data for a 
restricted sample should offer some discriminating power to assess these 
theories. 
We propOse to test the critical signs for these competing theories over two 
industries where products have experience quality-automobiles and whole-life 
insurance. First, we consider only (1) in an attempt to differentiate between 
the "best-buys" hypothesis on the one hand and the "signal" or "persuasive" 
hypotheses on the other; we begin with our automobile data set. 
The passenger car industry supplies a good test case during the 1960' s prior 
to the changes that occurred because of changing energy prices. A very exten-
sive study by Ohta and Griliches (1974) estimated hedonic price equations for 
13 U.S. car makes3 and many models for selected years between 1955-71. The 
basic form was: 
log P .. ex + ~i3,~ + ~1'JDJ (4) 
1 J 
where P is the list price of a given model; X, are product characteristics 
and DJ are brand dummies for each of 12 brands. 
1\ 
The estimated P thus measures the hedonic price of any model or brand due 
to its measured attnbutes and make. The brand coefficients 1ft> may measure 
systematic quality aspects which are present for the brand in question relative 
to the base brand, or a higher cost per unit of quality for the brand because 
of higher costs or higher markup. 
To the extent that 1'J measures higher cost per unit quality rather than omit-
ted quality attributes, Nelson's hypothesis requires that 1'J be negatively cor-
related with its corresponding brand advertising (AJ), i.e., higher advertising 
implies a lower brand price per unit of quality relative to other brands. To the 
extent that 1'J measures unaccounted for systematic quality elements, however, 
the negative relation between 1'J and advertising is weakened and may even be 
reversed, if the brand advertising is highly positively correlated with the omit-
ted brand quality attributes and, in tum, if these are uncorrelated with the X~s. 
There is an indirect test for this biaS. If 1ft> primarily measure omitted quality 
attnbutes-deviations of a brand price from its estimate price by attributes-
(1'J + errors), 4 they should be positively related to market share in the relevant 
class. A study by Cowling and Raynor (1970), however, suggests that brand 
deviations from the hedonic price are negatively correlated with market share. 
1 The brands of automobiles analyzed by Ohta and Grilicbes (1974) are: AMC. Buick. Cadillac. 
Chevrolet. Chrysler. Dodge. Ford. Imperial. Lincoln. Mercury. Oldsmobile. Plymouth and Pon-
tiac. Chrysler and Imperial (2 models manufactured by Chrysler Motors) were dropped because 
disaggregated advertising data for their brands are unavailable. 
• As the estimated R2s are very high (around .98). the errors are small relative to the "'r1s. 
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Thus, a negative 'YJ indicates •• good value per unit quality" within a product 
class rather than unobserved superior quality. Another possible bias may arise 
if iJ3 measure unobserved quality attributes between classes. In order to ac-
count for this possibility, two dummy variables were added to allow 'YJ to vary 
among standard, medium quality and luxury cars. 
The Nelson hypothesis, in particular, may then be tested with the following 
regression: 
'Y =0 +EA + 1/S +~tDI 
1 
(5) 
where 'Y is the vector of estimated 'Y/ s through time, A is the real adver-
tising expenditure by brand and year, separated by total media expen-
ditures (A) and electronic media expenditures (A.);5 S is real dollars 
of sales for each brand (to correct for size effects) (Nominal values are 
deflated by the CPD; D. = 1 if the brand is Buick, Mercury, Oldsmobile 
or Pontiac (medium quality) or = 0 otherwise; Dl = 1 if the brand is 
Cadillac or Lincoln Ouxury) or 0 otherwise. 
This regression was estimated using the combined time-series, cross-section 
values of 'YJ estimated by Ohta and Griliches for the years 1962-63, 1964-65, 
1966-67, 1968-69, and 1970-71. Advertising expenditures by brand come from 
Advertising Age. The regression contains 11 brands over 5 year pairs. As the 
constant tenn, which measures the deviation of the base brand price from its 
hedonic valuation, may vary between model years, we added time dummies for 
each year to eliminate possible bias. The results turned out to be relatively in-
sensitive to this addition. 
We next consider an estimate of (1) for participating whole-life insurance. The 
data are participating whole-life policies with a face value in 1983 dollars of 
$100,000 (constant in real tenns over the sample) with a duration of 20 years, 
issued to a male age 35, for a sample of 15 of the largest Canadian life insurance 
firms from 1968 to 1977. The price data were taken from Stone and Cox Life 
Insurance Tables. Actuarial costs are calculated using mortality tables (1957-60 
ultimate basic mortality for males) and. policy cancellation rates <Moorhead's 
S Rates) taken from the Federal Trade Commission Report (1979). Administrative 
costs per policy are inferred under the assumption that life insurance firms in 
the sample earned competitive rates of return on these policies in 1960, a period 
of nominal interest rate stability. These data permit us to calculate [P - c(q)] 
which is deflated by the CPI to give a real retention index by firm. (These calcula-
tions are described more fully in Mathewson and Winter 1985.) 
5 In the measurement of advertising effects for automobiles. we separate electronic from print 
media. The assertion is that electronic advertising contains less objective information than print 
advertising; for this reason. separate regressions were estimated using only expenditures on elec-
tronic advertising. 
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Advertising expenses are measured as sales expenses, the sum of explicit 
advertising expenditures and salesmen's commissions. These data are taken 
from the Reporl of the Superintendent of Insurance for Canm:/lz, Volume Ill, An-
nual Statements-Life Insurance Companic; and Fratem/.Il Ben4it Societies (1968 
to 1977). In general, the media mix selected by life insurance firms is relatively 
light on traditional advertising and relatively heavy on direct personal selling. 
We argue that the relevant "advertising" measurement is the sum of these 
selling expenses. If "best buys" advertise more heavily, then sales personnel 
are a form of information to consumers. If advertising is a sunk "signal" of quali-
ty, then so are these sales expenditures. Participating whole-life insurance, a 
complex contingency contract,· is only one component of estate planning. If life 
insurance firms offer estate planning, insurance information and insurance con-
tracts as their service, higher sales commissions signal a more personalized in-
dividual service to potential consumers. If advertising is a potential substitute 
for quality under some conditions, then sales personnel glean information on 
the characteristics of individual consumers and facilitate price discrimination 
across consumer classes-a "persuasive" role. (This role is developed more 
fully in an open-entry equilibrium model of the life insurance industry in Kellner 
and Mathewson 1983 and Mathewson 1983.) As sales personnel are contract 
specific and do not have the public-good effect of advertising, sales expenses 
for each firm are measured per dollar of premium revenue. 
In particular, the regression equation for the life insurance sample takes the 
form 
log R = cfI +p. log AlS + r log S +l:~/O/ 
i 
(6) 
where R, the retention figure, equals P - c(q); A is total real sales ex-
penses; S is total real premium revenue in the first year of the new 
contracts; 0/ is a set of time dummies (to correct for the impact of chang-
ing nominal interest rates on regulatorily imposed solvency constraints). 
The regression results are reported in Table 1. As the coefficients themselves 
hold no interest, we present only signs and the t-statistics. (For automobiles, 
the dependent variables are themselves regression coefficients. In this case t-
statistics need to be interpreted with caution; they offer some indication of the 
strength of the measured relations.) These estimates reveal that with some ex-
posure to a Type-1 error, we may reject the "best-buys" hypothesis. 
Can these data discriminate between the "signal" and "persuasive" 
hypotheses? The answer is yes. The test for automobiles is indirect; the test 
for life insurance is direct. We begin with automobiles. 
The "signal" hypothesis states that higher experience quality is associated 
with greater advertising commitment as an ex-ante signal of quality. The dif-
ference between the depreciation of an individual brand of automobiles in the 
first year of a model's existence from the group average is treated as a relative 
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measure of the consumer's disappointment with the product after use. If adver-
. tising is a signal of experience quality, then the depreciation in the first year 
should be negatively correlated with the advertising intensity of the model in 
the previous year. If, however, persuasive advertising leads consumers to believe 
that the product advertised is superior, but these beliefs are not reinforced by 
experience in the first year, then the depreciation in this year should be positively 
correlated with the advertising intensity of the model in the previous year. 6 
To test this hypothesis, we regress the deviations of first-year depreciation 
rates of each brand from the mean first-year depreciation rate for all brands 
against advertising in the preceding year for the years 1962, 1965, 1967 and 
1971. Class dummies were included to allow for systematic variation in discount 
or durability. (Time dummies were insignificant and so they were dropped.) 
The tests for life insurance are direct. To test (2), we regress logs of estimated 
real marginal cost for each firm against logs of real total sales expenses per dollar 
of first-year premimn revenues, logs of firm size measured as real first-year 
premium revenues and time dummies to correct for nominal interest rate changes 
on regulatorily imposed solvency constraints. According to the "signal" theory, 
the coefficient on sales expense should be positive; according to the "persuasive" 
theory, the coefficient on sales expense should be negative. 
To test (3'), we regress the logs of insurance firm real retention figures against 
the logs of estimated real marginal cost for each firm, logs of firm size measured 
as real first-year premium revenues and time dummies as before. According 
to the "signal" theory, the coefficient on marginal cost should be positive; ac-
cording to the "persuasive" theory, the coefficient on marginal cost should be 
negative. Again, only signs and t-statistics are reported; the results appear in 
Table 2. 
The signs of the point estimates are uniformly consistent with the "per-
suasive" theory and counter to the "signal" hypothesis. Some effects are highly 
significant, others less so. In our view, the set of tests for these two industries 
offers little comfort to the "best buys" or "signal" hypotheses, although the 
evidence is stronger against the former. 
Previous analyses of persuasive advertising where such advertising has the 
potential to substitute for experience quality use simple linear learning rules for 
consumers (Mathewson and Kotowitz 1979, Shapiro 1982). Is there a more 
detailed model of consumer learning consistent with rational expectations and 
the absence of "long-run" chiseling but consistent with (i) the above empirical 
results and (Ii) ancillary evidence from marketing? We turn our attention to this 
task in the next section. 
6 Depreciation includes the effects of new car discounts and therefore may vary systematically 
across brands. For example,lwtury cars tend to depreciate less in the first year than other types. 
Such systematic variation across class depreciation rates are captured by the class dummies (0 I 
and OJ. There does not appear to be, however, a sigri6cant pattern CNer time for relative depreciation 
by make (Ohta and Griliches 1974: Table 13 and 14). 
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3. A Modtl with 'Consumer Learning 
(1) Experience Only, No Advertising 
We first set out a simple model of a consumer learning through experience 
about an Unknown brand. Consider the problem facing a single consumer at each 
point of time in determining a budget allocation between the consumption of 
two brands of a specific product (Brand 1 and Brand 2) and a numeraire good 
Z composed of a bundle of all other commodities, where the consumer has a 
constant stream of income per period. In order to focus solely on the informa-
tional aspects of the problem, we assume that the marginal utility of the numeraire 
good is fixed and independent of the consumption of the specific product, so 
that income effects are ignored. As well we assume that the two brands of the 
product are perfect substitutes, and have the same price per unit, and that the 
consumer purchases only one unit of this product per period. The qualities of 
good Z and of Brand 1 are known with certainty and the marginal utility index 
of Brand 1 is set arbitrarily at 1. 
The quality of Brand 2 is however uncertain. The consumer's expected utili-
ty in period t is defined by 
EU: - EU (p+u(i)q,(l-p» + Z, (7) 
where u(i) measures the intensity of preference for Brand 2 for consumer i, 
p = 1 if the consumer buys' Brand 1 and 0 otherwise and U' > 0, U" < O. 
Quality (q.) depends on the product's characteristics, where these characteristics 
are scaled so that the consumer production technology is linear in characteristics. 
The quality index is measured to reflect the subjective evaluation of the prod-
uct by the consumer if all product characteristics were known. In most of the 
following we assume that q is comprised of only one characteristic in order to 
simplify the analysis. The results are insensitive to this assumption. 
Define a consumer's actual experience with Brand 2 as y. It may vary due 
to intrinsic variation in the quality of the product (assumed normal with mean 
zero and known variance) or due to errors of measurement on the part of con-
sumers (again assumed normal with mean zero and unknown variance). This 
experience quality is then nopruilly distributed with mean defined as Q and 
unknown variance. 
Subjective errors may arise from variability in the conditions of usage or com-
plementaries in use with other commodities and are likely to be large for com-
plex products. Consumers are assumed to be aware of such errors and incor-
porate their variance in their learning. Define s as the consumer's estimate of 
var(y). This estimate may not be accurate because it cannot be refuted by ex-
perience as the error is not observable. Thus s, even if it is erroneous, is fixed 
for each individual. 
In order to make a decision about the product, the individual must fonn an 
opinion about the average quality of the uncertain product. This opinion may 
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be gleaned by word-of-mouth from other consumers, from the news media, or 
from personal search. We assume that the individual formulates an opinion in 
the form of a Bayesian prior probability distribution of the mean quality (Q). 
We assume this prior is normally distributed with mean IL and variance v, and 
that the consumer uses a Bayesian update rule to modify beliefs (reflected in 
IL and v) through time, in light of accumulated experience from the consumption 
of Brand 2. A time (t + 1), therefore, the posterior is also normally distnbuted 
with the rate of change of the mean and variance given by equations (8) and 
(9) respectively: 
/Lr+l = [(SIL+VY)/(V+ s)], 
Vt+l z [(sv/(v+s)], 
(8) 
(9) 
or, in terms of changes in the prior mean and variance (ignoring time subscripts), 
(8') 
!:::..v = -my (9') 
where m = v/v+s is the speed of learning. 
Equations (8) and (9) assume that information does not depreciate. To incor-
porate depreciation of information in the model, we would need to modify equa-
tions (9) and (9') slightly to allow v to change over time. The fact that informa-
tion becomes dated or is forgotten does not change the consumer's prior con-
ception of the average quality of Brand 2; it does change the consumer's estimate 
of the reliability of prior beliefs and modifies the estimate of the prior's variance. 
As the reliability of prior beliefs is likely to decline with the passage of time, 
the variance of the prior must rise with time. We shall assume this process oc-
curs in a linear fashion so that equation (9') would be modified to include a "coef-
ficient of information depreciation" in the form: 
!:::..v = (-m + o)v (9") 
The effect of "forgetting" is to counteract the effect of experience on the 
prior variance and to decrease the rate at which the prior variance is reduced 
with experience. Note that, as t - 00, v approaches a finite positive limit. This 
is because!:::.. v approaches zero before v approaches zero. As the rate of reduc-
tion in uncertainty due to accumulated experience falls to the level of the rate 
of information depreciation, the level of uncertainty stabilizes at the steady state 
level v· z: 5/(1-0). In the steady state for v , equation (8') degenerates into 
the standard adaptive expectation equation!:::..1L = O(Y-IL). The "forgetting" coef-
ficient is then a lower bound of the speed of learning when experience is 
accumulated. 
. 
• 
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If the consumer attempts to maximiz'e discounted expected utility over a given 
horizon, an optimal policy consists of choosing a reservation quality at each point 
of time R. for the unknown brand, such that if IJ.r > Ro, the unknown brand is 
purchased at time t. That is, if the consumer believes that the mean quality 
of Brand 2 at time t exceeds this reservation level at time t, Brand 2 is purchas-
ed. Otherwise Brand 1 is bought. Note that once the consumer buys Brand 
1, the consumer always buys Brand 1 unless some additional information from 
outside sources leads to a change in the prior in favor of Brand 2 or unless the 
time horizon changes. If the individual buys Brand 2, the individual revises the 
estimate about the prior mean and variance in the light of experience with the 
product, compares the new prior with the reservation value and proceeds as 
before. 
(2) Experience and Advertising 
We are now in a position to incorporate persuasive advertising into the model. 
We first analyze the content of advertising and then the advertising expenditure. 
Advertising expenditures determine the number of consumers and their atten-
tiveness to advertising messages, while content is assumed to affect their percep-
tion and their behavior. 
Advertising content has three functions-first to capture the consumer's at-
tention, second to insure message retention and finally to transmit information 
about the product. In the language of communication experts, the first and se-
cond ftmctions are to create. an "interrupt" (Simon 1957) in order to induce 
conscious consideration of the information supplied. (This is the role of the pretty 
girUboy in the bikini, which may not have anything to do with the information 
transmitted.) We ignore this component and concentrate here on the informa-
tion content of advertising. 
Consider the message content of advertising. Advertising is assUrtled to make 
claims about the quality of the characteristic relevant to the determination of 
quality. Advertising then acts as another piece of information. Define the adver-
tising claim of quality as c (measured in units of quality). The consumer incor-
porates this information in the prior according to Bayes rule, weighing its value 
in inverse relation to the estimate of its reliability defined as r, which may be 
interpreted as the consumer's estimate of the proportion of the variance of the 
true mean quality (q) explained by the advertising message; equivalently, r may 
be interpreted as the consumer's unconditional estimate of the coefficient of 
variation between c and q . Upon receipt of the advertising message and assuming 
no passage of time to process the information, the revised prior mean (p,') and 
variance (v') become (again ignoring time subscripts): 
p.1 = [(rp. + vc)/(r + v)] 
v' = [rv/(r+v)] s v 
(10) 
(11) 
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Once the advertising message is received and incorporated in the consumer's 
posterior, there is no role for further advertising. There is no reason to believe 
that a consumer revises the prior again upon receipt of the same message from 
the same advertiser. Repetition in this context may be necessary to insure that 
the information is noticed by the consumer. But once noticed, there is no fur-
ther effect unless the message changes, or the identity of the advertiser is 
disguised. 
There is nothing in the Bayesian learning process to determine the credence 
of the advertising message. There are two ways to proceed. First, we may 
assume rational expectations. That is, we may define a value of r which is con-
sistent with equilibrium levels of c assuming that such equilibrium levels exist. 
Because, in the absence of government regulations, there is no dollar cost to 
making exaggerated claims, there is no limit on such claims. Firms will thus 
make unlimited claims which are unrelated to the true quality of their product 
unless there is a market mechanism to discipline exaggerated claims, so that 
c is correlated with true product quality. 
In the absence of government regulations, the consumer model as it stands 
here does not supply a penalty for false or exaggerated advertising. While the 
benefits to firms from exaggerated advertising rise with true product quality, 
they are always positive: if it pays to advertise at an, it pays to exaggerate without 
limit because the marginal cost of exaggeration is zero. 
As a consequence, in the absence of truth in advertising regulations, no cor-
relation between advertising claims and true quality can be established and hence 
advertising claims contain no useful information. The content of advertising is 
therefore irrelevant and should not affect rational consumers. Notice that this 
is also the position of those who cast advertising exclusively as a signal of quality . 
A finite exaggeration level requires the imposition of additional structure. This 
defines the second way to proceed. The psychology and marketing literature 
dealing with cognitive processes suggests that the credibility of information 
depends on its conformity with both general and particular preconceptions. Con-
fonnity of general preconceptions may be related to persuasiveness in the sense 
that the information supplied does not contradict general knowledge. For ex-
ample, the washing power of detergents may be reasonably related to the 
presence of enzymes, automobile horsepower is related to acceleration, etc. 
Confonnity to particular preconceptions must be related to the prior. The theory 
of cognitive dissonance states that people are uncomfortable in the presence 
of conflict. When information is received which contradicts accepted beliefs, a 
dissonance is created. To resolve the conflict, consumers may acquire additional 
information or re-evaluate the source of the conflicting information, possibly 
discarding some of it. In particular, where new information conflicts with prior 
decisions, it may be ignored. In tenns of our model, the theory suggests that 
the more likely is the information to conflict with the prior-cognitive 
dissonance-the less credible it is. 
A convenient way of measuring such confonnity, in tenns of the probability 
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that the information came from the prior, is the distance of the information from 
the prior mean. We may specify the following relationship for reliability: 
r = r(lc - ILl/c), where rl > 0 and rlt > o. 
Returning to equations (10) and (11), we see that the effect of advertising 
on ILl and VI rises with the consumer's ignorance because when the prior is 
diffuse, consumers are more receptive to advertising (ar/av < 0) and give lower 
weight to their uncertain prejudices. As r rises, advertising is discounted, so 
that r - 00 leads to ILl - IL and VI - v: The advertising is ignored and priors 
are not revised. 
This specification of r yields a limit on the ability of advertising to affect con-
sumer perceptions; as advertising claims are exaggerated, consumer confidence 
in them falls, reducing the weight given to the advertising. This negative in-
direct effect, represented by the first term of equation (13), may offset the direct 
effect of increased c, represented by the second term. 
(12) 
As dZILI/dcl = rlt(p.-c)/v < 0, the marginal effects ofadvertising claims on con-
sumer perceptions declines as c rises, dlLl/dc = 0 therefore defines the max-
imum influence which advertising may have on a consumer with initial percep-
tions of IL and v. 
The effects of advertising on experimentation is somewhat complex. Positive 
advertising (c > IL) tends to raise the prior mean and encourage the relevant 
consumer to purchase the uncertain brand. However, advertising also reduces 
VI affecting the reservation quality (R). The effect of such a reduction in VI on 
R is uncertain and depends on the degree of risk aversion. In particular, if the 
consumer is risk neutral, aRiav < 0, so that an increase in c reduces VI, induc-
ing in turn an increase in the reservation quality which partly offsets the favorable 
effect on ILl. If, however, the consumer is sufficiently risk averse, aR/ac <0, 
so that increased confidence reduces the subjective risk evaluation encouraging 
experimentation. 
In order to investigate whether such consumer decisions are consistent with 
rational expectations (i.e., whether they are rational in the context of market 
equilibrium), we must analyze the firm's decisions. 
4. The Finn's Advertising Decision 
These decisions are extremely complex when consumers are diverse, because 
they must take into account the reactions of different consumers to the com-
mon information supplied. To simplify the problem, we analyze the firm's deci-
sions under two sets of assumptions, first, that consumer tastes are diverse 
but quality priors are uniform, and second that consumer tastes are identical 
but quality priors are diverse. The results vary significantly between these two 
. 
• 
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sets of assumptions. 
We assume that firm 2 (producing Brand 2) operates as a Nash competitor 
in determining its advertising content and expenditure vis-a-vis firm 1 (produc-
ing Brand 1) and that it accepts the price determined by firm 1 which we treat 
as exogenously determined. (This separation of advertising and price competi-
tion is similar to Schmalensee 1982.) As well we assume that the market can 
sustain only the two firms in question. 
(1) Consumers with Identical QUality Expectations and Varying Tastes 
Assume all consumers hold the same initial values of /J.o, Vo and s. But their 
preferences (u(i» differ. Consumer demand for Brand 2 is then determined by 
the condition IJ.o 2: R(u). Define the advertising reach (N) as the proportion of 
consumers exposed to advertising; N is assumed to be an increasing function 
of advertising expenditure (A) so that N = N(A) with N' > 0, N" < O. The 
proportion of consumers who buy Brand 2 out of those reached (n.) is deter-
mined by the condition 1': 2: &(u(i» (i.e., n. is the proportion of consumers 
whose reservation quality falls short of their mean quality perception). If con-
sumers are arranged in declining order of preference, we may write R. = R.(n.). 
These relationships at t = 0 are illustrated in Figure 1. 
If advertising only informs consumers of the firm's existence, N"Oo consumers 
purchase the product initially. Of these, some continue to buy the product and 
others do not, depending on their experience, i.e., on the evolution of 1". and 
R.(n) over time. Define the aqvertising of a specific quality level as c; this adver-
tising improves consumer evaluation of the product leading to an upward shift 
of IJ.o to I'~(c)in the first period and therefore in all subsequent periods, and 
may raise or lower R.(n) to R~(n) depending on the degree of consumer risk 
aversion. This is illustrated at t = 0 in Figure l. 
The firm's discounted profits are then: 
T 
E1I" = (1-C)N(A). 1: 13(t)En. - A == (l-C)N(A)4> - A (13) 
o 
where n. = n(I-'~,R~) and I-'~ and R~ evolve according to rules established in Sec-
tion 3; 13(t) is the discount rate and C = C(q) is the marginal cost assumed to 
be independent of output but increasing in true quality. True qUality is assumed 
to be exogenous. 
The firm's first-order conditions are: 
(C < 1) (14) 
oE1I"Ioc = (l-C)N(A)"o4>loc = 0 (15) 
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Equation (14) determines the advertising budget or reach for a given level 
of advertising content (c). There is insufficient structure in this model to in-
vestigate whether this advertising expenditure yields a valid signal of the true 
product quality. 
We can-however investigate the relationship between advertising content and 
true product quality. Equation (15) determining the optimal advertising content 
(c) may be alternatively written as: 
o~/oc == E(on, / ono)[(ono / o~~)(o~ / oc) + (orlo / oR~)·(o~ / oc)]) = 0(16) 
The term on. / Ono measures the decrease in repeat purchases generated by 
experience with the product and depends mainly on the differences between 
perceptions and experience as descn"bed by equations (8) and (9). Because all 
consumers who buy the product have the same initial perceptions, the expected 
evolution of these expectations is the same for all. The term in the square bracket 
represents the change in the proportion of customers reached who buy because 
of a change in their initial perceptions and reservation prices7 induced by adver-
tising. It is illustrated by the shifts from p.o to ~~ and Ro to R' 0 in Figure 1. 
Equating this term to zero defines the maximum increase in first period pur-
chases obtainable by an increase in c . This level of c is independent of the true 
product quality. In this context, advertising content cannot supply a rational ex-
pectations signal of true quality. The reason is that there is no penalty for false 
advertising. Whatever the reinforcement effect of true product quality on exag-
gerated advertising, such effects never offset the profitability of the exaggerated 
claims. Unless we introduce a punishment related specifically to the difference 
between the advertised and true quality, advertising content cannot be a ra-
tional expectations signal. 
In the context of advertising for a single product, there is rio incentive for 
a rational consumer to punish false advertising, as the consumer's buying pat-
tern should be independent of the source of any disappointed expectation. Such 
punishment would be a public good: Punishment for exaggerated claims would 
establish advertising as a truthful instrument benefitting all consumers yet no 
single consumer has the appropriate incentive to inflict the punishment. 
It is clear that truth in advertising regulations has a role to play under these 
circumstances. The role of government regulation is clearly to increase the cor-
relation between the advertised message and the true quality. The degree to 
which this can be achieved depends on the effectiveness of enforcement of truth 
in advertising regulations. 
Consider a modification of our previous model so that there is a penalty for 
false advertising. Imagine the continuous introduction of new products or at-
tributes by the firm, so that new advertising is required to induce consumers 
1 This is only approximate as the initial change in reservation prices is not the same for all con-
sumers because of possible differences in the concavity of n at different levels of ex. 
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to try the new product. In this setting, false advertising for one product will 
likely lead to greater skepticism about future advertising. A direct penalty is 
thus introduced which is specifically related to the false advertising messages 
(Golden 1977). Similar effects would be generated by growth in the number 
of potential customers for the product, coupled with word-of-mouth informa-
tion about false advertising, a modification not pursued by us. 
The preceding model leaves no room for advertising by Brand 1, whose quality 
is known with certainty. To take account of such advertising, it is necessary 
to allow some uncertainty about some characteristics of the known brand. Such 
uncertainty can be introduced without compromising the basic analysis of the 
preceding sections, if we assume that experience with the known brand has 
been sufficient to reduce the uncertainty of its prior to its steady state value 
V OO = so/(I-o). Continuous consumption of Brand 1 yields some information 
but this information has no value because it does not alter the consumer's 
behavior. TherefQre, although no model is developed formally, we believe that 
the logic of consumer decisions of our model remains unchanged. 
(2) Consumers with Varying Quality Expectations and Identical Tastes 
An Extension 
In this setting, individual consumers still make decisions according to the model 
described earlier in Section 3, except that in equation (7) a(i) = a for all con-
sumers. Furthermore, the expected profit function for the firIn producing Brand 
2 remains as equation (13): The decision on reach defined by the magnitude 
of the advertising expenditures is again defined by equation (14). 
The critical effect that changes is the selection of the marginal consumer to 
define the content of the advertising message. (Recall that in our model firms 
can neither segment markets nor discriminate in their advertising messages 
across consumers.) At the outset, we may define two levels of product quality 
critical for the advertising campaign, an upper level q and a lower level q. 
q is sufficiently high that all consumers who buy Brand 2 continue to purchase 
the brand regardless of their priors. (Again, recall that price is exogenously fix-
ed at 1, the known quality level of Brand I, the substitute product.) Then for 
all q ~ q, the value of c that maximizes the proportion of informed consumers 
who try the product will also, maximize the present value of future revenues. 
For q ~ q then, the prior of infra-marginal consumers is not relevant and the 
advertising content should be addressed to the marginal consumer who is least 
inclined to try Brand 2 in the first period. 
The same decision is relevant for q s q but for a different reason. For 
q s q, consumers who purchase the product do so for only the first period. 
In this quality interval, there are no future sales, so that the relevant consumer 
for advertising content is again the marginal consumer who is least inclined to 
try Brand 2 in the first period. 
This is not the case for q < q < q. Here the effects of the choice of c on 
consumers inframarginal in the first period must be considered, for such effects 
. 
• 
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alter the probability of repurchase and therefore the future flows of revenues. 
In terms of equation (15), these effects may be written as: 
T 
dno/dc + E .B(t).dn./dno·dno/dc = 0 
1 
(with C <1) (15') 
The relevant margins are most easily illustrated in a diagram; once these are 
clear, the relationship between c and q may be defined. 
Consider Figure 2 which illustrates quality expectations for consumers and 
alternative advertising programs. Potential consumers are defined by declining 
expectations of quality for Brand 2. The decision rule for the consumer's pur-
chase decision is unchanged from the model of Section 3, namely to buy if the 
relevant expectation exceeds the reservation value R.. 
Consider the first time period and the advertising policy ~o which the last con-
sumer in this time period (~) would find just sufficientJy credible that this con-
sumer would purchase the product. In other words, ~ is tailor-made for con-
sumer~. Consumers who hold higher or lower quality expectations have these 
expectations increased by advertising but less so than an advertising campaign 
tailor-made to their expectations. These expectations are represented by the 
curve in Figure 2. This holds for all feasible advertising campaigns. In particular, 
consider ~ (>~) which is designed to maximize the increase in the expecta-
tions for consumers 0;;( < ~). (A repetition of this for all consumers defines the 
upper envelope denoted as IL' in Figure 2.) 
Consider the increase from ~ to c;. As illustrated in Figure 2, the conse-
quence of this increase is that consumers in the interval (O,rIo] hold higher ex-
pectations as the increased campaign is closer to their optimal campaign; con-
sumers in the interval (0,'00) hold lower expectations as the increased campaign 
is further from their optimal campaign. Consumers in the interval (it,,~) who 
formerly bought the product in period 1 no longer purchase at all. 
In terms of (15'), these effects may be approximated as: 
A ~ 
no T . no 
[.6no / .6c]~ + E .B(t)[.6n, / .6no·,6no / .6c)iio 
1 
iio 
+ (.6n. / .6no·.6no / .6c)O ] = 0 
" ~ no no 
where [.6no / .6c]~ < 0, (.6n. / .6no·.6no / .6c)ii < 0, 
Iio 
(.6n, / .6no·,6no / .6c)O > O. 
(15/1) 
In this model, therefore, an interior equilibrium defines a critical "inframarginal" 
consumer at t = 0 who determines the nature of the advertising campaign. 
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The consequence is that where the true quality of the unknown product is 
sufficiently low or high, the marginal conswner at t = 0 determines the appropriate 
level of c; in the middle range, an interior equilibrium fOOlSed on the appropriate 
inframarginal consumer at t ... 0 yields at first an increase in c with q and subse-
quently a decrease as illustrated in Figure 3. As a result, knowledge of c is not 
alone sufficient to infer q, i.e., the relationship in Figure 2 is not invertible. Or 
c is not a valid rational expectations signal of q. 
5. Ancillary Evidence 
The consumer learning possibilities modeled in the preceding sections leave 
us with the propositi>n that, at least in the soort-run where consumers are learn-
ing about the embodied experience quality, advertising and quality can be 
substitutes. In this case, price premia exist because of increased advertising 
as a substitute for quality, not as a signal of quality. This explanation is consis-
tent with the empirical results of Section 2 of this paper. 
The "signal" theory of advertising may gain some empirical support from 
studies of the information content of advertising on television (Resnic and Stem 
1977) and in magazines (Healy and Kassarjian 1983). While many advertisements 
contain some information, the claim is that a large portion of television ads ap-
pear to contain none. For example, of 378 commercials analyzed by Resnic and 
Stem (1977), more than one half were found to contain no information. Even 
when television advertising contains information, such information frequently 
takes the form of claims that are difficult or impossible to verify, for example 
claims that products contain attnbutes or confer benefits on a consumer that 
depend on the consumer's social situation or state of mind. For example, Shimp 
(197.5) found that 58.5% of representations in a large sample of television adver-
tising consisted of such claims and only 41.5% asserted objective information. 
These observations then might support a signal theory of advertising which 
contends that advertising content is unimportant. Only the sunk resource ex-
penditure is the commitment to deliver. This evidence, however, is not entire-
ly convincing. These studies take only verbal information into account. Televi-
sion and magazine ads may include significant non-verbal information. The visual 
image of a car gives information about appearance, comfort and size; a car driven 
expertly on wet pavement supplies an implicit message of handling and safety 
features. Consequently, the informational content of televiSion advertising is 
likely to be underestimated.8 Further, marketing studies that evaluate alter-
native advertising campaigns suggest that, as some campaigns are more effec-
tive, content is important. 
The final piece of ancillary evidence comes from R. Caves (1983). Using data 
on individual firms over the period 1973 to 1980, Caves was able to test the 
a Our empirical results on automobiles suggest that electronic media advertising tends to be more 
"persuasive" and less objectively "informative" than print media. 
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influence of a set of explanatory variables on 4 jointly determined advertising 
variables-media advertising expenditures, sales force expenditures, promo-
tional (catalogues, exhibits, coupons, etc.) expenditures and other marketing 
expenditures. Among the variables in the explanatory set are (i) a variable to 
capture the percentage of a given firm's output deemed higher quality than its 
rivals minus the percentage deemed lower quality and (11) a variable to measure 
the amount of time elapsed between purchases by the final buyer of the 
product-infrequent buyers have more obsolete information so that advertised 
signals of quality should have greater consumer value. Contrary to the "signal" 
hypothesis, Caves (1983: 18) found that increases in both these variables decreas-
ed seller expenditures on advertising. 
6. Conclusions 
At the outset, this paper addressed a set of questions on the economics of 
advertising. For at least two industries whose products are logical candidates 
for embodied experience quality and therefore advertising as a signal of product 
quality, automobiles and whole-life insurance, the empirical evidence offers lit-
tle support for proponents of hypotheses that greater advertising either indicates 
better buys or signals more experience quality. The results are, however, con-
sistent with the hypothesis that advertising is substitutable for quality under 
certain conditions on consumer learning. These effects have previously surfac-
ed in consumer linear learning, product life-cycle models of a product supplied 
by a monopolist (Kotowitz and Mathewson 1979; Shapiro 1982). These empirical 
results, however, warrant a more detailed examination of the role of advertis-
ing content as informational input into consumer learning and the profit-
maximizing decisions of firms supplying both goods and information to such 
consumers. 
This model of consumer learning yields a supply of exaggerated claims by firms 
in their products under certain conditions. Penalties for exaggeration limit the 
magnitude of puffery by firms; the FTC rules on advertising content playa role 
here. Firms choose optimal levels of exaggeration; advertising need not be a 
signal of product quality. 
Ancillary evidence tends to corroborate our story. Marketing studies indicate 
low levels of information in some advertising and high levels of non-verifiable 
claims. Another study using individual firm data (Caves 1983) found little sup-
port for the signal hypothesis. 
Table 1 
ESTIMATES OF THE CORRELATION BETWEEN PRICE PREMIUM AND ADVERTISING (EQUATION (1»* 
(i) Autonwbiles 
Number A AIS A. A./S S 
1 .80 1.15 
2 1.08 -.77 
3 1.95·· -1.03 
4 1.89·· 1.69·· 
(ii) Participating Whole-Life Insurance 
• 
•• 
log AlS log S Time Dummies Present 
1.67·· -8.85 Yes 
Entries in the table for each variable are signed t-statistics . 
Significant at the 5% confidence level. 
Time Dummies 
D. DJ Presents 
1.40 16.40·· Yes 
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Table 2 
ESTIMATES OF THE CORRELATION BETWEEN EXPERIENCE QUALITY AND ADVERTISING (EQUATION (2» 
AND BETWEEN PRICE PREMIUM AND EXPERIENCE QUALITY (EQUATION (3W 
Autonwbi/es (Equation (2» 
Number A AIS A. A./S S D. D1 R1 
1 1.43 -1.62 -2.02·· -6.53·· .74 
2 1.89·· .31 1.61 -7.22·· .72 
3 2.10·· -2.26" -6.27·· .73 
4 1.38 -1.60 -1. 73·· -5.91·· .70 
5 2.54·· .39 -1.14 -4.04·· .74 
6 2.53·· -1.91·· -6.27·· .74 
7 .93 1.83" .71 -.91 -4.12·· .74 
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•• 
+ 
... 
Participating Whole-Life Insurance 
(a) Equation (2) 
log A/S log S Time Dummies Present 
-.22 -.49 Yes 
(b) Equation (3) 
log c log S Time Dummies Present 
-3.65** -9.72** Yes 
Entries in the table for each variable are signed t-statistics . 
Significant at the 5% confidence level. 
Time dummies were unifonnIy insignificant and so were omitted. 
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Fiiure 1 
CONSUMER PURCHASES AND THEIR RESPONSE TO ADVERTISED MESSAGES 
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/J..C 
Figure 2 
THE DETERMINATION OF THE OPTIMAL ADVERTISING CAMPAIGN 
'FOR CONSUMERS WITH IDENTICAL PREFERENCES BUT 
DIFFERENT QUAUTY EXPECTATIONS (q < q < Q) 
-
Co 
Co 
R 
c 
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Figure 3 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRUE QUALITY AND ADVERTISING CONTENT 
WITH COMMON CONSUMER TASTES BUT DIVERSE QUALITY EXPECTATIONS 
c 
Co 
q q 
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The Demand for Advertising by Medium: 
Implications for the Economies of Scale in Advertising 
Timothy F. Bresnahan· 
Stanford University 
1. Introduction 
This paper seeks to explain the growth in recent times of national brands as 
an economic phenomenon. Why is it that firms such as Procter and Gamble and 
Anheuser-Busch have come into existence and persisted as successful forms 
of economic organization? The entire organizawnal capital of P&G is marketing 
capital: the firm exists to create and earn the returns to nationally-branded con-
sumer products, mainly in consumer products like laundry detergent and 
toothpaste. No serious observer has suggested sufficient economies of scale 
in manufacturing to support the continuing existence of such a firm. The ex-
planation must lie not so much in the soap as in the soap opera: P&G's advan-
tages over smaller firms arise, in this view, from economies of scale in national 
distnbution of branded products. Similarly, Anheuser-Busch is a ten-brewery 
seller of branded beer. The market success of such a large firm is not the return 
to superior manufacturing technique, but rather to a fundamental marketing in-
novation made 25 years ago: the idea of national, branded, "premium" beer.l 
Thus one possible explanation of the growth of the extremely large consumer-
products firm is the exploitation of scale economies in the distnbution function 
of the firm, particularly in advertising. This view is somewhat controversial, 
as not all scholars agree with the proposition that there are scale economies 
in advertising. 
Such an explanation of the recent growth of large firms with nationally brand-
ed products must go on to explain why the distribution-system scale economies 
only came into existence in recent times or why they were only recently ex-
ploited. In this paper, that explanation will arise from a view of the distnbution 
system for consumer products and of the long-run economic forces affecting 
that system. The core observation in this view is that high-service retailing and 
advertising are substitutes (in the long run) in the production of distnbutive ser-
vices. One way to inform consumers about the nature of prcxiucts and their uses 
is at point of sale: an informed, helpful sales person could perform this function. 
Another way is to have the product simply sit on a shelf, and have all communica-
tion about the product's attnbutes flow directly from manufacturer to consumer 
-I would like to thank Tim Taylor for exceptional research assistance, and Gerard Butters, James 
Ferguson. Pauline Ippolito. Richard Kihlstrom, and Ray Olszewski for helpful comments. All opi-
nions and errors are my own. not those of the FiC or any other agency or person. 
1 Similarly, the size of the second-largest brewer, MDler, is an indication of the introduction 10 
years ago of modem advertising and distributing methods, lX'eviously developed in the cigarette 
industry. into brewing. 
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through advertising media. (The wora "inform" can be replaced with "con-
vince," "sell," or "mislead" without altering this argument in the slightest.) 
In this highly stylized view, there are two ctifferent forms of distribumn system-
traditional, in which the retailer has a great deal of informing or convincing value-
added, and convenience, in which mass media perform that function and the 
retailer serves only to provide low-cost access.to the product for the consumer. 
The two different forms of distnbution system are substitutes: within the con-
venience form, mass media and low-service, low-cost retail outlets are 
complements. 
Since the traditional distnbution method is labor-intensive, it has grown 
substantially more expensive in our century. Since the convenience method is 
communications-intensive, it has grown substantially cheaper. Specifically, ex-
tremely cost-effective means of communication, the electronic mass media, have 
been invented. These have lowered the effective cost of advertising very 
substantially. As a result, the cost-minimizing distnbution system has shifted 
away from high-cost, high-service retail outlets toward low-service retail plus 
manufacturer's advertising (or cooperative advertising between manufacturers 
and retailers). Over time, the number of messages received by a typical con-
sumer has increased, and the quantity of point-of-sale informing/convincing ser-
vices has decreased. These are simply the responses of the distribution system 
to the nature of 2Oth-century economic development in the already industrializ-
ed nations. 2 
To the extent that the mass communications media are more effectively used 
by large firms, this change in the nature of the optimal distribution system also 
increases the degree of economies of scale in distnbution. Any reason for the 
more effective use of mass media will suffice, whether it is easily conceived 
of as "economies of scale in advertising" or not. For example, if high costs 
of writing high quality advertisements lead smaBer firms to write less effective 
ones, that will lead to the scale economies. SimilariIy, if network television is 
cheaper than the sum of spot rates in all the cities (a somewhat controversial 
assertion),3 then national firms will have lower distribution costs than regional 
or local ones. In another dimension, broadcast media tend to reach customers 
and others somewhat indiscriminately: a firm whose products appeal to more 
people might be able to use them in a more effective fashion. If there are exter-
nalities in the·consumption of branded products (as when, for example, Michelob 
beer is to be valued not for its taste but as a demonstration of the buyer's taste) 
the value of reaching a large body of potential customers indiscriminately may 
2 The aucial distinction drawn here, that between expenditures on advertising and the quantity 
of advertising, bas been recognized by Ehrlich and Fisher, Bowman, and Rosse. None of these 
studies attempts to investigate the relationship between changing relative prices and changing degrees 
of returns to scale over time. 
3 See Petennan's extremely careful review of the evidence for the case that this effect is small. 
My reading of Peterman's results is that it is \0 to 15 percent cheaper for a national than a regional 
finn to use television. 
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be doubled. Any of these reasons, if ttue, will provide a basis for the explana-
tion of the recent growth in large national-brand firms. 
This overall conception of the role of advertising in the distnbution system 
and of the possible economies of scale that have only recently arisen is com-
plementary to some recent thinking in the economics of advertising. In a large 
body of work, Porter has recognized the interaction between the retail sector 
and manufacturer advertising. He draws the useful distinction between •• con-
venience" goods-those which can be bought in low-service retail environments, 
and nonconvenience goods, in which the retailer, not the manufacturer, retains 
a substantial part of the informing/convincing function. In the language of this 
paper, we would say that not all goods are alike in the ability to substitute mass 
communication for face-to-face communication, and that at any time the extent 
of replacement of high-service retail with low-service plus manufacturing adver-
tising is determined by the characteristic of the particular good. Thus, over time, 
more and more goods will become II convenience" goods as the price of the 
newer distribution fonn falls relative to the traditional one. Porter goes on to 
make the case that it is primarily the information structure of the market-
frequency of purchase, (dis)value of buying the wrong product, extent of objec-
tively verifiable quality attnbutes, etc., which determine the fonn of distribu-
tion for any particular good. Blair, and Mueller and Rogers make the empirical 
case that much of the increase in concentration in recent times have come in 
advertising-intensive industries, especially in industries where television adver-
tising is important. 
In related work, Steiner emphasizes that the role of the retail sector is crucial 
in understanding the economic role of advertising. A more heavily advertised 
product can expect to be carried by more dealers, to have smaller differences 
between wholesale and retail prices, and to be more effectively pushed by 
retailers. From the point of view of this paper, this establishes a . crucial link 
in the way the transition to the low-cost retail sector is established. The manufac-
turer does not need to explicitly force a change in distnbution channel type. 
A move to a long-tenn strategy of higher advertising will lead to an adjustment 
in the retail sector. Another observation by Steiner suggests that the interac-
tion between advertising and retail services may lead to further scale economies 
in the use of mass media. Suppose that retailers do not allocate shelf space pro-
portionally to imticipated demand, but instead give no space to unimportant brands 
and extra space to highly demanded brands. This will lead to a tipping 
phenomenon in manufacturer advertising. The manufacturer whose messages 
produce the most retail store floor traffic will find that they generate sales more 
than proportionally. 
The empirical part of this paper has two main goals: empirical investigation 
of the overall conception of the distribution system and empirical investigation 
of the question of returns to scale in advertising. 
The first goal is pursued by an investigation of the nature of the demand for 
advertising services by manufacturers of consumer goods. Is it true that adver-
tising, particularly in mass media, is a substitute for high-service retail and a 
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complement for low-service retail? This is the implication of the theory of the 
distnbution system outlined above. The elasticity of the demand for advertising 
services with respect to the "price" of low-service retail services should be 
positive, with respect to the "price" of high-service retail should be negative. 
In the empirical work, the price of retail services will be taken to be the retail 
gross margin. 
The second goal is pursued along two fronts. First, an attempt is made to 
resurrect the fact that larger firms in the same industry have lower advertis-
ing/sales ratios as evidence for more effective use of mass media by larger firms. 
Second, a new form of analysis is made of the quality of audiences sold to adver-
tisers by different media. It argues that if "size of audience" is a quality variable 
for network TV, then one of the stories of more effective use by large firms 
must be true. The empirical strategy is then to see for which media audience 
size represents quality (above and beyond CPM) and for which ability to ad-
dress a specific niche represents quality. 
2. The Costs of Distribution Services 
The total social costs of consumption of manufactured goods contain a large 
distribution cost component. This includes expenses directly paid by manufac-
turers or wholesalers, such as advertising, the sales force which visits retail 
outlets, shipping, etc. It also includes the retailer's gross margin, the difference 
between wholesale and retail price.' In this paper, all of the costs of distribu-
tion services, both retail gross margin and advertising, are viewed as if they 
are paid by the manufacturer. 5 This is the familiar treatment of distribution costs 
used in the economk analysis of vertical restraints in antitrust.6 Thus the language 
throughout will speak of the manufacturer • 'choosing" the distribution system 
to minimize costs. This is merely a shorthand for the tendency for manufac-
turer decisions (as on the amount and form of advertising) plus market forces 
(in retail trade) to minimize the social costs of providing distributive services. 
In the case of distnbutive services, "output" must be defined to have both 
a quantity and a quality element.7 The pri:e the marginal consumer is willing 
to pay for the good depends both on total quantity offered for sale and on amount 
of distributive services, summarized as "quality." I will use the notation out-
put is Q, retail quantity sold,'and quality is v, value of distnbutive services to 
consumers. The manufacturer is thought of as choosing both the level of pro-
duction, Q, and the quality, v. The inputs include %, a vector of physical inputs 
, This is appropriately viewed by the mauufacturer plus the consumer as a cost, even if retail 
market power raises it above social costs. , 
5 Other distribution costs. such as direct salesmen, promotional expenses, etc., are ignored in 
the empirical work. 
S Su Posner. Chapter 7. Note that that analysis establishes that it is in the manufacturers' in-
terest to minimize total distribution costs, the principal behavorial assumption of this paper. 
7 This point appears to have been made first by Dorfman and Steiner. 
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used in manufacturing, a, advertising messages in various media, and R, retail 
services of various kinds. There is a "production function" for Q and v: 
(Q,v) = F (x,a,R) (1) 
Here "production function" is in quotes because the "production" of retail quan-
tity sold and of the value of distributive services by advertising and retail ser-
vices depends not only on technology but also on consumers tastes. The manufac-
turer (with help from the market for retail services) will minimize total manufac-
turing plus distribution cost subject to producing a given level of sales and of 
quality. 
min <P .. x> + <P., a> + <PR , R> subject to (Q,v) = F(x,a,R) (2) 
where <, > represents the inner product and p. are the prices of factors of 
manufacturing production, P. the prices of advertising messages delivered, and 
PR the prices of retail services. The solution to (2) is the cost function for the 
entire firm, including both manufacturing and distribution. This is labeled C.: 
Cost of entire firm = C.(Q, v, P .. P., PR ) (3) 
The demand curve is written in inverse form as 
P = P(Q, r) 
The firms' overall problem is to maximize profit by choice of Q and v: this always 
implies cost-minimization in the "production" of Q and v. 
The usual variables appearing in empirical analyses of advertising ecoriomics 
have been implicit in the discussion to this point. A, "advertising," appears 
as expenditures on advertising <P., a>. Sales, S, is PQ. It is essential to main-
tain the distinction between the quantity of advertising messages delivered, a, 
and expenditures on advertising, A. Since the price of an advertising message 
delivered has been changing over time, A is not a sensible indicator of the amount 
of advertising firms are doing. 
There appears to be some confusion in the literature about the very notion 
of economies of scale in advertising (or in distribution). Arndt and Simon, for 
example, seem to feel that it is "conceptually meaningless" to "isolate the ef-
fect of advertising" as a determinant of scale economies. This argument turns 
on an incorrect view of the definition of scale economies. The incorrect view 
poses the question: if all inputs are increased in the same proportion, would 
output increase more or less proportionately? If more, then there are scale 
economies. What is wrong with this view is that it may not be sensible for a 
firm to increase all outputs proportionately. This definition is therefore only cor-
rect when the production function is homothetic. An alternative definition of scale 
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economies (for the single product firm) is the slope of the average cost curve: 
downward-sloping AC is increasing returns to scale. This can always be deriv-
ed, even when the production function is inhomothetic. 
Suppose that the total cost function can be written in this (separable) form: 8 
C.(Q, v, P., P., PR) = C ... (Q, P.) + CiQ, v, P., PR ) (4) 
where C ... is manufacturing cost and Cd distnbution cost. In this case, it is pertect-
ly sensible to define economies of scale in distribution, independent of the ques-
tion of economies of scale overall. If average distribution costs, CiQ, v, P., 
P R) / Q, are declining in Q, then there are pertectly well-defined economies of 
scale in distribution. . 
Thus we expect the concept of economies of scale in distribution to be a sen-
sible one. 
The empirical hypothesis of this paper is that CiQ, v, P., PR ) / Q, average 
distribution costs, is now more steeply declining in many consumer goods. 
markets than it was long ago. The origins of this in the technology of distribu-
tion follow from a slightly more detailed view of the high-service retail/conven-
ience plus advertising dichotomy suggested in the introduction. The conception 
of the distnbutive system is as of providing two distinct services to the con-
sumer: access to the product and "information" broadly construed. In figure 
1, there are exactly two ways to provide either access or information: On the 
left ray, informing/convincing is done through the retail function, and only a small 
amount of advertising is done. The same amount of sales may be obtained by 
a point on the right ray, using "convenience" retail and more advertising. The 
dotted lines are "isoquants," although only the points on the two rays are 
available. Since access must be provided for every buyer, either high-service 
or convenience retail services are used in approximately fixed proportion to out-
put. The left ray is higher, which means that a great deal more retail services 
are used in it. 
8 This is defined as independence of the marginal rate of substitution between any two elements 
of % from the level of either R or a. and independence of the MRS between any two distinctive 
factors (a or R) from the level of z. Separability is obviously true in the usual conception of the 
manufacturing firm, in which the product is produced by one decisiorunaking unit and sold by another. 
For separability to fail, the technology of the firm needs to have effects like this one: Within the 
firm. marketing both sets the distribution system and has some key input into the manufacturing 
process, for example, by writing sales forecasts. This dual role links the marginal rates of substitu· 
tion because the more accurate the sales forecast. the more capital-intensive (e.g .• less overtime) 
production teclmiques can be used. and the more high·service retail is used, the better the sales 
forecast will be. I find this particular story unconvincing: such effects are likely to be very substan-
tial only in high-volatility demand markets with extremely strong marketing functions within the 
firm. These circumstances are met in very few consumer-goods markets. though they are not all 
that rare in high-technology intermediate goods markets. Strictly speaking, more than separability 
is needed for this result. The additional assumption needed in the present analysis is that manufac-
tured goods (the retailer's intermediate input) are used in fixed proportion to Q. 
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Two assumptions about the nature of the distnbution tedmology are contain-
ed in the way the figure is drawn. First note that advertising messages expand 
much less than proportionately to output along each ray. This is the underlying 
assertion about economies of scale in advertising. Second, retail services are 
proportional to output along both rays. Since the left ray uses more retail ser-
vices, it is less curved. As a result, the degree of returns to scale in distribution 
changes with the price of retail services. At early-twentieth century prices, the 
left ray is the cost-minimizing expansion path, so that the AC curve is essential-
ly flat. When advertising's relative price falls, the cost-minimizing expansion 
path becomes the other ray, so that the late-twentieth century AC is now falling. 
The assertion behind figure I turns on the inhomotheticity in the distribution-
services part of F( ). One could draw a more general figure I-in which there 
were more than two technologies of distribution, so that the isoquants were 
smooth. As long as retail services of fixed quality are used in approximately 
fixed proportions to output and mass media are lower cost (per efficiency unit 
of message delivered) for large-scale distribution, a fall in the price of advertis-
ing services will lead to an increase in the degree of returns to scale in distribu-
tion. It clearly is correct to label this phenomenon "increasing returns in distribu-
tion" or "increasing returns in marketing"; it is only a very slight misnomer 
to call it "increasing returns to advertising." Further, it is caused by a com-
plementarity in distnbution between convenience retail services and mass media. 
3. Observable Implications for Industry Demand for Advertising 
Empirical work on the demand for advertising services by medium9 can shed 
some light on the truth or falsity of the last section's assertions about the nature 
of the distribution system and advertising's role in it. In the next section, de-
mand curves for advertising by medium for ten consumer-product industries 
in a fifteen-year time series will be estimated. In the following section, such 
demand curves will be estimated for a group of brewing firms. 
Data sources on advertising by firms and industries report A"., expenditures 
on advertising by medium, so that division by a price index is required to get 
a"" advertising messages sent by medium. 10 The definition of price used in the 
advertising industry is CPM, (cost pet thousand), the price of one thousand 
"exposures" of the message. ll The definition of an "exposure" varies 
somewhat 
9 In the empirical work in this paper the media are those covered by Llading National Adver· 
tisers. an annual trade publicatioo. These are network televisioo. spot television. radio. magazines. 
newspaper supplements. and ootdoor advertising. Though LNA reports advertising expenditures. 
the underlying raw data are surveys of media counting advertisements: these data are multiplied 
by estimated prices to obtain the expenditure ligures. 
10 The functional form-translog-used in estimation here never in fact calculates a~. since the 
demand is represented by an expenditure share.TbJs the remarks of this paragraph apply to the 
definition of a •. message" that is implicit in the data. 
II The McCann-Erickson CPM ligures used here are price indexes based on a sample of prices 
of specific advertising services. They are converted to a CPM basis by adjusting by the size of 
the audience each message will reach. 
. 
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by medium. In the print media, newspapers and magazines, it is circulation (not 
readership). In the broadcast media, radio and network and spot television, it 
is the number of receivers tuned to the program in question (not the number 
of viewers or listeners). For the outdoor medium, exposures are determined 
by indexes of automobile traffic. In general, the CPM for an individual audience 
"Newsweek back page" or "Gilligan's Island 30 seconds" is the price of ac-
cess to that audience divided by the number of exposures of the message. The 
CPM indexes for a medium are weighted averages of the CPMs for specific 
audiences within the medium. 
The assumption that the right indicator of efficiency units of advertising is 
the number of messages delivered is obviously suspect. But this is the assump- ' 
tion used when A ... is divided by CPM to get aM' The correct treatment adjusts 
for the changes in the nature of the audience each advertising medium can deliver 
over time. In this treatment, CPM is the cost of one exposure, not necessarily 
the cost of one unit of advertising services in the medium. 
A great deal of applied marketing research concerns itself with the fine detail 
of individual program selection within the advertising medium. This research 
and the time of the manager with responsibility for an advertising budget are 
focused on the quality aspects. They ask questions like which specific magazines 
can best deliver which ,specific kinds of audiences, or what kind of television 
program is the best context for an advertisement using a celebrity to recom-
mend the product personally. Obviously, these kinds of quality attributes will 
not show up in a study of media aggregates. 
One quality attribute that be can measured at the level of the medium is what 
marketers call "reach," the size of the audience delivered by the medium.12 
The advantages of greater reach to advertisers is not spelled out with any preci-
sion in marketing texts. But excellent nationwide reach is said to be the primary 
advantage of network television as an advertising medium. 13 
In any given medium, reach could be either a quality or a disadvantage, or 
neutral. When advertisers are willing to pay less per exposure for greater reach, 
we infer that they are in a region of diminishing returns to audience size. This 
might arise because the larger audience contains relatively fewer people who 
are natural consumers of the product. In this case, "selectivity" not reach is 
the quality attribute. In the highly selective media, such as radio (excellent 
targeting of audience by age) or magazines (by interests), total medium reach 
may be irrelevant or negative. If advertisers are willing to pay more per ex-
posure when reach is greater, we infer that larger audiences are more valuable. 
Any of the arguments for economies of scale in distribution raised on p. 136, or 
12 Reach is sometimes understood to mean the fraction of a population in a particular geographic 
area that will be exposed to the message. This definition is particularly attractive in directing retailers' 
advertising expenditures. The alternative definition. and the one which makes sense for our pur-
poses. is nationwide total population reach. the nwnber of people in total who will be exposed to 
the message. 
13 See Marketing and !'v1edia Decisions. 
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the Steiner argument about advertismg/retail interactions (p. 137) imply that 
the manufacturer will value reach positively. Thus the inclusion of message reach 
as a quality variable allows a new inference about advertising scale economies. 
In addition to the econometric evidence on reach as a quality measure in the 
sections below, some further direct evidence is available for the network televi-
sion medium. Television audience sizes and CPMs vary across time of day, time 
of year, and across individual programs. Is there any persistent relationship be-
tween audience size and advertisers' willingness-to-pay for time on the pro-
gram? Three kinds of evidence are available (m order of increasing convinc-
ingness). First, popular programs that attract large audiences have higher CPMs 
than less successful ones. l4 This is consistent with the hypothesis that adver-
tisers are willing to pay for reach, but also with the hypothesis that that au-
dience attracted to popular programs is the most faddish, and therefore suscep-
tible, audience for advertisers. Second, audience size and CPM are positively 
correlated across time of day. Table 1 is extracted from Peterman's Table 1 with 
some further A.C. Nielsen data added. Note that the prime-time audience is 
not only more expensive than for the other times, it is more expensive per ex-
posure. Since the reach of prime-time programming much exceeds that of other 
times of day, this is in part evidence for reach as a positive quality attribute. 
But this time-of-day evidence is also ambiguous: the quality of the audience, 
as well as the size, could vary by time of day.15 The observable indicators of 
audience quality in the last two columns of Table 1 do not strongly suggest this, 
but unobservable audience quality variation could be driving the price differences. 
Further evidence by season of the year is shown in Table 2. The source is 
again Peterman. 16 The first row gives the ratio of spring and summer network 
television reach to the winter audience. (The temperature elasticity of viewing 
appears to be substantial, and to be higher in prime time than daytime.) The 
second row gives the ratio of "participation" (buying ad time without sponsor-
ing the entire program) prices to the peak winter ones. These fall off more than 
proportionately to the size of the audience. In the third row, CPM is calculated 
(from the first two rows) as a fraction of winter CPM. Note that as the audience 
size declines, CPM falls. That is to say, as the audience size falls, the cost of 
advertising time falls more than proportionately. Thus the smaller audience must 
be viewed as somehow less valuable by advertisers. No obvious quality of au-
dience explanation arises for this time-of-year data. 
14 See McGann and Russell. chapter five for typical figures. 
IS For example. daytime CPMs are much lower than evening CPMs. But very different kinds 
of people are at home during the day and in the evening. For some advertisers (as sellers of detergent) 
the daytime audience is more valuable because it contains a higher fraction of homemakers. The 
average advertiser. however. seems to value the access to entire households (and thus to entire 
decisionmaking units) that evening television affords. The evening audience is also on average 
somewhat better off financially. another on-balance positive quality feature of an audience. 
16 From an unnumbered table in his note 6. 
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There is a consistent relationship between reach and CPM that reveals that 
television advertisers are willing to pay more for greater reach, though the ef-
fect is not extremely large. 17 Some of the evidence for this variation is suscep-
tIble to alternative interpretations, but the weight of the evidence seems to be 
that there .is a small premium paid for greater reach. This suggests that reach 
may be a quality attribute in network TV, and thus that economies of size in 
the use of network TV may be present. 
4. Empirical Specification: Industry Data 
In this section, a system of demand equations for advertising by medium is 
specified for estimation on data from consumer goods industries in time series. 
The system will then be estimated for 6 industries. 11 The data are annual time 
series for 1967-198l. 
The core empirical assertions are threefold. First, mass-media advertising 
and convenience retail are asserted to be complements in the demand for 
distnbutive serviCes, and mass-media advertising and high-service retail are 
asserted to be substitutes. This can be tested by looking at the cross-elasticities 
of demand: changes in the relative prices of high- and low-service retail should 
shift the demand for advertising by medium. In particular, an increase in the 
relative price of high-service retail services should increase the demand for mass-
media advertising by manufacturers. Second, larger firms should differ from 
smaller ones in their use of the media because the distribution technology is 
inhomothetic. This implication will not be testable in a demand analysis at the 
level of industries. The empirical specification includes an indicator of the size 
distribution of firms for each industry. The purpose of this variable is not so 
much to detect any inhomotheticity but to correct for its presence in an 
econometric sense. Third, reach is asserted to be a quality attnbute for mass 
media, particularly television. This assertion is tested by including reach as a 
medium-enhancing input quality index, following the method suggested by 
Berndt. 
17 The size of the advertisers' wiliDgness-to-pay differential cannot easily be inferred from the 
prices alone. U the supply curve of mvertising time is upward sloping (because of rising ad conges-
tion costs or other reasons), supply responses will tend to even out price relative to advertisers' 
willingness to pay differentials. . 
11 They are Food Products, Confections and Soft Drinks, Beer, Wme and Liquor, Toiletries, Drugs 
and Remedies and Soaps, Cleaners and Polishes. The definition of an "Industry" here is taken 
from the LNA. Several observations should be made about this. First, LNA "industries" are not 
always comparable in definition to those used in other data sets or in the SIC. The 6 used here 
were selected in part because they were easily comparable either to single two- or three-digit SIC 
industries or to combinations 01. four-digit industries. Also, all service industries were not included 
because of diffiallties in putting together sensible indexes of cistribution costs other than advertis-
ing. The tobacco industry was not included because of the television advertising ban. Second, LNA 
figures cover only advertising by the larger firms. In practice, this is the national brands within 
the industry or the larger regional brands. As a result, the estimates are interpreted as the demand 
for advertising by such linus. 
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The functional form used here is the translog. It has its dependent variables 
S .. I, the share of medium m in total advertising expenditures of industry i. 
5.,1= 
for M-l of the M media. 19 In this definition, m stands for the medium at hand 
and n indexes all M media. The exogeneous variables are: 
1. Media Prices: P .. is the log of the CPM index for medium m, divided 
by the CPM index for medium M (outdoor).zo 
2. Retail Prices: P. is the log of the relative price of retail services in high-
service versus low-service outlets (also in logs).Z1 
3. Reach: R .. is an index of audience size for each medium. For the print 
media, it is the Gog of the) total cirallation of all newspaper supplements 
or all magazines.zz For the broadcast media, it is the Gog of the) total au-
dience of an stations at peak times of day. 23 
4. Size distribution: The four-firm concentration ratio, FI within the three-
digit SIC industry most closely corresponding to the industry definition 
is used.u 
The actual estimating equation takes the form: 
II In the empirical work. M is 6 and it is the equation for the outdoor medium which is dropped. 
Thus the dependent variables are the shares of newspapers (supplements). magazines. network 
tv. spot tv. and radio in total advertising expenditures by the industry. The practice of dropping 
the last equation follows from a difIicuIty if an are estimated-the error structure is singular because 
the last share can always be calculated from the rest. When estimation is by 3SLS. as here. the 
results do not change depeDding 011 which equatioa it is that is dropped. because d. an algebraic identity. 
20 As a result.. the homogeneity of the cost function in prices is imposed. 
21 The defiDitions of high-service and low-service (convenience) retail outlets are taken from the 
Technical Appendix to Porter. The price of retail services in a particular outlet form is calculated 
as the gross margin in that outlet times the wboIesale price index for the industry. The mix of retail 
outlets used within the high or low eervice retail sector by a particular industry is (again following 
the Porter Technical Appendix) calculated from the 1963 Census of Business. Thus the price index 
for each type of retail services varies by industry far two reasons. First. the (fixed) weights vary 
because different industries used di!erent kinds of outlets in 1963. (The confectionsl soda pop in-
dustry does not use any shoe stores. nor does the beer. wine and liquor industry use any depart-
ment stores.) Second. the producer price indexes for the different industries increase at different 
rates. so that the same gross margin is relatively more expensive for an industry with higher prices 
later on. 
Z2 Source: Cimdatitm. 
23 Source: A.C. Nielsen Audience Demographics. Radio Fact Book. Note that this definition gives 
the same "reach" to network and to spot TV. 
2' It is unlikely that there exists a form of inhomothetic cost function that leads to this specifica-
tion on an exact-aggregation criterion. A natural generalizatioa of the translog cost function leads 
to inclusion of the sums of squares of logs of output as a size distribution measure. Su Lau for 
a discussion of exact aggregation analysis in the face of inhoimothetic production technology. 
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M 
E 13 ...... (p. + "(.R.) + 13 ... ,./J. + 5 ...,,/ + o..uF. 
n=l 
for m = 1, ... ,M - 1 i = 1, .. ,1 
Interpretation of the parameters a, 13, "(. 0 shows that this specification cap-
tures our main concerns. Note first that a varies both by industry and by medium. 
Thus, the shares of the different media can vary in an unrestricted way across 
industries. Second, note that wherever the price of an exposure, P., enters, 
it enters in the form P. + "( .. R •. To interpret this, consider the demand func-
tions for all media written in unlogged form. Let P... -= /og(P ... ), so that P ... is 
CPM for medium m, and let R ... = 10g(K...) , so that K.. is the audience size. 
Then the price of medium m would appear as P ... (K ... )"· in the unlogged demand 
functions. If "(. is negative. an increase in reach lowers the effective price of 
the medium. This means that reach is being treated as a purely own-medium 
enhancing quality variable. 25 If the l3's are all zero, then changes in the relative 
prices of different media do not affect the expenditure shares. In that case, all 
of the own-price elasticities of demand for media will be -1, and all of the cross-
price elasticities will be o. The parameters 13_ allow the elasticities to vary. 
13 ...... determines the own-price elasticity of the demand for media m, while 13 .... , 
m distinct from n, determines whether m and n are substitutes or complements 
in demand. Symmetry (13.... = 13 .... ) has been imposed, as have the adding-up 
restrictions on the as and the I3 ..... S.26 Similarly, 13 .... determines whether m is 
a substitute or a complement for a high level of service at retail.27 
The parameters 0 are included to account for the absence of Q or v as ex-
ogeneous variables. In large part, size and quality disappear from the right-hand 
side because the dependent variable is share, not level. Thus only the extent 
to which large size or high quality tends to use the medium to an extraordinary 
extent is there any need to include them. The proxies used here are F., which 
as suggested above is intended to capture the size-effects (in this aggregate 
data) and time, which is intended to capture any long-term trends in distribu-
tion quality not resulting from movements in relative prices. 
Estimation is on the five media equations simultaneously by 3SLS. The prices 
of the media are taken to be exogeneous, as are R ... and the retail prices.28 
2S Lau· s and Berndt' s results show that this fonn will hold whenever the .. production function" 
has a_ and K_ in it only though a- / {K_P". That is. increases in the quality of a medium have the 
same effects on the marginal product of other media as an increase in quantity would have. The 
interesting practical case that this rules out is direct impacts of the quality of one medium on the 
effectiveness of another. In their work, for example. Lau and Berndt are concerned that the quality 
variable .. fuel efficiency" attached to machines directly affects the marginal physical product of fuel. 
not that of machines. so that this quality variable is incorrectly treated as purely machine-enhancing. 
There are obvious analogs to this situation in the advertising demand. 
26 The adding-up restrictions do not appear explicitly because the demand for the retail services 
equations are not explicitly treated. 
27 The sign of {3;, does not alone determine whether i and j are complements or substitutes. See 
Denny et 31. for the relevant fonnulae. 
) 
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5. Empirical Results: Industry Data 
The results of this estimation are presented in table 3. The first thing to 
note about this table is that several extremely insignificant variables have been 
deleted from the analysis. These are the concentration ratios and all of the reach 
variables except that for network television. The insignificance of the concen-
tration ratios is disappointing, because it suggests that the inhomotheticity was 
not present. The insignificance of the reach measures is less troubling, since 
the most compelling reach-as-quality story is that for network TV. The coeffi-
cient of Rrv-N_ rk is negative and quite significant statistically, but quite small 
in economic terms. This reinforces the impression of section 3 that audience 
size is a positive quality attribute to buyers of network TV ad time. But it also 
reinforces the impression of that section that the size of this effect is not great. 
The other coefficients of primary interest relate to the substi.tution between 
retail services and advertising demand by medium. The coefficients {3"" .... il for 
each of the five advertising media imply that a fall in the price of low-service 
retail relative to high-service retail will increase the fraction of ad budgets going 
to magazines and to network TV, and will decrease the fraction going to radio, 
newspapers, and spot TV. This strongly supports a view of the distribution 
system in which the nationwide media-magazines and network television-are 
complements for low-service retail. and local media-radio. newspapers and spot 
TV -are complements for high-service retail.29 Although this was not exactly 
the view the introduction suggested. it is nonetheless consistent with the overall 
view of the distribution system exposited in this paper. 
It is important at this juncture to say precisely what has been established. 
The inhometheticity of the demand system does not necessarily imply increas-
ing returns. 30 Instead. it implies that the degree of returns to scale rises when 
the relative price of national advertising media falls. It is possible that the results 
imply only that the degree of decreasing returns to scale in distribution is now 
less than in earlier times. Only under the further (untested) assumption that 
retail services are used in fixed proportion to sales does the increasing returns 
result follow. 
28 The defense of the assumption that price is exogeneous is the usual one in the systems of 
demand equations literature: errors in the demand equations of the firms at hand are unlikely to 
be sufficiently large to affect prices. A slightly superior version of that defense is available in this 
case because there does seem to be some evidence that the long-run movements in ad and retail 
prices are driven by forces other than shifting demand by advertisers. The clearest long-run trends 
are the fall in broadcast media CPMs relative to print media. which is clearly consistent with cost 
shifts in the electronic age, and the rise of high-service relative to low-service retail costs, probably 
driven by long-term cost trends. Similarly, the response of newspaper ad prices to the 1970's bulge 
in the price of newsprint is marked. The fall in television ad rates following the ban on cigarette 
advertising is demand-driven but can clearly be taken to be exogeneous to the other industries studied 
here. 
29 The sense of "local" here must be understood precisely. The advertising figures used here 
are manufacturer advertising. They include cooperative expenditures, in which the ad time is boUght 
for the manufacturer by a retailer (or in which costs are shared) but exclude advertising by retailers. 
30 lowe this point to James Ferguson and Richard Kihlstrom. 
. 
• 
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6. Empirical Results: Brewing Firm Data 
This section estimates the same model as the last one, but on a time-series 
cross-section of six brewing finns31 rather than whole industries. The same 
IS-year tUne-series of annual data is used. The primary advantage of this change 
is that it will allow the explicit treatment of finn size-the inhomotheticity of 
the distribution "production" function can be directly assessed. This is ac-
complished by including finn quantity32 as an exogeneous variable in each equa-
tion. Thus the estimating equation now takes the form: 
M 
s"" = ex"" + r;~"".(p.+'Y.R") +~""jJ_ 
n = 1 
+ 0"".1 + ~"'QQ, 
for m = 1, ... ,M - 1 
/ = 1, .. ,6 
where/now indexes firms, and Q, is the Oog) quantity. For brewing firms, main-
taining the six separate advertising media is not feasible. Instead, magazines, 
spot TV and network TV remain, but the other three are aggregated into a single 
medium for which a price index is constructed.33 Thus M = 4 for this analysis. 
Otherwise, estimation is as in the last section. 
The insignificant variables in this analysis include all of the reach measures, 
including network television, as well as the time variable in each of the three 
estimated share equations. The price index for the combined fourth medium 
is also everywhere very insignificant. As before, the specification without the 
extremely insignificant coefficients is the one reported. The insignificance of 
RTV • N • __ k may arise because it measures the wrong audience. It was defined 
as peak-time audience, and brewers do not buy much prime television time. 
Their expenditures tend to be concentrated in sports programming, a distinct 
audience. 
The results about substitution between retail services and advertising media 
confirm those of the preceeding section. Here, magazines and network TV are 
complements for low-service retail, spot TV is a complement for high-service 
retail. 
The demand functions show considerable inhomotheticity in the estimates of 
~"'Q' An increase in firm size will tend to increase the share of network TV at 
31 Pabst. Anheuser-Busch. Coors. Schlitz. Miller. Olympia. 
32 Defined as the log of production of beer in barrels. 
33 This is done because the fourth "medium." outdoor plus radio plus newspapers. rarely ex-
ceeds one-tenth of any of these brewers ad expenditures. 
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the expense of spot TV and of magazines. This result shows up even though 
the firm-specific intercepts for each of the demand equations have been includ-
ed. Thus the cross-section variation (A-B tending to use more network TV than 
Coors) does not enter into the estimated coefficient on Q. Only the tendency 
of the indiVidual firm to change its media mix when it grows larger affects this 
estimate. (It also is independent of the simple advance of time, as shown by 
the insignificance of the o,s.) 
Thus the brewing-firm data tend to confirm a central part of the story: that 
the distribution "production" function is inhomothetic, with large scale tending 
to be Network-TV and Magazines using. It is not surprising that these national 
media are the ones more favored as brewing firms grow larger. Over the sam-
ple period, an important source of growth for brewers was conversion of regional 
brands into national ones. 
7. Advertising Scale Economies and the AlS-Size Relationship 
There is a great deal of controversy about the interpretation of a common 
empirical finding in the advertising literature. Within industries, the advertis-
ing/sales ratio is higher for smaller firms. 34 
The controversy is between two competing intuitions. One intuition is usual-
ly presented by the scholar making the finding. It treats A/S as the "unit cost 
of advertising" and says that it is lower for larger firms, hence larger firms are 
able to buy the "needed" advertising services cheaper. This intuition is then 
used to interpret the finding in a way that suggests that the "need" to adver-
tise constitutes an important source of lower average costs for larger firms in 
the industry(ies) in which the phenomenon is observed. This will lead to more 
concentration and thus more market power. The other intuition is built around 
the observation that advertising is a choice variable of firms. The uses of "unit," 
"cost" and "need" in the preceding argument were all clearly incorrect. A/S 
is the ratio of two dollar quantities, so that the "unit" label is clearly wrong. 
Advertising is a choice variable, and presumably influences sales through the 
34 See for example Brown. For the purposes of this paper. I will take this to be an established 
fact, and will take it to mean that all other things equal, a "larger" finn will spend less on advenis-
ing per dollar of sales. Here larger might mean demanded by more persons, or with larger manufac-
turing capacity, or available in more regions. This obviously sweeps under the rug a great many 
real concerns about whether this finding is a finding. For example, many scholars have suggested 
that larger/smaller firms are in different market segments. Thus the tendency of larger finns to 
behave differently may not necessarily have represented an an other things equal experiment. See 
Albion and Farris, Ch. 5, and Simon and Crain for this criticism. Nothing in this paper will resolve 
these issues: only the question of interpretation is addressed. I note in passing, however, that the 
simple observation that large firms do less advertising because they have more goodwill does not 
constitute a case against declining AlS finding. If larger firms generate more goodwill because they 
are large, then that is a clear economy of scale in distribution. If, as I presume these critics are 
actually saying, 6nns are large because they have good products. and they therefore need to advertise 
little as well, the critic's case is in fact made. 
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demand curve, so that the "cost" label is clearly wrong. Iflarger firms do in-
deed get more services per advertising dollar, then they might choose to do 
more advertising as a result, so that the "need" language is clearly wrong. 
(This counter-argument is made in very abbreviated form in Simon-Arndt.) Thus 
the conclusions of the first-intuition are not warranted. 
This question can be posed in a simple way: will the dollar amount of adver-
tising "A" divided by dollar sales "S" be larger or smaller for larger firms if 
there are economies of scale in advertising? The two intuitions are directly op-
posed: if advertising services, in efficiency units, are cheaper on the average 
for big firms, then they will spend less on them. On the other hand, the firm 
should respond to a cheaper input by buying more of it, so that we should ex-
pect big firms to buy more efficiency units of advertising. The unifying concept 
here is that of the elasticity of demand for advertising. Expenditures on an in-
put go up or down with price depending on the elasticity of demand for that 
input, whether it is greater or less than -1. Thus intuition 1 above corresponds 
to thinking in which advertising is inelastically demanded, and intuition 2 to think-
ing in which it is elastically demanded. A simple model shows that this Wlifying 
analysis is correct, but that -1 is not the aucial cutoff for the demand elasticity 
in the AJS case. 
The analytical model for this issue conceptualizes advertising scale economies 
in a simple way: larger firms can buy efficiency units of advertising cheaper. 
This model is designed to represent a situation somewhat like the following: 
suppose there could be either regional and national firms. Each regional firm 
faces the same demand curve for its product as a function of price and of effi-
ciency units of advertising. There is no demand interaction between regions. 
Since regional firms do not value messages delivered outside their region, each 
buys spot TV exclusively. The national firm, on the other hand, would have 
as its demand curve the sum of those of all the regional firms""':meaning that 
sending the total of all the regional firms' advertising messages and charging 
the same price will lead to the same sales as all of the regionals together. But 
the national firm can buy network TV, which is cheaper per message delivered 
than spot. When would AJ5 be larger for the national firms? In this (obviously 
stylized) situation, it is easy to get the answer in analytical terms.35 
For simplicity, assume that advertising in a single medium is the only choice 
35 This analysis can be reinterpreted very easily for a slightly less stylized situation. that of a 
"popular" versus an "unpopular" brand. Suppose that the only available media are mass media. 
that is, that the manufacturers of unpopular bnmds cannot buy audiences which contain a large frac-
tion of their natural consumers. Then the analysis goes thraJgh as written. with P. interpreted 
as cost per thousand exposures to lIN lmmd's customers. Thus the "price" will be higher for the 
unpopular brand. The analysis needs some small alteration to deal with another slightly less styliz-
ed situation. Suppose that the expenditure function per efficiency units of advertising, A(a), does 
not take the linear form A - P.a but instead exhibits increasing returns. Now suppose that large 
firms and small firms differ in the size of the market over whi:h they can spread those diminishing 
returns. This (different) model yields results essentially like those reported in this section, but its 
analytics are not reported here. 
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variable in the firms' distribution system. Label the price of advertising messages 
delivered as Pa and the quantity of messages delivered as a, so that a is effi-
ciency units of advertising for this case. Then advertising expenditures, A, are 
given by A = Paa. There is also a demand curve (written in inverse form) given 
by P = P(Q,a), where Q is quantity sold and P price. We interpret P( ) either 
as the demand curve of the representative regional firm or of the national firm-an 
interpretation which makes sense given that there are no regional demand in-
terreactions, and if the demand elasticities are the same in all regions. We assume 
only that marginal revenue is downward sloping in Q and increasing in a. The 
firm picks Q and a so as to maximize 
QP(Q,a) - meQ - Paa (5) 
where me is the (constant) marginal cost of production. Note that in this simple 
situation the intermediate step of defining a distribution cost function is skip-
ped. Instead, the approach is to directly maximize profits. The solution to the 
manufacturer's problem is given by the a and Q which solve 
P(Q,a) + QP1(Q,a) = me (6) 
and 
. QPz(Q,a) = P. (7) 
where subscripts to P( ) indicate partial derivatives. These equations directly 
imply two familiar results. Let -TIp and 1/a be the elasticity of quantity demanded 
with respect to price and a respectively. (Thus these are the elasticities of the 
structural demand curve, not of any equilibrium relation.) Then we have: 
1 P(I - _) = me (8) 
1/p 
directly from the (6). To manipulate (7), note this relationship between the 
derivatives of the inverse demand curve (P = P(Q,a)) and of the direct de-
mand curve (Q = Q(P,a)): 
(9) 
Substituting this into (7) above yields: 
(10) 
Multiplying and dividing on the left by p, Q and a leaves: 
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Q a' Q 
-( - IQ.) • (-. Qz) • P • - = P. P Q a (11) 
which is the familiar Dorfman and Steiner result, 
.!l! = A (12) 
1/p 5 
An immediate implication of (12) is that, when 1/p and 1/. are constant, AJS 
will be invariant in P.. So for the constant demand-elasticity case, variations 
in AJS by size of firm cannot indicate either that larger firms buy advertising 
services more expensively or more cheaply. They must indicate some other 
difference in the environment. 
By going on to get the comparative statics of A/S in P., we can see that, 
depending on the demand system, AJS can either be increasing or decreasing 
in P •. Thus a monotone relationship between AJS and 5 could indicate either 
more or less expensive efficiency units of advertising for larger firms. But the 
comparative statics analysis will also reveal the observable conditions under which 
each inference is warranted. First define MR(Q,a) = P(Q,a) + QP.(Q,a). Then 
a slightly involved comparative statics exercise shows that: 
(13) 
(14) 
where 
(15) 
With this in hand, we can move toward the comparative statics of A and S. First 
note that 
(16) 
Using the definitions of A and 5, it is easy to see that 
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aA = 1. (1 + T/p. ) 
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(17) 
where the notation T/p. denotes the elasticity of a with respect to P., determin-
ed by the finn's optimum, this is the demand elasticity for advertising services, 
and: 
~ = P aQ + Q (PI aQ + Pz ~ ) 
ap. ap. ap. ap. 
= P(l _ 1-) aQ _ ~ P Qz 
T/p ap. ap. T/p 
where the last equality uses MR = P(l - lIT/p). Hence: 
(18) 
These are sufficient to prove the result of central interest: 
(19) 
-
As expected, the more elastic the demand for advertising services is, the 
greater the tendency for AlS to be higher for the finn that buys advertising more 
cheaply. But the cutoff elasticity is not unity. Instead, it depends on market 
power, on the responsiveness of the size of the finn to the price of advertising, 
and on the advertising sales ratio. The counterintuitive result is that the low-Po 
finn has the high A/S. This result is made more likely by a higher AlS, by more 
market power, or by a lessened responsiveness of the size of the finn to p •. 
The meaning of this analysis for the interpretation of the empirical finding should 
now be made clear. Instead of being evidence for economies of scale in adver-
tising, the higher AIS numbers for smaller finns could be evidence for the 
reverse. This counterintuitive possibility does not require extreme values for 
the elasticities at all. It is an empirical question whether the higher AIS for small 
finns is evidence for or against scale economies. 
This question can, fortunately, be resolved empirically. The brewing industry 
studied in the last section allows a sensible test, since it exhibits the declining 
. 
• 
Page 154 ITC CONSUMER PROTECTION CONFERENCE 
AJS ratio. Anheuser-Busch, by far the largest finn, has an AJS (in 1982. Source: 
Advertising Age.) of .013. The average of the next four finns is over .005. Is 
this evidence that Anheuser-Busch faces a decreasing returns to advertising, 
as Arndt and Simon suggest, or that efficiency units of advertising can be bought 
more cheaply by the giant firm, as Brown and Peles would interpret it? 
The question turns on the sign a(AJS)/ap., which can go either way analytically. 
This section finishes by estimating that sign, using the brewing firm data.36 The 
model of this section, unlike lle cost-minimizing model behind the estimating 
equations of the previous two sections, is a model of the eqmlibrium of the whole 
firm. That is, the derivative whose sign we wish to determine is along the 
reduced-form of the entire firm's equilibrium, not any structural equation. Thus 
we regress (AJS) on quantitative measures of the firm's environment, but not 
on any choice variables of the firm. 
For this test, we use the advertising and sales data on only three brewing 
firms: Anheuser-Busch, Coors, and Pabst37 for the same IS-year period. The 
dependent variable is 10g(AJS). The intercept is allowed to vary across the three 
firms, but all of the slope coefficients are the same. It is not obvious what the 
determinants of AJS over time should be. The ones used here are the Oog, real) 
price of advertising, 38 disposable income, brewing average costs,39 and a dum-
my for the period 1974 on to capture the effect of the invention of "light" beer.40 
The results are presented in table 5. The question of primary interest, the 
elasticity of AJS with res~ to P., seems resolved in favor of a positive coeffi-
cient. The estimate is positive in all three specifications. The exact magnitude 
of a(AJS)/ap. is not clear from the estimates, since it seems to be quite sen-
sitive to specification. 
The Rl figures presented in table 5 are the percent of variances in the (AJS) 
data explained by the exogeneous variables other than the three firm dummies. 
That is, they are calculated from the residual of the errors in the specification 
and the residual variance in a specification which has only the three firm dum-
mies in it. The fit is excellent, given this definition. 
In time series, when the real price of advertising falls, brewing firms AJS fall 
3e Note that the evidence of the last section .did not bear on this question. since it asked only 
about the allocation of advertising ezpenditures within the total ad budget. It did oot estimate any 
equation determining the size of the 'total. 
37 In the brewing industry. S is rather more difficult to observe than Q. I am grateful to Professor 
. George Foster of the Stanford Business School for help in obtaining data on the donar sales of beer 
of these three firms. 
31 This is a Tornquist price index of the media CPMs using brewing-industry weights. See Baker 
and Bresnahan for precise descriptions of an of the data used in this secti<m. 
31 As defined in the census of manufacturers but excluding advertising. This is the average for 
all brewers . 
.0 The purchase of Miller Brewing by a cigarette company was followed not only by a substantial 
increase in advertising per baITel by that (and later other) firm but by a burst of new-product in-
troductions. These are broadly believed to have changed the nature of competitive interaction in 
the industry. 
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as well. Analytically, this means that the demand for advertising services by 
brewers is not very elastic. But it also means that the tendency of larger brewers 
to have lower AlS is consistent with their efficiency units of advertising cheaper 
than their smaller competitors. 
9. Conclusions 
In this paper, evidence on the role of advertising in the distribution system 
has been assembled. The overall conception of the distribution system suggested 
in the introduction-that high-service retail is a substitute for, and low-service 
retail a complement with advertising-has been modified slightly. If it is taken 
to mean advertising in the national media, network television and magazines, 
then the conception is correct. For other forms of manufacturer advertising, 
the substitution/complementarity results are reversed. 
Some further evidence that the social production function for distributive ser-
vices is inhomothetic has also been presented. There is direct evidence of this 
from the brewing firms' demand for advertising. This implies that a fall in the 
price of network televisx,n, or of its complement, low-service retail, will increase 
the degree of returns to scale. As a result, we can conclude either that there 
are increasing returns to distribution at modem prices or (at least) that decreasing 
returns have grown less important over time. Either finding is consistent with 
the theory that changes in the prices of distnbutive services contributed to the 
growth of concentration in cQnsumer-product industries in the postwar era. 
Two other kinds of evidence were presented. Further evidence that network 
television reach is a quality attribute was available from the relative prices (per 
exposure) of advertising time for different size audiences. A conceptual difficul-
ty with studies using the AlS ratio was resolved in favor of the interpretation 
that large firms' lower AlS indicates increasing returns to advertising. 
In short, a great many methodologies for assessing economies of scale in adver-
tising suggest that there are in fact some scale economies. Of these, only the 
AlS studies alluded to rely in any way on differences between large and small 
firms in cross-section. None of the results suggest extremely large economies, 
but all of the analysis was done on fairly substantial firms. Thus the possibility 
of more important scale economies at· smaller scale cannot be ruled out. 
The empirical results provide an explanation of the rise of the firm specializ-
ing in national brands through an increase over time in the degree of manufac-
turer scale economies in the use of the distribution system. That increase is 
driven by changes in the relative prices of different parts of the system, especially 
high- versus low-service retail, and by the invention of new national media, 
such as television. The evidence here is from a relatively short time period after 
the rise of the national-brand firms, and was not limited to firms already na-
tional in scope. Thus it is independent of the long-term trend, tending to con-
firm one theory of that trend. 
Since a recent review of the literature on economies of scale in advertising 
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concluded that the assertion that economies exist is a "myth," (Arndt and Simon) 
it is appropriate to relate the results found here to alternative approaches. 
1. Production Functions for Sales. Studies in which advertising combines with 
other inputs to produce sales, and in which this production function is directly 
estimated, are unlikely to reveal much about scale economies. The results 
presented here indicate that the distnbution technology is quite inhomothetic. 
In these circumstances, drawing a returns-to-scale inference from an estimated 
production function is extremely difficult. 
2. Advertising Response Functions. Studies of the way in which consumers 
respond to increasing levels of advertising messages (a special case of the pro-
duction function approach) cannot reveal anything about economies of scale in 
distribution. A rational firm will always operate in a region of diminishing return 
to advertising expenditures. Further, advertising response functions implicitly 
ask the question, would sending more messages to the same audience have in-
creasing or diminishing returns? This is simply the wrong question. For exam-
ple, it does not capture any distribution cost savings that might arise if regional 
firms were replaced by a national firm. In this case, both the size of the firm 
and the size of the audience increase. The to-be-explained fact is the rise of 
the national branded consumer product, and of the large firms selling such prod-
ucts. Thus the change from regional to national firms is more than hypothetical. 
I conclude by observing that this paper has no direct welfare-economic im-
plications. Just as changes in transportation costs in the last century led to ex-
ploitation of scale economies in manufacturing, changes in communication and 
distribution costs led to exploitation by national-brand firms of scale economies 
in the distribution function. In both cases, there is probably an increase in market 
power. But there is also a social cost saving due to the increase in firm· size. 
Thus, no welfare inference is warranted. 
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Table 1 
AUDIENCE SIZE AND CPM BY TIME OF DAY: NETWORK TV 
WINTER 1976-1977 
CPM/2 Prime Household Income3 Small· 
Time of Day Audience Size l TIme CPM > $15,000 Household 
Prime TimeS 64.5 1.00 112 112 
Late Evening6 26.9 .96 107 109 
Early Evening7 49.0 .90 97 108 
1 In millions of HUT: year-round average. Source: Nielsen Audience Demographic Report. 
2 NBC and CBS. (Network ad rate at this time divided by network ad rate in prime time)/(Net-
work HUT at this time I Network HUT in prime time.) Adapted from Petennan, Table 1, p. 553. 
3 (Percentage of this type of household watching at this time) I (percentage of all households.) 
Source: Nielsen Audience Demographic Report. 
• As in 3. "Small" is one or two persons. 
S 8:00 to 11:00 p.m. 
&- 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 a.m. 
7 6:00 to 8:00 p.m. 
Table 2 
AUDIENCE SIZE AND CPM BY TIME OF YEAR: NETWORK TV 
1965-1966 
Daytime Daytime Evening Evening 
Spring Summer Spring Swnmer 
HUT/(Winter HUn 92.4 88.5 85.7 72.3 
Price/(Winter Price) 89.7 86.7 83.3 68.3 
CPM ratio .97 .98 .97 .94 
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Table 3 
DEMAND FOR ADVERTISING MEDIA BY INDUSTRY 
Parameter 
allii 
BN..-,., ".4i. 
BAI .... , ItMI. 
BTY ........... , IIq~. 
.,TV-N_· 
BTY_s,... a.,u. 
Bllu_ • • u_ 
0,..4 .. , rt_ 
B,. ..... , ,....a 
BN...,,,., ItI.,.· 
BM.,.., Mo,.-
Brv_Nnw _, 116 .... 
BTY•s,.... II .... 
OM .... , , •• _ 
B",.,.., r ..... ' 
BN_",., TV-J~' 
BTY ......... , TV_S"., 
Brv_s"." TV-S"., 
O"'.S"." ,~_ 
Brv.s"." rftail 
BN_"., N_,,· 
Brv_N __ , H_II' 
ON_."., .,_ 
BN-."., rwtoll 
Brv_N ...... o, TV.Norw-
OTVoN ....... , ..... 
Brv.N_., r.,.a 
Summary Statistics: 
Dependent Variable: Radio Share 
R2: .63 
Durbin-Watson Statistic: 1.1276 
Dependent Variable: Magazine Share 
R2: .75 
Estimate 
(suppressed) 
-O.18372E-Ol 
0.14193E-01 
-0.63726E-01 
-0.22769E-01 
0.20660E-01 
o .28526E-01 
0.25435E-02 
-0. 14764E-01 
0.25941E-01 
-0.14488E-01 
-O.40546E-01 
0.38283E-Ol 
0.65724E-02 
0.18128 
0.1375OE-01 
0.17328 
-0.24928 
-O.13260E-Ol 
-1.18253 
-O.32778E-02 
0.11582E-01 
-O.5202E-03 
-O.4256OE-Ol 
-O.48554E-Ol 
0.66011E-02 
0.21223 
Durbin-Watson Statistic: 2.4622 
Dependent Variable: Spot Television Share 
R2: .69 
Durbin-Watson Statistic: 1.6522 
Dependent Variable: Newspaper Share 
R2: .53 
Durbin-Watson Statistic: 1.2291 
Dependent Variable: Network Television Share 
R2: .84 
Durbin-Watson Statistic: 1.6126 
Standard Error 
(suppressed) 
0.19586E-Ol 
0.24872E-01 
0.26681E-01 
0.52237E-02 
0.23594E-Ol 
0.42035E-02 
0.10973E-02 
0.50591E-Ol 
0.23265E-Ol 
0.12542 
0.87374E-01 
0.12815 
0.10377E-02 
0.12200 
0.20110E-Ol 
0.12701 
0.19634 
0.73404E-02 
0.37009 
0.27066E-01 
0.83022E-02 
0.95783E-03 
0.43255E-Ol 
. 14701E-Ol 
0.39253E-02 
0.62745E-Ol 
. 
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Table 4 
BREWING FIRMS DEMAND FOR ADVERTISING MEDIA 
WINTER 1976-1977 
Parameter Estimate 
aM .... ' A •• 
ClM .... ' " .... 
aM .... ' c.,., 
HM ., •• , All .... 
Brv . N_., AI ... • 
Brv.s"ou AI ... • 
B ...... , Q. 
BM .... , ..... 11 
arv.s __ . A-. 
aTV.S,...., " • .., 
a:TV_S,..., C.r. 
BrvoN .... , TV-S,... 
BTVoS..-_ TV-,s"or 
BTY . s ..... , go 
BTY•s ..... , ..... il 
Q'TV.N .... ·' A-. 
QTV.N_-, "aM 
QTV-N .... ·' c..,., 
Brv_N_o, TV-Nnw-
BTV .. V.,.,. Q. 
Brv _N __ , ..... iI 
Summary Statistics: 
Dependent Variable: Magazine Share 
R2: .80 
Durbin-Watson Statistic: 1.2721 
Dependent Variable: Spot Television Share 
R2: .71 
Durbin-Watson Statistic: 2.0239 
0.20028 
-0.20151 
-0.25789 
-0.31692 
-0.65124 
0.35175 
-0.32992 
0.57239 
-0.84237 
-0.42146 
-0.26393 
-0.60879 
0.49092 
-0.95173 
-1.1127 
2.0307 
1.9833 
1.7850 
-2.4139 
0.18626 
0.94625 
Dependent Variable: Network Television Share 
R2: .64 
Durbin-Watson Statistic: 1.6536 
Standard error 
0.49580 
0.50313 
0.50552 
0.29903 
0.38490 
0.39498 
0.50464E-01 
0.39481 
1.3166 
1.3090 
1.3067 
0.74739 
0.81756 
0.15061 
.51148 
1.5464 
1.5433 
1.5420 
0.60778 
0.74880E-01 
.29407 
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Table 5 
BREWING FIRM AlS REGRESSION REsULTSl 
A-B 7.9073 6.3817 7.6860 
(9.0977) (9.8792) (0.77538) 
PABST 10.130 8.6135 9.9181 
(9.0976) (9.8795) (0.75586) 
COORS 7.7072 6.1862 7.4906 
(9.1000) (9.8819) (0.79574) 
Y 1.0800 
(.53996) 
LRAC -0.42108 0.44358 
(3.1033) (3.3488) 
LITE -0.46221 0.35668 0.36540 
(.47023) (.25203) (0.23614) 
LRPA 3.5136 .27754 .29679 
(3.0693) (.0962) (.0479) 
R-SQUARED 0.912 0.889 0.882 
DURBIN-WATSON 2.0017 1.8134 1.8135 
1 Standard errors in parentheses. Sample size: 45. 
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Comments 
James M. Ferguson 
Federal Trade Commission 
Bresnahan poses an interesting question - what explains the relative growth 
of national brands in the twentieth century? The author makes three arguments. 
First. he argues that using advertising has become relatively less expensive over 
time compared to using retailers to provide information to consumers. Second. 
he argues that the "production" of distribution services. including the informa-
tion services provided by advertising and by retailers. is inhomothetic. Third. 
he argues that the electronic mass media are more effectively used by large 
firms. As a result. the fall in the relative price of advertising services has led 
to the substitution of advertising for retailer information services and to an in-
crease in the degree of returns to scale in distribution. The author claims he 
demonstrates that economies of scale in advertising and distnbution are greater 
than before. especially for large firms. the development of which explains the 
relative growth of national brands. His evidence does not support his claim. 
According to Bresnahan. there are two basic forms of retail distribution. In 
the traditional form the retailer spends a great deal of time informing or convinc-
ing the consumer to buy the brand. In the convenience form the retailer only 
provides low-cost consumer access to the brands. The traditional retail distribu-
tion method is labor-intensive. so it has become relatively more expensive with 
the rise in wage rates. The convenience method of retail distribution is national 
advertising-intensive. and has become relatively less expensive with the growth 
of the electronic advertising media. Thus. the cost-minimizing distnbution system 
has shifted away from high-cost. high-service retail outlets toward low-cost. 
low-service retail outlets "plus manufacturers' advertising (or cooperative adver-
tising between manufacturers and retailers)." 
The author argues that while the two different forms of retail distribution are 
substitutes. high-service retailing and national advertising are long-run substitutes 
in distribution while national advertising and low-service retail outlets are com-
plements. Apparently. this argument is based on the view that national brand 
advertising. especially in the more efficient electronic media. will increase retail 
sales at low-service retail outlets. However. I see no reason why it would not 
also increase sales at high-service retail outlets. I see national advertising as 
a technical complement in distribution to both types of retail outlets as well as 
a substitute in response to a relative price change. Thus. I disagree with the 
basic hypothesis of the paper. 
Furthermore. nowhere does the author mention the growth of retail adver-
165 
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tising in response to the rise in the cost of personal retailer information ser-
vices. Retail advertising, especially in daily newspapers, exceeds national adver-
tising in television. Since local advertising rates are often substantially lower 
than natic;>nal advertising rates, I would expect a major, if not primary, effect 
of the rise in wage rates and the cost of personal retailer information services 
to be to substitute retail advertising for personal retailer information services. 
The author chooses to define economies of scale as a downward sloping 
average cost curve, the definition of which does not require a homothetic pro-
duction function. However, in the presence of specialized resources, average 
cost is determined by price, so neither the shape nor the level of average cost 
is very informative. Nevertheless his hypothesis is that average distribution cost 
now declines more steeply in many consumer goods markets than it did long ago. 
He uses the sophisticated translog functional fonn in estimating a system of 
industry equations for advertising services by media in each of six consumer-
goods industries and additionally for six firms in the brewing industry. Unfor-
tunately, I doubt the relevance of this empirical analysis to the preceding 
theoretical discussion. I also find the evidence on the relationships between the 
ratio of advertising to sales and firm size to be even less useful. 
The data cover six consumer product categories - food products; confec-
tions and soft drinks; beer, wine, and liquor; toiletries; drugs and remedies; 
and soaps, cleansers, and polishes. I doubt that any of these products involve 
much retailer informing of the consumer during the period covered by the data. 
1967-1981. (The data do not include newspaper advertising, except newspaper 
supplements.) 
Since I have doubts about the approach underlying the empirical analysis. I 
will only briefly comment on the empirical results. The dependent variable is 
the share of advertising expenditures in each media in each of six so-called con-
sumer product industries. One of the independent variables is the ratio of the 
price of retail services in high-service versus low-service outlets. The price of 
retail services for each type of retail outlet is its gross margin times the wholesale 
price index for the consumer products industry. It is difficult to understand what 
this variable measures. It does not measure the retail margins for the specific 
consumer products in question. nor does it reflect the possibly different prices 
charged different types of retail outlets by producers. 
The author reports that the results indicate that a fall in the relative price 
of low-service retail distribution will increase the fraction of ad expenditures 
in these six consumer product industries going to magazines and network televi-
sion and decrease the share going to radio, newspapers, and spot television. 
The author claims this evidence strongly supports a view of the distribution 
system in which the nationwide media - magazines and network television -
are complements for low-service retail, and local media - radio, newspapers, 
and spot TV -are complements for high-service retail. Why only these two media 
show a rise is puzzling. As he recognizes the theoretical discussion suggested 
a substitution of all media advertising for retail consumer infonnation services 
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in response to a rise in the price of retail information services, I have an alter-
native explanation. The advertising data used by the author exclude cooperative 
advertising purchased by the retailer, whether or not paid for by the manufac-
turer. Since such cooperative advertising is concentrated in local media, the omis-
sionof this sizable component of advertising can distort the results. 
The author recognizes that establishing the inhomotheticity of the demand 
for distribution services does not necessarily imply increasing returns, because 
the untested assumptions that retail services are used in fixed proportions to 
retail sales and that advertising messages increase much less than proportionately 
to sales may not be correct. The author's troubles are compounded, because 
the reported lack of significance of the coefficients of the concentration ratio 
variable suggests inhomotheticity was not present. (He does find it present for 
the brewing firm data.) He claims that analysis of data for six brewing firms 
for the same IS-year period confirms that magazines and network television 
are favored by brewing firms as they grow larger. 
In his conclusions, Bresnahan claims that either there are increasing returns 
to distribution at modem prices or that decreasing returns are less than before. 
, 'Either finding is consistent with the theory that changes in the prices of 
distributive services contributed to the growth of concentration in consumer-
products industries in the postwar era. " This is incorrect. beCause the so-called 
economies of scale are not industry specific. As I pointed out in my book. Adver-
tisingand Competition: Theory, Measurement, Fad (Ballinger, 1974, pp. 16-17). 
if there are economies of scale which are not industry specific. the greater 
minimum efficient size of firm will reduce the number of efficient firms in the 
economy but need not reduce the number in any industry and thus need not 
have any effect on industry concentration. 
II 
Kotowitz and Mathewson argue that advertising may mislead consumers in 
the short run, while consumers are learning about experience quality. In this 
situation. price premiums exist because advertising is a substitute for experience 
quality, not a signal of experience quality. Is it possible. they ask. to reconcile 
rational expectations with observations of misleading advertising? 
They introduce these issues by presenting alleged tests of three competing 
explanations of advertising using data for two experience good industries. 
automobiles and life insurance. They interpret the theories in the following way. 
According to Nelson. greater advertising expenditures indicate better buys -
offer more quality per dollar of expenditure. According to Klein-Leffler. greater 
advertising expenditures signal higher experience quality assured through a larger 
price premium over average salvageable cost. The Kotowitz-Mathewson hypo-
thesis is that greater advertising expenditures can be a (deceptive) substitute 
for product qUality conditional on the rate of learning by consumers. 
The first problem is that the so-called third theory of advertising is a hypothesis 
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about disequilibrium conditions during the process of consumer learning while 
the other two are statements about an equilibrium. So I don't understand how 
the same test can be valid for all three theories - either the test assumes full 
adjustment or does not, but it can hardly do both. 
Second, I do not believe the authors have properly characterized the Klein-
Leffler model. The relevant variable which measures the incentive to produce 
high quality is not current advertising expenditures but the stock of advertising 
capital (compared to anticipated future sales). In fact the relevant variable is 
the stock of nonsalvageable capital - which includes more than advertising. Fur-
thermore, the price premium that tends to assure quality is the price premium 
over average recoverable cost, not average total cost. 
Third, with respect to the first automobile regressions using the brand dum-
my coefficients from the Ohta-Griliches hedonic price equations as the depen-
dent variable, the expected sign of the advertising variable depends upon the 
interpretation of these brand dummy coefficients. Do they represent systematic 
quality differences between the brand and the base brand not captured by the 
other variables or do they represent higher costs per unit of quality for the brand? 
The authors opt for the latter interpretation. Finding that these dummy coeffi-
cients are positively correlated with electronic media advertising and with the 
ratio of electronic media advertising to sales, the authors reject the Nelson best 
buy hypothesis of advertising, even though the coefficients of total advertising 
and of total advertising to sales are not significant. 
Nevertheless, the authors propose an interesting test to distinguish between 
their view of advertising and the Klein-Leffler view. The difference in deprecia-
tion rates of auto brands from the group average during the first year of owner-
ship is taken as a relative measure of consumer disappointment. If advertising 
is a signal of experience quality assurance, then according to the authors this 
depreciation should be negatively correlated with advertising intensity of the 
model in the previous year. If, however, persuasive advertising is enticing con-
sumers to believe the brand is better than experience shows it to be, then 
depreciation should be positively correlated with advertising intensity in the 
previous year. Again, the test does not use the stock of advertising capital. A 
more serious objection is that the measure of depreciation used is the difference 
between list price and the value after one year of ownership. This confounds 
two distinct components - discounts from list price which are given at the time 
of purchase - a reduction in the quality assuring premium - and depreciation. 
If the two components could be separated and only the actual post-purchase 
depreciation used, the authors would have an excellent test. The coefficients 
of the advertising to sales variables, both total and only electronic advertising, 
are positive and significant, while the coefficients of the advertising variables 
are not. 
The authors also present some regressions using Canadian data for par-
ticipating whole-life insurance. The discussion is too abbreviated to ascertain 
the variables. Even if life insurance is an experience good, I question the adver-
. 
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tising variable used, which is the swn of advertising expenditures and salesmen's 
commissions with commissions apparently a large part of the total. "If adver-
tising is a sunk 'signal' of quality, then so are these sales expenditures." This 
is incorrect. While salesmen obviously play an informative role, they do not play 
a quality assuring role, because salesmen's commissions are not a stmk expense. 
The lengthy remainder of the paper attempts to develop a model of consumer 
learning consistent with rational expectations but also consistent with the 
presence of deceptive advertising in the short run. In my opinion this effort is 
unsuccessful. No testable implications are derived. Furthennore, the model pro-
vides for no policing function by conswners - it never pays conswners to punish 
advertisers for false advertising. 

Comments 
Richard E. Kihlstrom* 
University of Pennsylvania 
In these remarks I propose to comment on an issue raised by the Kotowitz-
Mathewson paper. In concluding their discussion of the reliability of the infor-
mation provided by advertising, they remark that 
.... in the absence of truth in advertising regulations. no correlation between advertising claims 
and true quality can be established and hence advertising cJaims contain no useful infonnation. 
In many cases, this observation is undoubtedly correct. It is, however, possible 
to imagine circumstances in which there are no truth in advertising regulations 
but in which sellers have incentives to provide buyers with advertising messages 
that are convincingly informative. In these remarks, I propose to discuss one 
such set of circumstances. The discussion of the advertiser's incentives will 
follow the analyses of disclosure by informed sellers contained in the papers 
of Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981) and Milgrom and Roberts (1984). It will 
also be closely related to the recent contributions of Stiglitz (1984), Farrell-Sobel 
(1983), Farrell (1985) and Matthews-Postlewaite (1985). 
Grossman extends the argument of Grossman-Hart (1980) to demonstrate 
that, when there are significant penalities for lying, sellers who know the quali-
ty of their products have an incentive to fully disclose their information to potential 
buyers. As Grossman notes, for his argument to be correct, communication 
must be essentially costless and it must be possible to costlessly and accurately 
detect lying ex post. The same argument can be used to demonstrate that if false 
advertising is subject to penalty and can be costlessly detected ex post and if 
communication is costless, then all information possessed by advertisers will 
be accurately disclosed. Truth in advertising regulations are, of course, one way 
of penalizing false advertising. 
The question I propose to address is whether, in the absence of truth in adver-
tising regulations, there exists any other economic mechanism that can be ex-
pected to substitute for these regulations. The situation I will describe is one 
in which such a mechanism indeed operates. In this situation, the seller himself 
will uni1aterally take actions that have the effect of introducing a penalty for false 
advertising. In the particular circumstances to which I am referring, the seller 
of a product has the option of receiving an informative signal of his product's 
quality. Once the seller receives the message provided by the signal, he must 
decide whether or not to disclose it to the buyer. The crucial feature of the 
situation is that the seller does not, when he makes the decision to become 
om the process of preparing this comment. the author has benefitted from conversations with 
Franklin Allen. Andrew Postlewaite and Michael Riordan. 
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informed, !mow the message that will be conveyed by the signal. Another crucial 
feature of the hypothesized situation is that the profits the seller receives from 
an uninformed buyer are less than the expected profits he can anticipate receiv-
ing from a buyer whose decision will be made with the aid of the information 
conveyed' by the signal. 
Thus, in the situation envisioned here, the seller is assumed to be better off 
if he sells to an informed buyer than he is when he sells to an uninformed buyer. 
This assumption effectively means that if ex ante the seller could convincingly 
commit himself to truthfully disclose any message he might receive he would 
choose to do so. If false advertising can be costlessly detected, the seller can 
make such an ex ante commitment by posting a sufficiently large bond with a 
third party, who will henceforth be referred to as the trustee. The commitment 
will be convincing if the seller agrees to forfeit the bond whenever false adver-
tising is detected. 
It should be emphasized that, in the particular formalization described below, 
false claims by the seller about the nature of the information acquired will be 
included under the heading of false advertising. Thus, the asumption that false 
advertising can be detected must be interpreted in a strong sense. It asserts 
that the buyer can costlessly validate claims the seller makes about the reliabili-
ty of the information he has' acquired. 
It is not, however, necessary to assume that the buyer is capable of verifying 
that no information has been acquired if the seller claims that to have been the 
case. There is a potential problem when the buyer cannot verify such claims. 
Specifically, if the seller receives an unfavorable message, he can simply report 
that he has not acquired information; that is, he can claim that no message has 
been received. This problem can be avoided if the trustee is instructed to award 
the bond to the buyer whenever the seller fails to make a report concerning 
the information he has received. In this way the posting of the bond commits 
the seller to the acquisition of information and requires him to make some form 
of report on the results to the buyer. 
The mechanism just described will function effectively as long as it is possible 
for the buyer to convince the trustee that false advertising has taken place. The 
cost of this communication need only be finite. If this cost is significant, the bond 
will simply have to be large enough to permit the buyer to recoup these costs 
if he ever has to incur them as the result of a false claim. In the equilibrium 
described below, no false claims will ever, in fact, be made. 
For the purpose of formalizing the argument, I will introduce a simple but 
general model of the seller's advertising decision. I will assume that the adver-
tising message has content in the sense that it is informative about the quality 
of the product. The model of the consumer is virtually the same as that used 
in Section 3 of Grossman's paper. Thus, there are two quality levels, bl and 
b2 , and 
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Initially, both the buyer and the seller believe that the probability of quality 
level bl is 7!', where 
1 > 7!' > o. 
Thus, if the buyer receives no additional infonnation and pays p dollars for 
one unit of the product, his expected utility is 
7!'U(b1 - p) + (1 - 7!')U(bl-P). 
If the buyer's reservation utility level is u.., the seller, who throughout this 
analysis is assumed to be a monopolist, will charge him p(7!') where p(7!') is the 
p value at which 
Suppose now, however, that the seller can provide the buyer with an infor-
mative signal of quality. In fact, suppose that there is a continuum of possible 
infonnative signals that can be supplied to the buyer. Also suppose that these 
signals can be indexed by their reliability. We let e be the index of reliability 
and use Xe to denote the random message provided by an advertising signal 
of reliability e. The advertising messages are assumed to lie in some set X. 
The probability that a signal of reliability e brings message x.X when the quali-
ty level is b, that is, the probability that Xe = x when quality is b, is denoted 
by f(x;b,e). For e to be a justifiable measure of the infonnation's reliability 
we must assume that, when e > e' observations of Xe are more informative 
(in Blackwen' s sense) about quality than observations of Xe. Finally, we assume 
that more reliable infonnation is more expensive to provide than less reliable 
infonnation. Thus, we let C(e) be the cost to the seller of providing the buyer 
with infonnation of reliability e, and we assume that C'(e) > o. 
For concreteness, we can assume that X = {Xt. Xli and that 
e, if k = j 
1 - e, if k :t= j, 
where 1/2 ::; e ::; 1. In this example, the receipt of the message that Xe 
Xj can be regarded as a prediction that the quality level is bj , and e can be inter-
preted as the probability that the prediction is correct. It is also possible to in-
terpret e as the size of a sample taken by the seller. 
If the buyer receives the message that Xe = x, his a posteriori probability 
of b l will be ~(x;e) and his a posteriori expected utility when he purchases one 
unit of the good at a price p will be 
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E[u(b - p);x,9] 
= ~(x;9)u(b1 - p) + [1 - ~(x;9)]U(bl - p). 
In this situation, the seller will be able to charge p(x,9) where p(x,9) is the 
p for which 
E[u(b - p);x,9] = u... 
As noted earlier, we assume that the seller makes his information acquisition 
decision before he knows the content of the message that will be provided by 
any information he might choose to acquire. For the moment, we will assume 
that the buyer knows the reliability of the information supplied by the seller and 
that the seller discloses the infonnation when it is received. Under these assump-
tions, if the seller is risk neutral, and if he chooses to acquire information it 
will be of reliability level 9 where 
9 = Argmax Ep(Xe,9) - C(9). 
9 
In computing the expected price 
the seller uses the marginal distribution 
g(x;9) = f(x;b h 9)?r + f(x;b1 ,9)(1 - 11'). 
The seller will choose to acquire information and supply it to the buyer if 
(1) 
When inequality (1) is sati~fied, the assumption, discussed earlier, that the 
seller prefers to sell to an informed buyer is satisfied. We can now show that, 
under this assumption, the seller will acquire information of reliability 9 and 
then, as asserted earlier, post a sufficiently large bond with the trustee with 
instructions to award the bond to the buyer if the seller is ever found to have 
made a false advertising claim or if no report on the information is made. 
For the purpose of defining a bond that is, indeed, sufficiently large, let P. 
be the price the buyer would pay if he knew that quality was b l and let PL be 
the price he would pay for a good of quality b1 ; that is, let P. and PL satisfy 
U(bl - PJ = u.. 
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and 
respectively. The bond G will, as we shall see, be sufficiently large if it exceeds 
or equals Pw - PL. Recall that the bond must also be large enough to cover any 
costs the buyer might conceivably incur in convincing the trustee that a false 
claim has been made. 
Suppose then that the seller does post such a bond with the instructions in-
dicated. Suppose also that he invests in information of any degree of reliability 
9. We can now apply the argument of Grossman (1981) to establish that the 
seller will indeed disclose both 9 and the message when it is received. Note 
that, when G is large in the sense defined above, no profits obtained because 
of a false advertising claim can ever make up for the loss incurred when the 
lie is detected and G is forfeited. 
Clearly if the seller is going to follow the strategy of posting a bond and in-
vesting in information he will prefer to invest in information of reliability 9. In-
equality (1) implies that the expected profits achieved in this way exceed the 
price obtained when no information is acquired and there is no advertising. When 
we interpret p(1r) as the profits associated with no information, we are assum-
ing that if the seller doesn't acquire information then he doesn't post a bond. 
We are also assuming that if buyers do not observe the seller post a bond, they 
ignore any advertising claims he makes. TIris attitude on the part of buyers is 
justified by the fact that when no bond is posted, the seller has no incentive 
to truthfully disclose what he knows. 
There are of course strategies other than the ones just discussed that sellers 
could follow. They could, for example, acquire information and post either no 
bond or a small bond. It is easy to demonstrate that, because of the assumed 
attitudes of buyers, the acquisition of costly information by a seller who doesn't 
post a bond will leave the seller worse off than he would be if he didn't acquire 
any information. An argument that is slightly more involved can be used to 
demonstrate that the seller will never prefer to post a small bond. 
Concluding Remarks 
The analysis presented here is intended as an introductory discussion of the 
incentives faced by advertisers. In particular, the assumption that false adver-
tising can be detected is particularly strong and not especially realistic. It does, 
I believe, nevertheless provide a useful basis for an introductory formal investiga-
tion of the extent to which the Grossman, Milgrom, Milgrom-Roberts analyses 
can be applied to the study of informative advertising. The reader is referred 
to the papers of Farrell-Sobel (1983), Farrell (1985) and Matthews-Postlewaite 
(1985) for more complete discussions of related issues. The informational 
assumptions of those papers are somewhat different than those considered here, 
as is the focus of their discussion. In particular, they discuss the impact of 
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disclosure requirements on the seller's decisions. 
It should finally be reemphasized that the assumption that the seller's adver-
tising decision is made ex ante is crucial for our conclusions. We specifically con-
sider the case of an advertiser who does not yet have the information he is con-
templating providing to sellers. Sellers who are already informed face different 
incentives than those discussed here. 
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Introduction 
Federal concern about product advertising dates back to the turn of the cen-
tury. The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 included Section 12 which 
was designed to control the exhorbitant product claims made by the patent 
medicine sellers of that era. At that time these medicines were the major adver-
tisers in the economy.l In 1938 the FTC Act was amended to eliminate am-
biguity concerning FTC jurisdiction over deceptive product claims not affecting 
competition. Since then the Commission is mandated to protect consumers from 
the wiles of unscrupulous sellers. 
The Commission's actions in regulating deceptive advertising over the last 
40 some years are extensive and well documented.2 For the purposes at hand, 
the significant era at the Commission commenced in the 1960s. In 1963, the 
Commission held that an advertiser making a claim related to health or safety 
"implicitly represents that he has a reasonable and substantial foundation in fact 
for making the claim."3 For·the first time deception could occur even though 
a seller's claim is true. 
Towards the end of the 1960s, the FTC's efforts in regulating advertising 
became of interest to the consumer movement. During this era, advertising was 
generally viewed as an evil of capitalism and a means of persuading the ignorant 
consumer to follow the dictates of Madison Avenue.' Rather than protecti,ng 
consumers, FTC actions were viewed as "obsessed with trivia" by leaders in 
the consumer movement.s In 1969, Ralph Nader's organization and the American 
Bar Association both filed reports recommending total revamping of the FTC's 
regulation of advertising.6 
"James Ferguson and Mark Pl~er of the FTC have been most helpful in this research. 
1 See F. Presbrey. The History and Development of Advertising (1929). 
2 See. for example. R. Pitofsky. "Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of 
Advertising," Haroard Law Review 90 (February, 1977) and S. Pelt2man. "The Effects of FTC 
Advertising Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics (December, 1981), and the numerous papers 
cited by these authors. 
3 Heinz W. Kirchner, 53 FTC 1282 (1963), 1275. 
• Vance Packard. The Hidden Persuatkrs, and J.K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society. are typical 
of prevalent opinions of advertising's role in the economy. 
; "FTC Drops 70% of Cases," Advertising Age. 12/8/69, p. 1. 
6 The Nader Report on the Federal Trade Commission (1969): American Bar Association. Report 
of the ABA Commission to Study the Federal Trade Commission (1969). 
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Within this "heated" climate, Casper Weinberger was appointed head of the 
FTC in late 1969. President Nixon gave Weinberger "carte blanche" to 
reorganize.7 Eighteen of thirty-one top level staff members were discharged 
and the Bureau of Consumer Protection was created replacing the Bureau of 
Deceptive" Practices.8 Seventy percent of existing cases were dropped in prepara-
tion for an overhaul of the regulatory fare. 9 
This activist, revitalized Federal Trade Commission instituted the Advertis-
ing Substantiation Program (ASP). In April, 1970 the FTC first signalled an ex-
panded concept of deception that included the lack of substantiation for all prod-
uct claims.10 By late 1970, Ralph Nader campaigned in the press for FTC re-
quirements that ad substantiation be available to the public. 11 The McGovern-
Moss Bill was introduced in Congress in April, 1971. This bill called for substan-
tiation of ad claims. 12 The clear signal that advertising substantiation was now 
a primary part of the FTC's arsenal in fighting deceptive sellers' claims came 
at this time ,13 when a hearing examiner found the Pfizer Company guilty of decep-
tion due to the absence of substantiation for their advertised product claims. 14 
Economists have generally been skeptical of the impact of the FTC's regula-
tion of advertising. 1s First of all, under FTC programs deceived consumers 
receive no redress, that is, there are no damages to the deceived. Traditional-
ly, the end result of a successful FTC complaint has been a consent decree which 
essentially is a promise by the defendant not to offend again. This obviously 
limits the incentive for consumers to utilize the regulatory authority of the FTC. 
Posner has concluded that the FTC's efforts at regulating advertising are without 
effect. 16 A leading industrial organization text concludes that "the FTC impact 
on advertising remains slight." 17 
On the other hand, major companies and major advertisers have been sub-
jected to FTC proceedings with non-trivial litigation costs. Sterling Drug, the 
manufacturer of Bayer products, has undoubtedly spent hundreds of thousands 
7 K. Clarkson and T. Muris, "The FTC Since 1970" (Cambridge University Press. 1981). 
8 Ibid., p. 4. 
9 Advertising Age, 12/8/69, p. 1. 
10 Wall Street Jounrtll. 4/14170. p. 4: as reported in R. Higgins and F. McChesney, "Truth and 
Consequences: The Federal Trade Commission!s Ad Substantiation Program," mimeo. undated. 
p.35. 
II Advertising Age. 12/14170. p. 3. 
12 Advertising Age, 4115171. p. 1. 
13 Four cases had been filed as the substantiation program was being developed. National Dynamics 
Corp. (82 F.T.C. 488). filed 11121169: Pfizer. i1lC. (81 F.T.C. 23). filed 4/6170: Firestone Tire (81 
F.T.C. 398), filed 6/29170: and Standard Oil o/California (84 F.T.C. 1404). filed 12/29170. The 
Pfizer case was the first in which a decision was reached. 
14 Discussed in the 1972 decision of the Commission (81 F.T.C. 23). at 25. The examiner's opin-
ion was reported in Advertising Age. 6/14/71. p. 1. The hearing examiner's decision was subse-
quently overturned by the Commission though the substantiation theory was upheld. 
15 See S. Peitzman. "The Effects of FTC Advertising Regulation." Jounrtll 0/ Law and Economics 
(December. 1981). p. 447. 
16 R. Posner. Regulation 0/ Advertising by the FTC. Americn Enterprise Institute. 1983. 
17 W. Shepherd and C. Wilcox. Public Policies Towards Business. Irwin. 1979. p. 539. 
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of dollars fighting a substantiation complaint filed in February, 1973 but still not 
decided. The FTC spends significant amounts on ASP, about 3f4 million dollars 
in 1979.18 Private self-regulatory bodies that have arisen to forestall govern-
ment controls, have direct enforcement expenditures of over 2-112 million dollars 
annually .19 The costs of substantiation documentation and compliance with FTC 
information requests are not known but are undoubtedly significant. 20 
The advertising substantiation program has the potential to impact numerous 
economic markets. Producers relying on advertising to disseminate informa-
tion about their products are the most directly affected. Due to the diligence 
of the FTC, consumers may find advertising to be a more crechble, reliable source 
of product information. As a consequence, producers of "better buys" may in-
crease advertising, market sales and profits. If ASP significantly impacts the 
value or cost of advertising, the effects will extend to the producers and 
disseminators of the ads, namely ad agencies and the media (TV, radio, 
magazines, newspapers and billboards). 
To date. little is known about the effects of the FTC's advertising regulation. 
However, the limited empirical results suggest a potentially large effect. Peltzman 
studied FTC advertising deception cases from 1960 to 1975.21 As we discuss 
further below, the issues involved in deception and substantiation cases are very 
similar so that Peltzman's findings should be indicative of the substantiation pro-
gram's impact. Peltzman found that a deception complaint lowered the stock 
value of the involved producer by over 3 percent. Quoting Peltzman, "the size 
of the effect is ... astounding,"22 since the companies involved are usually quite 
diversified with the complaint involving a small percent of products sold. The 
results become even more mysterious in light of Peltzman's general failure to 
show significant effects on product sales as a consequence of FTC action. 23 
Higgins and McChesney have studied the capital market effects on both adver-
tisers and advertising intermediaries from the substantiation program. They form-
ed portfolios of both large advertisers and large ad agencies. The advertiser 
portfolio, 54 firms with the largest advertising expenditure in 1970 in drugs, 
18 C. Guerard and J. Niemasik •• 'Evolution and Evaluation of the Ad Substantiation Program Since 
1971," mimeo, FTC 12/1178. p. 35. 
19 Priscilla LaBarbera. "Analyzing and Advancing the State of the Art of Advertising Self Regula-
tion. " Journal of Advertising. V. 9~ N. <l. 1980. p. 32. reports that the Council of Better Business 
Bureaus budgeted $1.475.000 for advertising self regulation in 1979 and the National Association 
of Broadcasters budget was $950.000. Self regulation activity is discussed in Section 1 below. 
20 On March 3. 1983. the FTC requested comments on their substantiation program. The FTC 
included request for data on costs. The respondents to this question (Whirlpool. Procter and Gam-
ble. General Mills. Inc .• and Sears. Roebuck) all responded that the program did not not impose 
significant additional costs of substantiation. 
21 S. Peltzman. "The Effects of FTC Advertising Regulation." Journal of Law and Economics. 
(December. 1981). pp. 401-448. 
22 Op. cit .. p. 418. 
23 Peltzman found no effect from complaints against Crest and Colgate toothpastes: little effect 
from complaints against Blue Bonnet margarine and Alcoa Wrap. Standard Oil and Sun Oil. some 
effects of questionable impoItance for two unidentified food items. 
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toiletries, home products and building products submarkets, had 27 percent ex-
cess returns over the period April, 1970 to July, 1972.24 If this was a result 
of ASP, the order of magnitude is also "astounding." Direct sales effects should 
be readily observed. 
Higgins and McChesney also examined the stock market value of four, large 
publicly traded advertising agencies.25 They report that from April, 1970 to June, 
1971 these companies earned 91 percent excess market returns which they at-
tribute to the implementation of the advertising substantiation program.26 This 
finding is also striking in magnitude. It suggests either a very substantial in-
crease in the value of advertising due to ASP or possibly, as Higgins and 
McChesney argue, a regulatory bias towards the larger agencies. Either way, 
the source of the increased value should be readily observed in disaggregated 
advertising data. 
In this paper we pursue the effects of ASP on the advertising agencies. The 
advertising agencies have been vocal opponents to former FTC Chairman James 
C. Miller's suggestion to reevaluate and perhaps weaken the ASP Program.27 
This supports the Higgins-McChesney finding ofbeneficia1 effects for these firms. 
Here we wish to examine more detailed data to see if we can uncover the source 
and distribution of any such benefits to advertising agencies. 
In the first section we review the temporal pattern of FTC activity in regulating 
advertising since the mid-1960s. Our ultimate objective is to develop variables 
proxying the level of FTC substantiation scrutiny over advertising content. In 
order to have some controf for the extent of "suspect" advertising, we also 
discuss the activity of the private self regulatory National Advertising Review 
Board of the Council of the Better Business Bureau. Comparing private and 
FTC case activity, we find ASP to be a program of the mid-70s. Advertising 
substantiation appears to have been substantially deemphasized independently 
of the Reagan retrenchment. . 
In the second section, we briefly discuss the many ways that FTC regulation 
of advertising might impact the advertising agencies. This section also details 
the structure of the advertising industry and relates the concentration of U.S. 
agencies to international concentration trends and FTC activity. 
The aggregated structural data shows a possible differential favoring the mid-
24 Higgins and McChesney, "An Economic Analysis of the FTC's Ad Substantiation Program," 
this volume. 
2S Higgins and McChesney, "Truth or Consequences: The Federal Trade Commission's Ad 
Substantiation Program," mimeo, undated. 
26 These were the only four publicly traded agencies, They were J. Walter Thompson: ~cCann­
Erickson: Foote, Cone and Belding Communications: and Wells, Rich and Greene. They ranked 
I, 7, 11 and 19 in 1971 U.S. billings according to Advertising Age. 2/21/72. 
27 Advertising Age. "Miller Questions Ad Proof Policy." 11/2181: Stanley Cohen, "A Healthy 
Skepticism About Public Policy," 11/21/81. p. 48: Gordon. "Miller Asks for Ad Rule Re\iew." 
10/25/82, p. 1: Larry Edwards and Todd Findell. "FTC's Miller: Ad Proof Still Concerns ~e," 
10/16/81. p. 3. Cohen's biweekly column "Washington Beat" makes frequent unreferenced reports 
of industry support for ASP. 
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sized agencies, those with ranks below the top 8. Any such effect is, however, 
small. No impact on the relative growth of the leading eight finns can be discern-
ed. In addition, any impact of ASP on advertising levels and agency use seems 
to be negative. While major limitations in the data make any conclusions most 
tentative, ·the failure to find very significant beneficial impacts is inconsistent 
with the Higgins-McChesney attribution of 91 percent excess returns for large 
agencies to the advertising substantiation program. 
The third section of the paper studies individual agency accounts. An empirical 
model of account retention is developed to test for the impact of ASP. 
The concluding section discusses further research on the impact in the adver-
tiser or product markets and the media markets that is needed. Only by assem-
bling the effects in all of the advertising" sub-markets" can a complete, consis-
tent picture of the effects of ASP be assembled. 
I. FTC and Private Advertising Substantiation Activity 
With its seed from the consumerist movement, the advertising substantia-
tion program's major role was conceived as a consumer education device.28 In-
dustries were selected for substantiation requests. The responses were to be 
publicly available and to be used for possible follow-up complaints. Table A lists 
the industries subject to these substantiation "rounds" along with the number 
of complaints resulting from staff investigation of the substantiation responses. 
The peak of this program was obviously in 1971-1972 when 11 industries and 
148 companies were scrutinized. The far right column of Table A simply pro-
vides an indicator of the importance of round activity. The number of rounds 
and generated complaints are simply added. 
The industry "round" approach was not particularly successful. "The public 
education goal was largely frustrated because the substantiation was too 
technical ... (and) ... deterrence would not occur simply by placing the documents 
on the public record.' '29 After internal evaluation of the industry rounds in the 
early 1970s, the emphasis of ASP shifted from education to law enforcement. 
Industry rounds were still utilized as a source for cases, but Table A shows 
the decreasing importance of these rounds. 
Subsequently, ASP has focused on individual products. The source of par-
ticular complaints is unknown:' presumably the staff reacts to consumer com-
plaints. In addition, the FTC staff generates investigations from their "weekly 
ad monitoring meetings. "30 Table B summarizes the activity of the FTC in adver-
tising substantiation cases. The cases are divided into those involving national 
28 See C. Guerard and J. Niemasik, "Evolution and Evaluation of the Ad Substantiation Program 
Since 1971," ITC memo to the Commission, mimeo, 12/1178, for an "inside" discussion of ASP. 
29 Op.cit., p. 23. 
30 Op.cit., p. 25. report that "(From January to December, 1978). the Division of Advertising 
Practices has conducted nearly fifty preliminary investigations of claims which surfaced in the weekly 
ad monitoring meetings." 
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Year 
1971 
1971 
1971 
1971 
1971 
1972 
1972 
1972 
1972 
1972 
1972 
1973 
1973 
1973 
1974 
1974 
1974 
1975 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Table A 
FTC ADVERTISING 
SUBSTANTIATION INDUSTRY ROUNDS 
Number of Number of 
Industry Companies Complaints 
Automobiles 7 0 
Air Conditioners 17 2 
Electric Shavers 4 0 
Televisions 12 0 
Dentifrices 8 0 
Cold/Cough Remedies 15 0 
Tires 18 1 
Soaps 35 0·· 
Hearing Aids 11 6 
Pet Foods 12 1 
Automobiles 9 0 
Antiperspirants 10 0 
Shampoos 11 0 
Acne Preparations 14 3 
Auto Tires 13 3 
Color TVs 6 2 
Dental Products 4 1 
Dishwashers 5 1 
Lawnmowers 5 0 
Preference Polls 4 2 
Energy 7 0 
SOURCE: Appendix A. Guerard and Niemasik (1978) 
Industry 
Round 
Activity 
Variable· 
7 
14 
6 
3 
3 
1 
'Sum the number of industries investigated and the number of complaints thereby iSSUed. 
··Detergent Rule was established governing ecology claims. 
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Table B 
FTC AND NAD CASE ACTMTY IN 
ADVERTISING SUBSTANTIATION ISSUES, 1968 - 1982 
Federal Trade Commission 
Substantiation Cases 
National Adv .• 
Agency 
Agency Not Local 
Year Named Named Adver .•• TOTAL··· 
1968 
1969 1 1 
1970 1 2 3 
1971 2 2 
1972 3 2 1 6 
1973 3 2 5 10 
1974 3 9 8 20 
1975 5 5 4 14 
1976 5 4 2 13 
1977 2 2 3 7 
1978 2 2 2 6 
1979 2 2 1 5 
1980 1 4 2 7 
1981 2 1 2 5 
1982 2 2 
Total 29 37 33 101 
NA = not applicable, program n:Jt operative. 
NAD/NARD 
Deception 
Cases Cases 
TOTAL 
1 
1 
6 
11 
18 
3 
7 
6 
3 
1 
2 
59 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
*.*. 
138 
132 
160 
168 
151 
164 
163 
129 
143 
***** 
1348 
·When multiple cases are filed for substantially the same allegation only 1 case is recorded. This 
includes situations where industry rounds result in numerous complaints (e.g .. hearing aids). situa-
tions where both a retailer and a manufacturer are named (Payless and Lear Siegler), and situations 
where separate complaints are filed for the advertising agency . 
•• Includes both door-to-door and local newspaper advertising . 
••• Includes only cases involving substantiation type claims. Examples of excluded practices include 
"bait-n-switch." fictitious sale prices. and labelling issues. Included cases are exemplified by Ocean 
Spray Cranberries' nutritional claims. Profile Bread's diet claims. and Firestone Tire's safety claims. 
The inclusion in the substantiation rather than deception column is based on the FTC's list of substan-
tiation cases used by Higgins and McChesney (1984). 
····Reporting methodology not comparable to subsequent years. 
·····Not available yet. 
. 
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advertising, generally television or magazine ads, and those local in scope, typical-
ly newspaper ads. The national cases are further broken down into those where 
the advertising agency for the product is named either within the complaint or 
in a separate complaint, and those cases where the agency is not named. 
The list. of substantiation cases was obtained from the Federal Trade Com-
mission.31 In reviewing these and other FTC advertising activity, we were struck 
by the similarity of many "deception" cases and the substantiation cases. For 
example, claims about Ocean Spray Cranberries' nutritional value, Vivarin's 
potency effects, and SWlOCO gasoline's performance characteristics lead to decep-
tion complaints. However, claims about Gainesburgers' nutritional value, Rev-
Up Vitamin's health effects, and Standard Oil gasoline's pollution characteristics 
lead to substantiation complaints. We, therefore, have surveyed all FTC adver-
tising cases and consent decrees since 1968 and found 65 "deception" cases 
we judged to involve issues basically similar to substantiation questions. The 
annual number of such cases are also given in Table B. It is noteworthy that 
the pattern of these deception cases over time is basically the same as that of 
the substantiation cases. The "hey day" of deception activity was from 
1971-1975. This suggests that the commonly held view that ASP substitutes 
for deception activity (with a shifted burden of proof) is not correct. Apparently 
a "consumerist's" concern with advertising leads to activity of either type. 
Measured by filed complaints, the substantiation program peaked during the 
years 1974-1976 when half of the cases filed since 1969 were issued. By 1982, 
case activity has nearly ceased with no cases of national scope being filed. The 
decline in FTC involvement could be the result either of policy changes within 
the agency or of the program's success in eliminating unsubstantiated advertis-
ing claims. 
One way to distinguish between these two possible explanations for the change 
in FTC advertising case activity is to find some independent measure of the 
prevalence of unsubstantiated advertising. In 1971, the National Advertising 
Review Board was set up by the Council of the Better Business Bureaus, the 
American Advertising Federation, the Association of National Advertisers, and 
the American Association of Advertising Agencies as a private self-regulatory 
body to scrutinize advertising content for product claimS.32 The National Adver-
tising Division (NAD) of the NARB handles most of the complaints about adver-
tising. If this staff cannot resolve the complaint with the advertisers, the NARB 
itself steps in. This procedure occurs in less than 4 percent of the cases. 
NAD cases originate mainly from staff monitoring (44 percent) and competitor 
complaints (30 percent).33 Table B gives the number of cases handled by the 
31 The list of complaint and consent decrees were obtained from Richard Higgins of the FTC 
as assembled by Susan Campbell of his staff. 
32 See Gary Armstrong and Julie Ozanne. "An Evaluation of NADINARB Purpose and Perfor-
mance." Journal 0/ Advertising. V. 12. n. 3 (1983). pp. 15-26. 
33 Complaint source percentages are from Armstrong and Ozanne. op. cit .. p. 19. for 1979-1981. 
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NAD from 1973 through 1981.34 The pattern of the cases is obviously very dif-
ferent from FTC complaint activity. These case numbers are not directly com-
parable to FTC complaints. About 52 percent of NAD cases involve ad claims 
substantiated by the advertiser. Another 17 percent involve ad claims dropped 
prior to a hearing.35 Presumably these cases would usually not reach the com-
plaint stage in an FTC investigation. However, the number ofNAD cases where 
ads were held unsubstantiated remained relatively constant over time. From 
1973-1975, the NAD ruled 132 advertisements unacceptable; from 1976-1978, 
143 advertisements were ruled unacceptable; and from 1979-1981,138 ads were 
found unacceptable. 36 
From a review of FTC advertising complaint activity as compared to NAD 
case activity, we conclude that FTC regulation of advertising has changed 
markedly over the period 1965-1982. The activity is well proxied by the pat-
tern of round activity and complaint activity given in Tables A and B. Activity 
peaked in the mid-1970s. The Reagan Administration has continued the deem-
phasis of advertising regulation that was discernible by 1977. 
II. The Advertising Substantiation Program 
and the Structure of the Advertising Agency Industry 
Federal regulation of advertising can impact advertising agencies in numerous 
ways. The demand for advertising and for advertising intermediaries' services 
can increase in general. Alternatively, the increased federal scrutiny of ad con-
tent can increase the use of intermediaries who specialize in regulatory com-
pliance, even if the overall demand for advertising falls. In addition, the regulatory 
activity can cause shifts in demand among the agencies. The regulators may 
focus efforts on the large, visible agencies relative to the smaller agencies or 
a program such as ASP may cause the advertiser to favor larger, experienced 
agencies. Another possibility is that the regulatory program can increase agen-
cies' efficient scale due to a fixed cost of the regulatory compliance division. 
Finally, the entry cost into the agency business may rise due to the increased 
value of reputation of having dealt with authorities. 
The actual effects on the advertising industry from the introduction of and 
variance in enforcement of substantiation requirements are not, in our view, 
determinable from a priori theorizing. Rather. descriptive, empirical evidence 
is required on the effects in the advertiser, advertising and advertising in-
termediary sectors of the advertisinq market. Here we provide only a limited 
set of the evidence necessary to understand the impact of ASP on ad agencies. 
In the conclusion, we suggest the additional e\idence from the advertiser and 
34 The case count is from annual NARD Activity Reports listing all cases and their disposition. 
3S Armstrong and Ozanne, op. cit., Table 8, p. 24. 
36 These numbers are calculated from Table B in conjunction with case disposition percentages 
in Armstrong and Ozanne, op. cit., Table 8, p. 24. An unacceptable ad includes either a finding 
of deception or lack of substantiation. 
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advertising sectors that would substantiate our preliminary conclusions reach-
ed here. 
The general structure and size of the advertising agency industry is given 
in Table C. The first set of numbers, columns II and m, gives the concentra-
tion ratios' for the largest eight agencies, CR8, and for the next largest twelve, 
CR9-20 for years 1965-1981.37 While no strong pattern is present in either set 
of concentration ratios, there is a tendency towards decreasing eight-finn con-
centration from 1965 to 1973 and increasing eight-finn concentration from 
1974-1981. The nine to twenty finn concentration shows a minor increased con-
centration after 1972. 
The next set of numbers in Table C, columns IV and V, gives a general in-
dication of the size of the advertising industry. The fourth column gives the total 
advertising expenditures on television, radio, magazine and local newspaper ads 
for the years 1965-1981, while the fifth column presents the total U.S. billings 
of the largest 50 agencies for the same years. 38 Advertising expenditures ap-
pear to increase in 1972 and then accelerate in 1976, while real billings general-
ly fall unti11976. Neither the structural or the size data indicate obvious im-
pacts of ASP. We now shall attempt to relate ASP to these data in more detail. 
The structure of the advertising agency industry is presumably affected by 
numerous factors including technology, industry growth, luck, entrepreneurial 
skills and regulatory activities other than FTC advertising policies (such as an-
titrust). To control for technological factors, we have calculated three alternative 
variables measuring the structure of non-U.S. advertising agency billings. These 
are a 25-finn Herfindahl index in Great Britain GHHI, a 2O-finn index for Japan 
JHHI, and concentration measures of U.S. agencies' foreign billings, FCR.39 
The foreign agency Herfindahls can measure only relative shifts among the very 
large finns since data on middle and small foreign agencies is unavailable. 
31 These concentration ratios refer to the percentage of domestic billings of the top 50 firms ac-
counted for by the top 8 and top 9 to 20 firms as calculated from .. Estimated Billings." as reported 
in Advertising Age, annually, various weekly issues. The standard concentration ratios would use 
agency revenue or gross income rather than billings and take the percentage of all agencies rather 
than the top SO. ·The income estimates are Wl3vailable prior to 1972. Domestic billings are broken 
out from international billings only for agencies billing more than 10 million doUars. In addition, the 
number of smaller agencies responding to the Advertising Age survey varies by 10-15 percent per 
year. We checked the percent of domestic billings accounted for by the largest SO firms. assuming 
all billings less than 10 million are domestic. and ignoring non-reporting agencies. This percent shows 
the same pattern as the CR9-2O numbers. U the implied CRSO estimate is valid. our conclusions 
about CR9-2O can be extended to firms in the 9-50 rank size. 
J8 The real advertising expenditures are the sum of television. local newspaper. radio and magazine 
advertising expenditures as estimated by McCann-Erickson. See Advertising Age 115/78 for an ex-
ample. The nominal estimates are deflated by the GNP deflator, 1972 ., 100. These expenditures 
exclude newspaper supplement and billboard advertising among missing major categories. The bill-
ings of the top 50 agencies are also deflated by the GNP deflator. 
39 Advertising Age reports foreign agency billings annually, the list of reported agency changes 
over time. We were able to form a reliable series of only 20 Japanese firms and 25 British firms. 
When a large agency did not report billings for any year over the 1965-1981 period they were ex-
cluded. There were two such firms for Japan and three for Britain. 
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Table C 
THE STRUCTURE AND SIZE OF 
THE ADVERTISING AGENCY INDUSTRY· 
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Industry Structure Industry Size (000) 
8 Firm 9·20 Firm Real Advertising Real Agency 
Year Concentration Concentration Expenditures Billings 
Percent Dollars 
IT m IV V 
1965 42.1 30.0 106,671 587.7 
1966 42.5 28.5 114,169 591.8 
1967 42.4 29.6 113,833 618.7 
1968 41.1 29.7 118,759 619.6 
1969 41.4 29.4 124,027 629.7 
1970 42.7 30.5 119,016 591.3 
1971 40.5 31.5 119,751 571.0 
1972 40.1 34.8 130,480 586.5 
1973 40.0 33.0 133,538 578.5 
1974 41.5 33.0 128,883 550.5 
1975 40.6 31.5 127,127 548.0 
1976 41.7 32.0 146,150 617.5 
1977 42.9 29.5 156,604 655.0 
1978 40.2 33.3 169,484 748.9 
1979 42.5 32.4 175,317 828.3 
1980 43.0 32.5 175,447 878.8 
1981 42.9 32.3 180,762 926.7 
• See notes 37 and 38 to the text for an explanation of these data. 
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We expect the eight firm concentr.ltion ratio of U.S. billings to be positively 
related to the foreign Herfindahl measures.40 The 9 to 20 firm concentration 
ratio should be negatively affected since an increase in the foreign Herfindahls 
indicate shifts in billings out of the smaller agencies in the top 20 or 25. The 
20 firm U.S. concentration should not be related to the foreign 20 or 25 firm 
Herfindahl. It is more difficult to predict how U.S. firms' foreign billings con-
centration should impact domestic concentration. On the one hand, increased 
foreign billings may substitute for domestic due to resource constraints.41 On 
the other hand, foreign billings concentration changes may measure technological 
factors also affecting U.S. concentration. A final problem in the U.S. agencies 
foreign billings variable is that ASP may affect both domestic and foreign prac-
tices of the U.S.-based agencies. We have not attempted to account for 
entrepreneur-specific events influencing agency concentration. 
We also are interested in the possible effect of ASP on U.S. concentration. 
Two alternative measures of ASP activity were used. The first, ASPD, is simply 
a dummy variable with a value of 0 prior to 1971 and value of 1 thereafter. The 
second, ASPA, is a measure of enforcement activity defined as the sum of case 
activity in Table B and round activity in Table A.42 
Table D reports the results of representative least squares regressions of 
various agency concentration measures.43 Keeping in mind the limited number 
of observations, it appears that the substantiation program did not affect the 
eight-firm concentration level. The measures of ASP always negatively affect 
the eight-firm concentration· but the effect is never significant. The second set 
of regressions in Table D.I. have the 9 to 20th rank agency concentration as 
the dependent variable. All coefficient signs are sensible and ASP has a signifi-
cant positive effect on these "next-to-the-Iargest" set of firmS.44 We conjec-
ture that perhaps ASP leads to general increased agency economies of scale 
along with increased scrutiny of the largest most visible agencies. 
Section II of Table D reports the results of agency billings regressions. Here 
we included a time trend, the level of real expenditures from Table C and the 
alternative ASP variables. We find that ASP negatively impacted the largest eight 
agencies and that the impact is statistically significant. The second set of regres-
sions is for the billings of the ninth to twentieth ranked agencies. We do not 
find a significant impact of ASP. In addition, while the estimated coefficient on 
ASP is negative, it is, relative to billings, far smaller than the coefficient for 
40 The foreign concentration and the foreign agency Her1indahls were found to be unrelated to 
any measure of ASP. 
41 Advertising Age reports nwnerous stories where agencies do not bid accounts due to worries 
of spreading their talent too thin. 
42 We hypothesized the industry rounds generating complaints might be viewed as panicuIarly 
tight enforcement. Hence the double counting of round generated cases. 
43 Time is included to account for any trend effects in domestic concentration not taken account 
of by the foreign structure variables . 
.. The firms ranked 9 to 20 have billings about 75 percent of the top 8 billings. 
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Table D 
I. REGRESSIONS OF AGENCY CONCENTRATION 
Dependent Independent Variable Coefficients and (t-statistics) 
Variable Time Billings FCR JHHI ASPA ASPD 
CR-8 -.ISO .006 -.138 .002 -.004 
(-Ll) (1.4) (-1.4) (.6) (-.07) 
.01 .004 -.119 .003 -1.33 
(.06) (1.2) (-1.3) (1.2) (-1.3) 
-.11900 .003 -.007 
(-2.2) (1.3) (-1.4) 
CR-20 .075 .006 -.078 .004 .14600 
(.3) (.9) (-.6) (-Ll3) (2.2) 
-.028 .001 -.146 -.00700 3.1700 
(-.1) (.3) (-1.4) (-2.1) (2.5) 
-.14500 -.00600 3.0600 
(-2.5) (-2.85) (4.6) 
II. REGRESSIONS OF AGENCY BILUNGS 
Independent Variable Coefficients and (t-statistics) 
Dependent Advertising 
Variable Time Expenditures ASPA ASPD 
Billings of -3.40 2.4700 -2.01 
the Top 8 (-.7) (2.46) (-2.0) 
Agencies 
-3.54 3.2900 -52.50• 
(-.9) (5.3) (-2.6) 
Billings of -3.80 2.30·· -.240 
the 9-20th (-Ll) (3.3) (-.3) 
Top -2.25 2.27·· -17.5 
Agencies (-.7) (4.7) (-Ll) 
•• Significant at the .05 level. 
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Cons. 
56.3 
40.4 
43.6 
30.0 
48.0 
46.5 
Cons. 
196.7 
110.3 
168.3 
68.6 
. 
• 
R2 
.350 
.437 
.251 
.665 
.693 
.737 
R2 
.841 
.863 
.858 
.870 
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the leading eight firmS.45 These results suggest that ASP generally adversely 
impacted advertising agencies but impacted the biggest agencies more. 
It is difficult to reconcile these results with the Higgins-McChesney substan-
tial capital. value increase findings mentioned above. One possibility is that ASP 
affected different agencies in very different ways and that their four agency sam-
ple happened to be a favored bunch. We note, however, that the share of the 
billings of the top 20 accounted for by the four publicly traded agencies declined 
from .235 in 1971 to .173 by 1974. This mainly resulted from the poor perfor-
mance of McCann-Erickson. We simply do not find any evidence in the aggregate 
data that suggests very substantial benefits from ASP to large ad agencies as 
argued by Higgins and McChesney. In the next section, we examine the pat-
tern of individual account activity to see if impacts of ASP on various agency 
categories are therein manifest. 
ill. The Effects of ASP on Agency Accounts 
The analysis of Section II indicated that different size agencies were likely 
impacted differently by the advertising substantiation program. Differential im-
pacts can arise because of FTC selectivity in enforcement and/or economies 
of scale impacts favoring particular sized agencies. In investigating specific ac-
counts of the agencies, we are interested in determining whether the ASP pro-
gram and ASP complaints di#"erentially impact agencies' probabilities of gaining 
or losing an account according to agency size. 
Table E.I. presents a list of products involved in substantiation complaints 
where the advertising agency was named in the complaint. Section II of Table 
E summarizes the size classes of named agencies. The data indicate that the 
largest and the smallest agencies are disproportionately represented. We 
hypothesize that the smallest agencies, with less reputational capital at stake, 
are more willing to take a chance with unsubstantiated claims. The dispropor-
tionate naming of larger agencies however is more likely due to their visibility 
and size itself. 
It is not obvious that being named in a substantiation complaint adversely im-
pacts an advertising agency's industry position. For the 15 agencies in Table E 
with industry rank data available before and after a complaint, 8 improved their 
industry position one year after the complaint as compared to one year before. 46 
However 10 of the 15 agencies did relatively poorer in the two-years interval 
surrounding the complaint than in the two-year period three years to one year 
before the complaint. In addition, 8 of 11 agencies for which data is available, 
did relatively better in the two-year period one to three years after the com-
plaint than during the complaint period. Since there is less than a 1 percent prob-
<5 The estimated negative effects on the top 8 billings from ASP are from 10 times (ASPA) to 
3 times larger (ASPD) than those on the top 9-20. 
<6 About half the agencies improved their rank and half regressed regardless of which before and 
after years are compared in the interval three years before and three years after the complaint. 
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Table E 
I. ADVERTISING AGENCIES NAMED IN FTC SUBSTANTIATION CASES 
Year Product Agency 
1970 Gas-F310 Batten, Banon, Durstine, Osborn 
1972 Sugar (Hawaiian) Leo Burnett"" 
1972 Lysol Sullivan, Stauffer, Colwell, Bayles 
1972 Vega/Opel McCann Erickson""" 
1973 Vanquish Benton and Bowles"" 
1973 Volvo Scali, McCabe 
1973 Bayer Daocer-Fitzgerald 
1973 Anacin C.T. Clyne Maxon 
1974 Whirlpool AC Doyly, Dane, Bernbach"" 
1974 Ford J. Walter Thompson"" 
1974 Eggs Richard Weiner 
1975 Rev.Up (Vitamins) Levine, Huntley, Schmidt 
1975 Yamaha Batsford, Kelchin 
1975 X-ll (Diet Pill) Kelly, Ketting, Furth 
1975 Poli-Grip Grey Advertising 
1975 Bridgestone Tires Parker Advertising"" 
1976 STP Additives Stern, Walters, Simmons 
1976 Perma-Strate Merrill, Kremer 
1976 Mr. Cool Franklin Lett 
1976 Ultra Sheen Bozell and Jacobs 
1976 Adolph's Salt Nagle, Spillman and Bergman"" 
1976 Vita/-E Diet Advertising Unlimited 
1977 Hawaiian Sugar Foote, Cone and Belding 
1977 Kenmore DIW J. Walter Thompson 
1978 Womack MO S.W. Advertising 
1978 Acne-Statin National Media Group 
1979 G.R. Valve Ad Marketing 
1979 Water Pik ]. Walter Thompson 
1980 Encare OIC ShaJler Rubin 
1980 Semicid OIC Sorga 
1981 Fleischmann's Ted Bates 
1981 Blackman's Shaver DKG Advertising 
"Rank by U.S. annual billings one year before the complaint, 
""Separate complaint in agency's name issued. 
""" Complaint dismissed. 
Size" 
4 
3 
17 
7 
16 
78 
12 
50 
7 
2 
NR 
184 
NR 
174 
5 
49 
123 
NR 
NR 
23 
NR 
467 
7 
2 
NR 
NR 
101 
2 
116 
~R 
6 
47 
NR = Not reported in Advertising Age or in the Standard Directory of Advertising Agencies. 
SOURCE: Advertising Age, "Agency Billings," various issues. 
II. SIZE CLASSES OF NAMED AGENCIES 
Number of Complaints 
0/0 of Complaints 
0/0 of Billings" 
1-8 
9 
28.1 
26.7 
9-20 
3 
9.4 
22.5 
Size Classes 
21-100 
4 
12.5 
29.0 
"Estimated for 1972 Agency Billings, Advertising Age, 2/26173. 
-100"" 
13 
40.6 
21.8 
"" Agencies that are not reported in Advertising Age are assumed to be small agencies with ranks 
above 100. 
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ability that this pattern is random, it appears that being named in a complaint 
does have adverse consequences.4.7 
The impact of ASP on agencies is not likely to be limited to those accounts 
named in complaints or to those agencies named. If advertisers anticipate FTC 
actions are more likely directed towards particular agency types or if certain 
agency types are less expert in avoiding FTC sanctions, the advertisers will 
presumably be less likely to use these agencies. 
In order to investigate this possible effect of ASP, we studied a sample of 
200 advertising accounts over the 1967 to 1976 period. These included the 36 
products named in ASP complaints prior to 1976 and 164 other products selected 
to ensure a reasonable number of accounts for agencies of different size classes. 
The final sample was reduced to 136 accounts because information on agency 
size and/or account size was unavailable.4.8 Through consultation with the Stan-
dard Directory of Advertisers, we noted whether, when and to whom these ac-
counts switched agencies, 1967-1976. 
Table F summarizes the agency account changes that occurred between agen-
cies of various sizes before and after ASP. Out ofl,360 possible agency changes, 
there were' 68 switches, 28 before ASP, 40 after. There is a 25 percent pro-
bability these numbers could be generated by the same binominal process. By 
inspecting the cells of Table F, we can see no obvious inter size changes before 
versus after ASP. Within each cell, the upper left number is the before ASP 
switches in accounts and in the lower right is the post ASP number. It appears 
that there are no major differences other than the top 8 firms losing more ac-
counts to firms of size rank below 50 after ASP. 
A more detailed regression analysis confirmed the absence of any significant 
effect of ASP on account retention. A logit regression of the following general 
form was estimated. 
PLA.ICI a. + aIASP. + a 1SK • ASP. + a 3SK + a.C rJ 
+ asR.., + a6ErJ 
where PLA.ICI is the probability of agency K losing account J in year t, a 0,1 
dummy variable with a value of 1 in a year where the account was lost; ASP. 
is a measure of the advertising substantiation program, ASPA or ASPD; SK is 
the size rank of agency K; CrJ is a dummy variable for whether account J was 
subject to an ASP complaint; R.J is a dummy variable for whether account J was 
subject to an industry round; E. is the size of advertising account J. 
<7 U we asswne that it is equally likely that an agency does relatively better or poorer during 
the complaint interval as before or after, there is only a .0062 probability that 18 of the 26 observa-
tions would show the agency doing poorer during the complaint interval. 
48 The final sample included for 1972 agency sizes. 47 accounts of the top 8.41 accounts of the 
ninth to twentieth agencies. 24 accounts of agencies ranked from 21 to SO. and 24 accounts of agen-
cies smaller than rank SO. Twenty-three accounts that were named in complaints were included 
in the 136 account sample. 
. 
• 
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Size Class 
Top 8 
9-20 
21-50 
Smaller 
Than 50 
TOTAL 
Table F 
SUMMARY OF ACCOUNT CHANGES, VARIOUS 
AGENCY SIZE CLASSES, BEFORE AND AFrER ASP 
9-20 21-50 Smaller than 
Top 8 Largest Largest the 50 Largest 
Before After Before After Before After Before After 
4 4 0 1 
1 3 0 5 
3 3 1 2 
3 5 2 2 
0 0 1 1 
0 1 2 4 
0 2 0 6 
1 2 1 8 
7 9 2 10 
5 11 5 19 
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Total 
Before After 
9 
9 
9 
12 
2 
7 
8 
10 
28 
40 
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Table G reports the results of maximum likelihood (logit) estimates of this 
regression equation. The reported equations use dummy variables for the listed 
size classes. While we find ASP to have reduced account stability, the effect 
is not significant. None of the pre or post ASP size variables is found to impact 
significant upon account stability. Generally, the regression analysis is very un-
successful in explaining the account changes and neither the ASP program ASP A, 
a specific account complaint CJr industry round R", agency or account size is 
found to affect an agency's account retention. Various alternative variable defini-
tions, inclusions and exclusions and functional forms confirm this conclusion. 
ASPA 
.04 
(1.4) 
.04 
(1.4) 
.014 
(1.0) 
Table G 
LOGIT REGRESSIONS OF AGENCY ACCOUNT LOSSES 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE COEFFICIENTS AND 
COEFFICIENT/STANDARD ERROR 
Agency Size Ranks 
Top 8 9-20 21-50 
Pre- Post Pre- -Post Pre- Post Account 
ASP ASP ASP ASP ASP ASP Complaint Round Size 
-.07 .006 -.01 .02 -.6 .03 .02 .005 
(-.2) (.3) (-.04) (.08) (-1.4) (1.2) (.04) (1.2) 
-.08 .006 (-.01) .02 -.6 .03 .18 .005 
(-.3) (.3) (-.04) (.9) (1.4) (1.3) (.8) (1.2) 
-.004 
(1.1) 
Dependent Variable: 0 if account is retained. 
1 if account is lost. 
Number of observations: 1.360. 
Cons. 
-3.5 
(-4.6) 
-3.3 
(-5.8) 
-3.0 
(-12.9) 
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Concluding Remarks 
We have found that the advertising substantiation program was followed by 
a slight increase in concentration of second level, size rank 9-20, advertising 
agencies' billings. At the same time, the biggest 8 firms showed a very modest 
fall in concentration. We also find FTC activity to be directed somewhat 
disproportionately towards the biggest and the smallest firms. However, try 
though we may, we cannot find ASP activity to significantly impact account reten-
tion or account switching. 
It would seem that any effects of ASP on advertising agencies are very modest. 
This is a puzzling conclusion if the Higgins-McChesney finding of 91 percent 
excess returns to publicly traded advertising agencies from April, 1970 - June, 
1971 is properly attributed to the FTC's advertisinq substantiation program. 
We cannot reconcile these findings and rather shall conclude by describing on-
going research, the results of which may provide a more complete picture of 
ASP's effects. 
The most obvious explanation for the Higgins-McChesney finding is that it 
is not a distributional result but rather an industry-wide increase in agencies' 
wealth. We are currently examining this in two ways. First, by using over-the-
counter stock market prices, we have expanded the Higgins-McChesney port-
folio to include middle and smaller advertising agencies.We shall test for any 
sensitivity of the excess returns to firm size and also confirm (or refute) the 
general finding' of excess retJJrns. 
The other, more difficult research requires a study of the impact of ASP on 
the demand for advertising. This we are doing by (1) examining advertising-
sales functions for over-the-counter drug markets, (2) expanding the Higgins-
McChesney portfolio of advertiser stocks and studying complaint and industry 
round impacts, (3) examining excess returns patterns in media stock prices, 
and (4) estimating demand equations for magazine advertisements. 
We believe that only by assembling the results of all these studies will a con-
clusive answer to the question of the benefits and costs, both private and pUblic, 
from the advertising substantiation program be available. 
. 
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An Economic Analysis of the FTC's -
Ad Substantjation Program 
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I. Introduction 
Fred S. McChesney· 
Emory University 
As the economic theory of regulation has developed, our understanding of 
the distnbution of gains and losses from government intervention in the market 
place has advanced considerably. 1 This article draws from the economic theory 
of regulation to examine preliminarily some of the allocative and distributive con-
sequences of the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) "advertising substantia-
tion" doctrine. Ad substantiation has sharply altered the focus of advertising 
regulation at the FTC. The FTC had traditionally been required to prove after 
the fact that advertising claims were false. With the coming of substantiation 
in the early 1970s, advertisers henceforth were required to possess a 
"reasonable b~" for advertising claims prior to making them.2 The FTC now 
enjoins advertising claims it finds exaggerated in the light of the evidence available 
at the time the claims were made. 
Section n of this paper explains the origins and workings of the ad substantia-
tion doctrine in greater detail. In Section ill we present a simple model of adver-
tising regulation by the FTC, and we show how the ad substantiation program 
in particular may have enhanced the FTC's ability to transfer wealth from small 
to large firms. Section ill also derives some testable implications, one of which 
distinguishes empirically between public interest (wealth enhancing) and mere-
ly redistributional applications of ad substantiation. Section IV tests these im-
plications using data from the stock market and on FTC case incidence. Section 
V summarizes our findings and suggests some policy options. 
• The views expressed here are the authors'. They doubtless do not reflect the views of some 
Commissioners, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission itself. We received 
helpful commeuts on earlier drifts from Ronald Bond, Gerard Butters, David Haddock, Cotton Lind-
say, Robert Mackay, Michael Maloney, the late Steven Marston, Robert McConnick, Wdliam 
Shughart, Robert Tollison and Bruce Yandle. Research and almputational assistance from Susan 
Campbell, Kim Garman and Kathleen McChesney is also very gratefully acknowledged. 
1 Stigler, The TIItory 0/ EetntDfIIic R~,2 Bell J. Econ. 3 (1971); Peltzman, Toward a Mort 
Gmnul TIItory 0/ R~. 19 J.L. & Eem. 211 (1976). 
2 As explained below, ad substantiation thus focuses on the finn's inputs, in the form of surveys, 
scientific tests or other evidence deemed to constitute a ,. reasonable basis" u anlll for advertising 
claims. On the differences between regulation of inputs and outputs, see gmeralJy Wittman. Prior 
R~ venus Post LitJbility: The CIwia bttr«m Input au 0uItMt Mrmitoring, 6 J. Legal Stud. 
193 (177). The ad substantiation doctrine complements the more traditional FTC monitoring for 
falsity u post, which focuses on outputs (i.e., on the actual Performance of the product relative 
to claims made for it). In principle. that is, the FTC may challenge a claim as either unsubstantiated 
or false; it often alleges both falsity and lack of substantiation. 
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II. The Advertising Substantiation Doctrine 
A. Origins of Ad SubsttJntitzti0n3 
Since its creation in 1914 the Federal Trade Commission has brought cases 
alleging false and deceptive advertising. There have been two essential elements 
in deception cases: interpretatioo of the actual claim or claims made in the adver-
tisements, and determination of the truth or falsity of the daims as interpreted 
by the Commission. Then and now the federal courts, which review FTC cases 
on appeal, have generously deferred to the Commission's expertise in inter-
preting advertising claims and determining their truthfulness. 
In April 1970, however, the Commission announced that it would issue a com-
plaint against Pfizer, Inc. for claims about its Unburn sunburn lotion that were 
allegedly unsuiJsttJntiattd. As discussed further below, the Commission's com-
plaint was a distinct break with its traditional regulation of advertising. 
Other substantiatiln actions ensued. In December 1970, Ralph Nader's Center 
for the Study of Responsive Law petitioned the Commission for a trade regula-
tion rule requiring national advertisers routinely to submit to the Commission 
the documents substantiating advertising claims. The FTC instead adopted a 
resolution in June 1971 requiring advertisers to submit to the Commission on 
demand relevant substantiation materials in their possession when they made 
their claims. The submissions, eventually to be released publicly, would inform 
consumers of unsubstantiated claims and encourage competitors to challenge 
them. 
From the outset, the substantiation program distinguished factual (objective 
and empirically verifiable) from non-factual (' 'puffing") claims, requiring substan-
tiation only for the former. Several industries were selected and required to 
submit substantiation for all factual claims. These so-called advertising "rounds" 
continued unt:il1981, but the results were disapP<inting. The expected consumer 
interest and competitor challenges did not materialize. An avalanche of paper 
descended on the Commission. And, internal sources show, the FTC was unable 
to evaluate much of the substantiation because it was too technical or complex 
(which doubtless explains consumers' lack of interest as well). 
Nevertheless, the rounds continued, but the Commission also began to issue 
more complaints under Section 5 alleging lack of substantiation. The Commis-
sion modified the program in late 1973, formally making it a part of the FTC's 
law enforcement mission. Substantiation rounds, while still available for public 
viewing. were to be used principally in generating cases. As the use of rounds 
has diminished. Commission staff has relied on advertisers' "voluntary" 
responses to its requests for substantiation and, where necessary, compulsory 
process to obtain materials supporting ad claims. In the decade since the Com-
3 This section is developed from several internal and external sources. See. e.g .• Cohen. 1M 
FTC's Adverlising Substantiation Program. J. Marketing. Winter 1980. pp. 26-35. 
) 
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mission issued its first complaints, the substantiation program has resulted in 
over a dozen litigated matters and over 100 consents. Indeed, substantiation 
is now the principal focus of the FTC's advertising regulation. 
The elements of the substantiation doctrine remain essentially as they were 
established by the Commission in July 1972 in Pfizer, its first opinion on substan-
tiation.· Under Section 5 of the FTC Act it is unfair and deceptive to make an 
advertising claim for a product without possessing a "reasonable basis" for the 
claim. The Commission explicitly held that substantiation must exist prior to 
dissemination of the claim: "the fact that [aJ test was not conducted prior to 
making the affirmative product claims •.. precludes it from being considered as 
a defense .... "5 In other words, subsequent tests might establish the truth of 
the claim, but they would not defeat liability; this has been the informed inter-
pretation of the Commission's opinion. 6 
As a matter of FTC stafipractice, the prior-substantiation doctrine was later 
broadened to include not just the existence of prior substantiation, but adver-
tiser reliance on it: 
The requirement of substantiation is a requirement that substantiation be poSSlSUli and rrlWl ufKm 
at 1M tirru: 0/ tile first disstminatilm of the ad. Ex post facto substantiation is not a legal defense. 
Documents in the corporate basement or library that were not in the corporate mind when the 
ad was prepared; opinions of general knowledge that was possessed by individuals within the cor-
poration but not communicated to those actuaDy involved in the lRparation of the ad are an insuflic:ient.7 
Further, the advertising agency hired by an advertiser has almost always been 
held liable once the client-advertiser's liability has been established, on the theory 
that the agency is a partner in designing, preparing and running the typical adver-
tising campaign and so shares responsibility for required substantiation. (Curious-
ly, the Commission has never proceeded against a testing agency hired by an 
advertiser to produce substantiation when that substantiation later proves in-
adequate, even if the inadequacy results in the advertiser and its ad agency be-
ing liable. 8) 
Violation of Section 5 through inadequate substantiation subjects the adver-
tiser to a cease-and-des~t order. The cease-and-desist order carries no monetary 
penalty, but advertisers incur the costs of litigation and adverse publicity, and 
sometimes the cost of interrupting a productive advertising campaign. Violation 
• Pfizer. Inc .• 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972). 
5 81 F.T.C. at 67 (emphasis in original). 
881 F.T.C. at 63.67. "[U]nfairness may exist even if the claim is true or if the product perfonns 
as advertised." Cohen. supru n. 4. at 27. 
7 Address of Richard Herzog (Asst. Director for Advertising Practices) before the Institute of 
Advanced Advertising Studies, American Assn. of Advertising Agencies, New York Council Oune 
24-27, 1976), at 19. quoted in Cohen, supru n. 4 (emphasis in original). 
I National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488 (1973), affd 492 F.2d 1333 (211 Cir.). etri. tkn .• 419 
U.S. 993 (1976); Litton Industria, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 1 (1981), a/f'd, 676 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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of an outstanding order. however. is typically punished by civil penalties. 9 
B. Economic Rationale for Substantiation 
In holding that factual advertising claims must be supported by prior substan-
tiation. the Commission relied on an economic model of the market for infonna-
tion and an assessment of its efficiency: 
Generally, the individual conswner is at a distinct disadvantage compared to the producer or distributor 
of goods in reaching conclusions concerning the reliability of product claims .... In other cases, the 
complexity of a consumer product, and accordingly the large amount of detailed product informa-
tion necessary to an informed decision, makes the costs of obtaining product information prolubitive. 
1bis problem is further magnified by the large number of competing products on the market .... 
The manufacturer has the ability, the know-how, the equipment, the time and the resources to 
undertake such information by testing or otherWise-the consumer usually does not . . . . 
The consumer is entitled, as a matter of marketplace fairness, to rely upon the manufacturer to 
have a "reasonable basis" for making performance claims. A consumer should not be compelled 
to enter into an economic gamble to detennine whether a product will or will not perform as 
represented. The econoinic gamble involved in a consumer's reliance upon affirmative product claims 
is created by the vendors' activities, and cannot be easily avoided by consumers. 10 
This assessment of the information market remains the rationale for the substan-
tiation doctrine today. Consumers have sub-optimal infonnation; there is no ef-
fective way for them to ameliorate this problem; it is more efficient to force 
producers to substantiate their claims. 
In effect. the substantiation requirement has put the FTC in the business of 
enforcing offers made through the media. 11 The need for third-party enforce-
ment of most (if not all) contracts is not self-evident. however. For third-party 
9 Interestingly, more than half the recidivism at the FTC has involved violation of advertising 
orders. Penalties assessed typically run between $10,000 and $100,000, but may be higher. See. 
Shughart and Tollison, Antitrust Recidivism in FTC Datil: 1917-1982 (mimeo. 1982); Altrogge and 
Shughart, TM Regressive Naturr o/Civil Penalties, 4 International Review of Law and Economics, 
pp. 55-66 Oune 1984). 
10 81 F.T.C. at 61-62. Although the P/iur holding was based on Section 5 unfairness, lack of 
prior substantiation has also been held deceptive under Section 5. National Dynamics Corp., sutmz, 
n. 10. The standard for evaluating sub'stantiation is the same under either an unfairness or decep-
tion theory, Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 86 F.T.C. 1493, 1548 (1974). modified, 530 F.2d 
1093 (D.C. Cir.). reisslUd, 88 F.T.C. 210 (1976). 
11 The FTC thus treats an advertising message differently from the common law. At common 
law, an advertisement usually is not deemed an offer; it is merely an invitation to make an offer. 
See 17 Am. ]ur. 2d sec. 334 for numerous cases. The terms of the contract are found in the pur-
chaser's ensuing offer and its acceptance by the sener. Variance of the product or its performance 
from advertising claims would not be actionable. The FTC breaks with the common law tradition 
by routinely treating advertising claims as part of the performance promised by the offeror/seller 
of a uniIateral contract. which becomes binding when accepted by the consumer's purchase. See 
also Section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which also includes in the contract any state-
ment of fact that is .. part of the basis for the bargain." 
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enforcement of contracts to be efficient, parties must be unable to enforce their 
own agreements at lower cost. Self-enforcement includes (1) consumers' abili-
ty to avoid being deceived, and (2) producers' incentives to avoid deceiving. 
The lower the costs to consumers of avoiding deception and the lower the in-
centive to producers to try to deceive in the first place, the more efficient self-
enforcement is. 
For example, Nelson has shown that the kinds of advertising claims made 
for different goods, and hence the potential for deception, are a function of the 
characteristics of the good being promoted. 12 The characteristics of some goods 
("search goods") are largely verifiable before purchase, and so are not likely 
to be advertised deceptively. The characteristics of other goods ("experience 
goods") are better evaluated after a purchase. Thus, consumer search, while 
it may not completely alleviate deception in advertising, effectively constrains it. 
Likewise, consumers can purchase seller mnesty in two ways: paying a higher 
price in any given transaction, or making repeat purchases. 13 Breach of con-
tract through deception results in a reduction in consumer willingness to pay 
price premiums or in the flow of repeat business over time to the deceptively-
advertising seller. Even if a good is characterized more by "experience" 
qualities, the likelihood of repeat sales reduces producers' incentives to deceive. 14 
The value of a firm's brand-name capital or reputation provides a third market 
check on producer incentives to deceiVe. A reputation established over time 
indicates that the firm has not disappointed its customers. Thus, venerable firms 
frequently note their time in business; newcomers rarely point out their recent 
arrival in the market. The firm's capital also includes the investment value of 
advertising, which yields a stream of returns over time. The value of the firm's 
investment in advertising falls if consumers find that the claims are untrue. 
Even if the costs and rewards to buyers and sellers are insufficient to main-
tain honesty in the market, private third-party enforcement of the sales con-
tract may be cheaper than government intervention. Deceptive advertising harms 
a dishonest firm's competitors, which then have an incentive to run corrective 
ads of their own or bring legal action against the false advertiser. 15 Consumer 
demands for information about seller honesty also create profit opportunities 
for outside suppliers of that information, like Consumer Reporls. local shopping 
newsletters, local Better Business Bureaus, and more specialized consumer jour-
nals and magazines (e.g., Steiro Review). 
12 Nelson. In/omtoJUm awJ C __ BeluztJior, 78 J. Pol. £Con. 311 (1970); Advertising and 
Information, 82 J. Pol. £COn. 77S (1974). 
13 Klein & Leffier, 1M Rok 0/ Marlett Forr:u ill Assurilfg Ctmtractual Perfomv;zrrce, 89 J. Pol. 
Econ. 615 (1981); Telser, A 1Mory 0/ Sel{-EIIftm:jlfg ~, 53 J. Bus. 27 (1980). . 
l' The situation is analogous to a consumer installment contract, where the consumer's perfor-
mance (payment) follows the seDer's. A deceived or defrauded consumer can refuse performance 
in the event of producer dishonesty, as the seller well knows. See R. Posner, Et:tmImIic ANJlysis 
0/ Law, 81 n. 2 (2d ed. 1977). 
15 Jordan and Rubin, An EcOflOf1lic ANJlysis o/the Law 0/ False Aliverlisilfg, 8 J. Legal Stud. 527 
(1979). 
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In short, it is frequently assumed that because of information costs govern-
ment must regulate advertising. is This was the leap of logic made by the FTC 
in Pfizer and subsequently used to justify the Commission's ad substantiation 
program, despite several self-correcting tendencies evident in the market. 
ID. An Economic Analysis of Advertising Substantiation 
This section hypothesizes that FTC regulation of truth in advertising enables 
it to redistribute wealth from marginal to inframarginal firms. We show how 
wealth distribution opportunities are altered when the FTC regulates truth ex 
ante according to the prior-substantiation doctrine, instead of regulating truth 
ex post according to the traditional deception standard. Finally, we derive some 
implications of the economic theory of regulation. One prediction in particular 
distinguishes between the public-interest hypothesis and the redistribution 
hypothesis and suggests an empirical test. 
A. A Simple MOtkI of Ad Substantiation 
The FTC's prior reasonable-basis standard is applied to advertising that im-
plicitly or explicitly contains verifiable factual statements about product perfor-
mance or attributes. 17 Factual advertising claims convey incomplete informa-
tion about product performance. Advertising is limited to summary information 
because the cost of complete information exceeds its value. The model here 
focuses on the amount of statistical and experimental evidence sellers subject 
to FTC regulation will collect, and on the truth of the advertisers' claims given 
the available support. 
The appropriate level of truth of ad claims is a statistical decision problem. 
Advertising claims are not absolutely true or false; some erroneous inference 
is always possible. Claims are more or less true, depending on the cost of error 
in statistical inference. There is a trade-off between more truth in advertising 
and the cost of achieving it. In other words, truth in advertising is an economic 
problem. . 
The FTC's ad substantiation program regulates the level of truth in advertis-
ing. Advertising claims are deemed true ex ante only if the advertiser possess-
18 E.g., Pitofsky, Beytmd NaMr: CtmSIIfrIrI' Prottctilm and tile R'I/fIIIliilm o{ Advntising, 90 Harv. 
L. Rev. 661 (1977); Note: TIle FTC Ad SubstarrtiatUm Program, 61 Geo. LJ. 1427 (1973). But 
see J. Galbraith, TM New Industri4l State, 332·3 (1968) (no need for regulation of advertising of 
non-lethal prodtl:ts, as COIISUme!'S understand that advertising "requires welk:alsidered mendacity"). 
17 The line between puffery and factual claims is not always a bright one. By focusing on factual 
advertising we are not disparaging the information content of puffery which, according to Nelson, 
by its mere existence conveys valuable information to CODSlDDers about the utility of offers. Stt 
Nelson. In{OJ'fMtion and CtmSUmer Behavior, 78 J. Pol. Ecen. 311 (1970); Advertising and In/or-
mation, 82 J. Pol. Eam. 729 (1974). 
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ed and relied on a reasonable basis iii. making the claims. Upon investigation, 
the FTC determines whether or not the sellers' claims were adequately substan-
tiated. If the claims are found to be unsubstantiated, the Commission issues 
a complaint enjoining the advertising. Anticipation by advertisers and ad agen-
cies of an FTC injunction and order, which if subsequently violated places the 
advertiser and the ad agency at the risk of incurring monetary fines, disciplines 
firms to supply the level of truth (a ante) required by the FTC.18 The FTC's 
ability to mandate truth is limited though, since it requires substantiation only 
for factual advertising claims. Advertisers can forego factual claims and escape 
FTC scrutiny. Nonfactual advertising ("puffery"), however, is not a perfect 
substitute for factual advertising. 
We show in a stylized context how the FTC can redistribute wealth among 
advertisers in a market by regulating the level of truth in factUal advertising. 
We suppose that all firms supply an identical product, that no. firms have ac-
cumulated brand-name capital and that all advertising is factual advertising. 
We also assume that the firms exhibit variable returns to scale and in the 
absence of any substantiation, all firms have the same minimum average cost 
but different optimal sizes. The industry supply curve is fiat in the absence of 
substantiation. We further assume that for a given product and type of claim 
the requirements of substantiation (e.g., a scientific test to substantiate a per-
formance claim) impose identical fixed costs across the market. The per-unit 
costs of substantiation rise more for the smaller producers. Substantiation thus 
imparts an upward slope to the industry supply curve. In other words, marginal 
firms' costs are raised relative to those of their inframarginal rivals-all other 
things equal. 19 
The commodity has one quality dimension that is fixed and cannot be ascer-
tained by consumers prior to purchase. 20 Producers also do not know quality 
with certainty. They must "test" to determine the quality of the commodity, 
and testing is subject to error. Thus, for a given amount of testing and a par-
ticular test outcome there is an optimal claim that the firms are justified in mak-
ing. We suppose that FTC ad substantiation regulation mandates the level of 
testing and the appropriate claim for the specific test outcome. For any level 
of prior support imposed uniformly on all firms in the market there will be a 
distribution of "optimal" advertising Claims. We assume that consumers rely 
on the average of these claims to estimate product performance. Thus, con-
18 It is assumed that the cost imposed by FTC remedies is large enough that the FTC can regulate 
the level of truth in factual advertising. This assumption is apparently reasonable: Peltzman found 
that FTC challenges to advertising caused serious capital losses for the !inns named. Peltzman. 
The Effects of FTC Advertising Regulation. 24 J.L. & Econ. 403 (1981). The cost of punishment 
to advertisers. discounted by the probability of being caught. includes the foregone benefits of the 
ad campaign enjoined. the cost of legal defense and investigation. and the loss in reputation occa-
sioned by the adverse publicity. 
19 See S. Salop. D. Scheffman and W. Schwartz. A Bidding Analysis of Special Interest Regula· 
tion: Raising Rivals' Costs in a Rent·Seeking Society. FTC Conference Volume on The Political 
Economy of Regulation: Private Interests in the Regulatory Process. (March 1984). 
20 For example. x% of the units sold "work." or the commodity works for x% of consumers. 
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sumers are assumed to rely on the FTC to assure that firms are making adver-
tising claims that have a reasonable basis. 
The welfare and wealth-redistnbution effects of our stylized version of FTC 
advertising regulation are illustrated in Figure 1 for two different levels of re-
quired substantiation. Curves 50 and 5\ depict supply curves in a competitive 
market for low and high levels, respectively, of required substantiation. By 
assumption, demand (0\ and Do) is linear in the average quality claim in the 
market. D\ > Do because the accuracy of the average product claim based on 
a higher level of substantiation (testing) exceeds the accuracy of the claims made 
with less Support.21 We have not assumed anything about risk aversion to get 
this result; demand is raised because the cost of error from relying on statistical 
claims is smaller when the claims are more substantiated. 
Average 
Price 
Po 
A 
Figure 1 
Output 
2\ To obtain this result we are implicitly assuming that true product quality (which is unknown) 
actually exceeds the minimum. that consumers know the level of substantiation the FTC typically 
requires for such claims em fact. some advertising describes the tests on which performance claims 
are based). and that consumers assume the worst when there is DO substantiation . 
. 
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By imposing higher standards of truth in Figure 1, the FTC raises rent for 
the inframarginal finns from area APoCD to area AP.B at a cost of CDE at the 
margin. By varying the required level of truth the FTC is able to divert wealth 
from marginal firms (and, ultimately, consumers) to inframarginal firms. 
We allow that ad substantiation regulation provides benefits as well as costs. 
Because advertising claims based on greater support are more infonnative, ad-
ditional reasonable-basis requirements shift demand and supply. But the marginal 
contribution of substantiation to demand price falls with greater substantiation 
while the cost at the margin rises with greater substantiation. Thus for initial 
low levels of substantiation additional substantiation requirements may benefit 
both marginal and inframarginal firms as demand shifts more than supply. 
However, we hypothesize that the FTC will avail itself of the opportunity to 
redistribute wealth to the inframarginal firms and push substantiation re-
quirements beyond the point where consumer welfare is maximized. 
Our hypothesis about the implementation of the ad substantiation program 
by the FTC is based on a simple view of regulation. The demand for truth in 
advertising is filtered by the political process so that regulation goes to the highest 
bidder. In other words, if by imposing more truth the inframarginal firms gain 
a dollar at the loss of less than a dollar to the marginal firms, then the additional 
truth is imposed. We realize that this is a very naive picture of the political pro-
cess; we do not have a supply-side theory. In our defense, we note that the 
typical impressionistic description of the opposing interests manifest in the 
political process would tilt the regulatory solution even further toward the in-
framarginal firms. For example, it is not uncommon in these accounts to ignore 
consumer interests. which would press towards less substantiation. supposing 
consumers have too little at stake to justify organization. 
B. The Pfizer Doctrine and Some Predictions 
Based on the foregoing hypothesis of how advertising regulation works. we 
now note that Pfizer represents a regulatory innovation that altered the 
redistributive potential of FTC advertising regulation. Before Pfizer. an adver-
tiser could avoid meeting FTC standards of truth ex ante. anticipating that. were 
he investigated, he could successfully supply, with some positive probability, 
the required substantiation of ' the truth of his claims (or the FTC interpretation 
of his claims, about which he may have been uncertain).22 After Pfizer. truth 
is not a defense. making the probability of vindication ex post zero. As a conse-
quence. the Pfizer doctrine raises the expected cost of punishment for a given 
penalty for violation. probability of detection. standard of truth and level of prior 
substantiation. 
22 Of course, it would be rare indeed for an advertiser's claims to be false ex ante and true ex 
post, But we are not dealing with all or nothing, Claims are more or less true: the appropriate margin 
is at stake, It is not unreasonable to suppose that an advertiser would make claims that are false 
ex ante according to FTC standards and are true ex post according to these same standards, 
Page 206 FTC CONSUMER PROTECTION CONFERENCE 
Thus the Pfizer doctrine represents a regulatory innovation that increases 
the FTC's ability to impose substantiation costs differentially on small and large 
firms, thereby raising the value of inframarginal finns. 
Another prediction of our model of ad substantiation is that the ability of the 
FTC to transfer wealth depends on the degree of diversity of firm size within 
a product market. When firms' market shares are uniform the FTC is powerless 
to redistribute wealth. Thus we predict that the incidence of ad substantiation 
cases by product market wiD. be positively related to diversity of firm size within 
the market.23 
The prediction that the FTC wiD. target markets where there is diversity in 
size distinguishes the eoonomic model of advertising regulation from what might 
be termed the public-interest model. According to the latter, the FTC repairs 
an infoimation-market failure. Suppliers can make their claims credible at a lower 
cost when the FTC stands ready "as cop on the beat" to penalize firms that 
exaggerate. The public-interest model predicts that case incidence is related 
to the supply of false advertising. Since there is no theoretical link between the 
amount of such advertising and diversity of firm size, ceteris paril1w;, the public-
interest model predicts no relationship between case incidence and diversity, 
in contrast to the economic model. Moreover, the conventional wisdom that 
it is the small firms without brand-name capital that are most likely to supply 
false and unsubstantiated advertising, suggests that the public-interest model 
predicts that average firm size (or market share) in a product market will be 
negatively correlated with case incidence. Diversity in a market with many firms 
without reputations or in a market with a low average level of brand-name capital 
is irrelevant according to this hypothesis. 
IV. Empirical Evidence 
A. Effects on Advertisers' Stock Prices 
The economic model of advertising regulation predicts that the ad substantia-
tion doctrine first applied in P/iar raises the value of large advertisers. Finan-
cial market analysis is used to measure the effects of the FTC's shift in adver-
tising regulation from falsity e% post to substantiation ex ante. Financial market 
analysis is based on the efficient market theory of finance. 24 Security prices at 
23 Of course as a long-run consequence we expect ad substantiation to raise the optimal scale 
of a firm in its various product lines. The gains to inframarginal firms from the Pfizer doctrine thus 
appear to be transitional. With a positive rate of interest these gains still could be large enough 
to justify seeking the regulation. And. finally, even after all size adjustment has occurred, the ad 
substantiation program will contiwe to provide benefits to incumbent firms by raSing the cost of entry. 
24 Schwert, Measun·1IIf tilt Effects 0/ RtgUiation: Euidmct from tilt CapitlZi Marl/tts, 24 J.L. & 
Econ. 121 (1981). For applications of financial market analysis to analyze regulatory changes, ste 
Schwert, Public ReguJatioft 0/ Natilmal Securities EzeM1IIfes: A Test o/tIIt Capnm Hypothesis, 8 
Bell J.Econ. 128 (1977). 
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a given moment in time reflect all available information and discounted expected 
future returns, including risk adjustments. As new information affecting a security 
is received, the resulting wealth effect is reflected in the security's price. The 
wealth effect of a regulatory change expected to affect a firm's revenues and 
costs into the future is captured in the present price of the firm's securities 
as information of the regulatory change develops. 
In financial market analysis, then, a principal concern is the timing of events 
that alter present values. A time "window" is investigated if a series of events 
contrIbuted to changing expectations. In the case of ad substantiation, the FTC . 
first signaled the policy change away from deception when it announced in April 
1970 its intention to file a complaint against Pfizer (which it in fact did three 
months later). At that time, a Pfizer spokesman noted that the FTC was "seeking 
to establish new legal theories that have no precedent in cases that have been 
decided by the courts or by the FTC. "25 This was apparently the first public 
mention of substantiation; a review of the financial and advertising press in 1969 
and 1970 discloses no earlier reference to it. 
Thus any adjustment in firms' values would date from April 1970.26 The ad-
justment should have been completed when the Commission published its Pfizer 
opinion. The relevant time window for measuring the value changes of firms 
affected by substantiation is therefore from April 1970 to July 1972. 
1. Advertisers' Returns 
The investigation of wealth changes due to the new substantiation require-
ment begins with an examination of monthly rates of return for large adver-
tisers in two categories, "drugs and toiletries" and "home products and building 
products." Within these product categories, for each of 79 sub-classes (markets) 
defined in Leading National Advertisers (LNA), the largest firm in total 1970 
advertising expenditures was selected.27 This produced a portfolio of 54 firms 
25 "Pfizer's Advertising of Sunburn Reliever is Challenged by FTC," Wall St. joumal, April 14, 
1970, p. 4, col. 2. 
26 Also well publicized was the Nader petition filed with the Commission in December 1970 that 
sought a rulemaking to require submission for public disclosure of all substantiation material. By 
that time, however, the market ~tment process should have been well underway. An FTC 
spokesman "indicated the proposed !Nader] requirement was in line with the agency's own recent 
efforts to require advertisers to substantiate claims." 
The proposed rule basically would broaden to an industrywide basis a principle the FTC already 
is seeking to establish on a case-by-case basis. In test cases, such as one against ad claims 
for Pfizer Inc. 's Unburn sunburn lotion, the FTC is seeking to require advertisers to have proof 
in advance that a claim is true rather than continuing the previous practice of placing on the 
agency the burden of proving that a c1aim is false. 
"Nader's Bid to Require Proof of Ad Claims to be Studied by FTC," Wall St. joumat. Dec. 14, 
1970, p. 8, col. 3. 
27 Leading National Advertisers, Inc., LNA Multi-Media Repat ClasslBrand $, January-December 
1970; Media Records, Inc., Expenditures of National Advertisers in Newspapers Year 1970; Radio 
Expenditures Report, First Quarter-Fourth Quarter 1970. 
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(some firms were leaders in more than one market). The equally-weighted port-
folio's monthly rate of return was regressed on the monthly returns for an equally 
weighted market portfolio of stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), as reported by the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP), 
and on a dummy ".ariable for the time of adjustment to the new substantiation 
requirement. za The dummy was coded 1 for the period April 1970 to July 1972, 
zero otherwise. 
The results are shown in Table 1. The coefficient for the market portfolio 
return is significant and positive, as one would predict.as The equation explains 
most of the variation in the dependent variable, and the Durbin-Watson statistic 
indicates no problem of first-order serial correlation. Notably, the coefficient 
for the time of adjustment to the ad substantiation program shows substantia-
tion had a positive effect on the value of the market leaders, significant at the 
five percent level. These firms experienced an abnonnal monthly increase in 
their rates of return of almost one percent for over 28 months. 
B. Incidmce of FI'C Subsllzntitztion Cases 
The public-interest and the economic hypotheses have opposing implications 
for the way in which the FTC implements the ad substantiation program. The 
economic model hypothesizes that substantiation exists to redistribute wealth. 
The necessary condition for the FTC to redistnbute wealth is a differential ad-
vantage of large firms to spread the costs of substantiation. Thus the economic 
model predicts that the FTC will bring more ad substantiation cases in those 
product markets where firm size and reputation are more diverse, since that 
diversity gives the FTC greater power to redistribute wealth.3O The mean level 
of firm size in the market and brand-name capital is irrelevant under the economic 
hypothesis. The market-failure model predicts, however, that lower mean levels 
of brand-name capital are precisely what attracts the attention of a publicly-
interested FTC. The variance in size or reputation has no explanatory power 
under the public-interest model. 
In short, the economic model predicts that variation matters (positively) in 
the incidence of FTC cases and the mean does not; the public-interest model 
predicts that the mean matters (negatively) but variation does not. 
Perfect measures of fimis' market size and reputation capital do not exist 
for appropriately defined product markets. As in the stock-market analysis of 
advertisers' returns, we adopted LNA's product sulK:lasses to define markets, 
and we used as proxies for firm market size and reputation a firm's 1970 total 
21 The portfolio for both the dependent and the independent variables exclude dividends. 
29 We also tested for the stability of the beta coefficient on the market portfolio return variable. 
and found that the introduction of the ad substantiation progr:un caused no significant shift in the 
beta coefficient. 
30 It is not overall finn size that we refer to but the firm' s size in a particular product market . 
. 
• 
IDGGINS AND MCCHESNEY Page 209 
advertising expenditure in each market. 31 The mean and coefficient of variation 
for firm advertising expenditures in each market was computed. To define the 
dependent variable, we assigned Fl'C ad substantiation cases and consent orders 
from 1972 to 1980 to the relevant market. 32 
The results of regressing case incidence on the mean and variation of adver-
tising expenditures are shown in Table 2. The only estimated parameter of 
significance is the coefficient of variation, and its positive sign is correctly 
predicted by the economic hypothesis. The test results refute the principal im-
plication of the public-interest model. The mean of the reputation/ size measure 
has no significant effect on the Fl'C's case activity.l3 When the coefficient of 
vat.ation is the sole regressor, as suggested by the economic model, its 
significance increases,and the F-statistic rises to 5.15. 
v. Conclusion 
An economic model of Fl'C advertising regulation has been presented that 
views this regulation as a means by which large advertisers differentially im-
pose costs on their rivals. The ad substantiation doctrine in particular is seen 
as a regulatory innovation that enhanced the Fl'C's ability to transfer wealth 
to large firms. The factual advertising not chilled by the higher cost of truth 
may contain greater truth than before Pfizer, but the cost of the extra truth 
exceeds its value. In any case, the integrity of advertising is a by-product that 
cloaks the aims of the large advertisers to restrict market penetration and en-
31 There are several theoretical and empirical problems with using a firm's advertising expen-
diture as a proxy for its size or reputation in a market. Su Nagle. Do AIi«rtisitrg-Pro/itllbiliiy Studies 
RlIllly SIJow that AdwrtUi"ll C,.,. Q BtnrWrtD E'lftryt U J.L. & £con. 333 (1981). For example, 
in the advenisiDg-proDtahility literature, a aitical issue is tile appropriate magnitaie of the depreciation 
rate for advertising c:apital. For our purpoees, whether advertising expenditure is a current or capital 
expense is iZTelevant as long as depreciation rates do not vary substantially IaoSS products. In 
fact, there is evidence that retention rates differ across products. Su Peles, RtJIls of Amortization 
of Aliverlisi"ll E~, 79 J.PoL Econ. 1032 (1971) and J. Lambin, AdI1f1'tisillg, CompeJiiion 
a7lli Marlut Ctmdw:t i" OlillOl»l1 Owl' Tau (1976). The unavailability of a sufficiently large set 
of product-specific estimates of depreciation rates precluded adjustment of advertising expenditures 
in our product sample. However; we ~ able to appy a aude test based on evidence that deprecia-
tion rates are higher for durable goods. When we estimated the regression model in this section 
on the subsample, "drugs and toiletries," we got results identical to those for the full sample which 
included many markets for durables. 
32 We are grateful to CoUot Gerard, Julie Niemasik and Bruce Levine of the Federal Trade Com-
mission for the list of ad substantiation cases. There was a total of 45 cases. 
13 We also estimated the regression models of Table 2 including total market advertising expen-
diture as a regressor. Holding constant total advertising expenditure pennits a test of an alternate 
version of the public·interest model in which mean finn shares, instead of mean size, is one of the 
key predictors of case incidence. The results do not suppon the public·interest model any more 
than those in Table 2; however, the significance of the variance coefficient was reduced to .08 in 
a one-tailed test. (Total advertising affects case incidence positively, but the effect is statistically 
insignificant. ) 
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try by their rivals. 
In support of our hypothesis we have presented some empirical evidence from 
the stock market that large advertisers' values did rise with the advent of the 
FTC's prior substantiation standard. Additionally, by relating ad substantiation 
case incidence to some characteristics of the product markets targeted by the 
FTC, we find support for the economic theory of regulation relative to the public-
interest hypothsis. 
Based on our findings we have several recommendations. We recommend 
more study; our results are certainly not dispositive. But they suggest that we 
should suspend judgment about the welfare effects of the program until more 
research is completed. In this regard, we applaud the efforts of our fellow 
panelist, and we eagerly await the research being conducted by the Bureau of 
Consumer Protection. 
More daringly, perhaps, our research impels us to suggest a natural experi-
ment. We would revive a policy proposal already made by others some time 
ago. Let the FTC give advertisers a choice between regulation by the FTC or 
no regulation. Those advertisers who think that conswners rely on the FTC's 
regulatory presence in assessing the credibility of their ad claims would submit 
their substantiation for review by the FTC. When the Commission found the 
claims adequately substantiated, the advertisers could mark their advertisements 
with an FTC 10go.:W The choice to undergo FTC scrutiny need not delay in-
troduction of an ad campaign, since the claims could be made with the notation 
"FTC approval pending." -Those advertisers who think FTC regulation is overly 
burdensome and intrusive could avoid the Commission's oversight altogether 
by refraining from seeking certification for their ads. With this rule in place we 
could readily observe the demand for an FTC role in advertising and gauge the 
relative infonnativeness of advertising with and without the FTC's sanction. 
If markets have truly failed, the demand for FTC regulation will be brisk, and 
the FTC's own claims for its program will be substantiated. 
:u After some experience with the program, the FTC may find that user fees can be charged 
to cover the cost of enforcement 
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Table 1 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 
SUBSTANTIATION ON RETuRNs TO PORTFOUO OF LEADING ADVERTISERS 
Intercept 
Market Return 
Event Dummy 
F = 182.58"" 
R' '" .78 
Durbin-Watson c 2.26 
"Significant at .05 level in one-tailed test. 
·"Signficiant at .01 level. 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
-.002 
(-1.10) 
.691"" 
(12.78) 
.009" 
(1.71) 
Source: Estimates from monthly returns tape (1964-1978), Center for Research in Securities Prices. 
Table 2 
INCIDENCE OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AD SUBSTANTIATION CASES 
AS A FUNCTION OF ADVERTISING VOLUME, 1972-1980 
Intercept 
Mean Advertising Expenditures 
Coefficient of Variation for 
Advertising Expenditures 
F ·statistic 
R' 
·Significant at .01 level in one-tailed test. 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
-.360 
(-.80) 
3.1xlO·' 
(.27) 
.428" 
(2.27) 
2.58 
.07 

Comments 
f. Howard Beales IlI* 
Associate Director for Policy & Evaluation 
Bureau of Consumer Protection 
Federal Trade Commission 
The legal theory of the advertising substantiation program requires an adver-
tiser to have a "reasonable basis" before making objective product claims in 
advertising. The papers presented today have viewed this doctrine as a different 
species of advertising regulation. In fact. however. substantiation is simply a 
more efficient regulatory tool to control deception. 
For an advertiser contemplating the possibility of a deceptive claim. the 
likelihood of getting caught, the consequences of conviction. and the standard 
for judging the truthfulness of the claim combine to determine an expected cost 
of violation. This expected cost creates an incentive for advertisers to deter-
mine the truth of a claim before making it. Incentives to determine whether 
the claim is true may be adequate or inadequate. but as long as making false 
claims has some consequences. an incentive to check in advance exists. Adver-
tising substantiation can change the amount of prior checking of the truth of 
a claim. but it does so by raising the expected cost of punishment if a firm 
deceives. Nonetheless, there exists some ex post regulatory strategy with ex-
actly the same effects as the ad substantiation program. Because an equivalent 
ex post strategy would not alter the resources advertisers devote to verification 
of claims in advance, the question should be the effects of different strategies, 
and not whether those strategies are implemented ex ante or ex post. 
The key question in assessing the effects of the advertising substantiation 
program is the standard of truth advertisers are required to meet. This is perhaps 
most apparent in the Higgins-McChesney model of substantiation. In their model. 
the efficient solution is for all firms to make exactly the same claim and conduct 
a single test. The advertising substantiation doctrine allows this outcome, so 
any effects of the doctrine must come from changing the level of testing. Changing 
the level of testing, however, has very little to do with whether the standard 
is ex post or ex ante. Rather, it deals with the standard of truth - how certain 
must we be that a claim is truthful, before the claim is judged permissible? 
With this perspective on the program in mind, consider the effects observed 
by Higgins and McChesney. They first examine the impact of the substantia-
tion doctrine on large national advertisers, as reflected in financial markets. 
Although they find a significant effect, it is unclear whether that effect is a cost 
or a benefit. If the amount of testing is suboptimal without a substantiation re-
'The views in this paper are my own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bureau 
of Consumer Protection. the Commission or any individual Commissioner. 
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quirement, the program generates net benefits. Because testing costs are fixed, 
however, increased testing will benefit large or inframarginal firms relative to 
smaJler ones. Thus, whether the advertising substantiation program is efficient 
or not, it will nonetheless generate wealth transfers. 
A differential impact of the substantiation requirement on advertisers of dif-
ferent size does not depend exclusively on the fixity of testing costs, however. 
If the program works as intended, it should enhance the credibility of advertis-
ing. The effect of such an enhancement is analogous to a reduction in the price 
of advertising, and, of course, large advertisers tend to benefit more. This also 
suggests a test of the competing hypotheses. The public interest theory, that 
advertising substantiation is efficient, implies that the financial market effect 
should be proportional to the number of ads run by a company. The Higgins-
McChesney theory, in contrast, implies that the effects should be proportional 
to the number of units of the product sold. Admittedly such a test is difficult 
to undertake, but conceptually it can distinguish the competing hypotheses. 
The Higgins and McChesney results, in conjunction with the Leffler and Sauer 
results, also suggest a puzzle. Like Peltzman's study of the impact of FTC adver-
tising cases, 1 Higgins and McChesney find large financial market effects. It seems 
difficult to find much impact in the product or advertising markets, however. 
Measured by the expectations of financial markets, the effects of substantiation 
are enormous. Measured by the apparent actual effects in advertising markets, 
at least as found by Leffler and Sauer, the effects are almost non-existent. 
Higgins and McChesney also seek to evaluate the substantiation program by 
examining competing theories of what factors should influence the likelihood of 
an FTC case. They first examine mean advertising expenditures in an industry, 
arguing that a substantiation program that primarily serves the public interest 
should bring cases against firms with little advertising capital; while rent seek-
ing implies no such relation. Unfortunately, the theoretical importance of average 
advertising expenditures under a public interest theory is unclear. Firms with 
little brand name capital are more likely to engage in deception, as Higgins and 
McChesney note, but for a given deceptive claim, benefits are greater from 
suing a larger firm. It is not apparent which effect will dominate. 
Superficially more compelling is the Higgins and McChesney test based on 
the coefficient of variation. The authors argue that a substantiation program that 
primarily redistributes wealth among large and smaJI firms should bring cases 
in industries with diverse firm sizes. They further contend that no such implica-
tion follows from a public interest theory. There is, however, a theoretical link 
between diversity of firm size and the likelihood of deception. First, honest firms 
are likely to grow relative to dishonest ones. Even if all firms are initially the 
same size, as honest firms grow, the presence of deception will generate 
disparities in firm size. The effect is analogous to an industry with different firms 
l Sam Peltzman. "The Effects of FTC Advertising Regulation." Journal of lAw and Economics. 
December 1981. Vol. 24. p. 403. 
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charging different prices. Because firms with lower prices will tend to grow. 
there is a theoretical relationship between the finn size distribution and the price 
distribution. Similarly. the existence of market forces that check deception im-
plies that deception will be more common when a fringe of dishonest firms com-
petes with a core of honest companies. 
Second. some market forces that limit deception may operate less effectively 
if finn sizes diverge. For example, large well known firms are probably less 
reluctant to counter claims by a rival of similar size than to name small. unknown 
competitors in counteradvertising. To the extent that such factors are signifi-
cant market incentives for truthful advertising. uniform finn sizes should pro-
mote honest advertising. 
The Leffler and Sauer paper represents a search for correlates of the adver-
tising substantiation program that may represent effects of the program on adver-
tising agencies. Little impact is apparent in the results. Again, one possible reason 
is that substantiation cases and deception cases are alternative means to the 
same end. Leffler and Sauer's suggestion that the theories are not substitutes 
seems to confuse changes in the level of activity with changes in the theory 
employed. The years surrounding the emergence of the substantiation doctrine 
in 1972 represent the peak years of advertising regulation in the period under 
study. Between 1970 and 1972, 76 percent of the Commission's 46 advertising 
cases were based on a deception theory. Between 1973 and 1975. 73 percent 
of 60 total cases were substantiation cases. This remarkable shift in the pro-
portion of cases under each theory would seem to indicate that the approaches 
are substitutes. An increase in the overall level of activity coincided with the 
advent of substantiation. but the level of activity tells us little about the effects, 
if any. of the theory employed. 
The primary effect that Leffler and Sauer find is that ad substantiation seems 
to be correlated with an increase in the market share of advertising agencies 
ranked between 9 and ID. Strong theoretical reasons for an impact of ad substaI:!-
tiation on agencies that are not too small and not too large are difficult to iden-
tify. Such a theory may be unnecessary. however. The Leffler and Sauer results 
are not overwhelming, and not fully consistent. For example. for large agencies 
(ranked 1 to 8), the effect of ad substantiation measures is negative but insignifi-
cant if market share is the dependent variable, but negative and significant (at 
least for one measure) when the dependent variable is agency billings. Despite 
the significant positive effect of substantiation on the market share of middle-
sized agencies, substantiation has a negative (but insignificant) influence on their 
billings. Medium-sized agencies seem slightly less likely to be named in FTC 
complaints relative to their billings than larger or smaller agencies. but any 
targeting effect does not seem sufficient to have influenced advertiser choices 
among agencies generally. Regressions explaining account stability do not in-
dicate any significant effects of agency size. either before or after the substan-
tiation doctrine. The pattern of results can to some extent be rationalized. and 
might provide persuasive evidence for an otherwise compelling theoretical predic-
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tion. They hardly seem to demonstrate the kind of strong empirical regularity 
that cries out for a theoretical explanation. 
The search for effects of the advertising substantiation program must take 
into account how that program fits into the larger scheme of advertising regula-
tion. Unless we assume. contrary to other evidence. that other fonns of adver-
tising regulation have no effects. we cannot learn much about substantiation 
without taking into account ad regulation based on other legal theories. Unless 
we control for the overall level of activity. we cannot tell whether or not substan-
tiation is simply a different legal theory to reach the same end as cases based 
directly on deception. Any observed effects that seem to stem from the substan-
tiation doctrine could just as easily stem from the level of activity. not the legal 
theory employed to prosecute deception. To examine the overall impact of adver-
tising regulation. we should examine the total number of cases. without regard 
to the legal theory employed. To examine the impact of the theory, we should 
seek differences in impact between substantiation cases and" deception cases. 
There is little basis in either of these papers for suspecting such an effect. 
Comments 
Pablo T. Spiller 
The Hoover Institution 
Stanford University 
The two papers on the FTC's Advertising Substantiation Program (ASP) com-
plement each other. While the Higgins and McChesney paper tries to measure 
the effect of the ASP on advertisers' stock prices and to explain its incidence, 
Leffler and Sauer try to find the effect of ASP on advertising agencies' perform-
ance. The results of the two papers are seemingly at odds: while Higgins and 
McChesney find large effects on large advertisers' stock prices, Leffler and Sauer 
find little if any effect on advertising agencies' performance. In the following 
comments I will discuss each paper and try to provide an explanation for the 
seemingly different results. 
Let me first start with the Higgins and McChesney paper. The authors discuss 
in sections 1m and IlIA two models of advertising, and analyze the potential 
implications of ASP. The model they discuss in section 1m is an application of 
the Klein and Leffler (1981) model and its implications can be summarized as 
follows: Firms build reputation implicitly to commit themselves to maintain the 
quality of their products. Thus, firms with brand name will be able to transmit 
hard information, which consumers may actually base their decisions on. That 
is, their quality statements are believable. On the other hand, firms which are 
entering the market and do not have a reputation yet, will not be able to transmit 
credible statements. The only strategy for them is to advertise a la Nelson, 
that is with "puffery," since no information message would be believed by 
customers. Introduce ASP and firms that so far were not able to transmit "hard" 
information are now able to do so, since consumers, knowing that firms can 
be prosecuted for unsubstantiated statements will tend to believe what firms 
say. These firms, then, are better off with ASP, since it essentially reduces 
their introduction costs. Large firms on the other hand, those with large in-
vestments in brand name, will find that they are worse off. Some of their in-
vestments in brand name will no longer provide a return, since those investments 
are not needed to transmit 'their informational advertising (still reputation may 
be needed to be able to promise the continuation of the optimal product quali-
ty). That is, the Klein and Leffler model predicts that, if consumers believe that 
the FTC will enforce ASP, firms that are building their reputation will benefit 
more than those that are trying to maintain it. I will refer to this model as the 
"reducing entrants' costs" model of the FTC's ASP. As we will see momen-
tarily, this model is consistent with both Higgins and McChesney's and Leffler 
and Sauer's results. 
In section lITA, the authors develop a model of the Salop and Scheffman (1983) 
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"raising rivals' costs" type. While being sympathetic to the idea, I do not think 
that the model the authors develop properly describes an industry where firms 
advertise. First, in their model advertising is about "quality," in spite of all 
products being identical. Second, consumers assess the "quality" of all iden-
tical products by looking at the average of all claims. Thus, if there are costs 
involved in testing, 00 firm will advertise any claim, and the introduction of ASP 
should not have any effect on anyone. The authcrs, however, conclude that ASP 
should hurt the marginal (small) firms while benefit - via a price increase -
the inframarginal Oarge) ones. I believe this result would follow from a "raising 
rivals' costs" model in which firms advertise because it is profitable to do so. 
My own "raising rival's costs" model is based on the Klein-Le£fier model 
previously described. Since entrants are tmse that need to advertise factual 
claims (how otherwise would you know that a Mitsubishi uses one gallon of 
gasoline for 44 miles), and since those firms may also benefit from ASP (see 
above), these firms, however, may be exposed to IIDlch more bureaucratic 
scrutiny than incumbent firms. Thus ASP bureaucratic costs may more than 
compensate for the implied reduction in required advertising in such a way that 
firms trying to introduce new products may actually be hurt from ASP (observe 
that while Leffler and Sauer say that the bureaucratic cost does not seem to 
be large, the firms they base their statement on are well established ones). 
We have two theories of ASP, one where the introduction of ASP "reduces 
entrants' costs" and another where it "raises rivals' costs. "I will now discuss 
the authors' empm and relate them to these two theories. 
Higgins and McChesney's first result (Table 1) is that a portfolio of 54 leading 
advertisers had from April 1970 to July 1972 an excess return of around 25 per-
cent. The authors attribute those gains to the introduction of ASP and suggest 
it supports the "raising rivals' costs" view against the "reducing entrants' 
costs" one. There are two problems with this result. First, a time span of 28 
months is extremely large. During that period many other things may have hap-
pened that may have affected the returns to large advertisers (for example, the 
ban on cigarettes' TV advertising may have reduced the price of TV ads and 
therefore improved the performance of large - non-dgarette - advertisers). 
I would recommend a much more precise test where each announcement on 
ASP is analyzed individuaJty and the overaB effect of ASP is derived from the 
cumulation of the effects of the individual announcements (for example, see my 
(1983) paper using such a methodology). Second, even if we grant the existence 
of such gains, it is not dear who really benefited from ASP. According to the 
"reducing entrants' costs" theory, firms introducing new products are the ones 
that (before ASP) were building the required stock of reputation through (perhaps 
large) advertising campaigns and they may have also been the larger advertisers. 
It is then consistent with that theory that these firms should gain from ASP. 
The raising rival's costs theory, however, implies that those same entrants 
should be hurt. 
. 
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The second result relates to the incidence of ASP (Table 2). Table 2 should 
be made clearer. In particular, the authors do not say whether they also include 
industries which did not have any ASP cases. If that is the case, then most of 
the dependent variable values will be zero arx:I thus OLS is inappropriate. If they 
did not ~clude them, then the standard selection problem is present and again 
OLS is inappropriate. I encourage the authors to deal with this specification prob-
lem. If we assume that the results in Table 2 are robust to the problem just 
described, then, I think this test cannot differentiate between the two alter-
native models. Since we should observe large aoss sectional variation of adver-
tising expenditures in industries where new entrants or products are present, 
and since these are the industries where "factual" claims are going to be usually 
made, it is not surprising that the incidence of ASP cases is larger in those in-
dustries. On the one hand these are the industries where truly unsubstantiated 
claims may appear. On the other hand, these are the industries where incumbents 
may use the bureaucratic apparatus to deter entry. 
The paper by Higgins and McChesney raises interesting issues. However, 
much still has to done to be able to conclude what the effects of ASP are and 
why it was introduced. 
Let me now discuss the paper by Leffler arx:I Sauer and relate their results 
to the two theories of ASP. 
While Lefiler and Sauer do not develop a particular theory explaining the ef-
fects of ASP, it seems that they also have a "raising rivals' cost" theory of 
regulation, which involves one group of advertising agencies promoting regula-
tions that will increase their mals' cost. They do not explain clearly which group 
of agencies should benefit nor through which mechanism. They state as their 
objective to empirically determine whether larger agencies were affected dif-
ferently than the smaller ones. The authors try to answer this question byanalyz-
ing whether ASP affected (a) the degree of concentration, (b) the volume of 
sales of the different agency groups, and (c) the probability of losing an account. 
Table D presents results of regressions which try to explain the degree of 
concentration as well as the volume of sales. The main results from this table 
are: (1) the market share of the medium-sized agencies increased, at the ex-
pense, it seems, of the smallest and perhaps also of the largest ones; (2) ASP 
reduced the demand for all advertising agencies, but perhaps more of that of 
the largest ones. The latter result is very interesting since it fits the prediction 
. of the "reducing entrants' costs" theory. Also, in a study that Tom Ross and 
myself are aJITently working on, we found that around the Pfizer case (actual-
ly, 20 trading days before to 20 trading days after the first public announcement 
in the Wall Street Journal of the Pfizer case), a portfolio of media firms (including 
TV, radio, newspapers and magazines) had an abnormal return of -7 percent 
(with a t-statistic of around 3.5). Moreover, when we estimated monthly time 
series models for advertising expenditures by different types of media, we found 
that there is a change of regime in 1971, not only for TV, but for all other media 
as well. This change in regime implied a reduction in advertising following 1971 
Page 220 FTC CONSUMER PROTECTION CONFERENCE 
for all types of media. Thus, both' our results and those of Leffler and Sauer 
suggest that ASP did have a negative effect on overall advertising (interesting-
ly, the change in regime is permanent and does not disappear as of 1977 when 
the FTC's measure of ASP activity seems to have declined). This reduction 
in advertising is consistent with the "reducing entrants' costs" theory. Since 
advertising messages are now more credible, firms may need a smaller amount 
of reputation capital; thus the demand for advertising may fall. Why should this 
reduction in advertising affect mostly the largest (since their market share did 
not change so much) and the smallest firms? The authors try to answer this 
question by looking at the incidence of ASP cases by agency size and whether 
ASP cases affected sales and turnover accounts. Their answer is inconclusive. 
While it seems to be true that being named on a case implies some losses of 
revenue (perhaps because the quantity of ads perfonned by the account named 
in the complaint falls), it does not imply that the agency's probability of losing 
an account increases. Thus, we are left without an understanding of why large 
and small firms may have lost more sales than medium-sized firms. My impres-
sion is that to answer this question, much more has to be learned about the 
detenninants of the size distribution of ad agencies. 
To summarize, the effects of ASP on different advertisers and advertising 
firms are unclear. While the evidence presented here and elsewhere suggests 
that ASP reduced the demand for advertising, it is nevertheless unclear who, 
if anybody, actually benefited from its introduction. In neither study did the pro-
posed "raising rivals' cost" theories fare well. The evidence tends to support, 
albeit not too strongly, the "reducing entrants' costs" one. 
Additional References: 
Salop, S. and Scheffman D., "Raising Rivals' Cost," American Economic 
Review, May 1983. 
Spiller, P. T., "Assessing the Profitability Effects of Airline Deregulation," 
Economic Letters, 1983. 
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Quality Uncertainty and Bundling* 
Charles A. Holf and Roger Sherman 
University of Virginia 
Bundling is a practice of selling certain goods together rather than individual-
ly. Probably the most celebrated bundle arose with the "block booking" of mo-
tion pictures, a practice from the early days of film exhibition whose legality 
was disputed off and on from 1938 until the Paramount and Loew's decisions 
in 1948 and 1962 made it illegal for theatrical and television exhibition. l George 
Stigler has provided a classic price-discrimination rationale for block booking.2 
Interest in the practice of bundling was revived when James Adams and Janet 
Yellen3 offered a new framework to show why a two-product monopolist facing 
independent demands could prefer to bundle its offerings. Richard Schmalensee' 
extended this study of bundling incentives to the monopolist who produces two 
products but has a monopoly on only one of them. And by introducing diversity 
of consumers' bundle preferences, Robert Dansby and Cecilia Conrad5 showed 
an incentive for a firm to bundle even though it had no monopoly power. All 
of these analyses of bundling incentives assumed complete information and 
certainty. 
Roy Kenney and Benjamin Klein6 demonstrated that a motive to bundle can 
arise when infonnation about the quality of individual items is imperfect. Buyer 
search can then be economized if bundles of units are sold that are reliable in 
their average quality level, rather than individual units whose quality must be 
separately determined. Kenney and Klein illustrated this argument with an 
analysis of the De Beers Central Selling Organization, a monopoly arrangement 
for selling diamonds in boxes, or "sights," of numerous presorted groups rather 
than individual diamonds. Besides avoiding buyer's search of all diamonds in the 
market, sale of the diamonds in groups prevented rejection of lower quality 
diamonds within any particular category. Kenney and Klein also showed how 
block booking of motion pictures was similar to this diamond market practice. 
Film distributors typically possessed de facto monopoly power, so the market 
• The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Esther Cash in conducting the experiments 
and preparing the manuscript, zd are grate!uI to James Mackay and Ross Miller for helpful comments. 
1 U.S. v. Para,rulI",t PictJIns, IIIC., 344 U.S. 131 (1948), and U.S. v. Loew's, IIIC., 371 U.S. 
38 (1962). 
2 George J. Stigler, "UrriUd SlaUsv. Loew's, Irte.: A Note on Block Booking," 1963 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 152 (1963). 
l Set W. James Adams and Janet L. Yellen, "Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopo· 
ly," 90, Q.j. Ec01I. 475 (1976). • 
4 Richard Schmalensee, "Commodity Bundling by Single-Product Monopolies," 25, j. Law and 
Ec01I. 67 (1982). 
5 Robert E. Dansby and Cecilia Conrad, "Commodity Bundling," 74, AmmCa" Eccmomic RtWw 
377 (1984). 
6 Stt Roy W. Kenney and Benjamin Klein, "The Economics of Block Booking," 26, j. Law and 
Ec01l. 497 (1983). 
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structure was similar. And both inventory cost savings and film exhibition schedul-
ing economies could be obtained from block booking, which prevented reneging 
by exhIbitors on agreements to show less successful films while retaining rights 
to show hit movies. 
Bundling appears to offer a means by which buyers and sellers can moderate 
the effects of exogenous uncertainty, and so its use may be motivated in cer-
tain cases even though JDJnopoly power is absent. Bundling can discourage selec-
tive rejection of items below average in quality, and this is desirable if it is cost-
ly or impossible for buyers to inspect prior to purchase or if it is costly or im-
possible for sellers to resell rejected items. A more detailed discussion of the 
effects of blDldling together units of uncertain quality is contained in section I. 
One of our objectives in this paper is to specify a simple model in which bundl-
ing can be an efficient means of moderating the effects of uncertainty. We do 
this in section n. Once it is shown that bundling can improve market efficiency 
in the context of this model, our second aim is to determine whether bundling 
will emerge in a competitive market situation. We explore this question in an 
experimental double oral auction market which is desaibed in section m. Units 
of uncertain quality are bought and sold in the market by buyers and sellers 
who can choose to transact in individual units or in two-unit bundles. Section 
IV contains the evidence from the competitive experimental markets which in-
dicates that bundles are preferred when they offer an efficiency advantage. The 
final section contains a ~. 
I. Bundling When Quality Is Uncertain 
We consider a market in which there is exogenous production uncertainty. 
Some units of the product may tum out to be of relatively low quality, and ad-
vance identification of low-quality units is either impossible or prohibitively costly. 
By combining units together and selling them as one bundle, a seller can pre-
vent rejection of lower quality units which might be contained within the bun-
dle. The seller can still allow a right of rejection by buyers, but only of the en-
tire bundle rather than of the. least valuable units within the bundle. This prac-
tice of bundling can be s~y beneficial, as Kenney and Klein have shown for 
the diamond market,7 when it reduces the wasteful search buyers would other-
wise make to identify the least valuable units. With widespread agreement on 
the values of individual units that fall within a quality category, the sale of bundles 
that contain a fairly reliable average quality level avoids separating units accor-
ding to the quality of every unit. For fostering transactions, sale by bundles 
can have virtually the same effect as identifying the quality of each unit and 
therefore can be efficient by preventing every buyer from having to search to 
determine the quality of each unit. But in addition the rejection practice itself. 
7 Su Kenney and Klein. ibid. 
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which may be necessary to attract bUyers, can be wasteful of the rejected units 
if their value decreases with time, or if for any other reason recontracting is 
costly. By making quality more reliable, the practice of bundling can reduce the 
extent to which the rejection option is exercised, and that can improve efficiency. 
As an example of these effects of bundling, consider the negotiations between 
distnbutors and exhibitors of motion pictures. New infonnation about the quali-
ty of a film may become available to a particular exhIbitor between the time a 
contract is signed and the time the film is delivered to the exlubitor. Motion 
pictures that turn out to be of low quality, in that they do not appeal to large 
audiences, may nevertheless be of some value to exhibitors. If contracted for 
in advance with the right of inspection and rejection, these films might be re-
jected, though, and so would be wasted, while hit movies would be accepted. 
An agreement in advance, by which exhibitors would accept a block of movies 
including only some hits, could offer the advantage that the lower quality films 
would have exlubition use without costly 1'eContrading. The costs of rejection 
and recontracting could be significant because rejection of individual films might 
greatly complicate exhibition scheduling. Assuming that a right of rejection is 
to be offered to the buyer, then it might be better for both parties if that right 
applies to a set of films rather than to individual films. This right of rejection 
will protect the buyer while at the same time avoiding for the seller the com-
plicated rearranging of exhibition schedules that might fonow when individual 
films can be rejected. By having the right of rejection apply to the bWldle, selec-
tive film rejection, with attendant inefficiencies, is less likely to occur. 
To summarize, uncertainty about quality can add to the advantages of bundl-
ing. It is possible for quality to be uncertain at the time of production, as for 
example in the making of a motion picture, where no amount of search can deter-
mine the ultimate appeal of the film. Bundling WJ.its together might then result 
in a package containing items of reasonable average quality which are all usable 
to a buyer. On the other hand, sale of individual items with inspection and .re-
jection privileges might cause items of below-average quality to go unsold, or 
the rejection of low-quality units might result in significant recontracting costs. 
In a case like this where high transaction costs arise after uncertainty is resolv-
ed, the bundle could offer efficiency advantages. The bundle can moderate the 
effect of uncertainty by fostering transfer of ownership before uncertainty is 
resolved, in a manner that will allow sale of low-quality as well as high-quality 
items. 
ll. A Model of Bundling Efficiency 
Throughout our discussion we shall consider a market for a commodity with 
only two possible quality levels: high or low, each occurring with probability 
one half. These probabilities are independent across units and are independent 
of seller decisions, so there is exogenous production uncertainty. Units are sold 
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before quality is known, either singly or in bundles, and buyers have a money-
back guarantee on each purchase contract. Buyers and sellers are risk neutral. 
In anyone time period, each seller produces N units at a common, constant 
unit cost denoted by C, where N is an even integer and C > o. Each buyer 
may purchase up to N units per period. AIl low-quality units have a monetary 
value, VL , common to all buyers. The monetary value of a high-quality unit 
depends on the number of high quality units consmned by the buyer in that period. 
We let V I be the monetary value of the first high-quality unit for each buyer 
in a period, and let V H be the value of all subsequent high-quality units; thus 
VI > VH > VL • 
In this market sellers will sell their units either singly or in two-unit bundles. 
When sellers offer inspection and rejection rights to buyers, in the case of a 
bundle purchase the bundle itself must be accepted or rejected; buyers are not 
permitted to reject part of a blUldle. We focus on mandatory guarantees, but 
the case of optional guarantees will also be considered. 
This market-structure is rich enough to provide an efficiency advantage for 
bundled sales, but it is simple enough to serve as the basis for the laboratory 
experiments that will be discussed in later sections. We shaD now elaborate in 
more detail two models in which quality uncertainty can make bundling an effi-
cient means of transacting. In the first case, discussed in subsection A, market 
participants have two units to buy and sen in each market period, so the 
unspecified N in the description above is set at two. In subsection B, buyers 
and sellers deal with four- units each period. 
A. A Motkl with Two-Units per Trader 
We shall consider first an especially simple case in which each buyer and each 
seller can deal with at most two units in anyone market period, so that N = 
2. There will be an equal number of buyers and sellers. Besides its simplicity, 
this setting has the advantage of forcing on every market participant a choice 
between dealing in single units and dealing in bundles, for with only two units 
at hand one cannot deal in both. We analyze first the case of single-unit sales, 
then consider bundles. and finally compare the two possibilities. 
1. Single-Unit Sales 
Each unit has a SO-50 chance of turning out to be of high or low quality. The 
probabilities of obtaining a high-quality unit are independent across sellers and 
across units. For simplicity, we analyze transactions of single units for a paired 
buyer and seller. Then we shall subsequently consider a blUldle transaction for 
a buyer-seller pair. Units sold by a seller may be rejected, and the rejections 
experienced will depend on the sale price of the units. 
Let PI denote the price of a single unit. Obviously, no units sold at PI would 
be rejected if PI < Vr., but all units would be rejected if PI > Vir and indeed 
none should even be purchased if PI > V I. Recall that V L < V H < V I, so there 
) 
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are two intermediate cases: VL < PI < VH and VH :s PI < VI' The case in 
which the price is exactly equal to V H is ambiguous without some convention 
about whether buyers will purchase a unit that yields a zero profit to them. If 
buyers sometimes do not accept such zero-profit units, then sellers would prefer 
to reduce price slightly. For simplicity, we consider only strict inequalities. With 
V L < PI < V H, all high-quality units ("highs It) would be accepted and all low-
quality units ("lows It) would be rejected. With V H < PI < V It a buyer would 
only accept a unit if it is the tirst high-quality unit for that buyer in that period. 
We next analyze the seller's expected profit for these cases. 
For the range of prices V L < PI < V H, a buyer would reject all lows and 
accept an highs. The probabilities of obtaining two highs, two lows, and a highIlow 
combination are 114, 114, and 1/2 respectively. Thus the seller's expected pro-
fit as a function of Pit denoted ES(r(pI», is computed: 
(1) 
where C is the uniform unit cost. We assume that the cost C is incurred at the 
time of production, before quality is known and buyer inspection and possible 
rejection occur. 
We shall choose parameter values that force price into the range (VL < PI 
< V H) just considered. To do so we tirst detennine values of V I and V H so 
that seners' expected profits cannot be increased by raising price above V H' 
A price increase to a level "above VI would result in all units being rejected, 
so instead consider a price increase to a level just below VI' At such a price, 
a buyer would accept a unit only if it was the buyer's tirst high-quality unit. The 
seller in this buyer/seller pair would therefore sell one unit in every case ex-
cept that of two lows, and so would sen with a probability of .75. Thus the seller's 
expected profit would be approximately (314) V I - 2C. (This is an approximation 
because it assumes that PI - VI while the price actually is slightly below VI;) 
The previous result in (1) indicates that a price just below V H would yield an 
expected profit of approximately V H - 2C, so there will be no incentive to raise 
PI above VH when VH - 2C ~ (314)VI - 2C, or equivalently, when 
(2) 
In the experiments we shall choose parameter values to satisfy this weak ine-
quality, and the buyer preferences for lower prices should then prevent PI from 
exceeding VH • We shall also set the seller's average cost C to be at least as 
great as VL : 
(3) 
so we can expect to see PI exceed VL • Thus our parameter choices will allow 
us to focus on the case where V L < PI < V H. 
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A buyer will reject an lows and aCcept all highs when V L < PI < V H, so the 
buyer's expected profit as a function of Ph denoted EB(r(PI», is computed: 
(4) EB(r(pl» .. (lh)(V1 - PI) + (l/.)(VI + VH - 2p1) 
.. (3/.)V I + (l/.)V H - PI' 
The expected total surplus, obtained by summing equations (1) and (4), is in-
dependent of the transfer price PI: 
(5) 
2. Sales in Bundles 
When a seller's two units are sold in a bundle, the likelihood of rejection will 
depend on the level of the bundle price, which is denoted by Pl' A bundle is 
never rejected if Pl < 2VL • Only bundles composed of two low-quality units 
will be rejected if 2V L < Pl < V I + V L' Both a bundle with two lows and a 
mixed bundle with a high and a low will be rejected if V I + V L < Pl < V I + 
V H' All bundles will be rejected if Pl > V I + V H, so Pl will not be that high. 
If inequality (3) is satisfied, then we expect that Pl will exceed the level 2V L' 
Thus there are two ranges of prices to be considered: 
We first compute expected sener profit for a bundle price in the lower range, 
and then we use inequality (2) to show that the seller's expected profit cannot 
be increased by raising the bundle price above the upper limit of this lower range. 
If 2VL < Pl < VI + VL , mixed bundles and bundles with two high-quality 
units will be accepted, and only bundles with two low-quality units will be re-
jected. Thus the probability that a bundle will be accepted at a price in the range 
being considered is 3/., and the seller's expected profit as a function of Pl, denoted 
ES(1r(Pl», is: 
(6) 
Remember that (6) holds for 2VL < Pl < VI + VL • An increase in Pl above 
the level VI + VL would result in the rejection of mixed bundles, which occur 
with probability 112. A bundle with such a higher price would be accepted with 
probability 114 as long as Pl < V I + V H' The most favorable price for a seller 
in this higher price range is slightly below V I + V H, and the seller's expected 
profit at such a price would be approximately (1/4)(V I + V H) - 2C. It is straightfor-
ward to use inequality (2) to show that this expected profit is less than the ex-
pected profit determined by (6) when Pl is approximately equal to the highest 
price in the lower range, VI + VL • Thus a risk-neutral seller would not raise 
price above VI + VL • 
. 
I 
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As long as pz > 2VL , a buyer wili. only accept mixed bundles, which occur 
with probability 112, and bundles with two highs, which occur with probability 
1/4. Thus in the feasible price range 2VL < Pz < VI + VL , the expected buyer's 
profit as a function of Pz, denoted E·(1r{Pz», is: 
(7) E·(..-(pz» = (lh)(V1 + VL-pJ + (1M (VI + V rPz) 
'"" (3/.)VI+(lh)VL+(1MVr (3/·)Pz· 
The expected value of total surplus, obtained by adding equations (6) and (7), is: 
3. Comparison of Single-Unit and Bundle Sales 
At this point it is possible to evaluate the efficiency advantage of bundled sales 
in this model. When inequalities (2) and (3) are satisfied, we expect that: (1) 
the singles price PI will be in a range (V L, V H) where only 10w-quaIity units will 
be rejected, and (2) the bundle price Pz will be in a range (V L, Vl)), is computed: 
(1) 
where C is the uniform unit cost. We assume that the cost C is incu in a bundle. 
A comparison of (5) and (8) shows that the total surplus in the case of the bun-
dle sale is greater by an amount V L12. This is because half of the low-quality 
units are not rejected when sold in bundles, but are all rejected when sold singly. 
Notice that only certain values of high and low quality units will cause bundl-
ing to be preferred by both buyers and sellers. In this example, if prices are 
at the upper end of price ranges VL < PI $ VH and 2VL < pz :s VI + VL , 
a comparison of expected profits will show that the buyers prefer bundling for 
(3/.)VI + (lMVL < V H and the sellers prefer btmdling for (3!.)(V1 + V J > V H' 
We normally would expect bundling to emerge more reliably in circumstances 
where it would be beneficial to both the buyers and the sellers. 
This market situation will differ from the De Beers group diamond market 
institution in that there is more than one seller here and rejection by buyers 
is not punished as severely .IIt is similar enough, however, to make interesting 
the question of whether bundling will survive when there is more than one seller. 
The market situation is similar also to the market for motion pictures involving 
film studios (as sellers) and exhIbitors (as buyers). Sale in bundles, with rejec-
tion only of bundles, would compare to the contracts used (although rarely) for 
film exhIbition rights between studios and smaner exhIbitors. Sale of individual 
units would be approximated more by contracts between studios and the larger, 
first-run theaters, which might want to exhibit only higher quality films. 
I In the DeBeers group diamond market, once an invited buyer rejects a box, or "sight," of 
diamonds, that buyer is not invited to buy again and so all future profits are forgone. 
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B. A Model with Four Units per Trader 
We now consider a case in which each trader has four units. The traders need 
not specialize in singles or bundles, so we expect more mixed experimental 
resultS. The advantage of the four-unit design, however, is that traders have 
more complex choices, and a richer variety of behavior may be observed. For 
example, a seller in the two-unit setup cannot decide which units go into a bun-
dle and which do not. But suppose that a seller in a four-unit setup sells two 
bundles and that only two of the units tum out to be of high quality. Then the 
seller must decide whether to deliver bundles of mixed quality. Buyer rejection 
decisions are also more complicated when four units are being purchased. 
The analysis of the four-unit case is analogous to the preceding analysis of 
the two-unit case; the main lessons can be found by comparing the single-unit 
and bundle cases only. Thus, we calculate upper and lower limits on PI and P2, 
and then we calculate expected profits and total surplus in each case and com-
pare them. For cost and valuation parameters to be used, sales in bundles are 
shown to result in a higher expected total surplus because alllow-quality units 
are rejected when sold singly in the anticipated price range for PI, but some 
low-quality units are not rejected when bundled with high-qua1ity units. Both 
the methods of analysis and the intuition behind the results in this section are 
similar to those for the two-unit market. Consequently, the reader may wish 
to skip to the beginning of section m on a first reading. 
1. Single-Unit Sales with N - 4 
We consider for inustration one seller who sells at most four units to one buyer 
who can redeem at most four units. Here, all four units will be sold as singles. 
There are 16 possible combinations of four units each and we shall draw pro-
babilities of outcomes from these possibilities. We choose an average cost C 
which exceeds VI., so we can expect PI to exceed VI. as long as there is a range 
of prices above VI. for which both buyer and seller earn positive expected pro-
fit. When VI. < PI < VII, alllow-quality units will be rejected. The seller's ex-
pected profit for a price in this range is 2p1 - 4C, because only half of the units, 
. the highs, will be acceptect. Notice that this profit is just twice the correspon-
ding expected profit in equation (1) for the two-unit case. 
Now consider more specific prices, and choices of buyers and sellers from 
among those prices. When the seller's price is a small amount below V H, the 
upper end of the (VI., V H) price range, the seller's expected profit is approx-
imately 2V H - 4C. Now consider whether the seller would be motivated to raise 
PI above V H. Of course only the first high-quality unit will be accepted if V H 
< PI < VI, and the best price for the seller in this higher price range is just 
below V I. There will be one high-quality unit in all of the 16 possible cases ex-
cept for the one case offour low-quality units, so expected profit for the seller 
at price VI would be approximately (15/16)VI - 4C. It follows from these expected 
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profit calculations for PI below and above V H that a risk-neutral seller would 
not prefer to raise the price above V H if the valuations satisfy 2V H ~ (15/16) V I, 
or equivalently if: 
(9) 
This is analogous to inequality (2) for the two-unit setup. 
When V L < PI < V H, so only low-quality units are rejected, a straightfor-
ward probability calculation can be carried out using the 16 possible outcomes 
of 4 units each. Sununarizing the appropriate values indicates that the expected 
total surplus will be 
(10) (1S/16)VI + (17/16)VH - 4C. 
2. Sales in ·Bundles with N .. 4 
A comparable evaluation can be made of prices set by a seller of four units 
who combines units into bundles of two units each. As in the case considered 
above, we assume that this seller deals with one representative buyer who can 
redeem at most four units. A seller of four units has 16 possible combinations 
of high and low quality units. 
Consider combinations of two units into bundles. We should expect PI < V I 
+ V H because at higher prices all bundles will be rejected. With C ~ V L, we 
expect that Pl > 2V L. Within these upper and lower limits on PI there are three 
price ranges of interest: (i) V I + V L < Pl < V I + V H, (ii) V H + V L < PI < 
V I + V L, and (ili) 2V L < PI < V H + V L. The analysis of these cases is simpler 
if VI + VL < 2VH , and the parameters used in the subsequently reported ex-
periments will satisfy this inequality. By tracing out possible sellers' combina-
tions of bundles, expected profits can be detennined for each of the three cases: 
(i) If PI > V I + V L, only bundles with two high-quality units will be accepted. 
At such high values of Ps, the seller will put two highs into a bundle whenever 
possible, and the resulting seBer's expected profit is (1l1l6)PI - 4C because 
eleven of the sixteen possible combinations of four units contain at least two 
high-quality units. 
(ii) If V H + VL < PI < VI + VL , and if VI + VL < 2VH , at most one bundle 
will be accepted by a buyer each period. That bundle could involve one high-
quality unit and one low-quality unit or two high-quality units. This observation 
can be used to show that the resulting seller's expected profit is (lSIl6)Pl -
4C, because the only way the seller can fail to sell one bundle is if all four units 
are of low quality, an event shown in section B.1 to have probability 1/16. 
(iii) If 2V L < PI < V H + V L, all bundles with two high-quality units and all 
mixed bundles with a high and a low will be accepted. By constructing mixed 
/ 
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bundles whenever possible, the seller can maximize the probability that a bun-
dle sold at this price will be accepted. If the sixteen possible quality combina-
tions of four units are again enumerated, it can be shown that the resulting seller's 
expected profit is (13/8)Pl - 4C. 
3. Comparison of Single Unit and Bundle Sales with N "" 4 
In the experiments with four units per trader, we shall select valuation 
parameters so that a seller's expected profit could not be increased by raising 
Pl above the level V H + V L which determines the upper limit of prices in case 
(ill). The downward pressure on prices exerted by buyers should then make 
case (1i11 the relevant case. Recall that Pl < V H + V L in case (m), so only bundles 
with two low-quality units will be rejected and an mixed bundles will be accepted. 
When only bundles with two low-quality units are rejected, a straightforward 
probability calculation can be carried out from the 16 equally likely 4-unit out-
comes. The result shows that the expected total surplus for a buyer/seller pair 
(the expected benefit to both buyer and seller) with bundled sales in case (ill) is 
(11) (lS1l6)Vt + (17/16)VH + (20/16)VL - 4C. 
This exceeds the corresponding expected surplus in (10) for sales of single units 
by an amount (20/16)VL which represents the value of low-quality units that 
are not rejected in mixed bundles, but would of course have been rejected if 
sold as single units. 
Although for certain parameter values the bundle can be attractive as a means 
of avoiding rejection of lower valued individual units. its resulting advantage comes 
really from the way it can moderate the effect of uncertainty. The individual 
unit that would be rejected by a buyer would be a unit of lower value thaD. the 
buyer had intended to accept, and would resemble a "bait and switch" tactic 
from which the buyer should be allowed an escape. But it is not an attempt to 
fool a buyer when a seller delivers a bundle of. say, one high-quality and one 
low-quality unit; the seller is creating a reputation. since buyers can see what 
it is doing. The seller is contending with uncertainty that is inevitable in its situa-
tion, and doing it by reasonably satisfying the average needs of the buyer while 
avoiding the waste that would follow from having rejected units. 9 Also. 
9 If we consider again the practice of block booking for motion pi:tures. the valuations included 
in this example would call for one higb-quality film to be worth more than a second one 01. > V II). 
and both of those to be worth more than a low-quality film 0111 > V,). As noted above for the 
two-unit case, mIy certain valuations of high and low quality 1ilms woulcl cause both film distributors 
and exhibitors to prefer bundling over single-unit transactions. In the example here. for prices at 
the upper end of the ranges V. < P, S V II and 2V. < p. S V" + V •• it can be shown from ex· 
pected profit cak:ulations that bundling will be pzefeIred by both buyers and sellers if a low-quality unit 
(footnote cont' d) 
. 
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bundling that reduces the probability of rejection makes the seller's profit less 
variable, and risk-averse sellers may prefer bundling for this reason. 
m. Experimental Design and Method 
We shall now examine this motive to bundle in an experimental setting with 
equal numbers of buyers and sellers. Two qualities of units will be identified 
as RED Oow) and BLACK (high). The sellers of these units are required to 
make contracts before knowing which of the units that they have produced are 
REDs and which are BLACKs. As a consequence of this exogenous production 
uncertainty some buyers may not be satisfied with their purchases when they 
finally are able to inspect them. Buyers can reject a delivery but must reject 
the entire contract if more than one unit is involved. Once rejected, a unit can-
not be resold; thus there are no inventories. Valuations can be chosen to satisfy 
the constraints noted above, so if they are allowed to do it sellers will create 
bundles in order to make rejection less likely. 
The specific goods we employ are playing cards, which individually are red 
or black with 0.5 probability. The nominal values at which buyers can redeem 
their cards, which will motivate their purchases, can be chosen to make one 
type of card (BLACK) typically more valuable in that it generates more buyers' 
surplus than the other type (RED). The first BLACK that is redeemed brings 
more than others (V I > V H), and other BLACKs bring more than any RED 
(V H > V J. Sellers incur a cost per period and receive only a limited number 
of cards each period. They learn how many are RED or BLACK only after they 
have made contracts with buyers. Sales contracts may be for either single units 
or for two-unit bundles. 
Subjects for experiments according to this design were recruited from 
principles-of-economics classes at the University of Virginia "to earn money 
in a research project." The subjects were assigned to buyer and sener posi-
tions located far enough apart as to be unable to see one another's records. 
Instructions, which are contained in the Appendix, were read to the subjects. 
The Appendix also includes forms of records that were used by subjects. Before 
beginning the experiment, the subjects were told that the experiment would 
last from 2 to 21,12 hours. Subjects were not permitted to speak to each other 
during the experiment, and they were paid in private immediately afterwards. 
Specific parameters for the two-unit and four-unit experiments are given in the 
two subsections which follow. 
is worth at least a fourth. roughly. of a second high-quality unit. Something like this requirement 
might have been met at smaller theaters. where block booking was more comnion. but not at larger 
urban theaters where block booking was not used. perhaps because in the larger theaters a low-
quality film could have had very little value relative to a high-quality film. 
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A. Two Units per Trader 
It follows from a comparison of equations (4) and (7) that for risk-neutral 
buyers., bundles will be preferred if PI > (3/')Pl - (lh,)V L. From (1) and (6) it 
is clear that for risk-neutral sellers bundles will be preferred if PI < (3I4)Pl. It 
is apparent that a higher value of V L, the value of a RED, will increase the size 
of the region in the price space in which bundling is attractive to both buyers 
and sellers. We chose the following parameters: 
VI .. $8.10 
VH - $6.10 
VL - $2.00 .. C. 
As indicated in section n, we anticipate the prices for single units to be in the 
range from C to V H: $2.00-$6.10, and we anticipate the prices for bundles to 
be in the range from 2C to V L + V H: $4.00-$8.10. These ranges were derived 
from the observation that sellers would resist selling below cost and that for 
parameters chosen sellers would not profit from raising prices above the upper 
limits of these ranges, even if they could. But buyers are willing to pay any 
amount up to VI + VH ($14.20) for a bundle and any amount up to VI ($8.10) 
for a single, because they can always reject contracts with low-quality units. 
Thus the actual prices are indetenninate, although there is an efficiency motiva-
tion for bundling. Our previous analysis of seller bundling and buyer rejection 
decisions was for the case of one buyer and one seller. We use these calcula-
tions for buyer-sener pairs to provide predictions for a market with an equal 
number of buyers and sellers. 
If gains for both buyer and seller together are greater for bundles, bundles 
also are more efficient than singles, and that will be true for the price ranges 
to be expected with these parameters. Substituting these parameters into (5), 
the sum of buyer's and seDer's expected surplus is $3.60 for single units (at 
prices for units between $2.00 and $6.10). Substituting the parameters into (8) 
yields expected total surplus of $4.60 for bundles (at prices for bundles bet-
ween $4.00 and $8.10), the higher value for bundles indicating that bundles are 
more efficient. 
B. Four Units per Trader 
The specific redemption values used for the four-unit case are: 
VI = $6.10 
VH z:: $4.10 
VL = $1.00 = C. 
We anticipate the prices for single units to be in the range from C to V H: 
.J 
) 
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$1.00-$4.10, and we anticipate the prices for bundles to be in the range from 
2C to VL + VB: $2.00-$5.10. 
Substituting the above parameters into (10), we find the sum of buyer's and 
seller's expected profit is $5.98 for single units (at prices for units between 
$1.00 and $4.10). Substituting into (11) we find combined expected profit is $7.21 
for bundles (at prices for bundles between $2.00 and $5.10). Thus bundles can 
result in significant efficiency gains for the parameters we have selected. 
IV. Experimental Results 
This section reports the results of two experiments with two units per trader 
and of two experiments with four units per trader .10 An earlier pilot experiment 
is also discussed. In each experiment, simultaneous oral double ·auctions for both 
single-unit and bundle contracts were con<hlcted for at least six periods. The 
four-unit experiments were conducted first, and the subjects in those ex-
periments had no previous experience in oral double auctions. The subjects in 
the two-unit experiments had participated previously in oral double auctions, 
and all but one of these subjects had been a trader in one of the four-unit ex-
periments. We begin with results of the four-unit experiments, since they were 
carried out first. 
A. Results for' the Design with Four Units per Seller 
Recall that the parameters for the four-unit design discussed in the previous 
section are: VI .. $6.10, VB - $4.10, and C .. VL - $1.00. The anticipated 
range of contract prices is $1.00-$4.10 for singles and $2.00-$5.10 for bundles. 
Each of the four-unit experiments, Experiments I and n, was operated for 
exactly six market periods. Contracts for single units and bundles were pennit-
ted and both were observed in use every period. The average price per market 
period for a single or bundle is reported in Table 1, along with the number of 
units that were sold as singles or in bundles in each period. Figures 1 and 2 
trace prices by contract within each period for Experiments I and n. 
In Experiment I an intere.sting tendency is clear. Both Table 1 and Figure 
1 show that bundle prices lie at the upper end of the bundle price range 
($2.00-$5.10) and that many of the single-unit prices lie near the bottom of the 
single-unit price range ($1.00-$4.10). Also in Experiment I there is a slight 
tendency toward greater use of bundles, as evidenced in the last two market 
periods. In the first two market periods, single units traded at prices better 
than in bundles (two single units sold for a combined average value of $5.50 
10 A detailed Data Appendix which contains all information on each contract (price. type of con-
tract. identity of traders by subject number. realized quality of the unit(s). and buyer rejection deci-
sion) is available from the authors on request. 
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in period 1. while a bundle sold for an average of $4.90). As trading continued. 
the singie units declined to less than their value in btmdles (two single units 
were worth $4.10 together in period 6. while a bundle was worth $4.65). This 
price trend. together with the slight increase in the use of bundle contracts. 
suggests that bundles became more attractive to traders. 
Bundling is more prevalent in Experiment II with two-thirds of an units being 
sold in bundles. The average prices and sellers' profits were much lower than 
was the case in Experiment I; bundle prices were lower than in Experiment 
I. and almost all of the single-unit prices were near the bottom of the anticipated 
price range ($1.00-$4.10). The tendency for a bundle to sell for more than twice 
the price of a single was apparent in both experiments but was stronger in the 
second. In both, sellers seemed to realize the advantage of delivering mixed 
bundles containing one RED and one BLACK. In the second experiment, every 
seller delivered mixed bundles each time the seller's cards pennitted a bundle 
to be mixed. 
An earlier pilot experiment was like the two experiments just reported with 
the exception that redemption values of REDs were $.50 higher-at 
$1.5O-greater than the unit cost of $1.00. In addition, BLACKs after the se-
cond were valued exactly the same as REDs. There were four buyers and four 
sellers in the market. Although a price for single units that is just below V H would 
also be optimal for a risk-neutral seller in that case based on the inequalities 
analyzed above, a price slightly below V L actually turned out to be chosen most 
often. At this price ($1.40) every unit was always accepted, so the outcome 
was efficient. The price of $1.40 exceeded the sellers' unit cost of $1.00, so 
sellers' profits were positive and stable, although low. Sellers apparently were 
sufficiently risk averse to prefer that outcome. 
At a per unit price of $1.40 with these parameters, sellers would be indif-
ferent between bundles and single units. Bundles offer no efficiency advantage 
when every unit is accepted without them. Nevertheless, overall exactly half 
of the units were sold as single units and half were sold as bundles, although 
a slight trend toward single units developed over the four periods studied. The 
lesson we draw is that we must expect some bundles to be sold even if bundles 
offer no special benefit over. single units, and the results of Experiments I and 
II should be judged in this context. 
B. Results for the Design with Two Units per Seller 
To force a clearer choice between single units and bundles, experiments were 
conducted in which subjects bought and sold only two units. This design forces 
each buyer and seller to deal in either single units or bundles and thus it allows 
a sharp test for the attractiveness of the bundle. Also, because of the greater 
simplicity of the experimental situation with only two units per trader, less time 
is needed for instruction and decision making, which permits more market periods 
to be conducted each session. The additional market periods enabled us to 
HOLT AND SHERMAN Page 235 
examine the role of the money-back guarantee in one experimental session. 
The parameters for the two-unit design discussed in section ill are: VI ... 
$8.10, VH .. $6.10, and C .. VL .. $2.00. With those parameters, the anticipated 
price range for single-unit contracts is between C and VH : $2.00-$6.10, and the 
anticipated price range for buncfies is between 2C and VL + VH : $4.00-$8.10. 
As before, although efficient contracts can be described for particular parameters 
in this market , the price level is indeterminate. The prices were so low in Ex-
periment ill that sellers were losing money, and after period 7 they were each 
given an additional payment of $10 to sustain a profit-seeking motivation. Earn-
ings of sellers were higher in Experiment IV and no such added payment was 
needed. 
The actual sequences of contract prices for these experiments are shown in 
Figures 3 and 4, and summary results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. In Ex-
periment ill, after 6 trials buyers and sellers were allowed to abandon the 
guarantee which results from the rejection option. The results of the first 6 trials 
for Experiment ill are presented in Table 2, along with 11 trials from Experi-
ment IV. A strong tendency is evident in both experimental sessions to rely 
eventually on bundles. After 3 periods in Experiment ill, no further transaction 
occurred in single units; all transactions were in bundles. A more gradual move-
ment to bundles occurred in Experiment IV but the trend is strong. The transi-
tion to buncfies in this last experiment is interesting. As can be seen in Figure 
4, no bundle was sold until period 5. Seller 4, who sold this buncfie, received 
a RED and a BLACK, and the resulting mixed bundle was accepted by the buyer. 
None of the sellers sold bundles in the following period, period 6, and seller 
4 received two REDs which were both rejected. The very first contract in period 
7 was a bundle sold by seller 4, and bundles dominated in transactions after that. 
Periods 7 through 10 in Experiment ill were carried out with the guarantee 
as an option rather than a required condition of transactions. The instructions 
which were given to make guarantees optional are included in the Appendix. 
For a contract without a guarantee, the buyer does not have the option to in-
spect and reject, so buyers absorb the uncertainty for such a contract. With 
optional guarantees we essentially conducted four oral double auctions 
simultaneously; the auctions were for single units and bundles, each either with 
or without guarantees. Results are shown in Table 3 and Figure 3. Singles were 
used only in period 8, when one single was transferred with a guarantee and 
. one was transferred without. All other sales involved bundles. There was a slight 
trend toward bundles with no guarantee, but not enough periods were carried 
out to detennine whether the guarantee would be abandoned. When units are 
sold without a guarantee there is no possibility of unaccepted units and so the 
market outcome will be efficient whether buncfies are involved or not. Further 
work is needed to detennine whether buyers so prefer the guarantee that bundles 
are needed to reach an efficient outcome. 
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V. Conclusion 
Transactions must often be arranged for goods of uncertain quality. When 
quality is uncertain and buyers have a right of inspection and rejection (a "money-
back" guarantee), we show that bundles of units can be the most efficient basis 
for transactions. The advantage of the bundle is that an average quality can be 
provided more reliably for a bundle than for an individual unit. This efficiency 
advantage for bundling will arise only for certain conditions on costs and the 
valuations of unit qualities, but it can arise in a competitive market. 
A preference for transacting in bundles was demonstrated in an experimental 
double oral auction market which was designed to satisfy conditions that make 
bundling efficient. A clear choice was required in a pair of experiments with three 
buyers and three sellers, where each buyer and seller handled only two units 
per period and so was forced either to bundle or not. There, bundles came to 
dominate as the basis for all transactions. In experiments where buyers and 
sellers each had four units to handle there was a slight preference for bundling. 
Although single-unit transactions did survive, they brought a relatively lower 
unit price, and trends had favored the use of bundles when the experiments 
were terminated. We conclude that the practice of bundling may be efficient 
in some circumstances, and that competition will then encourage its use. 
The conditions we identify as appropriate for bundling to offer advantages seem 
roughly to have been satisfied in transactions where motion picture studios 
negotiated with smaD.er exhibitors, which is also where the so-called "block book-
ing" practice was used. Block booking essentially is contracting for motion pic-
tures in bundles, and it is now unlawful to use in distributing films either to 
theaters or to television. The role of bundling in this and other areas may deserve 
reconsideration in light of the efficiencies it has been shown to offer in com-
petitive conditions. 
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6 
Table 1 
RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENTS WITH N = 4 
EXPERIMENT I 
AVERAGE PRICE UNITS SOLD 
SINGLE BUNDLE SINGLE BL'NDLE 
$ 2.75 $ 4.90 6 6 
2.68 5.03 6 6 
2.32 5.00 6 6 
1.82 4.97 6 6 
1.75 4.82 4 8 
2.05 4.65 4 8 
·c 
J 
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MARKET 
PERIOD 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
MARKET 
PERIOD 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
~arket Period 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Table 1 (cont'd) 
EXPERIMENT II 
AVERAGE PRICE U~'lTS SOLD 
SINGLE BUNDLE SINGLE BUNDLE 
$ 1.13 $ 2.20 4 8 
1.40 3.10 2 10 
1.27 3.60 6 6 
1.23 3.49 4 8 
1.17 3.38 4 8 
1.23 3.28 4 8 
Table 2 
RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENTS WITH N 2 
EXPERIMENT III (FIRST SIX PERIODS) 
AVERAGE PRICE U~'TS SOLD 
SINGLE BUNDLE SINGLE BUNDLE 
$ 2.62 S 5.30 4 2 
5.23 0 6 
2.35 5.10 2 4 
5.07 0 6 
5.10 0 6 
4.93 0 6 
EXPERIMENT IV 
Average Price Units Sold 
Single "Bundle Single Bundle 
$ 3.25"" 6 0 
3.32 5 0 
3.37 6 0 
3.40 6 0 
3.52 S 6.10 4 2 
3.40 5 0 
2.90 6.00 2 4 
2.40 6.00 4 
3.60 5.95 1 4 
5.97 0 6 
5.93 0 6 
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Market 
Period 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Market 
Period 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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Table 3 
RESULTS WITH OPTIONAL GUARANTEE 
EXPERIMENT III (PERIODS 7-10) 
With Guarantee 
Singles Bundles 
Average Units Average Units 
Pri:e Sold Price Sold 
0 $ 4.90 6 
$ 2.30 1 4.80 2 
0 4.75 4 
0 5.00 2 
With No Guarantee 
Singles Bundles 
Average Units Average Units 
Pri:e Sold Price Sold 
0 0 
$ 2.00 1 $ 4.00 2 
0 4.00 2 
0 3.95 4 
., 
I 
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Figure 4 
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Appendix 
Instructions for Experiments with N = 2 
General Instructions 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. Various 
organizations have provided funds for this research. If you follow the instruc-
tions carefully and make good decisions you might earn a considerable amount 
of money, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. In 
this experiment we are going to conduct a market in which some of you will 
be buyers and some of you will be sellers in a sequence of "market days," 
or trading periods. 
Attached to these Instructions you will find some sheets, labeled Record Sheet 
of Buyer or Record Sheet of Seller, depending on whether you are a buyer ,or 
a seller. Your Record Sheet contains information that determines the value to 
you of the decisions you might make. You an not to nveal this infonnation to 
anyom. It is your own private information. 
Specific Instructions to Buyers 
During each market period you are free to contract for the purchase of up 
to 2 units from any seller or sellers. Units in the market will tum out to be 
of two kinds, called RED or BLACK. The units will be represented by ordinary 
playing cards. BLACKs tend to be more valuable than REDs. For the first 
BLACK unit that you redeem during a trading period you will receive the amount 
listed on Page One of your RECORD SHEET marked lst BLACK unit redemp-
tion value; if you redeem a second BLACK unit you will receive the additional 
amount marked 2nd BLACK unit rrdemption value. The redemption values' of 
the REDs you may purchase are similarly calculated from the information given 
on Page One of your Record Sheet. 
The profits from each purchase (which are yours to keep) are computed by 
taking the difference between the redemption value and the purchase price of 
the unit bought. That is, 
your earnings = redemption value - purchase price 
At the time you make a purchase, neither you nor the seller will know whether 
the unit is RED or BLACK. Sellers will receive cards from a newly shuffled 
deck that has half RED cards and half BLACK cards, so each unit has a 'SO-50 
chance of being RED or BLACK. 
If you are not satisfied with what you receive from a seller you may reject 
the contract. A unit received counts among the two you are allowed. regardless 
whether you accept it or reject it. The contracts and deliveries of sellers will 
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be made public, so you and other buyers will know each seller's deliveries. You 
must realize that since sellers do not know whether units are RED or BLACK 
when they make offers, they may sometimes have to deliver REDs which are 
less valuable than BLACKs. REDs or BLACKs also carmot be carried over from 
one period to the next; they have a "life" of only one period. 
The values to you of REDs and BLACKs depend on the numbers of each 
you have to redeem. The evmp!e in the table below shows hypothetical redemp-
tion values of RED and BLACK units. 
n.LUSTRATIVE REDEMPTION VALUES OF RED AND SLACK UNITS 
Redemption Va1ue of 1st UDit 
Redemption Value of 2nd unit 
RED 
$ 70.00 
$ 70.00 
SLACK 
$ 200.00 
$ 150.00 
To illustrate, if you had purchased two units at $50 each and when they were 
delivered you learned one was BLACK and one was RED, you would want to 
accept both the BLACK (profit would be $3)()..$50 - $l50)and the RED (profit 
would be $70-$50 .. $20). If you bad purchased two units at $100 each and 
when they were delivered one was BLACK and one was RED, you would want 
to accept the BLACK (profit would be $200-$100 - $1(0) and reject the RED 
(profit would be $70-$100 - -$30). If you had purchased two units at $175 each 
and when they were d~ered both were BLACK you would accept one (profit 
would be $200-$175 - $25) and reject the other (profit would be $150-$175 
.. -$25). The numbers used here are for illustrative purposes only (and they 
yielded profits per period far greater than you can expect). In the actual market 
periods all prices must be expressed in at least $.10 units. 
Now please turn to the blanks in the table on Page Two of your RECORD 
SHEET. A new Page Two will be used each period. At the time of a purchase 
record the Contract Number, Units, Price and Seller Number on your RECORD 
SHEET. When delivery is received you can record the contents. If you accept 
the delivery you may also calculate the Redemption Value of the contract. At 
the end of the period, totals can be obtained for prices paid and for RED and 
BLACK units accepted and redeemed. The total obtained from redeeming RED 
units can be placed under the total obtained from redeeming BLACK units, as 
the short arrow indicates, and addition of the two sums will then indicate the 
total Redemption Value of all units. The total for Prices of Accepted Contracts 
can then be placed below the Total Redemption Value, as the arrow indicates, 
and subtraction will yield profit for the period. 
Thus far we have considered bids and offers only of individual units. It will 
also be possible, however, for buyers to offer to buy two units as a package 
for a particular price, rather than one unit. Seners also will have the option of 
offering two units for sale at a specified price. Of course it is possible also to 
bid on or offer a single unit for a single-unit price. The buyer's right of rejection 
always will apply to the total package. 1bat is, a two-unit package must be 
. 
• 
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accepted or rejected in total; parts of the package cannot be accepted or re-
jected separately. In recording any transaction involving a pair of units, you may 
indicate it is a pair by indicating "2" in the Units colunm and by reporting the 
delivery contents for the pair. It is advisable to use two rows if two units of 
the saine color are delivered; that way their redemption values also may be 
entered separately, which can help to avoid making any mistake in determining 
total redemption values. 
Specific Instructions to Sellers 
During each market period you are free to make contracts to sell to any buyer 
or buyers as many units as you might want as long as the total does not exceed 
2 units. Units in the market will turn out to be of two kinds, called RED and 
BLACK. Units will be represented by ordinary playing cards. When you offer 
to sell units during a period, you will not be certain how many of your units 
will be RED and how many will be BLACK. 
Whether a unit is RED or BLACK will be determined randomly by the draw-
ing of cards from a well shuffled deck of playing cards. Because it will be either 
a red or a black card, each of your units will have a so-so chance of being RED 
or BLACK. BLACK units will tend to be worth more to buyers than RED units, 
but RED. units always have some value to buyers. After you are informed how 
many BLACK and RED units you have, you will make up deliveries to buyers 
who accepted your offers .. Buyers may inspect the units you deliver and reject 
them if they wish. If your price per unit exceeds the value to the buyer of a 
unit, the buyer may reject it. Each separate transaction you make is subject 
to this possibility of rejection. The color of units actually delivered by each seller 
will be made public to all buyers at the end of the market period. At the end 
of each period sellers will also be informed of price offers, acceptances, deliveries 
and rejections for all sellers. 
In each period, you will have 2 units to sell at a cost per unit which is listed 
at the top of your Record Sheet of Seller as cost per unit. You incur this cost 
whether a unit is accepted or not. 
The profits on sales, which will be yours to keep, can be calculated by adding 
up the revenues you obtain for deliveries actually accepted, less your costs. 
A specific example will help'illustrate the contracting process. Consider the of-
fers indicated on the offer sheet below. (The numbers used are for illustrative 
purposes only.) 
(Cost per unit is $80 .00) 
Contract No. 
1 
2 
Units 
1 
1 
Price 
$ 3>0.00 
$ 200.00 
(0) Total revenue from accepted contracts: 
(00) Total cost: 
(000) Profit [row (0) - row (00)]: 
Buyer No. 
3 
1 
Accepted 
Yes 
No 
Revenue 
$ 200.00 
o 
$ 200.00 
- 160.00 
$ 40.00 
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In this example, your contract number 1 was to sen 1 unit to buyer 3 for $200, 
and your contract number 2 was to sell 1 unit to buyer 1 for $200. Buyer number 
1 rejected your delivery, however, so you received no revenue on your second 
offer. The profit on your first offer would be revenue of $200 less cost of $80, 
or $120. On the second offer you would receive no revenue but have a cost 
of $80, so you would lose $80. Total profit would be $40. H the price of both 
units had been $150 rather than $200 and one unit still was rejected a loss would 
have been incurred, since revenue would have been $150 and cost $160. Notice 
that if cost per unit is $80 and only half the units are accepted, price per unit 
will have to exceed $160 to be profitable in this example. 
The numbers above were used for illustrative purposes only (and they yield-
ed profits per period greater than you can expect). In the actual experiment 
you must set prices in even $.10 increments. 
Thus far we have considered bids and offers only of individual units. Sellers 
also will have the option of offering two units for sale at one price rather than 
individually, and "buyers may offer to buy two units for one price. A seller may 
sell in one period two single units for a contract price in each case, or a pair 
of units for a two-unit price. The buyer's right of inspection and rejection will 
always apply to the entire package, however. That is, a two-unit package must 
be accepted or rejected in total; part of the package cannot be accepted or re-
jected separately. In recording a contract involving a pair of units you may in-
dicate it is a pair by indicating "2" in the Units column and by reporting the 
delivery contents and the" revenue for the pair. 
Market Organization 
The market will be conducted in a series of market periods. Each period will 
last for at most 4 minutes. Any buyer is free at any time during the peri09 to 
raise his or her hand and make a verbal bid to buy either a single unit or a two-
unit bundle at a specified price. Any seller is free at any time during the period 
to raise his or her hand and make a verbal offer to sell either a single unit or 
a two-unit bundle at a specified price. The bid (offer) should specify the Buyer 
number (Seller number), the. rmmber of units, and the bid (offer) price. The 
bid (offer) should be higher OQwer) than the outstanding bid (offer) for the number 
of units that the bid (offer) pertains to, should such an outstanding bid (offer) 
exist. Any seller is free at any time to accept or not accept the bid of any buyer, 
and any buyer is free at any time to accept or not accept the offer of any seller. 
H a bid or offer is accepted, a contract has been closed for the number of units 
specified in the bid or offer, and the buyer and seller will record the contract 
price to be included in their earnings. Any ties in bids or acceptances will be 
resolved by random choice of buyer or seller. Except for the bids, offers, and 
their acceptance, you are not to speak to any other subject. There are likely 
to be many bids and offers that are not accepted, but you are free to keep trying. 
After the market period ends, sellers will learn exactly what playing cards 
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(RED, BLACK) they have available'to sell and will make up envelopes for ac-
cepted contracts. Each envelope will contain the playing cards (RED, BLACK) 
the seller is delivering against that contract. Delivery occurs when a seller 
transfers, via the experimenter, a contract to a buyer. The buyer then either 
accepts or rejects each contract (envelope). Buyers and sellers can record results 
for that period, and then the next period will begin. A large number of periods 
will be conducted. 
You are not to speak to other participants in the experimental market. You 
will begin with a balance of $ , which is part of your payment for par-
ticipating. You are free to make as much profit as you can. 
FUtU Observations 
1. Each individual has a large folder. All papers, instructions, records, etc. 
should be put into this folder. Leave the folder with us before leaving. Take 
nothing home with you. 
2. We are able to advise you a little on making money. First, you should 
remember that small sums add up over many trades and a long period of time. 
Secondly, your earnings may not be steady. You may have some good periods 
and some bad periods. 
3. We have noted that you are not to speak except as necessary to participate 
in contracts. You must certainly not mention anything about activities which might 
involve you and other participants after the experiment (i. e., no physical threats, 
deals to split up afterwards, or leading questions). 
4. Each individual will be paid in private. Your earnings are strictly your own 
business. 
Added Instruction for Introducing No-Guarantee Condition 
Thus far all packages (single units or bundles) have been transacted essen-
tially with a money-back guarantee; buyers have been able to inspect the type 
of units they receive and reject any contract they wish. In future periods the 
option of forming such guaranteed contracts will continue to be available. But 
in addition it will be possible 'to form contracts without the guarantee. Under 
a no-guarantee contract an exchange takes place between buyer and seller at 
the agreed upon price, and no right of rejection is allowed the buyer. Separate 
bid-and-offer records will henceforth be maintained for Guarantee Singles, 
Guarantee Bundles, No-Guarantee Singles and No-Guarantee Bundles. 
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RECORD SHEET OF BUYER __ _ 
Page I-Redemption Values 
RED 
1st RED unit redemption value 
2nd RED unit redemption value 
BLACK 
1st BLACK unit redemption value 
2nd BLACK unit redemption value 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
(1) 
Contract 
No. 
(2) 
Units 
RECORD SHEET OF BUYER __ _ 
Page 2-Contracts 
(A total of only two units may be redeemed each period.) 
(3) (4) 
Price SeHer No. 
(5) (6) 
Delivery Contents 
RED BLACK 
Totals 
Total Redemption Value 
Total Profit for Period 
Cumulative Profit 
(7) 
Prices of 
Accepted 
Contracts 
Period __ _ 
(8) (9) 
Redemption Value 
RED BLACK 
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SeUer __ _ Period __ _ 
RECORD SHEET OF SELLER 
Cost per unit $ __ _ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Delivery Contents 
Contract 
No. 
(. ) 
( .. ) 
( .. ) 
( ... ) 
Units Price Buyer No. RED 
Total Revenue from Sales of Accepted Contracts 
Total Cost of the Two Units 
Total Profit for Period [row (.) - row ( •• )] 
Cumulative Profit 
BLACK 
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Product Quality, Consumer Information and 
"Lemons" in Experimental Markets 
Michael Lynch, Federal Trade Commission 
Ross M. Miller, Boston University 
Charles R. Plott, California Institute of Technology 
Russell Porter, Federal Trade Commission 
I. Introduction 
This paper reports on the behavior of experimental markets wherein buyers 
were ignorant (unless truthfully infonned by sellers) of the quality of the prod-
uct purchased. True quality of the product was learned only after the sale. Sellers 
chose quality or "grade" and higher quality was more costly to produce. Our 
experimental markets were characterised by asymmetric information possess-
ed by buyers and sellers who traded a pure "experience" good whose quality 
was endogenously detennined. 
Some theories predict that such markets will ultimately consist only of the 
lowest quality goods, that is, only "lemons" will be traded. Bad quality drives 
out good, in spite of the fact buyers are willing to pay the added cost of higher 
quality. This "lemons" outcome is clearly inefficient, because both buyers and 
sellers could be better off if higher quality goods were also produced. The inef-
ficiency is due to the failure to effectively share the sellers' information on quality 
with the buyers. Thus the "lemons" equilibrium is one type of informational 
market failure, perhaps the simplest one that has been analytically modeled. 
The "lemons" model itself is of more than academic interest to the FTC. 
The FTC staff (1978) explicitly referred to and used this model to argue the 
merits or lack thereof of (most appropriately, at least in an etymological sense) 
the proposed Used Car Rule. The model has also been explicitly invoked· in 
various housing warranty cases. Less explicit but quite conscious use of the 
main theme of this model appeared in the Staff Report on Life Insurance (1979). 
It is also of interest as a special case of a general problem. Under what condi-
tions may market inefficiency be caused by a lack of consumer information or 
by seller provided misinformation? Alternatively, under what conditions are 
regulations penalizing deceptiVe or misleading seller claims, or government man-
dated disclosures or standards likely to improve market perfonnance? This is 
clearly a central question for consumer protection policy-both for fonnulating 
the basic principles of policy and for allocating resources efficiently to imple-
ment them. 
Some general answers have been given, and at this general level there seems 
to be considerable agreement, even among those who often disagree on specific 
policy issues. Both Posner (1973, 1979) and Pitofsky (1979), for example, agree 
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that disclosure problems are most likely to arise for products or services that 
either have important' 'hidden characteristics" or that are infrequently purchased 
and expensive. A hidden or a "credence" characteristic is one that would not 
become apparent in nonnal use or consumpmn (e.g., cholesterol content of butter 
or margarine). In either case, sellers may have little incentive to disclose a 
negative characteristic because failure to do so will not harm future sales, 
whereas disclosure may hurt present sales. Both also appear to agree that there 
is little reason to think that disclosure problems will ever arise for frequently 
purchased experience goods. 
Agreement at this general level does not imply agreement on any specific issue, 
as a perusal of the Posner-Pitofsky exchange will quickly show. "Natural" 
markets, like that for used cars or new home warranties or new life insurance 
policies, are extremely complicated. Firms may pursue very diverse marketing 
strategies in different market segments. Consumers in different segments may 
have very different infonnation on product quality. It is often very difficult to 
determine whether there has been any "failure" in such markets and even more 
difficult to test alternative theories of the cause of failure. Reputation effects 
could be very powerful, but extremely difficult to measure. The artificial ex-
perimental markets we have created have fewer complications and allow us to 
unambiguously identify "failure" when it occurs. 
The study was designed with one primary objective and several secondary 
objectives. The primary objective was to investigate circumstances in which 
the "lemons" phenomena will arise in markets. The design of the markets, 
the market organization' and institutions. were guided by models found in 
economic literature. Thus. the pursuit of the primary objective implicitly involved 
adding operational content to various theories as well as tests of the reliability 
of the resulting models. The secondary design objective. predicated upon the 
assumption that the first objective would be successfully attained. was to check 
the sensitivity of the "lemons" phenomena to parameters and regulations that 
some theories and policy arguments suggest will eliminate the phenomena and 
increase market efficiency. 
The broad questions posed and answered by the research are as follows: (1) 
Can "lemons" problems occur in markets? Our answer is "yes" in the sense 
that we have designed markets in. which it can be observed with substantial 
reliability. (2) Are express warranties an effective remedy if the lemons 
phenomena are viewed as a market failure? In our experimental markets ex-
press warranties and truthful advertising are the same thing. Regardless of the 
interpretation. the answer in the markets we studied is "yes." (3) Where quality 
is easily ascertainable after purchases (experience goods) will sellers form reputa-
tions that guarantee efficient market performance? Our answer is "not necessari-
ly. " We are then able to isolate some conditions that will help the reputation 
fonnation process. The "hidden" characteristics problem was not in the cur-
rent experimental design. except in a very minor way. In studying and answer-
ing these three broad questions we pose several specific hypotheses that are 
suggested by both the data and existing ideas about the evolution of informa-
tional efficiency in markets. 
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The following section is an outline of the experimental design, procedures, 
and parameters. The third section is a discussion of models that might reasonably 
be expected to apply to the setting. The fourth section is a discussion of results, 
and the final section is a summary. 
n. The Market and Regulatory Environments, 
Experimental Design, and Procudures 
A. Parameters 
A total of twenty-one markets were conducted plus some pilot experiments. 
Participants were students at Boston University (BU) California Institute of 
Technology (Caltech), and Pasadena City College (PCC). Some of these par-
ticipants were involved in several markets as a control for experience. 
All markets proceeded as a series of market days or trading periods. The 
number of periods was unknown to participants, but, because they knew roughly 
the maximum time of the experiment (three hours), they had some idea of when 
the last periods were approaching. Sellers remained sellers throughout an ex-
periment and buyers remained buyers. 
Sellers could supply wlits of grade Super or Regular. Each seller was limited 
to a total supply of two units per period. The units could be any combination 
of grades possible as long as each seller supplied a total of two or less units. 
Thus, the seller could sell two Rs, two Ss, one of each. one unit of some type. 
or nothing. The fact that Supers were more costly to sellers than were Regulars 
was public information. Both Supers and Regulars were supplied at constant 
marginal cost up to the limit of two units in total. For' 'high cost" experiments. 
which are all but selected periods of experiments 19 and 21. the (constant) 
marginal cost of Supers was 100 francs (one dollar) more than the (constant) 
marginal cost of Regulars. In the low-cost experiments, this difference in marginal 
cost was reduced to either 20 or 25 francs. 
Buyers' redemption value of Supers was more than Regulars and this was 
public information. The redemption value for buyers is in Figure 1. As can be 
seen, the marginal valuation of a Super always dominates the marginal valuation 
of a Regular. Thus, given a choice of a Super or Regular, a buyer would always 
prefer a Super until a limit of three Supers is attained and the marginal valuation 
falls to zero. All buyers had identical redemption schedules. 
For a typical experiment with eight buyers and six sellers the market demand 
and supply are presented in Figure 1. The values are in an experimental cur-
rency called "francs" that have a dollar conversion factor. As can be seen, the 
market supply is horizontal for twelve units and then becomes vertical. 
All transactions were in an experimental medium of exchange called francs. 
Francs could be converted to dollars at a predetermined rate known only to 
each individual. Prior to some markets, subjects were told that the dollar per 
franc conversion rate might be scaled upward after the experiment. In early 
experiments in which little was known about behavior and parameters, the value 
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of francs was increased so that on average participants earned about $5 to $7 
per hour. This was thought necessary in order that the experienced subjects 
would be willing to participate again. 
In addition to profits earned from purchases and sales, buyers were given 
a bonus. of 50 francs each period and an unexpected one-time endowment of 
200 francs at the end of the first period. Early pilot experiments demonstrated 
a potential problem of credibility and control, which the bonus helped to eliminate. 
During the first period inexperienced buyers would pay high prices for units 
on the expectation that sellers would deliver Supers. When Regulars were ac-
tually delivered, the buyers suffered substantial losses. Once operating at a loss, 
they seemed to suspect that the experimenter would not collect money from 
the subjects, so they had little to lose from further losses. With perceived 
downside risk gone, control over incentives was lost. The surprise bonus was 
sufficient to bring all buyers back to a profitable position. When the surprise 
bonus was given to buyers, they were told to expect no more bonuses. Of course 
we had no real control over expectations, so we were potentially trading one 
problem for another. 
B. Market and Regulatory Variables 
Institutional variables were those that deal with market organization, infor-
mation, and the rights and guarantees afforded to participants. The institutional 
variables are the treatment variables. When and how did the grade of a unit 
become mown to a buyer? What guarantees were available to buyers of Regulars 
who thought they were buYing Supers? When and how did the sales record of 
individual sellers become mown? Answers to these questions define the institu-
tional structure of the markets. These institutional features will be discussed 
after the features common to all markets are outlined. 
B.l The Basic Market Organization 
The basic market organization was the same for all markets. Buyers and sellers 
were located in different rooms. Communication between rooms was accomplish-
ed by citizen band (CB) radios. Each room had an experimenter in front of the 
room equipped with a large chalkboard and a CB radio. A long horizontal line 
scaled from zero to infinity francs was displayed on the chalkboard. Buyers sub-
mitted bids that were transplitted to the seller room over the CB by the ex-
perimenter. At the same time the experimenter in the buyer room entered the 
bid under the horizontal line at the franc value equal to the bid. When the bid 
transmission was received in the seller room, the experimenter repeated the 
bid and entered it under the horizontal line at the appropriate value. Similarly, 
when sellers tendered offers, the offer was entered above the line at the ap-
propriate value and transmitted to the buyer room where it was verbally repeated 
and entered on the chalkboard. If two bids (offers) were tendered at the same 
price, the second one was listed below (above) the first one. Thus the time 
of tender is partially ordina11y indexed by distance from the line. 
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Bids and offers remained open un61 accepted or canceled. Buyers or sellers 
accepted offerslbids verbally by indicating to the experimenter the one they 
wanted from those on the chalkboard. Traders were free to indicate the par-
ticular bid or offer they wanted independent of the temporal order of tender. 
An acceptance was immediately radioed to the other side of the market over 
the CB. Of course, since the CB transmitter and receiver were located in the 
room with agents, all transmissions over the radio were public. Once a trade 
was made the bid/offer was circled on the chalkboards and numbered. Aside 
from bids, offers, acceptances, and other necessary communications with ex-
perimenters, the participants were not allowed to say anything. No talking was 
permitted. 
B.2 Regulatory Environment 
The major treatment variables were warranties, warranty enforcement, iden-
tification of the seller of units, and the timing and public or private nature of 
grade revelation. These variables are discussed in order. 
Warranties, when they existed, were express warranties1 generated by a claim 
or grade advertisement by the seller prior to the buyer's purchase. In some 
cases sellers and buyers could do nothing other than make bids and offers with 
no reference at all to the grade of the unit. This condition is designated as "N" 
because no warranties of any sort existed or could exist. Under a different con-
dition, condition "0," sellers had the option of advertising a unit as a Regular 
or Super at the time an offer was tendered to the market. The offer was then 
tagged on the chalkboard as an S or R according to the seller advertisement. 
Likewise, under the "0" condition buyers had the option of indicating along 
with a bid the grade of the unit desired. A third condition, "R," required sellers 
to advertise or disclose units as either a Regular or a Super at the time of an 
offer and required buyers to indicate with all bids, the grade of the unit deliired. 
Thus, the regulatory environment governing warranties could be any of the con-
ditions (N, O,R). 
Warranties could be unenforceable (condition U) or enforceable (condition E). 
If warranties were unenforceable, no regulations existed governing the cases 
in which sellers failed to deliver the grade that was promised in the advertise-
ment or requested by the buyer. That is, sellers could advertise a unit as a 
Super but deliver a Regular and the buyer could do nothing about it. In essence, 
false advertising was permitted. If warranties were enforceable (condition E) 
buyers were granted "specific performance."2 That is, the seller was required 
1 Section 2-313 of the unifonn commercial code requires: (a) Any affinnation of fact or promise 
made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the 
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall confonn to the affinnation or promise. 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express 
warranty that the goods shall confonn to the desaiption. 
2 Consistency of this regulation with the unifonn commercial code is covered in Section 2·716. 
(footnote cont' d) 
. 
• 
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to deliver a Super to the buyer if the unit had been so advertised. Thus, the 
enforcement condition could take two values (V,E). 
In some markets sellers' identification numbers accompanied all offers and 
bids transmitted over the CB. Furthermore, under such conditions buyers were 
able to direct bids to individual sellers and such tagged bids could only be ac-
cepted' by the requested sellers. This condition is designated as K to indicate 
that sellers" (but not buyers' ') identifications were known at the time of a con-
tract. In the alternative condition U, neither buyer nor seller ever knew the 
identity of a trading partner. Thus, the identification variable took two values 
(V,K). 
Unless grades were covered by an enforced express warranty, buyers became 
aware of grade either immediately after the purchase (condition A) or at the 
end of a period (condition E). Under condition A the seller held up a card im-
mediately after the sale with letter S or R indicating the unit as Super or Regular. 
The information was then transmitted by the experimenter to the buyer. Under 
condition E the seller would submit a slip of paper indicating the grade for each 
trade in which the seller was involved. Trades were numbered on the chalkboard 
and sellers and buyers would record the number attached to each trade along 
with the price, etc. 
The case in which the enforced warranty is provided is a little hard to describe 
notationally. If a grade was advertised, which need not be the case under condi-
tion "0," the buyer was aware of the grade prior to purchase. Thus the nota-
tion B is used. The actual announcement, however, could have been "A" or 
"E." 
Some interpretations are in order. An enforced warranty can be interpreted 
as a case in which all characteristics of the product can be fully identified and 
evaluated by the customer prior to purchase. If the grade becomes known im-
mediately after the sale, the customer has no recourse from unfulfilled expecta-
tions except alterations in future purchase patterns. Since the information 
becomes available immediately after a purchase, the conswner can react through 
modifications of purchasing behavior for the remainder of the period as can other 
buyers if the information is public. If the information becomes available only at 
the end of a period, the conswner is faced with a type of "credence" problem. 
During a period the consumers are .unable to evaluate purchases. The informa-
tion that permits evaluation becomes available only after a delay. 
Information about grade' was either publicly revealed (condition Pub.) or 
privately revealed (condition Pvt.). In the case of public revelation the infonna-
(1) Specific perfonnance may be decreed where the goods are UDique or in other proper circumstances. 
(2) The decree for specific perfonnance may include such tenus and conditions as to payment of 
the price. damages or other relief as the court may deem just. (3) The buyer has a right of replevin 
for goods identified to the contract if after reasonable effort he is unable to effect cover for such 
goods or the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing or if the goods 
have been shipped under reservation and satisfaction of the security interest in them has been made 
or tendered. 
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tion regarding grade communicated to the experimenter was then announced 
over the CB for all to hear including the buyer. If the infonnation was privately 
revealed, the slip indicating grade was passed along to the buyer or a cipher 
was used to privately transmit the grade over the CB. The latter procedure 
was useful if the rooms were so far apart that physical delivery of slips slowed 
the process excessively. 
C. Experimental Design 
A total of twenty-one markets was studied. The treatment variables included 
experience on the part of buyers and sellers, the relative cost of Supers, and 
the regulatory variables listed above. Obviously, with the large number of poten-
tial treatment variables not all possible experiments could be conducted. The 
strategy was to follow the sequential process outlined in the introductory 
statements. The choice of a particular experiment depended in part upon the 
availability of subjects and the pattern of previous results. 
The treatments chosen for each of the twenty-one markets are listed in Table 
1. The conditions of an experiment are indicated by an 8-tuple. 
1 2 3 4 
Warranty Warranty Trader Time of Grade 
Offered Enforcement I.D.'5 Revelation 
<N,R,O) (U,E) (U.K) (B.A.E) 
5 6 7 8 
Method of Grade Relative 
Revelation Experience Super Cost Location 
(Pub.Pvt) <N.E.VE) a..H) (EU.CIT,PCC) 
For example, the index (O,E,U,B,Pub,VE.H,PCC) is a market in which war-
ranties were optional but enforced if provided; trader I.D.'s were unknown; 
grades were known befor~ purchase because warranties were enforced; the 
grades were publicly announced; traders were very experienced; the cost of 
Supers was in the relatively high condition; and the experiment was conducted 
at Pasadena City College. 
Subjects with no experience (N) had participated in no experiments of the 
type under examination here, but some subjects from Caltech had participated 
in market experiments of a different type and were thus somewhat familiar with 
a market experimental environment. Experienced (E), subjects had participated 
in at least one previous experiment in this series. In almost all cases of new 
subjects the first market experience involved at least two different treatment 
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variables that resulted in different patterns of market price so that afterwards 
subjects were all somewhat familiar with aspects of the parameters. Very ex-
perienced subjects evE) had participated in at least two previous experiments. 
The description of the other variables must proceed with the discussion in 
the section above. The easiest way to understand the variables is to notice that 
advertisiilg and the warranty are tied together in interpretation. If a grade is 
specified along with a bid or offer, it is viewed as both advertising and a warran-
ty. The two are equivalent, because if a grade specification is available to any 
buyer, it is available to all. The interesting additional variable is whether or not 
the warranty is enforced or, equivalently, whether or not the advertising must 
necessarily be truthful. A "defective unit" backed by an unenforceable warran-
ty is equivalent in these markets to an advertisement about grade that is false. 
As will be discussed in the parameter section below, the cost to sellers of deliver-
ing Supers was always higher than Regulars. If the difference was 100 francs 
($1) per unit, the cost was in the high (H) condition. If the cost difference was 
20 francs ($.20) or 25 francs ($.25) per unit, the condition was low (1). 
D. Experimental Procedures 
Subjects were recruited from BU undergraduate business and PCC 
undergraduate economics classes and from Caltech dorms. The "sales pitch" 
included with the instructions in Appendix A contains the essence of the infor-
mation given subjects when they were recruited. All were told that the experi-
ment would take approximately three hours. They were told that we could not 
guarantee an amount, but that they would have an opportunity to make "more 
than they would likely make in a comparable hourly period," that "we have 
never had a· dissatisfied customer," and that "we were interested in studying 
situations in which people make decisions that matter, so we provided incen-
tives accordingly." Such statements were intended as assurances that the stakes 
could at least cover their opportunity cost. Of those that signed up at PCC, 
approximately 65 percent actually showed up. The rates were higher at BU and 
Caltech. 
At the assigned time and location the number of subjects present were counted 
and a decision was made about the number of buyers and seners. 3 Subjects were 
randomly assigned instruction sheets as buyers or sellers. Buyers were on one 
side of the room and sellers ,were on the other side. Forms in the instructions 
were reproduced on the chalkboard. Instructions were then read, questions were 
answered. The market process was explained, including the bids and offers pro-
cess, the chalkboard, and the determination of Supers and Regulars. If warran-
ties or advertising were involved, special instructions regarding these were in-
cluded.· After all questions were answered, sellers were then accompanied to 
another room. 
3 We preferred to have two more buyers than sellers. This would assure unique price predictions 
by certain models. 
• Set appendix. 
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Table 1 
A LIST OF CONDmONS, SUBJECT POOLS AND 
PARAMETERS USED IN ALL EXPERIMENTS 
Key to Abbreviations 
Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 
N - no E - yes U - unknown 
R - required U - no K - known 
o - optional 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Information 
Grade Grade about Grade 
Exp. WatTallty WatTallty Seller' Subject 
~o. Lacanon Reqwrement Eniorcement Identification Time ~ethod Expenence 
Bt.: ~ U 1-6 E pvt ~ 
K 7.8 
2 BL' ~ L' E pvt ~ 
3 BL' R 1-6 E U B pub ~ 
~ 7-9 L' E pvt 
4 BL' R 9-8 E L" B pub ~ 
~ 9.11 L' E pvt 
5 Bt.: ~ K E pub ~ 
6 BL" ~ K E pub E 
7 B1.,' 
" 
K E pub E 
8 CrT :0;. 1-6.9.10 t.: E p\'t 
" R 7.8 E L" B pub 
9 PCC ~ 1-8 U E pvt ~ 
R 9-11 L' B pub 
10 PCC ~ 1-6 K E pub ~ 
0 i.8 E K B pub 
11 crT ~ K 1-8 E pub 1-8 8-E 
L' 9-10 p,·t 9.10 'S-N 
12 pcc 
" 
1-6 K A pub 
" 0 i E 
13 PCC ~ 1-6 K A pub 
" 0 7 E .A pub 
14 PCC ~ 1-7 K .A pub 
" 0 8,9 L" K 
5-\'E 
15 crT ~. K E p\'t 6-E 
3-~ 
16 PCC ~ 1·7 K A pub E 
0 8,9 E 
3-VE 
Ii PCC ~ 1-8 K A pub o-E 
R 9 E 2-N 
~ 1-6 5·H 
18 PCC 0 i.8.9 L' K .A pub 9·E 
R 10.11 E 
19 PCC ~ 1-3 K A pub 2·\'E 
0 4-14 L' 5-E 
20 crT ~ K E p\'t ~ 
21 PCC 
" 
K A pub VE 
BU\'er Identifications were always unknown except penods i and ~ of experiment 1. 
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Key to Abbreviations 
Column 6 Column 7 Column B 
B - before purchase pub - public N - none 
A • after purchase pvt • private E • experienced 
E • period end VE • very experienced 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Full Informauon 
Cost !'lumber 
Compeutive 
Equilibrium Price·· Total 
Exp. Sumber 
So. Supers Regulars Buyers SeUers Supers Regulars Penods 
120 20 7 6 300 165 8 
2 120 20 7 6 300 165 7 
3 120 20 5 4 300 165 9 
4 120 20 8 6 300 165 11 
5 120 20 8 6 300 165 7 
6 125 25 8 6 305 170 12 
7 125 25 8 6 305 170 12 
8 120 20 ·6 6 300 165 10 
9 120 20 7 6 300 165 11 
10 120 20 8 6 300 165 8 
11 120 20 8 6 300 165 10 
12 120 20 8 .6 300 165 
13 120 20 8 6 300 165 7 
14 120 20 8 6 300 165 9 
15 120 20 8 6 305 liO 10 
16 120 20 8 6 305 liO 9 
17 120 20 6 305 liO ~ 
18 120 :w 8 6 305 170 11 
19 120 20 5 1(6)··· 300 165 14 
17·14)40 20 
20 120 20 8 6 300 165 9 
125 25 
21 (5-14)45 20 8 6 305 170 14 
:5iF was .02 for buvers and .01 for seUers. Buyers received 50F per penod endowment 
plus a one-ume unexpected pa"ment of 200F after penod 1. 
••• The :nonopousl has the capaCIty of eight seUers. 
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When buyers and sellers were .in separate rooms, questions were again 
answered. Buyers completed a period zero. 5 They were also warned that they 
must keep accurate records and note the transaction numbers. If we found 
anyone who "mistakenly" recorded Regulars as Supers, we would need to ter-
minate the experiment.6 The market opened for period one and it remained open 
for seven minutes as opposed to the usual five. After period one the extra bonus 
of 200 francs was given to buyers in addition to the 50 franc per period endow-
ment. Buyer and seller record sheets were checked after the first, second, and 
third periods and occasionally after that. 
m. Models and Ideas 
Ideas and models are outlined in five different categories. We have applied 
the models to generate a prediction, but the reader should notice that with all 
of the ideas outlined in this section some latitude exists regarding how a model 
might best be applied to the markets we created. For example, some models 
found in the literature are supported by analysis that involves the reasoning pro-
cess that agents undertake, what they observe, and how they process these 
observations. Since we did not have access to such data, theories that rest on 
such ideas remain untested. Instead we applied the models using those opera-
tional concepts and measurements that were available and seemed reasonable. 
A. The Full Information Model 
This idea rests on the hypothesis that the markets will behave as if all infor-
mation about the underlying state of nature available to any agent will be revealed 
to all through the market process. A natural assumption would be that this model 
could only be applicable in cases where the buyer knows the seller, or some 
form of direct communication is possible. However, it is conceivable that the 
predictions of the model be borne out even when such special conveniences 
are absent. Sequences of bids, special prices, special offers, etc. could all serve 
as some sort of signal. Any market is filled with such possibilities, so the model 
could generate good predications even in cases where buyers and sellers have 
far less than full information, 
The idea is as follows. Each seller presumably knows the quality of a unit 
to be sold at the time an offer is tendered.7 The state of nature is thus the pat-
tern of Supers and Regulars offered on the market. The hypothesis is that buyers 
5 See instructions. Each buyer was required to list the redemption values in the practice record 
sheet assuming a sequence of purchases S. R. R. S in period 1 and RSR in period 2. This exercise 
removed certain confusions about the redemption values. 
e Fortunately the only cheating problems we detected were in the pilot experiments that caused 
us to add this statement. 
7 In most markets the seller need not commit to a grade until after a sale. We assume. however. 
that the decision about gradeis made before an offer is tendered. 
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will behave as if they can distinguish between offers of Supers and Regulars. 
Sellers will develop a profit maximizing response to buyer decisions. Applica-
tion of the laws of supply and demand yield a prediction that only Supers will 
be sold at a price of P s (see Table 1). 
B. Null Expectations Model 
This idea rests on the hypothesis that buyers without prior instruction on the 
likelihood of Supers and Regulars will treat them as equally likely. The rational 
expectations postulate is not applied and neither is a substitute learning axiom. 
So expectations are postulated to be unchanging. Sellers will adopt a profit max-
imizing response to this behavior. If Supers and Regulars are expected to be 
equally likely. application of the laws of supply yields a prediction that all Regulars 
will be sold at a price equal to the average of Ps and PI! (see Table 1). 
Clearly a nun expectations model could involve any probability at an. The choice 
of 50:50 is arbitrary. The model is .used primarily as a point of reference. 
C. Lemons Model 
Sellers. faced by buyers who behave as if they cannot distinguish Regulars 
from Supers will adopt a short-term maximizing strategy and sell only Regulars. 
Buyers seeing only Regulars delivered will develop rational expectations and 
behave as if they expect only Regulars. Application of the laws of supply and 
demand yields predictions of all Regulars at a price PI! (see Table 1). 
. D. Signaling Models 
If firms have a means of adding some distinguishable feature to units. that 
feature can sometimes be used as a signal that distinguishes offers of Supers 
from offers of Regulars. If the cost of adding this feature is sufficiently lower 
for Super units as opposed to the cost of adding the feature to Regular units. 
then signaling models predict a signaling equilibrium. The feature will be added 
to Supers only. and its presence will serve as a signal that lets buyers differen-
tiate the underlying grades of units. See Spence (1977). Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976). Miller and Plott (1983). 
Signaling models have an obvious application when warranty instruments ex-
ist. If warranties exist and ar~ costlessly enforced. the cost of adding a warran-
ty of Super to a Super unit is zero and the cost of adding a warranty of Super 
to Regular units is the difference between the cost of providing a Super and 
the cost of providing a Regular. The warranty guarantees specific performance. 
so a seller advertising a Super must deliver one and therefore loses the cost 
advantage of delivering a Regular. If warranties are required or are optional. 
then the signaling model becomes the full information model and therefore has 
the same predictions. The results will be volume that is all Super units sold with 
a warranty8 and the price will be P s (see Table 1). 
5 Grossman (1981) develops the notion that the warranty will be added. His model differs from 
the signaling model. but in this narrow case the predictions are the same. 
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A model developed by Grossman (1981) leads to the same conclusions (Leland, 
1981), but the Grossman model is based on different principles. Grossman ap-
plies a perfect equilibria principle from game theory!' and a rational expectations 
principle. 10 
If warranties are not enforced, then the cost differential between adding the 
special feature to Supers and to Regulars disappears. Regulars can be advertis-
ed as Supers. The signaling model then predicts that no separation will occur 
because Super units and Regular units will both add the special feature. Regular 
units will be offered along with an unenforceable warranty that the unit is a Super. 
Buyers will adopt expectations accordingly and anticipate that all units are 
regulars. The final result will be all Regulars at a price of p. (see Table 1). 
The lemons model can also be interpreted as a degenerate case of the signal-
ing model. In Akerlofs (1970) model, price serves the dual role of equilIbrating 
supply and demand and signaling the quality of the product sold. Because of 
the one shot nature of trades and the absence of any cost associated with signaling 
high quality with high price, price cannot effectively signal quality and therefore 
only lemons are traded. 
E. Reputation Models 
Models of reputation formation tend to be motivated by the theory of dynamic 
games. Buyers behave as if they are aware of seller identities and adopt dynamic 
strategies of rewarding and punishing sellers. Sellers who perform as the buyer 
desires are rewarded with future business, and sellers who do not perform are 
avoided. Sellers recognize buyer behavior in developing their own dynamic 
strategies. 
A model developed by Klein am Leffler (1981) postulated a quality guarantuing 
price (weak venion). Buyers who observe a Regular delivered on terms that 
buyers would ordinarily expect a Super act as if that se11erwill always deliver 
Regulars in the future. A seller who has once "fooled" buyers will sell only 
Regulars at p. (see Table 1). If sellers anticipate this buyer reaction and if sellers 
expect one full period more in the market, then, given the parameters in these 
markets, sellers have an incentive to deliver Supers at any price above P s -
10. Rational expectations and the law of supply and demand yield a model that 
predicts only Supers will be sold in the market and these will be delivered at 
a price of P s. As the end of.the experiment approaches, sellers will sell Regulars 
at Ps and thereafter sell Regulars at p •. 
A natural extension of the theory to a quality guaranteeing price (strong ver-
sion) can be applied even when buyers do not know seller identities. Buyers, 
once seeing a regular delivered to the market in the "high" price range, will 
anticipate that all future deliveries will be regulars. The resulting demand func-
tion will be that for Regulars. Price will immediately fall to the regular com-
9 The principle is imbedded in equations (A4) and (AS) on page 481. Grossman (l981). 
10 Statement (A6) on page 481. Grossman (1981). 
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petitive eqwlibrium. Sellers know that: a single reguJar sale will "spoil" the market 
for all. Thus. if the price is high enough. sellers will sell only supers. 
Other rtputation models can be found in the literature (Rogerson 1982; Shapiro 
1982a,c; Nelson 1974; Schmalensee 1978). The thrust of these models is that 
sellers who feel that buyers can tailor their reactions to individual sellers by 
refusing to buy from them or by paying a premium to certain sellers will in turn 
modify their behavior in anticipation. According to the model, buyers will 
patronize sellers who have a history of offering good grades and sellers will re-
spond by offering good grades. The result in the parameters of our experimen-
tal markets will be that only Supers will be sold. Premiums. prices above P s. 
might be paid to sellers who consistently sell Supers. 
IV. Results 
The time series of all markets are in Figures 2 through 22. Each contract 
is shown according to price and the ordinal time at which it occurred. Market 
efficiencies. summary statistics for each period, and the regime of treatment 
variables is also shown. Tables 2, 3 and 4 show average efficiencies for various 
periods under each regime. 11 Comparisons of efficiency between different periods 
or regimes should be made cautiously because the periods may have occurred 
at different stages in a given market, there may be a different number of periods 
in the intervals compared, etc. In spite of these difficulties. the reader may find 
the tables useful in gaining an overview of our results. 
Conclusion 1. When disclosures (if made) must be truthful. the full information 
model works well. 
Argument. The relevant markets (periods) are shown in Table 3. The full infor-
mation model predicts all Super units, 100 percent efficiency and prices equal 
to Ps in Table 1. Of the 308 units sold during the relevant periods, 275 (89 per-
cent) were Supers. On eight occasions an enforced warranty was imposed after 
the market had previously been operating under an alternative regulation and 
in all eight cases efficiency increased immediately. In three cases truthful 
disclosure was removed and in all three cases efficiency fell immediately. The 
absolute levels of efficiency.are "near" the predicted 100 percent by the se-
cond period of enforced warranties. More precisely, the levels are above 90 
percent in seven of seven second periods and at 100 percent in three of the 
seven. By the second period of enforced warranties prices in all cases are within 
10 francs of the price predicted by the full information model. Average efficien-
cy for all periods was above 95%. 
11 We are indebted to Richard CrasweU for suggesting the classification scheme embodied in Tables 
2-4. Market efficiency as developed by Plott and Smith (1978) refers to actual earnings as a percen-
tage of the maximum possible earnings. 
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Figure 2: Experiment 1 
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Figure "4: Experiment 3 
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Figure 6: Experiment 5 
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Figure 8: Experiment 7 
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Figure 10: Experiment 9 
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Figure 11:· Experiment 10 
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Figure 12: Experiment 11 
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Figure 13: Experiment 12 
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Figure 14: Experiment 13 
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Figure 16: Experiment 15 
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Figure 17: Experiment 16 
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Figure 18: Experiment 17 
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Figure 20: Experiment 19 
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Figure 22: Experiment 21 
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Table 2 
EFFICIENCY IN MARKETs WHERE DISCLOSURES ARE PROHIBITED 
Seller ID Known Seller ID Unknown 
Experiment Experiment 
&Periods School Efficiency &Periods School Efficiency 
Buyers 
Have: 
1:(7,8) BU 78% 1:(1-6) BU 71% 
15:(1-10) CIT 93% 2:(1-7) BU 77% 
Private 20:(1-9) CIT 87% 3:(7-9) BU 77% 
Information Average CIT 90% 4:(9-11) BU 77% 
Only Average All 89% 8:(1-6,9,10) CIT 76% 
9:(1-8) PCC 61% 
11:(9.10) CIT 80% 
Average BU 75% 
Average CIT 77% 
Average PCC 61% 
All 72% 
5:(1-7) BU 82% 
6:(1-12) BU 64% 
7:(1-12) BU 90% 
10:(1-6) PCC 76% 
11:(1-8) CIT 93% 
12:(1-6) PCC 71% 
Public 13:(1-6) PCC 71% NOTE: An all Regulars "Lemons" 
Information 14:(1-7) PCC 76% Equilibrium is 78% of the 
16:(1-7) PCC 73% Maximum Possible Surplus 
17:(1-8) PCC 58% 
18:(1-6) PCC 74% 
19:(1-3) PCC 75% 
21:(1-4) PCC 73% 
21:(5-14) PCC 83% 
Average BU 78% 
Average CIT 93% 
Average" PCC 71% 
Average" All 75% 
"Excludes 21:(5-14). periods with low cost supers. For these periods a "lemons" 
equilibrium is only 56% of maximum surplus. 
Page 288 FTC CONSUMER PROTECTION CONFERENCE 
Table 3 
EFFICIENCIES IN MARKETs WHERE TRUTHFUL DISCLOSURES ARE PERMITrED 
Advertising (or Labeling or Warranty Provision) 
Advertising Must Be Truthful 
(Labeling. or 
Warranty Seller Known Seller Unknown 
Provision) 
Experiments Experiments 
& Periods School Efficiency & Periods School Elliciency 
17:(9) PCC 90% 3(1-6) BU 99% 
Is 18:(10-11) PCC 100% 4:(1-8) BU 98% 
Required 8:(7.8) CIT 100% 
9:(9-11) PCC 970/0 
Average AD 97% AD 98% 
10:(7.8) PCC 950/0 NOTE: An all Regulars "Lemons" 
12:(7) PCC 99% Equilibrium is 78% efficient 
13:(7) PCC 90% 
Is 16:(8.9) PCC 98% 
Optional NOTE: Public Infonnation 
Average All 96% in all periods. 
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Advertising 
(or Labeling. 
Warranty 
Provision 
Is 
Required 
Is 
OPTIONAL 
Table 4 
EFFICIENCIES IN MARKETs WHERE DISCLOSURES 
ARE PERMI'ITED AND MAyBE FALSE 
Seller Known SeDer Unlmown 
Experiment Experiment 
& Periods School Efficiency & Periods School 
None None 
14:(8.9) PCC 800/0 
18:(7·9) PCC 780/0 
19:(4-6) PCC 780/0 NONE 
19:"(7·14) PCC 830/0 
Average" All 790/0 
"Average excludes 19:(7·14) .. i.e .• those periods where the cost of supers was reduced. 
For these periods the all regulars "lemons" equilibrium is only 56% of the maximum 
surplus. 
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Conclusion 2. The lemons model works well when seller identification is unknown 
and disclosures are prohIbited. 
Argument. The relevant markets (periods) are shown in the right hand columns 
of Table 2. The lemons model predicts that only regular units will be sold. Of 
the 399 units sold in the periods in which seller identification was unknown and 
warranties were unenforced 384 (96 percent) were regulars. Efficiency predicted 
by the lemons model is approximately 78 percent in all markets. In the next 
to last periods of the sequences listed above, the efficiencies are within 1 per-
cent (relative to full efficiency) of the lemons equilibrium efficiency. Average 
actual prices are within 5 francs of the prices predicted by the lemons model 
by the fourth period of all markets except market 9 where they are from 10-15 
francs too high and only slowly converging. Average efficiency for all relevant 
periods was actually less than the lemons equilibrium at 72%. 
Conclusion 3. The Grossman/signaling hypothesis that enforceable warranties 
will be voluntarily added to units (or that if disclosures must be truthful sellers 
will voluntarily make them) is supported in the data. 
Argument. The relevant periods are shown in the lower left hand corner of Table 
3. 12 Of the 72 offers in the relevant periods, 53 indicated a Super, and of the 
83 bids, 74 requested a Super. Of the 65 Supers sold, 64 were supported by 
an express warranty. Average efficiency is 96%, about the same as when 
disclosures are mandatory and truthful. 
Conclusion 4. Sellers will nontruthfully advertise when it is possible. The "pool-
ing" or regulars posing as supers phenomena predicted by the signaling models 
are observable when advertising need not be truthful (express warranties are 
not enforced). 
Argument. The relevant periods are shown in the lower half of Table 4 in which 
advertising was optional but the implied express warranty was not enforceable. 
A total of 147 trades were made during these periods of which 105 were regulars 
and 42 were supers. A total of 61 of the regulars sold were falsely advertised 
as Supers (58 percent) with the other 44 advertised as Regulars or unadvertis-
ed. These misrepresentations are not random mistakes, because all of the 42 
supers sold were also advertised as Supers. There were no "mistakes" at all. 
Conclusion 5. Knowiedge of seller indentification in the absence of truthful but 
voluntary disclosure: 
i) does not guarantee efficiency improvements over the lemons" equilibrium, 
but in some markets such knowledge increased efficiency. 
ii) can continue to have an influence if grade is only privately disclosed. 
12 Some ambiguity exists about whether or oot warranties were optimal or were required in 17(9) 
and 18(10.11). Of the 43 offers in these periods, 37 indicated a Super, and of the 39 bids 36 re-
quested a Super. All of the 34 Super sales were supponed by a warranty. 
. 
• 
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Argument. The relevant markets (periods) for part i are given in the left half 
of Table 2 and the lower left half of Table 4. The relevant periods of experiments 
1. 6. 10. 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18. 19(1-6), 21(1-4) have efficiency levels in-
significantly above that of the lemons equilibrium. For the most part these effi-
ciencies are close to the lemons model predictions, even though the price data 
suggest"that buyers (especially inexperienced PCC buyers) are more optimistic 
than the lemons model suggests they would be. Experiment 5 is on the borderline 
but the relevant periods of 7,11,15,19(7-14), 2l(5-14) have efficiencies substan-
tially above the lemons model values. In addition. these markets show evidence 
of improved efficiency over time. The data in parts of 15, 20. and 21 compare 
favorably with truthful disclosure markets. 
Controlling for possible subject pool differences by comparing only experiments 
drawing from the same subject pool and in which seller identifications are known 
(for more than three periods) versus those in which they are unknown, the con-
clusion still emerges. Efficiencies in all but one of the nineteen periods of 5 and 
7 are higher than the comparable experiments in the BU subject pool of 1 and 
2. In the CIT pool. of the twenty-five periods of 11, 15. and 20 all but two are 
higher than the relevant periods of 8. Finally, in 11 efficiency goes down when 
seller I.D. 's are removed. The data in the PCC experiments are less clear unless 
the cost of Supers is lowered. 
The relevant data for part ii come from the CIT markets 15 and 20 in com-
parison with 8 (upper half of Table 2). In all of these markets grade was only 
privately revealed. Efficiencies in all but two periods of 15 and 20 are higher 
than in all periods of 8. AV'erage efficiency is about 90% for 15 and 20. com-
pared to 76% for 8. 
Conclusion 6. The signaling model works except where seller identification is 
known. Where seller identifications were known, the predictions of the model 
were less reliable and in some cases inaccurate relative to the full information 
model. 
Argument. The signaling model predictions coincide with the full information 
model when warranties are enforceable and with the lemons model when war-
ranties are not enforceable. Both predictions are supported. When warranties 
are optional but enforced, the signaling model predicts they will be used. 
The predictions of the signaling mOdel remain the same when seller identifica-
tions are known. In fact. the signaling model is basically a static model and. unless 
it is reinterpreted to designate "reputation" as a "signal." predicts that the 
market will be insensitive to the revelation of seller identification. Conclusion 
4 demonstrates that the model fails at this point. 
Conclusion 7. Buyer reaction to "ripoffs" is not that postulated by either the 
strong or weak versions of the quality guaranteeing price model. 
Argument. The reaction postulated by the model has buyers boycotting sellers 
who deliver Regulars at a price that is unprofitable for buyers. Buyers necessarily 
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lose money on any purchase of a I'egular at a price of 180 or more. Consider 
all experiments where unenforceable warranties existed, seller identifications 
were known, and there was public revelation of grade. On 25 occasions sellers 
delivered a Regular at a price above 180 and were then able to make the very 
next sale at a price above 180. In 10 instances a seller sold a Regular to a buyer 
at a price above 180 and then sold to the same buyer within the next period 
at a price above 180 and without delivering a Super during the intervening time. 
The models predict that this will never occur. 
Conclusion 8. A seller's demand depends not only upon his/her own "reputa-
tion" for delivering Supers, but also upon the market 'reputation." The Shapiro 
model (1982a), if it is to be generalized to multiple finns, must be changed to 
add a "market reputation" term. 
Argument. The following model was estimated. 
T-1 T-1 
PiT = CI + Cz • E (SI,T_. • N-I) + C3 E (S.,T_. • B'-I) 
N 
S.,T_. = E Si,t-t 
i=l 
t=l t=l 
PiT = price received by seller i in period T 
N = number of sellers 
ChA,B = constants to be estimated 
Si,T_. number of Supers sold by seller i in period T - t so 
T-1 E (Si,T_ •• N-I) is own reputation = a weighted sum 
t=l 
of all past Super sales by i. 
S.,T_. = number of Supers sold in the entire market in the 
T-1 
period T - t, so E (S.,T_ •• B·-I) is a market reputation 
= a weighted sum of all past Super sales. 
. 
• 
J 
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The estimated coefficients are in Table 5. Data from experiments 19 (monopo-
ly) and 21 Oow cost Supers) were not included. The conclusion stated above 
is supported by the fact that five of the twelve experiments have a significant 
C3 term. 
Conclusion 9. The markets where individual sellers prices are not influenced 
by either their own reputation for selling Supers or the market reputation for 
Super sales do not exhibit either lemons behavior or full information behavior. 
Furthermore, significant influence of individual seller's own reputation on own 
prices is not a sufficient condition for reputation-induced efficiency gains. 
Argument. In markets 12 and 13 neither C1 nor C3 is significant. Market behavior 
is not captured well by either of the two models. Both experiments 16 and 17 
exlubited sensitivity to individual reputations, but neither exhibited substantial 
efficiency gains. 
The A and B parameters measure the "discount" rate over time-whether 
past or most current Supers sales are most important. Those experiments for 
which A is small and C1 significant suggest the importance is on the most recent 
individual behavior. Where B is small and C3 is significant, the most recent market 
behavior seems to be the most important. 
Conclusion 10. A reduction of buyer information about the grade deliveries of 
individual sellers from public information to private information decreases market 
efficiency . 
Argument. Because of subject pool differences in market behavior, the only op-
portunity to reject the proposition occurred in the CIT experiments Oeft half 
of Table 2). Because efficiencies at both BU and PCC tended to be low, little 
opportunity existed for further efficiency losses. The public revelation of individual 
seller's decisions in market 11(1-8) at CIT produced efficiencies at near the 100 
percent level. Efficiencies in experiment 11 (with public information and after 
period 4) dominate the efficiencies (after period 4) in both 15(1-10) and 20(1-9), 
where only private revelation of grade existed. The pattern of trades in the two 
private revelation markets is that suggested by the theory. Define a •. ripoff' ' 
as a contract in which the price indicates that the (risk neutral) buyer was at 
least 90 percent confident that the unit would be a Super (270F), but a regular 
was delivered. In this case. a Regular is delivered at a price of 270 francs or 
more. In market 11 a total offour ripoffs occurred while twenty-eight and fif-
teen ripoffs occurred in markets 15 and 20 respectively. While no tests are pro-
vided, both prices and efficiencies appear to be drifting downward in 15 and 20 
and upward in 11. 
COllclusion 11. A subject pool difference exists and subject experience makes 
a difference in market behavior. 
Argument. The best example is between CIT 11 and PCC 16 and 17. These 
experiments had experienced participants, yet the market behavior of the pce 
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Table 5 
REGRESSION REsULTS 
SELLER PRICE AS A FuNCTION OF 
OWN REpUTATION AND MARKET REpUTATION 
EXP C. C, A C, 
5 215.16 13.16 0.958 -1.34 
(N-72) (34.50)·· (4.62)·· (7.Z32)·· (1.45) 
6 170.15 5.44 0.101 26.01 
(N -106) (109.Z3)· (0.74) (0.083) (8.40)·· 
7 72.54 37.58 0.72 15.37 
(N -136) (5.53)·· (6.22)·· (0.499) (4.33)·· 
10 164.39 0.07 3.675 2.62 
eN -59) (103.99)·· (0.13) (0.383) (3.42)·· 
11 283.49 13.46 0.547 -3.75 
(N-82) (22.93)·· (2.46)·· (3.041)·· (1. 78) 
12 185.81 -1.85 1.314 3.34 
(N-55) (13.66)·· (0.29) (0.729) (1.09) 
13 205.35 -7.48 -0.221 2.55 
(N-53) (16.51) (1.01) (0.211) (0.84) 
14 186.97 -0.61 -1.318 5.37 
(N-67) (13.74)·· (0.14) (0.555) (2.25)· 
15 206.92 22.36 0.367 4.55 
(N -108) (11.71)·· (3.48)·· (2.190)· (2.12)· 
16 177.87 Z3.17 -0.501 1.81 
(N-66) (28.57)·· (2.79)·· (1.185) (0.75) 
17 191.21 38.97 -0.200 -2.02 
(N-62) (47.70)·· (5.04)·· (0.955) (0.63) 
20 162.78 17.37 -0.054 3.79 
(N -94) (10.82)·· (2.46)·· (0.132) (1.65) 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
. significant at .95 level 
.. significant at .99 level 
B 
1.257 
(4.503)·· 
0.220 
(2.955) 
0.300 
(2.278) 
0.741 
(4.964)·· 
-0.741 
(0.173) 
1.093 
(2.714)·· 
0.145 
(0.147) 
0.205 
(0.482) 
-0.200 
(-0.760) 
-0.023 
(0.012) 
-0.600 
(0.501) 
0.728 
(3.346)·· 
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group is lemons, while the behavior of CIT is full information. Again an interesting 
comparison exists between the inexperienced PCC participants of 12, 13, and 
14, which is difficult to describe in tenns other than overly optimistic buyers, 
with the behavior of 20, which used inexperienced CIT participants. Notice, 
however, that with some institutional arrangements, such as markets with 
unknown sellers and markets in which express warranties were enforced, the 
differences between subject pools is almost nonexistent. 
Experience seems to be important in the PCC subject pool when seller iden-
tifications are known, and enforced warranties are absent. Compare 12, 13, and 
14 with 16, 17, 18, 21. The purchases that can be characterized as made by 
overly optimistic buyers substantially disappear with experience. In brief, the 
models seem to work better as participant experience increases. 
Conclusion 12. The time of revelation, whether revelation was made at the end 
of the period or immediately after the sale, made no difference. 
Argument. Markets 5(BU) and lO(PCC) had inexperienced subjects and the 
revelation came at the end of a period. Markets 12(PCC), 13(PCC), 14(PCC) 
had inexperienced subjects and the revelation was made immediately after a 
sale. Market efficiencies are indistinguishable. 
Experienced participants in 6(BU), 7(BU) with revelation at the end of the 
period can be compared to participants in 16(PCC), 17(PCC), 18(PCC) and 
21(PCC) when revelation was made immediately after sale. Market 7 with the 
credence property had the highest efficiencies. The others are indistinguishable. 
Conclusion 13. A reduction in the relative cost of Supers switched market 
behavior from that of the lemons model to that of the full information model. 
Argument. On two occasions the relative cost of Supers was lowered, markets 
19(7-14) and 21(5-14). Prior to the lowering of cost the markets were essen-
tially at a lemons equilibrium. After the cost was lowered the number of Supers 
delivered increased significantly as did efficiencies and prices. 
Conclusion 14. Aside from a possible small increase in price at first, nontruthful 
advertising had no effect on average price. 
Argument. Two of the three «;ases, in which warranties were optional but unen-
forced, experienced a slight upward movement in price at first, 18(7), 19(4), 
but prices then returned to previous levels. The third case, 14(8) experienced 
no upward movement at all. 
V. Summary and Interpretation of Results 
The lemons phenomena can occur (conclusion 2). We are aware of no other 
clear documentation of its existence. Markets will not necessarily allocate in-
formation to the agent that values it most. Informational failure in a market can 
be observed. Of course this result alone says nothing at all about the likelihood 
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of informational failure in naturally occurring markets. The result is important 
because it demonstrates that the tools and theories used to analyze naturally 
occurring markets were not rejected when put to an important test. 
With the existence of the lemons problem documented, the analysis turns to 
an examination of the conditions that generate it. The lemons phenomena do 
not automatically go away when firms have an incentive and opportunity to 
establish a reputation for good quality (conclusion 5). Reputation and brand names 
are not sufficient devices to guarantee efficient market operation even in the 
case of experience goods and repeat purchases. Several factors can operate 
to frustrate the competitive development of reputations. First, the cost of 
developing a reputation is evident in several markets. Supers must sell at regular 
prices in sufficient quantity to attract buyers' attention and develop their con-
fidence in the seller's reliability. Of course, this can generate substantial tem-
porary losses. The problem can occur because the market price response must 
be sufficiently rapid to reward sellers who adopt a strategy of delivering high-
grade units, and this price response is not well understood. In fact, the positive 
responsiveness axiom that states that super deliveries will be rewarded by higher 
prices or increased demand is not always reliable. This axiom is at the heart 
of many models as in Klein and Leffier (1981), Nelson (1974), Peltzman (1981), 
Schmalensee (1978), Shapiro (1980, 1982abc).Buyers might not even respond 
positively to high-grade deliveries (conclusion 9). Instead of understanding seller 
motivations or believing that sellers have an interest in reputation development, 
buyers might regard sellers as being totally random or buyers might even avoid 
sellers who deliver SuperS on the belief that the sellers were attempting to trap 
the buyer or lure the buyer into paying a high price and then delivering a regular. 
While we cannot actually document the existence of such extreme buyer skep-
ticism, some of the markets seemed to have that characteristic (i.e., markets 
12, 13, 14), and in some cases it might even be justified. In summary, buyer 
reactions to poor quality deliveries are not as uniformly predictable or as p~hing 
and rewarding as presupposed by some dynamic models such as the quality 
guaranteeing price (conclusion 7). 
How a policy might alter belief and learning processes or even buyer reac-
tions to seller strategies is an open question. Marketing programs or regulatory 
pOlicies that "properly frame" the problem that buyers face might be impor-
tant. Conceivably the very ~xistence of some sort of regulation. even if unen-
forced, is a type of public information that might foster buyer confidence in seller 
intentions and also foster seller beliefs about buyer reactions to "ripoffs." With 
such changed beliefs the market would possibly provide the proper rewards for 
quality such that further regulation would be unnecessary. Because the par-
ticipants have incomplete information, multiple equilibria might exist, and the 
existence of multiple equilibria might be the source of confirming results. A public-
ly stated regulation might serve as a focal point that coordinates actions toward 
one of the equilibria. At this point theory provides very few hints and the issue 
is appropriate for more experimentation. 
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Buyer confidence and learning is ·just part of the reputation cost problem. The 
confidence must be translated into price increases. Once buyers recognize a 
seller who reliably delivers Supers, the price of that seller's units must adjust 
sufficiently rapidly to reduce the reputation cost. Data from experiments (Plott, 
JEL 1~82) leads one to suspect that this price adjustment property is sensitive 
to market organizational features independent of any learning properties of 
buyers. The cost of reputation development depends upon the speed of price 
adjustment in response to changed buyer beliefs. Price adjustment speed ap-
pears to be related to market organization. Therefore reputation costs and the 
resulting evolution of quality products might be sensitive to market organiza-
tion. Thus, empirical reasons exist for economists to have some interest in 
market organization, in addition to the theoretical propositions about the rela-
tionship between quality and market organization developed by Wilson (1980). 
A second factor that can prevent reputation development from guaranteeing 
market efficiency is a type of externality that seems to exist in some markets. 
Individual seller success can be related to a market reputation for delivering 
Supers as well as to the individual seller's own reputation (conclusion 8). The 
externality can work negatively in two ways. First, individual sellers have an 
incentive to free ride on the reputations and markets developed by others. After 
one or two sellers have incurred the cost of reputation development and are 
successfully selling supers at a high price, an entrant can coat-tail on their reputa-
tions. Buyers will test units of entrants priced just below the price at which 
Supers are being sold (price is a signal) and if the entrant delivers Supers, its 
reputation is almost cost1essly established. The free rider aspect can dampen 
the development of reputations and the resulting market efficiency. The exter-
nality also can work negatively on a seller that has an established reputation. 
If other sellers decide to destroy their reputation by dumping regulars and 
thereby make a profit on the ripoffs, buyer reaction can be negative toward all 
firms. Even sellers that continue to deliver Supers can experience a drop in 
demand as buyers appear to become suspicious of all firms. This negative ex-
ternality can depress the returns from reputation development. Whether or not 
alternative market organization, public announcements, or regulations can ef-
fectively promote the development of quality by reducing such externalities awaits 
further experimentation. , 
A third potential problem is structural and derives from the problems discussed 
above. If quality improvements can only be achieved by large and discrete in-
creases in cost, markets might equilibrate at local equilibria that have the lemons 
property. The large discrete increases in cost mean that the cost of quality im-
provements can be covered only by large changes in price. Either the buyer 
must be willing to take a risk and pay a premium in hope that the seller will 
deliver a Super or the seller must incur large losses by selling Supers at regular 
prices in order to build buyer confidence. Risk aversion on both sides will make 
reputation development and the resulting high quality difficult. In markets in which 
the relative cost of Supers is lowered, the instances of super sales and resulting 
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reputation-like behavior in the market becomes much more pronounced (con-
clusion 13). 
A final problem also derives from the others listed above when supplemented 
by the fact that multiple markets are involved. If buyers are optimistic and bid 
prices ~gh even in the face of many regular deliveries. sellers have no incen-
tive to develop a reputation for delivering Supers. The difference between the 
going prices of units that are being delivered as Regulars and the maximum value 
that one might get from a Super is not enough to cover the cost differential 
(see markets 12. 13). Before a reputation is worthwhile. buyer optimism must 
be dampened and the prices must fall to a point that makes reputation develop-
ment profitable. Complete market quality deterioration. all lemons. might be 
a necessary condition for automatic market recovery. Commentators with a taste 
for paradoxical statements could say that things cannot get better until they get 
worse; or regulation is needed least when market performance is at its worst. 
Market reputation development may be difficult in some circumstances. but 
it is certainly not impossible. In some of the markets knowledge of seller iden-
tification alone (brand names) was sufficient to guarantee behavior consistent 
with the full information model (conclusions 5 and 13). This opens a possible 
role for third party actions that facilitate such reputation development. Reputa-
tion development is clearly a tool but we do not know its exact limitations. En-
forced warranties also will induce the market behavior that is captured by the 
full information model (conclusion 1). Markets that are otherwise behaving in 
a confusing and inefficient manner recover almost immediately when enforced 
warranties are introduced: The power of the instrument in fostering market ef-
ficiency is remarkable. 
Legal instruments or practices that have the effect of a costiessly enforced 
warranty will be voluntarily offered by sellers. Such warranties. if they exist. 
will also be voluntarily demanded by buyers (conclusion 3). Such instruments 
require that any disclosures made are truthful. Competition. in turn. forces 
disclosures. The data in these experiments suggest that the Grossman/signal-
ing models that predict the voluntary use of such instruments (when their 
availability is publicly mown) are reliable in this respect as models of warranty-
like instruments. We are thus not too far from an understanding of the process 
through which the warranty-like instruments have an effect on markets. Fur-
ther support for this type of theory has substantial ramifications for regulatory 
policy because a direct implication of the theory. when applied to experience 
goods as opposed to credence goods. is that mandatory disclosure is 
unnecessary . 
Markets need not be characterized by either the full information model or 
the lemons model. The reasons for such confusing behavior are not understood. 
Of course one can speculate that it reflects a lack of sophistication on the part 
of market participants or a lack of experience. or a number of things idiosyn-
cratic to the population (conclusion 11). The problem could be due to the ex-
istence of multiple Bayes equilibria as was mentioned above. These are just 
. 
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speculations that call for more detaij.ed investigation. Precisely because the 
behavior of such markets is not understood, it is necessary for policy analysts 
to know when standard principles can only be applied with substantial precau-
tions. Markets that behave in understood patterns are characterized by either 
private reputation formation or market reputation formation or both (conclusion 
9). 
Our final observation is related to advertising. False advertising exists in our 
markets (conclusion 4) even when buyers quickly and easily detect the decep-
tion. Thus policy analyses (posner 1973, 1979) or models <Nelson 1970, 1974) 
that imply that false advertising cannot be sustained or will be beneficial are 
not supponed by our results. We hasten to add that conditions relied upon by 
Nelson were not present in our markets and invites further experimentation. 13 
Though false advertising occurred and the effects were not beneficial, the ef-
fects (for experience goods) are not as deleterious as presupposed by some 
advocates of advertising regulations. People are not misled. They simply dismiss 
all sellers' claims so that advertising fails to provide effective information which 
could enhance efficiency. This last finding may provide some insight into the 
advertising industry's strongly voiced suppon for the FTC's advertising substan-
tiation program. 14 
GENERAL 
Appendix 
Experiment Instructions 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. Various 
research foundations have provided funds for this research. The instructions 
are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you might 
earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at the 
end of the experiment. 
In this experiment we are going to conduct a market in which some of you 
will be buyers and some of you will be sellers in a sequence of market days 
or trading periods. Attached to the instructions you will find some sheets, labeled 
Buyer or Seller, which describe the value to you of any decisions you might 
make. You are not to reveal this in/ormation to anyone. It is your own private 
information. 
The type of currency used in this market is francs. All trading and earnings 
will be in terms of francs. Each franc is wonh ___ dollars to you. Do not 
reveal this number to anyone. At the end of the experiment your francs will 
be convened to dollars at this rate, and you will be paid in dollars. Notice that 
the more francs you earn, the more dollars you earn. 
13 The conditions are that advertising is costly and sellers can increase market share. 
I' Su Adlltrlising Age. November 1. 1980, p. 40; TtleuisioniRadio Air, November 29. 1982. p. 35. 
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SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO BUYERS 
During each market period you are free to purchase from any seller or sellers 
as many units as you might want. The value of a unit depends upon its grade. 
There are two grades (Regular and Super) and the value of a Super is much 
greater than the value of a Regular. At the time you buy a unit you will not 
lmow the grade but (at the end of a trading period) (after the purchase) you will 
be told the grade of each unit you bought. 
The attached infonnation and record sheet will help you detennine the value 
to you of any decisions you make. Page __ of your infonnation and record 
sheets contains two schedules. The schedule in the left column identifies the 
redemption values of Regulars and the schedule in the right hand column con-
tains the redemption values for the Supers. The redemption value of the first 
Regular you purchase is in the row marked First Units and the column marked 
Regular. The redemption value of the first Super you purchase is found on the 
same row only, under the column marked Supers. The redemption value of se-
cond units are found in the second row, etc. The profits from each purchase 
(which are yours to keep) are computed by taking the difference between the 
redemption value and the purchase price of the unit bought. That is, 
your earnings = (redemption value) - purchase price. 
In addition to these earnings you will receive a capital payment of __ _ 
francs each period. 
Suppose, for example, the redemption value for your first Regular is 1000 
and the redemption value for your first Super is 4000. If you buy two units at 
1200 and one is a Regular and one is a Super your profits are 
1000 - 1200 = 
4000 - 1200 = 
TOTAL 
-200 
2800 
2600 
Turn now to the second page of the infonnation and record sheet. The pur-
chase price of the first unit you purchase should be listed in row two for the 
first unit purchased. The pUrchase price of the second unit should be listed in 
row 2 of the second unit, 'etc. When the grades of units become known you 
should enter the redemption values in rows 1 for each unit. If, for example, 
your first unit purchased is a Super and if your second purchase is a Regular, 
you record the redemption value for the first Regular because even though the 
unit is the second purchase it is only your first Regular. Profits at the end of 
the period should be recorded at the bottom of the page. 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO SELLERS 
During each market period you may sell to any buyer or buyers as many as 
___ units. There are two types of units, Supers and Regulars. Each Super 
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will cost you and each Regular will cost . Notice that the 
cost of Supers is more than the cost of Regulars. The profits or losses on each 
sale (which are yours to keep) are computed by taking the difference between 
the price at which you sold the unit and its cost. 
Your total profits for a market period are computed by adding the profits or 
losses on each sale during the period. The attached record sheet will help you 
keep track of your profits or losses. Enter the price of the first unit you sell 
in the appropriate column (Super or Regular) in row 1 at the time of sale. Then 
record the profit or loss as directed in row 3. The sale price of the second unit 
should be listed in the appropriate Super or Regular column in row 4. Profits 
should be similarly calculated and the total for the period recorded in row 16. 
Ail profits over are yours to keep. 
MARKET ORGANIZATION 
The market for this commodity is organized as follows. The market will be 
conducted in a series of trading periods. Each period period lasts for at most 
___ minutes. Any buyer is free at any time during the period to make 
a bid to buy the commodity at a specified price, and any seller with units to 
sell is free to accept or not accept the bid. Likewise, anyone wishing to sell 
a unit is free to make an offer to sell one unit at a specified price. All bids and 
offers are entered on the blackboard and remain there until accepted or cancel-
ed. If a bid or offer is accepted, a binding contract has been closed for a single 
unit at the specified price and the contracting parties will record the contract 
price. Any ties in bids or acceptances will be resolved by random choice. Ex-
cept for the bids and their acceptance or cancellation you are not to speak to 
any other subject. There are likely to be many bids that are not accepted, but 
you are free to keep trying. You are free to make as much profit as you can. 
Trading period 0 will be a trial period to familiarize you with the procedure, 
and will not count toward your cash earnings. 
FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
1. (At the end of the periIx!) (After each sale) sellers indicate to the experimenter 
those trades that involved Regulars and those that involved Supers. This infor-
mation will be transmitted to the buyers who participated in those transactions. 
Buyers can then calculate their profits. 
2. Each individual has a lirge folder. All papers, instructions, records, etc, 
should be put into this folder. Leave the folder with us before leaving. Take 
nothing home with you. 
3. We are able to advise you a little on making money. First, you should 
remember that pennies add up. Over many trades and a long period of time 
very small amounts earned on individual trades can add up to a great deal of 
money. Secondly, you should not expect your earnings to be steady. You will 
have some good periods and some bad periods. During bad times try not to 
become frustrated. lust stay in there and keep trying to earn what you can. 
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It all adds up in the end. 
Some people rush to trade. Others find it advantageous to "shop" or spread 
their trading over the period. We are unaware of any particular "best" strategies 
and suggest that you adapt accordingly. 
4. Under no circumstances may you mention anything about activities which 
might involve you and other participants after the experiment (i.e., no physical 
threats, deals to split up afterwards, or leading questions). 
5. Each individual will be paid in private. Your earnings are strictly your own 
business. 
6. Buyers tender bids verbally by indicating in sequence "(buyer number) 
BIDS (amount)." 
7. Sellers tender offers verbally by indicating in sequence "(seller number) 
OFFERS (amount)." 
8. Each trade in a period will be numbered. (At the end 0/ the periiJt!) (after 
each sale) each seller will (submit a slip 0/ paper) (hold up a cart!) for each trade 
specifying a Super or a Regular. The seller is free to determine the grade of 
the units he sells and may mix grades within or between periods. 
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An Experimental Study of Warranty Coverage 
and Dispute Resolution in Competitive Markets 
Thomas R. Palfrey and Thomas Romer 
Graduate School of Industrial Administration 
Carnegie-Mellon University 
1. Introduction 
In service and product markets where warranties are offered, disputes over 
warranty performance frequently occur between buyer and seller. Resolving 
such disputes in a fair and effective way has become an increasingly important 
and controversial question in recent years. Some observers have gone so far 
as to argue that the pervasiveness of such disputes and the inability to resolve 
them effectively is having a corrosive effect on society.1 This is probably 
somewhat extreme, but even a less excited perspective suggests that the design 
of procedures to handle consumer disputes is a matter for serious concern. 
The design of appeals mechanisms for resolving consumer disputes has center-
ed largely on procedural issues and features of internal functioning. Mechanisms 
are evaluated on the basis of comparisons that involve the relative cost of the 
procedures, how the burden of costs is distnbuted, and the ability of the proce-
dure to make the "right" decision in specific cases. Consumer advocates, for 
example, have suggested that more desirable outcomes can be achieved if sellers 
are forced to bear all litigation costs relating to a dispute and its subsequent 
adjudication by a "dispute resolution mechanism" (DRM). Much attention has 
focused on the need for having a D RM evaluate the facts accurately and neutrally, 
and the importance of procedural faimess. 2 The overall tenor of discussion has 
generally been that the primary consideration is with the welfare of the 
disputants: Given that a dispute has occurred, what is the best way to resolve it? 
We have argued elsewhere [Palfrey and Romer (1983)]. that, at least in service 
and product markets with warranties, the welfare of consumers and sellers who 
are not involved in disputes should be considered as well. Specifically, we claim 
that the choice of rules for a particular DRM can affect prices, the range of war-
ranties offered, and the likelihood of disputes in these markets, as well as their di-
rect effect on outcomes when disputes do actually occur. Thus, the design of 
DRMs will not only affect disputants, but wiD. also indirectly affect non-disputants. 
Unfortunately, data are not available to assess the effects of DRMs on these 
markets and on the welfare of buyers (both disputants and nondisputants) in 
these markets in a systematic way. The purpose of this study is to provide some 
1 Suo e.g., Nader (1980). 
2 See FTC (1980) and Ray (1983). 
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empirical evidence about the effects of DRMs on the equilibrium in markets 
where warranties may be offered. In order to do this, it was necessary first 
to develop a technique for conducting laboratory markets with uncertain prod-
uct quality and warranties, which allowed for the possiblity of disputes and which 
could later be adapted to include appeals procedures to deal with disputes over 
warranties. The type of uncertainty in our markets and the combination of a 
"market" phase and a "warranty" phase in these experiments represent signifi-
cant departures from standard experimental methodology. Our approach can 
also be useful in studying other problems in the economics of uncertainty. For 
example, DeJong, Forsythe, and Uecker (1984) have been able to combine our 
procedures with some novel features of their own to study the effects of auditing 
rules in a principal-agent setting. 
Using our methods, we designed and carried out a series of laboratory market 
experiments to study the menu of prices and warranties offered in a competitive 
market for a prQduct (or service) of random quality. Since our ultimate goal is 
to investigate the effects of DRMs on markets outcomes and buyer welfare, 
we included several experiments in which buyers could appeal under different 
rules. These rules varied in an important component: how the cost of the DRM 
was shared between the disputants (seller and buyer). Some hypotheses about 
the experimental outcomes--e.g., prices, warranties, buyer welfare and frequen-
cy of disputes-are obtained from a simple analytical model of warranties, and 
are evaluated using the data from these laboratory markets. 
In the next section, we give an overview of the experiment setting. In Sec-
tion 3, we provide details of the experimental design. Section 4 presents an 
analytical framework for deriving hypotheses about experimental results. In Sec-
tion 5, we enumerate some hypotheses. Section 6 presents the data from the 
experiments and discusses the results. Our concluding remarks are in Section' 7. 
2. Overview of Experimental Setting 
In Palfrey and Romer (1983), we developed a theoretical framework for analyz-
ing a market in which warranties are offered and disputes over warranty per-
formance occur. We argued that the key feature of such markets is that buyers 
and sellers have differential and imperfect information. In order for warranties 
to exist, there must be some uncertainty about (future) product qUality. In order 
for disputes to occur, it must be possible, at least in some circumstances, for 
buyers and sellers to disagree about whether performance by the seller is called 
for under the warranty covering the product. There is a wide variety of ways 
that such disagreements can occur, but they reduce to two essential cases: 
• Buyer and seller may agree about warranty terms, but disagree about 
whether observed product characteristics trigger warranty performance. 
• Buyer and seller may agree about product characteristics, but disagree about 
whether the claimed product defect is covered by the warranty. 
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In Palfrey and Romer (1983), we noted that. to a large extent. these two 
causes of disputes can be formally equivalent in their impact on warranty markets. 
The important point is that disputes occur when buyer and seller perceive (or 
claim to perceive) the situation differently. For concreteness, however, our ex-
periments are structured so that potential disagreements concern perceived prod-
uct quality, not what the warranty covers. In our laboratory markets, at the 
time a sale is made, buyers and sellers are uncertain about product quality. After 
purchase, a buyer gets a noisy signal about product quality. Depending on the 
type of warranty covering the product, the buyer may then make a claim to 
the seller for warranty performance. Again, depending on the type of warranty, 
the seller may automatically honor the buyer's claims, or may condition his per-
formance on a noisy signal that he obtains about product quality. If the market 
structure has no DRM, then the seller's decision is the final one. If there is 
a DRM in place, and there is a disagreement between buyer and seller, the 
buyer may choose to appeal to the DRM. whose decision is final and binding. 
The DRM, too. may be subject to error. In the experiments, its decisions are 
based on a noisy signal about product quality. 
In many markets, transaction costs may be quite important. This is particularly 
relevant in considering DRMs. Our experiments allow for transaction costs both 
in making warranty claims and in appealing to the DRM (if there is one). 
Moreover, these costs maybe different for buyers and sellers. 
One of the questions of interest is whether the availability (or mandating) of 
a DRM has an effect on the type of warranty offered in the market. For exam-
ple, sellers may wish to avoid costs associated with a DRM by offering a war-
ranty under which disputes are extremely unlikely or do not occur at all. (E.g., 
sell only "as is" or, at the other extreme, adopt a "customer is always right" 
policy.) Or. the availability of a DRM may make buyers more willing to pur-
chase products with intermediate or "limited" warranties. knowing that, in the 
event of a dispute. the seller's word is not the final one. To capture such ef-. 
fects, our laboratory market allows for the possibility of more than one warran-
ty type. 
While a variety of warranties are conceivable, we restrict our attention to 
replacement policies; that is, the buyer is given a replacement unit if a claim 
is made and the seller agrees that the c1aim is a valid one. We distinguish be-
tween an unconditional (which we loosely refer to as "full") warranty and a 
conditional (which we loosely refer to as "limited") warranty. With an uncondi-
tional warranty, the seller always agrees that the buyer's c1aim is valid; there 
are "no questions asked." We call this a Type 1 warranty. 
With a conditional warranty, a seller promises to perform only if the unit is 
of low quality. Under such a warranty. a seller "inspects" the unit if a claim 
has been made. and then honors the c1aim if the "inspection" tells the seller 
it is a low quality unit. He refuses the claim if the "inspection" indicates it is 
not a low quality unit. Such warranties are Type 2 warranties. 
The seller may also sell a unit "As Is." This null warranty is called Type 3. 
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More specifically, our laboratory markets involved the buying and selling of 
a •• commodity. " The quality of a given unit of this commodity is either high 
(a Good unit) or low (a Defective unit). A high quality unit yields a value VA 
to the buyer, while a low quality unit generates a value V, < VA. Before a unit 
is sold, neither buyer nor seller Imows the true quality of the unit, but the pro-
bability that a unit is good, t, is common Imowledge to all parties. Each unit 
is drawn independently from the same distnbution. regardless of the seller from 
whom it is bought. The cost to the seller of a unit is c. 
After purchasing a unit, a buyer receives a signal about the quality of the unit. 
This signal is either 0 or 1. The probability, q, of receiving the 0 signal, condi-
tional on the unit being Defective, equals the probabi1ity of receiving the 1 signal, 
conditional on the unit being Good. We set q > 0.5, so that 0 is a (noisy) signal 
of low quality, and 1 is a (noisy) signal of high quality. Thus q is the probability 
of a correct signal. 
If the unit was purchased under a Type 1 or Type 2 warranty, then the buyer 
may return the unit to the seller from whom it was purchased. If he does so, 
he is charged a return fee c., and the seller is charged a return fee c •. 
Under a Type 2 warranty, if a unit is returned, the seller obtains a signal about 
the unit's quality. All buyer and seller clues are drawn from the same distribu-
tion and are independent, conditional on true quality. A seller is obligated to 
honor the warranty if it is a Type 1 or if he receives a 0 signal under a Type 
2 warranty. An important and limiting feature of our experimental design is that, 
under a Type 2 warranty, sellers are forced to act strictly on the outcome of 
their signal, which is public Imowledge. Thus, our formulation rules out the 
possibility that a seller might offer a warranty and then always refuse claims, 
regardless of his signal about product quality. Such fraudulent behavior may 
underlie the calls for dispute resolution in some markets. 3 Our primary intent, 
however, is to focus on disputes that may emerge due to imperfections of infor-. 
mation, rather than disputes resulting from purely fraudulent behavior. In future 
work, we intend to investigate DRMs in markets where sellers have the option 
of reneging.' 
If there is a DRM available, then a buyer whose claim under a Type 2 war-
ranty is refused has the option of appealing. If he appeals, he is charged an ap-
peal fee ac .. and the seller is Charged an appeal fee /3c ... Our "mechanism" 
is, in fact, quite mechanical. 'Rather than incorporating all the intricacies of 
decision-making by a judge, arbitrator, jury, or panel, we collapse the decision-
making process into yet another noisy signal. In the event a dispute is brought 
to the DRM, a signal is drawn, independently of buyer and seller signals. The 
probability q that the signal is 0, conditional on the unit being Defective, equals 
3 Indeed. the FTC has mandated DRMs as part of the settlement in a variety of cases involving 
systematic failure to honor warranties. 
• Lynch et al. (1984) in their study of product quality also have warranties that are .. perfectly 
enforceable." We believe the possibility of fraudulent behavior is important in markets with war-
ranties. and may be significantly affected by DRMs. This issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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the probability that the signal is 1, conditional on the unit being Good. If the 
DRM signal is 0, the seller must perform under the warranty. If it is 1, the 
buyer must keep the original unit. 
3. Experimental Design: Details 
We conducted eight experiments. Four of the experiments had no DRM, and 
four experiments included a DRM.5 Subjects were undergraduate students at 
Carnegie-Mellon University, none of whom had any previous experience as 
research subjects in experimental markets. Each subject participated in only 
one experiment. Each experiment consisted of nine or ten subjects, four of whom 
were designated sellers, with the remaining subjects designated as buyers. Each 
experiment lasted approximately three hours. The average amount a subject 
earned in these experiments was approximately $30, and there was considerable 
variation in earnings across subjects. 
At the beginning of each experiment, after the instructions were read, a 
demonstration of how the random variables in the model worked was given. 
This was followed by a short test, to make sure that all subjects understood 
the rules and how to keep records. The instructions and the test differed slight-
ly depending upon whether or not the experiment used a DRM. Both sets of 
instructions are included in the Appendices. 
The parameters of a given experiment without a DRM consist of a specifica-
tion of (t,q) for the market, a specification of (V~, V"cb ) for each buyer, a specifica-
tion of (c,c,) for each seller, and a specification of a maximum number of units 
each buyer could purchase in each market period. In all experiments, buyers 
were limited to two purchases per period. (This was public information.) 
The values of t and q were publicly announced at the beginning of the experi-
ment. All other parameters were private·information to the particular subject. 
No subject was given any information about other subjects' values of these 
parameters, and direct communication of private information was prohibited. 
In fact, all sellers' parameters were identical and all buyers' parameters were 
identical. 
In the experiments with a DRM, the precision parameter of the DRM, ~, 
was publicly announced at the beginning. Each buyer was privately informed 
of erc.. and each seller was privately informed of (3c .... 
In all eight experiments, we set t = 0.5 and q = 0.75, and in the four DRM 
experiments, we set q( = q) = 0.75. The complete parameter structures for 
the eight experiments are given in Table 1 (Experiments 1-4) and Table 2 (Ex-
periments 5-8). Note that experiments 1 and 2 share the same parameters as 
do experiments 3 and 4, and, except for er, {3, and c .. , experiments 5-8 have 
the same parameters. 
5 In addition. we conducted two pilot experiments in which we tested the clarity of the instruc-
tions and the manageability of our procedures. 
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Table 1 
PARAMETERS FOR EXPERIMENTS 1-4 (NO DRM) 
Exp.1 Exp.2 Exp.3 Exp.4 
t 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
q 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
V~ 6.00 6.00 8.00 8.00 
V, 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
c 1.20 1.20 2.40 2.40 
c. 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
c, 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Buyer Reservation Price (assuming buyer uses optimal return policy) 
Type 1 ("Full") 3.70 3.70 4.95 4.95 
Type 2 ("Limited") 3.70 3.70 4.95 4.95 
Type 3 ("As Is") 3.00 3.00 N.A. 4.00 
Seller Expected Cost (assuming buyer uses optimal return policy) 
Type 1 ("Full") 1.85 1.85 3.65 3.65 
Type 2 ("Limited") 1.62 1.62 3.20 3.20 
Type 3 ("As Is") 1.20 1.20 N.A. 2.40' 
No. of Buyers 5 6 6 6 
No. of Sellers 4 4 4 4 
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Table 2 
PARAMETERS FOR EXPERIMENTS 5-8 (DRM) 
Exp.5 Exp.6 Exp.7 Exp.8 
t 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
q 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
V. 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 
V, 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
c 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 
c. 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
" 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 q 
Coo 0.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 
a 0 0 1 0 
{3 0 1 0 1 
Buyer Expected Value 
Type 1 (Strategy 51) 3.70 3.70 3.70 3.70 
Type 2 (Strategy 51) 3.70 3.70 3.70 3.70 
(Strategy 55) 3.79 3.79 3.64 3.79 
(Strategy 5,) 3.84 3.84 3.69 3.84 
Seller Expected Cost 
Type 1 (Strategy 51) 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 
Type 2 (Strategy 51) 1.58 1.58 1.58 1.58 
(Strategy 55) 1.91 2.06 1.91 2.06 
(Strategy 5,) 1.69 1.84 1.69 1.84 
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Each experiment was divided into a number of trading periods. with the 
parameters of the market held constant across all periods of the experiment. 
Between eight and eleven periods were run. within a three hour time limit. 
Experiments differed in the types of warranties available for sellers to offer 
buyers. In Experiments 1 and 2. sellers could offer all three warranty types 
simultaneously. After running these experiments. we were concerned that our 
design did not permit subjects sufficient experience with the stochastic struc-
ture of Type 1 and 2 warranties. Consequently. in Experiment 3. only Types 
1 and 2 were permitted. In Experiment 4. only Types 1 and 2 were allowed 
in the first four periods. Beginning with period five. Type 3 warranties were 
introduced. and subjects were told that sellers could now offer these in addition 
to Types 1 and 2. Because the stochastic structure in the DRM experiments 
was so complicated. in all four of the D RM experiments (Experiments 5-8). only 
Types 1 and 2 warranties were permitted. thereby allowing subjects as much 
experience with these warranties and the DRM as possible. 
Market Organization in Experiments 1-4 (no DRM) 
The first four markets were organized as follows. Each experimental period 
was divided into two stages. Stage 1 was an oral auction in which sellers offered 
units for sale by announcing price-warranty combinations. Sellers were permit-
ted to offer units for sale simultaneously at different prices and with different 
warranties. As a result. there were multiple markets (one for each warranty 
type) operating simultaneously. Buyers did not make bids. They simply indicated 
willingness to accept an offer. Although each buyer was permitted to purchase 
at most two units per period. there was no restriction on how many units a 
seller could sell. When an offer was accepted. the buyer and seller were asked 
to record on their record sheets (see Appendix A) the price. warranty. and identity 
of the other party to the transaction. Stage 1 ended when (a) all buyers bought 
two units. or (b) the preannounced time limit (usually 7 minutes) ran out. 
At the beginning of Stage 2. each buyer was given a "quality clue" for each 
unit he or she had purchased in stage 1 of that period. These clues were private 
information. Buyers with units that had Type 1 or 2 warranties were then asked. 
in turn. whether they wished to return. 6 Whenever a warranty claim was made, 
the buyer and seller of that unit were privately charged c. and c .. respectively. 
If a claim was made under a Type 1 warranty. the buyer was given a replace-
ment unit and gave up the original unit. The seller was charged c for the replace-
ment (in addition to the cost c of the original unit). When a claim was made 
under a Type 2 warranty. the seller of the unit was given a "quality clue. '. This 
clue mandated the seller's behavior. If the clue was "0" ("low quality"), the 
seller had to replace the unit. If the clue was "1" ("high quality"), the buyer 
had to keep the original unit. Units purchased "As Is" (Type 3) could not 
6 These return decisions were public information. 
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be returned. Replacement units could not be returned, either, regardless of the 
original warranty type. 
At the end of Stage 2, buyers were informed of the true quality of each unit 
(original or replacement, as the case may be). Buyers' payoffs were determined 
by the true quality of the units they held at the end of each period, less the 
price they paid, less return costs. Sellers' payoffs were given by their revenues, 
less "production costs," less return costs. 
Figure 1 shows all possible sequences of decisions and events that can occur 
between the time a unit is purchased and the time true quality is announced. 
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Market Organization in Experiments 5-8 (with DRM). 
In these experiments, each trading period consisted of three stages. The first 
two stages were identical to the first stages in each period of experiments 
1-4.The third stage permitted buyers who had returned units under a Type 2 
warranty, but failed to receive a replacement in stage two (i.e., a dispute oc-
curred) to appeal to the dispute resolution mechanism. In case such a buyer 
chose to appeal, he or she had to pay an appeal fee (i.e., ac..) and the seller 
had to pay an appeal fee (i.e., {3c..). The decision of the mechanism was then 
determined by a random draw from the appropriate conditional probability 
distribution.7 1f the DRM ruled in favor of the buyer, the seller had to replace 
the unit, at an additional cost of c. If the DRM ruled in favor of the seller, no 
replacement was made, and the buyer kept the original unit. In either case, 
no further appeal was allowed. Buyer and seller payoffs were determined as 
in markets with no DRM, except that appeal costs were subtracted where ap-
. propriate. (Appendix B contains instructions and record forms for experiments 
5-8.) 
Figure 2 shows all possible sequences of decisions and events that could oc-
cur in experiments 5-8 between the time a unit is purchased and the time true 
QUality is announced. 
7 In order to save time. all of the random draws (including true quality. and buyer and seller clues) 
were done in advance. 
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4. A Formal Model of the Market 
As a baseline for fonnulating hypotheses about outcomes in our laboratory, 
we present in this section a model in which we assume competitive behavior 
by risk neutral agents. This model is similar to that developed by Palfrey and 
Romer (1983), with important modifications to capture features of our experimen-
tal design (competitive markets rather than monopoly; and only one replace-
ment permitted for each unit under warranty). In the model, average product 
quality, buyer preferences, production and transaction costs, and the extent 
to which "true" quality can be observed by buyer and seller interact to deter-
mine warranties, product price, and the likelihood of disputes. 
An equilibrium of the market is defined as follows. A buyer takes the price 
of a unit of the commodity and the warranty policy (Type 1, 2, or 3) offered 
by the seller as given. He chooses the best response; i.e., for a risk neutral 
buyer, the action that maximizes expected value, net of transaction costs. This 
involves whether or not to buy and when to return under the warranty. These 
decisions generate a response function for the buyer. Sellers take these response 
functions as given, and offer prices and warranties to maximize expected profit. 
We call the outcome of this interaction between buyers and sellers the equilibrium 
in this market. 
We develop this model in the absence of a DRM. This provides the basis for 
Experiments 1-4. We then incorporate DRMs into the framework. 
4.1 Market with no DRM 
All buyers are identical and all sellers are identical. Since each unit is drawn 
independently from the same distnbution, it is sufficient to calculate expected 
costs, values, and profits for a typical unit, for a representative buyer and a 
representative seller. Recall that if a seller does not replace a unit under a war-
ranty, the buyer keeps the original unit, and the buyer's ex post payoff is deter-
mined by the true quality of the unit. If the seller makes a replacement, the 
original unit is discarded, and the replacement unit may not be returned. The 
buyer's ex post payoff is determined by the true quality of the replacement unit. 
The true quality of a unit is not known until all relevant transactions (buying 
and selling, warranty claims, and replacements) are completed. 
We summarize the notation: 
t 
q 
Buyer value if unit is high quality 
Buyer value if unit is low quality 
Seller's production cost of a unit 
Buyer's cost of returning a unit 
Seller's cost of processing a return 
Ex ante probability that unit is high quality 
Probability of correct quality signal (same for buyers and sellers) 
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Note that we have set V, • 0, as in all the experiments. 
Buyers' upected values and sellers' upeded costs 
For a given unit, these depend on the warranty offered by the seller and on 
the return strategy followed by the buyer. 
A. Type 1 ("Full") Wa1Taniy. With this type of warranty, the seller makes a 
replacement if the buyer makes a claim. If the buyer makes a claim only if he 
gets a signal indicating low quality, the buyer's expected value (gross of price) is 
VI ... tqV. + t(l-q)(-c.+tVJ + (l-t)q(-c.+tVJ (1) 
The first term on the RHS is V" times the probability that the buyer correctly 
perceives a good unit and does not return. The second term is the probability 
that the buyer ·returns what is in fact a good unit-t(l-q)-times the expected 
value of the replacement minus the return cost. The last term corresponds to 
the buyer returning a low quality unit. A fourth term, corresponding to keeping 
a bad unit after receiving a 1 signal-(l-t)(l-q)V,-is omitted, since we have 
taken V, • O. 
The seller's expected cost associated with this return strategy is: 
KI == C + [t(l-q) + (l-t)q](c +cJ (2) 
B. Type 2 ("Limited") Wa1Tanty. With this type of warranty, the seller makes 
a replacement only if he receives a signal that the returned unit is of low quali-
ty. If the buyer returns a unit when he receives a signal indicating low quality, 
his expected value is: . 
Vz - tqV. + [t(l-q) + (l-t)q] [-c. + q(l-q) + t(l-q)z + (l-t)ql tV.] (3) 
t(l-q) + (l-t)q 
The second term has two components. The first corresponds to the probability 
that the buyer returns the ~t. The second gives the expected value given that 
a return has been made. Equation (3) may be rewritten as follows: 
Vz = tqV. + [t(l-q) + (l-t)q](-c. + tV,,), (4) 
I.e., Vz = VI' 
Buyers are indifferent between Type 1 and Type 2 warranties at the same price. 
A seller's expected cost for a Type 2 warranty with the buyer returning 
perceived low quality units is: 
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Kl = C + [t(l-q) + (l-t)q] [C. + t(l_q)l + (l_t)ql c ] (5) 
t(l-q) + (l-t)q 
Note that Kl < K, for 0 < t < 1 and 0 < q < 1. Sellers' costs are lower under 
a Type 2 warranty than under Type 1. 
For the parameter values of our experiments, given a Type 1 or 2 warranty, 
the strategy of returning only units whose signal is 0 dominates all other return 
strategies. Of course, this does not mean that in laboratory markets all buyers 
will use this strategy. For completeness, we present in Table 3 buyers' ex-
pected values (gross of price) and sellers' expected cost for all possible buyer 
strategies. a 
C. Type 3 ("As Is") Warranty. This is, effectively, no warranty at all. A buyer's 
expected value is simply 
(6) 
while a seller's expected (and actual) cost is 
(7) 
Price-Warranty Equilibrium 
To define a price-warranty equilibrium, we need a bit more notation. Denote 
by Kis) the expected cost of selling a unit with a type j warranty to a buyer 
using strategy s. Denote by Vis) the expected value to a buyer using strategy 
s of having a unit with a type j warranty. Then a price-waTTanty equilibrium is 
a set of prices, one for each warranty, (p!, ... ,p~; a set of strategies, one for 
each warranty, (s!, ... ,s~; and a warranty, j-, s~ch that 
K,(s~ .., p; 
Vis~ ~ VieS) 
V/(s;') - p;' . ~ V,(s~ - p; 
for all j 
for all s, j 
for all j 
(Ba) 
(Bb) 
(Bc) 
Intuitively, a price-warranty equilibrium is a set of prices, one for each war-
ranty, such that sellers earn zero expected profits at those prices. given op-
timal buyer return strategies, and a particular warranty such that, at the 
equilibrium prices, no other warranty gives the buyers higher expected surplus 
(i.e., value net of price). 
In a market with competitive, risk neutral sellers and a fixed number of iden-
tical risk neutral buyers with "zero-one" demands, at these equilibrium prices 
all buyers will buy units with warranty j-, sellers earn zero expected profits, 
8 We exclude the "silly" strategy of returning only if the signal is 1. We saw no evidence of 
such a strategy being used by buyers in our experiments. 
,. 
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and there is no price for any warranty a seller might offer which would give 
that seller positive profits. 
From inspection of Table 3 one can see that only Type 2 or 3 can be equilibrium 
warranties, since Type 1 is dominated by Type 2. Indeed, since buyer values 
under a' Type 1 warranty are dominated by values under a Type 2 warranty, 
for any return strategy, this result is independent of buyer risk attitudes. 9 
Whether Type 2 or Type 3 is the equilibrium depends on whether or not V1-K1 
exceeds V3-K3-i.e., it depends on the parameter values. 
9 We are assuming here that c. >0. Otherwise it is possible to have Type 1 be an equilibrium 
warranty. In our experiments c. > 0 for all markets. 
) 
j 
) 
-:j 
Table 3 
EXPECTED VALUES (ABOVE DASHED LINES) AND COSTS WITH NO DRM 
:::s;: 1 2 Buyer return strategy 
Return original unit tV.-c, tqV.-c, + [t(l-q) + (l-t)q]tV. 
regardless of signal ... _------------------_ ...... -------------------------------- ------------------------------------_ .. --------_ .. _------
2c+c. c + C. + [t(l-q) + (l-t)q]c 
Return original unit tqV.+ [t(l-q) + (l-t)q] (tV.-c,) tqV. + [t(l-q)+ (l-t)q] (tV.-c,) 
only if signal ---------------_ .. _------------ .. - .. _--------------------.. ------------------------- .... --------------------... _------
equals 0 
c + [t(l-q) + (l-t)q](c +c.> c + [t(l-q)+ (l-t)q]c. 
+ [t(l-q)J + (l-t)qJ]c 
Never return tV. tV. 
original unit -------------- ... _-------_ .. _-----_ ... _--------------_ .. ---- .. -----------------------_ ... _--- ..... -- ... _------_ .. -- .. --- ... -----
c c 
3 
NA 
-_ .... __ .. _ .. -
NA 
NA 
-_ ..... _- .. _--
NA 
tV. 
----------
c 
~ 
~ 
-< 
~ 
::0 
o 
~ 
""0 
,I» 
~ 
VJ 
~ 
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4.2 Market with a DRM 
The addition of a DRM adds one more "stage" to the decision-making prob-
lem of buyers. Besides having to decide whether or not to return a unit, given 
a signal, the buyer must decide whether or not to appeal if the seller refuses 
to make a replacement under the warranty. This expands the number of alter-
native buyer strategies considerably in the case of Type 2 warranties. There 
are no disputes with Type 1 or Type 3 warranties, so that the strategies of 
buyers and the values and costs for those two types of warranties are unaf-
fected by the DRM. 
Recall that a DRM is parameterized by the following elements: 
c", 
a 
cost of the mechanism. This can be thought of as the total resource 
cost of processing each dispute which is brought before the 
mechanism. 
proportion of cost borne by the buyer. Thus ac", is the effective 
cost to the buyer of appealing a warranty dispute. 
proportion of cost borne by the seller. Thus, ~c'" is the effective 
cost to the seller if a buyer appeals a warranty dispute. 
probability that the mechanism requires the seller to replace the 
original unit, conditional on the unit being defective. a is also the 
probability that the mechanism does not require the seller to replace 
a unit, given it is not defective. 
Hence, c"" a, and ~ represent the cost parameters of the model, and q 
represents the accuracy of the mechanism. One might think that we are im-
plicitly assuming that the mechanism is neutral (or unbiased) since the probability 
that it erroneously judges a defective unit to be good equals the probability that 
it erroneously judges a good unit to be defective. That is, the probability of in~ 
correctly ruling in favor of the seller when true quality is bad equals the pro-
bability of ruling in favor of the buyer when the unit is good. However, as we 
shall see, the overall probability of erroneously ruling in favor of the buyer or 
the seller will in general depend upon the proportion of appealed units which 
are good or defective, which in turn will depend on q, t, and the buyer strategies. 
Buyer strategies with Type 2 warranties 
We consider the following six strategies the buyer could follow under a Type 
2 warranty. They are: 
(1) Never return original unit (and, hence, never appeal); 
(2) Always return original unit, regardless of signal, and always ap-
peal disputes, regardless of signal; 
(3) Always return original unit, regardless of signal, but only appeal 
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a dispute if signal was 0; 
(4) Return units only if signal was 0, appeal disputes; 
(5) Return all units, appeal no disputes; 
(6) Return units only if signal was 0, appeal no disputes. 
Given a mechanism M = (c"" a, (3, Q) and the other parameters of the market 
rv~, c, c~, c., t, q), we can calculate the expected buyer values and expected 
seller costs under a Type 2 warranty for each of these buyer strategies. 10 These 
expressions are given in Table 4. Notice that the entries for strategies (1), (5), 
and (6) correspond to entries in column 2 of Table 3. 
10 As before. we exclude strategies in which buyers return (or appeal) only if they receive a 1 signal. 
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Table 4 
EXPECTED VALUES AND COSTS WITH DRM UNDER TYPE 2 WARRANTIES 
Buyer Strategy 
Return all units 
Appeal all disputes 
Return all units 
Appeal disputes only 
if signal was 0 
Return all units 
Never appeal 
Return original unit 
only if signal equals 0 
Appeal disputes 
Return original unit 
only if signal equals 0 
Never appeal disputes 
Never return 
-
original unit 
~~cted Value 
Expected Cost 
tV.[t(q-l) + (l-t)q] +tqav. + [tq(l-a> + (l-t)(l-q)~tV. 
-[tq + (l-t)(l-q)]ac.-c. 
c +C,+ [t(l-q) + (l-t)q]c+ [tq+ (l-t)(l-q)]~c. 
+ [tq(l-a> + (l-t)(l-q)aJc 
tV.[t(l-q) + (l-t)q] +tq'V.-q(l-q)ac.-c. 
+ q(l-q)[tav. + (t(l-a> + (l-t)aJtV J 
c +C,+ [t(l-q) + (l-t)q]c +q(l-q)~c. 
+q(l-q)[t(l~ + (l-t)Q]c 
tqV.-c. + [t(l-q) + (l-t)q]tV. 
-
c +C,+ [t(l-q) + (l-t)q]c 
tqV. + [t(l-q)' + (l-t)q']tV. 
+ q(l-q)[tav.+ (t(l~ +(l-t)~tV J 
-q(l-q)ac.-[t(l-q) + (l-t)q]c. 
... ---
c + [t(l-q) + (l-t)q]c, + [t(l-q)' + (l-t)q']c 
+q(l-q)[t(l~ + (l-t)~c +q(l-q)/3c. 
tqV. + [t(l-q) + (l-t)q] (tV.-c.) 
-- ... _---_ ... 
c + [t(l-q) + (l-t)q]c, 
+ [t(l-q)' + (l-t)q']c 
tV. 
---_ ... _------............. _----
c 
. 
I 
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A definition of price-warranty equilibrium analogous to that given for the no-
DRM market applies here. The only difference is that the set of buyer strategies 
to be considered is larger. 
5. Hypotheses 
5.1 Hypotheses Derived From Model 
The equilibrium model of warranties described above provides a number of 
specific predictions which suggest a natural way to organize and analyze the 
data from these eight experiments. By definition, an "equilibrium" is a set of 
prices, a set of return strategies, and a single warranty. We thus have three distinct 
groups of hypotheses about market behavior in these experiments: 
1. Hypotheses about the transaction prices of units sold under each warranty; 
2. Hypotheses about buyer decisions to return as a function of the signal the 
buyer receives (and, in the case of DRMs, buyer decisions about appealing in 
case of a dispute); and 
3. Hypotheses about which warranties will be purchased. 
Prices 
In laboratory markets, it"is well established that there is considerable varia-
tion in transaction prices in the early rounds of an experiment, as buyers and 
sellers gradually learn about the market. Hence, our hypotheses about prices 
are made with reference to the transaction prices that occur in the later periods 
of the experiment. That is, we interpret the model as making predictions about 
the prices towards which the market is converging. In presenting the results 
in the next section, we make the notion of "convergence" more specific: 
The first set of predictions, based on the model of risk neutral sellers and 
buyers is: 
Hi: Transaction prices for warranty Types 1, 2, and 3 will converge to the 
values given in TableS. " 
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Table 5 
EQUILIBRIUM PRICE PREDICTIONS UNDER RISK NEUTRAUTY 
Warranty type 
Experiment # 1 2 3 
1 l.85 l.62 l.2O 
2 l.85 l.62 l.2O 
3 3.65 3.20 -
4 3.65 3.20 2.40 
5 l.80 l.69 -
6 l.80 l.84 
-
7 l.80 l.58 
-
8 l.80 l.84 
-
Each row of Table 5 gives the predicted risk neutral equilIbrium prices for war-
ranty Types 1, 2, and 3 for an experiment. 
If sellers are risk ave~e, the price predictions from the model do not apply. 
If they are risk averse, sellers will require a premium above the expected cost 
of selling a unit under warranty Types 1 and 2. It is straightforward to show 
that, if sellers are risk averse expected utility maximizers, an appropriately 
modified equilibrium prediction is the following: 
H2: Transaction prices for warranty Types 1 and 2 will converge above ·the 
values given in Table 5. Transaction prices for Type 3 warranty will con-
verge to the value given in Table 5. 
Buyer Return/Appeal Strategies 
Given that a buyer has purchased a unit under some warranty, the model 
predicts a particular return/appeal strategy that an expected value maximizing 
buyer should use. For each experiment and for each warranty type, Table 6 
presents the optimal strategy. The notation we use for strategies 11 with no 0 RM 
is 
5. = never return 
51 = return all units 
53 = return units only if a 0 signal was received 
11 Again, we omit the strategy discussed in footnote 8, 
. 
• 
, 
) 
PALFREY AND ROMER 
The notation we use with a D RM is 
51 = never return 
S. = return all units, appeal all disputes 
55 = return all units, appeal only if a 0 signal was received 
56 = return all units, never appeal 
57 = return units if a 0 signal was received, appeal all disputes 
5a = return units if a 0 signal was received, never appeal 
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Not every strategy is feasible under every warranty type. For example, with 
a DRM, under a Type 1 warranty only strategies 5 .. 56, 5a are possible, since 
there are never disputes. 
Note that/or a particular buyer with a particular unit, it is not always possible 
to tell which of the feasible strategies the buyer is using. 5uppose, for example, 
a buyer purchases a unit under a Type 1 warranty (with no DRM), receives 
a 1 signal, and subsequently does not return the unit. Then all the experimenter 
knows is that the buyer was using either strategy 51 or strategy 53. Thus, for 
the purposes of analyzing the data, the predictions in Table 6 have to be modified 
to take account of this observability problem. Hence, the hypothesis we ex-
amine is: 
H3: Observed buyer strategies will be consistent with the entries in Table 6. 
Table 6 
OPTIMAL 5TRATEGIES FOR BUYERS 
Warranty type 
Experiment # 1 2 3 
1 53 53 51 
2 53 53 51 
3 53 53 -
4 53 53 51 
5 Sa 57 -
6 5a 57 -
7 5a 5a -
8 5a 57 -
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WafTanties 
The final prediction of the model concerns which warranty will be purchased 
by the buyers, as a function of the parameters of the model. For all eight ex-
periment!! the predicted equilibrium warranty is Type 2. 
H4: Once market prices have converged, only Type 2 warranties will be pur-
chased by buyers. 
A natural reaction to H4 is that warranty choice must depend on the risk at-
titudes of buyers and sellers. This is true only to a limited extent. Consider 
first the case with no DRM. For any return strategy, the distribution of (ex 
post) payoffs to a buyer of a unit with a Type 2 warranty weakly dominatu the 
distnbution of payoffs with a Type 1 warranty. Hence, if a Type 1 warranty 
were offered at a higher price than a Type 2 warranty, any rational, informed 
buyer should never purchase the Type 1 warranty. This is true regardless of 
the risk attitude olthe buyer. The seller expected costs for a unit sold under 
a Type 1 warranty are also higher for a Type 2 warranty, so the predicted 
equilibrium price of a Type 1 warranty should be higher. Hence, in equilibrium, 
no buyer should ever purchase a Type 1 warranty. 
In a market with a DRM, the buyer has the option of never appealing disputes. 
For any return strategy available to a buyer under a Type 1 warranty (51t 56, 
or 5J, the above argument about the distribution of buyer payoffs holds. Under 
a Type 2 warranty, a buyer his the additional option of appealing disputes (i.e., 
choosing 54' 5s, or 57). This strengthens the dominance of Type 2 over Type 
1 warranties. However, due to seller appeal costs, Type 2 warranties may be 
more expensive than Type 1 warranties in equilibrium. 12 
These observations are summarized in the following hypotheses: 
H5: If a buyer has a choice between purchasing a Type 1 and a Type 2 war-
ranty and the Type 2 warranty is less expensive than the Type 1 warran-
ty, the buyer will choose the Type 2 warranty. 
H6: In experiments 1-4, once the market has converged, no Type 1 warran-
ties will be purchased. 
No unambiguous comparison can be made between Type 2 and Type 3 war-
ranties. Despite the fact that in equilibrium Type 2 warranties will yield greater 
expected surplus to buyers, Type 3 warranties have a much different distribu-
tion of returns. In particular, in our design, the "downside risk" to a buyer 
is minimized with Type 3 warranties since they are cheaper in equilibrium. Thus, 
one might expect some sufficiently risk averse buyers to purchase them. 
12 This is true in experiments 6 and 8 (su Table 5). 
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5.2 Alternative Theories of Behavior with a DRM 
Do the DRMs we investigate in our experiments affect market outcomes? 
According to our theory, there are clear differences in the predictions of the 
model depending upon (a) the presence or absence of the DRM and (b) the 
specific form of the DRM. 
A simple approach to investigating this question involves the following alter-
native models for the behavior of buyers and sellers in these markets. They 
assume limited rationality in one form or another. Because of the difficulty of 
the decision problems faced by buyers and sellers with a DRM (recall Figure 
2), there is reason to believe that buyers and sellers may be simplifying their 
decision problem. One way this might happen involves myopic behavior. Buyers, 
for example, may evaluate alternative warranties being offered at different prices 
without conditioning on the possibility of appealing a dispute with the seller. The 
same is possible for sellers. The actual application of Bayes' rule required to 
make the calculations of probabilities of disputes and the distrIbution of values 
(and costs) conditional upon a dispute having been appealed is a difficult task. 
Similar points have been made by others studying warranties in arguing that 
consumers do not properly evaluate warranties when making a purchase in prod-
uct markets, and have great difficulty correctly assessing probabilities. 
If both the buyer and seller act in this myopic fashion, a DRM will have no 
"market" effect. Its only effect will be on ex post outcomes (i.e., the quality 
of units buyers consume, seller costs, and mechanism operating costs). In par-
ticular, prices will be as if there were no D RM. Similarly, buyer return strategies 
would be unaffected, as would the equilibrium warranty. The equilibrium price 
of a Type 1 warranty is unaffected by this kind of myopia. For experiments 5-8 
the equilibrium price of a Type 2 warranty that would have been predicted had 
there been no DRM is $1.58. 
H7: In experiments 5-8 prices of Type 2 warranties converge to $1.58. 
A second interesting set of hypotheses emerge if we assume that only buyers 
are myopic. When sellers are'" fully rational," 13 prices are those given in Table 
5 for experiments 5-8. A myopic buyer evaluates expected value (incorrectly) 
to be the same for Type 1 and Type 2 warranties, and consequently should simply 
choose whichever one is cheaper. Since in equilibrium Type 1 warranties are 
cheaper in experiments 6 and 8 and Type 2 warranties are cheaper in experiments 
5 and 7, we have: 
H8: In experiments 5 and 7, after markets have converged, only Type 2 war-
13 Since the sellers make no decision in stages 2 and 3, it seems more plausible that sellers are 
fully rational than that buyers are. One could also consider the alternative model in which buyers 
are fully rational and sellers are myopic. We do not do so here because, given the parameters of 
our experiments, the predictions would be the same as those of the complete myopia model (H7). 
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ranties will be purchased, by myopic and sophisticated buyers alike. In 
experiments 6 and 8, after markets have converged, Type 1 warranties 
will be purchased by myopic buyers and Type 2 warranties will be pur-
chased by sophisticated buyers. 
5.3 Learning and Convergence to Equilibrium 
Two very strong infomuztimuJl assumptions are made in the theoretical model 
of Section 4: (1) buyers and sellers both know all the relevant distributions and 
can condition using Bayes' rule; (2) sellers know what return strategies are be-
ing used by buyers for each warranty they might offer. In fact. buyers and, par-
ticu1arly, sellers have to acquire this information by trial and error and by observ-
ing what decisions are made by buyers in the various stages of the experiment. 
This learning process is further complicated by some additional problems. Buyers 
and sellers are also learning the general procedural rules. At the same time, 
prices of different warranties are constantly fluctuating. Moreover, since buyer 
signals are private information, sellers cannot directly observe buyer strategies. 
In order to focus our attention on one particular feature of these learning pro-
cesses and at the same time tie it in with our basic model. we isolate the prob-
lem of sellers learning the expected cost of a warranty. In fact, sellers do not 
care precisely which strategy each buyer is using, or the distributions of qualities 
and signals. All that matters to the sellers is the distnbution of costs for units 
sold under each warranty. We assume no learning is required for sellers to figure 
out that the cost of a Type 3 warranty is equal to c. 
With Type 1 warranties, in experiments 1-4, the sellers could incur costs equal 
to either c or 2c + Co, depending on whether a buyer returns the unit or not. 
Hence, the only relevant statistic needed for a seller to estimate expected cost 
of a Type 1 warranty is n~, the probability of a return under a Type 1 warran-
ty. The laboratory markets were carefully organized so that information about 
how many buyers have returned units under each warranty, and how many units 
have been sold under each warranty is public at every point in time. We assume 
that the seller estimates n~ in period t by using these past frequency data: 
number of type 1 units returned through period t-1 
number of ,type 1 units sold through period t-1 
The estimat~ of expected cost at time t is then the same for each seller, and 
is given by n~(2c+cJ + (1-fi~)c = E~. 
We assume that sellers use similar procedures to estimate expected costs 
of Type 2 warranties in experiments 1-4. Here, there are three possible costs 
that the seller could incur: c, c + c .. 2c + c •. These correspond to no return, return 
but no replacement, and return and replacement. respectively. The seller must 
now estimate two parameters: IP~.= probability of a return and no replace-
ment; and IF. = probability of a return and replacement. The necessary infor-
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mation for all sellers to use market aggregate return and replacement frequen-
cies was made public thrqughout the experiments. Using past frequencies, sellers 
could 0R~ estimate~ til~" and ft1". T~e e~timate of expected cost was then 
E~ = IIl~"(c+c.) + IIl"(2c+c.) + (1-II2"-II1~")c. 
Under a DRM, with a Type 1 warranty the sellers again only had to estimate 
III". For a Type 2 warranty, however. there are four possible costs: c. 2c. 
c+{3c .... 2c+{3c .... (Recall that c. = 0 in experiments 5-8.) Thus. three pro-
babilities have to be estimated: 
II~ = probability of a return and replacement (no dispute) 
II":.. = probability of return and appeal. no replacement 
II":. = probability of return and appeal and replacement. 
Expected costs are computed by 
"A " f\"" Eo;'= II~(2c) + II:.,(c +(3c".) + II:.(2c +(3c".) + (l-II~-II: •• -n:.)c. 
This learning model yields the following hypothesis: 
H 9: In period t, the price of a warranty is given by the estimated expected 
costs. either E~, E~ or Err;. 
6. Data 
6.1 Price Convergence 
The entire time series of prices for all warrranties in all experiments .is 
displayed in Figures 3-10. The average transaction price for each warranty in 
each period is given in Table 7 for Experiments 1-4 (no DRM) and in Table 
8 for Experiments 5-8 (with DRM). 
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Table 7 
AVERAGE PRICES FOR EXPERIMENTS 1-4. 
Period Number 
Experiment # Warranty Type 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2:67 2.00 2.50 2.22 ,2.06 - 1.70 
1 2 2.88 1.50 2.00 1.95 1.90 1.69 1.46 
- ._----
3 2.50 1.40 1.17 1.20 1.25 1.20 1.21 
1 4.25 3.39 2.50 2.04 1.90 1.62 1.58 
-- ----. 
2 2 - 3.00 2.50 1.45 1.98 1.55 1.50 
'--"--
3 3.42 2.72 1.97 1.47 1.35 1.29 1.23· 
1 4.53 4.30 - 3.55 - 3.75 3.75 
3 ,--- ----2 4.69 4.14 3.41 3.10 3.10 3.14 3.25 
1 4.70 4.10 3.88 3.38 - - -1-- --- ----- .---_ .. -
4 2 4.10 4.06 3.68 3.35 3.07 2.96 2.90 
... _--------- ---
3 - - - - 2.65 2.48 2.45 
--
.. , 
·One sale at $.50 not included . 
8 9 10 
1.62 1.70 -
1.45 1.44 -
1.20 1.25 -
1.85 - -
1.55 - -
1.24 - -
3.82 3.70 
-
3.20 3.22 3.24 
- 3.40 -
3.00 3.29 3.55 
2.45 2.45 2.48 
I 
111 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3.25 
3.60 
3.57 
2.48 
--
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Table 8 
AVERAGE PRICES FOR EXPERIMENTS 5-8. 
Period Number 
Experiment # Warranty Type 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1.75 1.65 1.60 1.45· 1.40 1.80 
5 2 1.64 1.71 1.50 1.51 1.53 1.69 
1 3.00 2.49 2.09 2.02 1.84 1.82 
6 f-----2 2.81 2.16 2.17 2.14 1.93 1.89 
1 2.58 2.45 2.32 2.12 1.97 1.85 
7 ------ -2 2.28 2.28 2.14 1.97 1.86 1.70 
1 3.01 2.40 1.68 1.25 1.77 1.93 
8 -2 3.10 2.49 1.68 1.31 1.85 1.98 
7 8 9 
1.80 1.87 1.73 
1.82 1.80 1.79 
1.80 1.80 1.80 
1.80 1.80 1.79 
1.85 1.88 1.58 
1.62 1.63 1.52 
1.80 1.80 1.68 
1.86 1.87 1.58 
10 
1.70 
1.75 
1.80 
1.79 
1.60 
1.54 
-
-
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The price convergence results are mixed. If one considers each warranty in 
each experiment as a separate market, then in 9 out of 19 markets, or roughly 
half the time, the average transaction price in the final period of trade was within 
$.05 of the price predictions of the risk neutral model (see Table 5). More 
specifically, 4 out of 8 Type 1 warranty markets (Experiments 2,3,4,6) con-
verged in this sense, 3 out of 8 Type 2 warranty markets (Experiments 3,6,7) 
converged and 2 out of the 3 Type 3 warranty markets (Experiments 1,2) con-
verged. Thus Hypothesis (Hi), although not perfectly accurate, does reasonably 
wen in predicting 6:na1 period prices. 1. Interestingly, the weaker Hypothesis (H2), 
which is based on the assumption of risk averse seners, fares worse. Of the 
nine Type 1 and Type 2 markets that do not converge to within $.05 of the 
risk neutral predicted price, six have average final period prices below the risk 
neutral equilibrium, which is inconsistent with risk aversion. 
Perhaps even more interesting than the observations about final period prices, 
and certainly more descriptive, is the general pattern of convergence over time 
which was observed in all but one of the experiments. In 7 of the 8 experiments, 
prices began well above the risk neutral predictions for both Type 1 and Type 
2 warranties. Over the course the experiment, prices were competed down 
to a level well below the risk neutral predictions. Finally, toward the end of the 
experiment, these depressed prices gradually recovered back to a level close 
to the risk neutral equhbrium. The one exception to this pattern of convergence 
was Experiment 5 in which, by chance, average period 1 prices were within 
$.05 of the risk neutral prediction. Yet we still observed the second and third 
"stages" of convergence, with prices temporarily bid down below the risk neutral 
equilibrium and subsequently recovering. 
This consistent price pattern suggested to us that prices were fluctuating in 
response to information that was gradually being learned by sellers about their 
expected costs under the alternative warranties. This prompted the theoretical 
learning model outlined in the previous section, in which sellers are assumed 
to begin with diffuse priors over the distribution of costs under the warranties, 
and use past frequency data to form estimates of these costs. The predicted 
prices under this model for each warranty in each period (except the first period) 
of each experiment are given in Table 9. To evaluate this learning model and 
the corresponding hypothesis (H9), we compare its accuracy with the accuracy 
of the risk neutral model. We include comparisons for the last several periods, 
rather than only the last period. As a measure of accuracy for each model, we 
1< Inspection of figures 9 and 10 and table 8 reveals that in Experiments 7 and 8 prices fell off 
rather dramatically at the conclusion of the experiments. In both cases, there was a seller who 
became upset that his earnings per sale were essentially zero. One of them later told us that he 
decided to • 'punish" other sellers by selling at ridiculously low prices, even if it meant losing money 
(which it did!). This deviant behavior occurred after these markets had apparently converged for 
several periods at or very near the risk neutral equilibrium prices. If we were to use average prices 
two periods from the end of these two experiments. the risk neutral predictions would have per· 
formed very well. 
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use the absolute difference between the model's predicted price and the average 
transaction price in each period beyond period 5. The absolute deviations from 
the risk neutral predictions are given in Table 10, and the absolute deviations 
from the learning model are given in Table 11. Out of 66 total comparisons, 
the two models perform equally well 5 times, the risk neutral model is better 
in 39 cases and the learning model is better in 25 cases. Using a simple binomial 
test based on this data clearly rejects the learning model in favor of the • • static " 
risk neutral predictions. We find this surprising, as it is clear from the overall 
pattern of convergence that a significant amount of learning is taking place. 
Evidently, our learning model is not the appropriate one. 
Table 9 
ACTUAL MEAN (PAST) COSTS FOR TYPE 1 AND TYPE 2 WARRANTIES IN LATER PERIODS 
(LEARNING MODEL PRICE PREDICTIONS) 
Experiment Number 
Warranty Type Period # 1 2 3 4 5 6 
6 1.78 1.74 3.90 3.36 1.57 1.78 
7 1.78 1.76 4.19 3.36 1.65 1.86 
1 8 1.75 1.77 3.96 3.36 1.60 1.82 
9 1.67 - 3.36 3.36 1.80 1.61 
10 - - 3.54 3.47 1.57 1.83 
11 - - 3.54 3.47 - -
6 1.82 1.74 3.20 3.26 1.65 1.78 
7 1.79 1.59 3.16 . 3.19 1.69 1.71 
2 8 1.72 1.54 3.14 3.23 1.71 1.74 
9 1.72 - 3.11 3.22 1.74 1.70 
10 - - 3.08 3.23 1.70 1.69 
11 - - 3.24 3.23 - -
7 8 
1.61 1.82 
1.61 1.84 
1.61 1.82 
1.83 
-
1.61 -
- -
1.67 1.88 
1.69 1.86 
1.65 1.84 
1.69 1.83 
1.70 
-
- -
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Table 10 
ABSOLUTE DEVIATIONS OF MEAN TRANSACTED PRICES FROM RISK NEUTRAL EQUILIBRIUM PREDICTIONS 
Experiment Number 
Warranty Type ·Period # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 - .23 .10 - 0 .02 .05 
7 .15 .27 .10 - 0 0 .05 
1 8 .23 0 .17 - .07 0 .08 
9 .15 - .05 .25 .07 0 .22 
10 - - - - .10 0 .20 
11 - - - .05 - - -
6 .06 .08 .06 .24 0 .05 .12 
7 .17 .13 .05 .30 .13 .04 .04 
2 8 .18 .08 0 .20 .11 .04 .05 
9 .19 - .02 .09 .10 .05 .06 
10 - - .04 .35 .06 .05 .04 
11 - - .05 .37 - - -
8 
.13 
0 
0 
.12 
-
-
.14 
.02 
.03 
.26 
-
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Table 11 
ABSOLUTE DEVIATIONS OF MEAN TRANSACTED PRICES FROM LEARNING MODEL PREDICTIONS 
Experiment Number 
Warranty Type Period # 1 2 3 4 5 6 
6 - .12 .15 - .23 .04 
7 .08 .18 .44 - .15 .06 
1 8 .13 .07 .14 - .27 .02 
9 .03 - .05 .04 .19 0 
10 - - - - .13 .03 
11 - - - .13 - -
6 .13 .19 .06 .30 .04 .11 
7 .33 .09 .09 .29 .13 .09 
2 8 .27 .01 .06 .23 .09 .06 
9 .28 - .09 .07 .05 .09 
10 - - .16 .32 .05 .10 
11 - - .01 .34 - -
7 8 
.24 .11 
.24 .04 
.27 .02 
.03 .15 
.01 
-
- -
.03 .10 
.07 0 
.02 .03 
.17 .25 
.16 
-
- -
"'C 
I\) 
~ 
~ 
CD 
~ 
n 
n 
~ 
i 
~ 
B 
o 
z 
n 
o 
~ 
~ 
n 
tz:I 
PALFREY AND ROMER Page 349 
6.2 Buyer Behavior 
The data on the frequency of inconsistent buyer return behavior are given 
in Table 12. In experiments 1-4, the predictions about buyer behavior are par-
ticularly simple. Under either a Type 1· or a Type 2 warranty a buyer should 
return units with a 0 clue and retain units with a 1 clue. Only 6 out of 314 buyer 
decisions were inconsistent with the predictions of the model. 
Table 12 
PROPORTION OF BUYER DECISIONS INCONSISTENT WITH PREDICTIONS IN TABLE 6 
(TOTAL NUMBER OF UNITS IN PARENTHESES) 
Experiment Number 
Warranty Type 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 0.0 0.0 .09 0.0 .125 0.0 .103 
(25) (36) (11) (15) (24) (52) (58) 
2 .025 0.1 0.01 0.026 .166 .082 .177 
(40) (10) (103) (74) (90) (61) (62) 
-----
8 
0.0 
(47) 
.25 
(56) 
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In experiments 5-8, the possibility of appealing disputes complicates the 
buyers' decision problem considerably (compare Figures 1 and 2), at least with 
Type 2 warranties. Type 1 warranties, on the other hand, present the buyers 
with the same decision problem as in Experiments 1-4. Overall, there were many 
more inconsistencies-a total of 54 out of 450. This larger number may be part-
ly due to the more complicated decision rule. For example, with Type 2 war-
ranties the strategy of always returning followed by appealing only if the buyer 
signal was 0 yields an expected payoff to buyers which is only $.05 less in ex-
pected value, even though it is a strictly dominated strategy. Of the 54 incon-
sistencies, 31 were of this variety. Hence most of the inconsistencies reduced 
payoffs by a fairly small amount. In experiment 7, where buyers were forced 
to bear the cost of the DRM, this type of inconsistency occurred only three times. 
6.3 Warranties 
The data on frequency of warranties are presented in Tables 13 and 14. 
Hypotheses (H4), (H5), and (H6) all suggest that Type 2 warranties should drive 
out Type 1 warranties. In experiments 1-4, after period 1 the average price 
of Type 2 warranties is below the average price of Type 1 warranties without 
exception. Furthermore, only rarely during the course of a period was a Type 
1 offered at a lower price than a Type 2. Thus essentially all the observations 
of Type 1 warranties in the no-DRM experiments contradict our hypotheses 
about warranty coverage. We have no entirely satisfactory explanation for these 
occurrences. 1S It is interesting to note, however, that in experiments 3,4, and 
5, Type 2 warranties do succeed in almost completely driving out Type 1 war-
ranties. However, in the other five experiments, Type 1 warranties persist 
throughout the experiment. Hence there is only weak evidence in favor of our 
predictions about the equilibrium level of warranty coverage. 
15 One possibility is that subjects prefer a simpk lottery (Type 1 warranty) to an .. equivalent" 
compound lottery (Type 2 warranty). 
Table 13 
FREQUENCY OF WARRANTIES IN EXPERIMENTS 1-4 
Period Number 
Experiment # Warranty Type 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 3 4 2 8 , 4 0 
1 2 4 1 4 4 2 8 
3 3 5 3 1 3 2 
1 ·4 5 4 6 5 6 
----
2 2 0 1 1 1 2 ~-
- ---
3 8 6 7 5 5 4 
1 3 1 0 1 0 2 
3 -------. -'"--- -_ .. _- ----2 8 11 12 7 10 6 
1 5 4 2 2 0 0 
--------
---_ .. -- .------.-- ._-----
_._---- _.--
4 2 7 8 10 10 7 7 
------_.-_._--_._._" -- _ .. --_._-- .. - -- - _._-
-------
3 - - - - 5 5 
----
... 
7 8 9 
1 3 3 
8 5 4 
1 2 3 
4 2 -
1 2 -
5 7 -
1 2 1 
5 10 11 
0 1 0 
7 8 3 
5 6 9 
10 11 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
0 0 
12 11 
1 -
3 -
---. 
8 -
! 
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Table 14 
FREQUENCY OF WARRANTIES IN EXPERIMENTS 5-8 
Period Number 
Experiment # Warranty Type 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 6 2 2 2 1 3 
5 ------- ---- f------ -----2 6 9 10 10 10 9 
1 1 8 4 8 6 6 
6 ---2 11 4 8 4 5 6 
1 6 6 5 5 7 6 
7 ----------_ . . _----- f----- ----2 6 6 7 7 5 6 
1 7 5 8 4 3 5 
8 - ------- 1-----2 5 7 4 8 7 5 
-
7 8 9 
2 3 2 
9 8 10 
6 5 4 
5 6 8 
6 6 6 
6 6 6 
5 5 5 
---
7 6 7 
i 
I 
10 I 
1 
---
10 
4 
--
6 
5 
7 
-
-
-
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6.4 Effects of DRM 
In order to examine whether the DRM had a significant impact on prices and 
warranty. coverage, in Section 5 we presented an alternative "myopic" theory 
of behavior. In its strongest version, this theory holds that both sellers and buyers 
ignore the presence of a DRM and hence the DRM will have no market effect 
in altering prices (H7). This hypothesis is rejected in favor of the risk neutral 
theoretical predictions. l6 The price effects of our particular DRMs seem to be 
accurately predicted by the risk-neutral model of Section 4. 
The weaker assumption about limited rationality-that some buyers may be 
myopic, but sellers are sophisticated-is mildly supported by the data. Hypothesis 
(H8) implies that if, on average, each experiment has the same mix of myopic 
and sophisticated buyers, then after convergence more Type 1 warranties should 
be observed in Experiments 6 and 8 than in Experiments 5 and 7. There is a 
difference between these pairs of experiments, but this difference is too small 
to be any more than suggestive. 
Including a D RM seems to have had an impact on the market. The evidence 
is that sellers and a large proportion of buyers acted in a sophisticated manner, 
anticipating the use of the DRM in case of a dispute. 
7. Conclusions 
The purpose of these experiments was two-fold. First, we wanted to design 
and study equilibrium behavior in a laboratory market environment with the 
following features: 
• Buyers and sellers are uncertain about product quality. 
• Each seller can offer a variety of warranties simultaneously. 
• Disputes over warranty performance occur in the natural course of 
transactions. 
Second, given such an environment, we investigated the effects of varying a 
DRM's cost and the allocation of this cost between buyer and seller. 
The rich specification of these markets is susceptible to interpretation by 
several theories about market behavior (i.e., about prices and warranty 
coverage). These theories range from an "ultra-rational" model of Bayesian 
equilibrium to "irrational" theories postulating that market participants will not 
properly take account of the complicated procedures of dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Given how complicated our markets were, particularly compared 
to previous laboratory markets, the "irrationality" theory seemed likely to 
predict well. We also put forth an intermediate' 'learning" model, in which buyers 
15 This comparison is even clearer if one adjusts for the deviant seller behavior described in foot-
note 14. 
. 
• 
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and sellers gradually become better informed about the likelihood of defects, 
disputes, and warranty performance. This model attempts to capture some of 
the dynamics of the convergence process in these markets. 
Our findings in light of these theories are as follows. (These results are very 
suggestive, but, given only eight experiments we cannot claim that they are 
conclusive.) First, mechanism costs and the allocation of these costs affect market 
prices through effects on both buyer and seller behavior. Placing the burden 
of the D RM cost on the seller raises the price of goods offered with a warranty, 
and shifting the burden of cost to the buyer lowers the price of goods offered 
with a warranty. The effect of the DRM's cost on warranty coverage was in-
conclusive. We suspect that our design did not allow for enough variety of war-
ranty coverage to be able to discern these subtle effects with only a few 
experiments. 
A second conclusion is that the Bayesian equilibrium model predicts prices 
very well. This is quite surprising, given the model's relative complexity. 
Moreover, the Bayesian model significantly outperforms the learning model, 
even before the last period of an experiment. The overall pattern of the dynamics 
by which convergence was achieved in our experiments is not explained well 
by any of the models we examined. Clearly there is a lot of learning going on 
about probabilities and market variables (such as prices and what warranties 
mean). Identification of these learning processes is severely confounded by the 
fact that participants in the market are constantly adjusting their strategies as 
they learn. What is needed is a' testable theory of how participants simultaneously 
adjust their beliefs and their strategies in response to endogenously generated 
market information. 
Our experiments included some restrictive features to avoid making them too 
complicated. Some of these could be relaxed, so that other important questions 
about warranties and DRMs could be investigated. For example, we did not 
allow "fraudulent" behavior on the part of sellers. It has been argued by many 
that one important role ofDRMs is to enforce "honest" seller behavior. It would 
be very interesting to run a comparable series of experiments permitting 
"fraudulent" behavior (e.g., reneging on warranties), to see if DRMs play an 
important role in policing seller behavior and reinforcing reputations. Other in-
teresting extensions of this work might involve any of the following modifications: 
• allow sellers to control average quality (i.e., choose t); 
• introduce heterogeneity of sellers and of buyers; 
• examine different price-making institutions (such as a double oral 
auction). 
We believe that the basic technology is now established for intensive laboratory 
study of markets where product quality and warranties playa major role. While 
the design of these markets is much more complicated than that of usual ex-
periments, it is sufficiently straightforward so that learning the "rules of the 
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game" is not too severe a problem for the participants. (This is, of course, a 
fundamental consideration with any economics experiment, since we are not 
merely asking whether subjects understand instructions, but testing models of 
behavior, given the rules of the game.) It may also be possible to modify the 
basic design u$ed here to study questions about disputes over contract perfor-
mance in settings other than warranties in product markets. These might in-
clude questioned settlement claims, breach-of-contract disputes, and a variety 
of other important legal problems17 where concerns naturally arise about the 
effects of rules and procedures for processing disputes. 
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APPENDIX A 
Instructions and Subject Record Sheets 
Experiments 1-4 
These instructions were used for Experiments 1 and 2. Instructions for Ex-
periments 3 and 4 were identical, except that discussion of the "As Is" war-
ranty was omitted. In Experiment 4, this type of warranty was described orally 
at the beginning of Period 5. 
Record sheets were identical in all four experiments. 
I.D.No. ___ _ 
Market Experiment 
This is an experiment in market decision-making. If you make good decisions 
you can earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash 
immediately following the experiment. 
In this experiment, you are going to participate in a market in which some 
of you are buyers and some of you are sellers. Your identification number is 
indicated on the top of this page. This tells you whether you are a buyer or 
seller. In the instructions that follow, the value of any decisions you might make 
is descnbed, along with the specific rules for trading and record-keeping. You 
are not to communicate with other buyers and sellers except when necessary to 
complete transactions. Some of the information contained in these instructions 
is private information. Such information is written in red ink. You are not to reveal 
it to anyone. 
Buying and selling will take place over a sequence of "trading periods." All 
the rules described below apply equally to each period. 
Each period has two stages. In the first stage sellers offer units for sale to 
buyers and buyers make purchases. Each buyer may purchase at most two units 
in each period. Some of the units are "defective" and some of the units are 
"good. " The true quality (good or defective) of a unit is announced only at the 
end of the second stage of the period in which it is sold. At the time of sale, 
neither the buyer nor the seller knows whether the specific unit being sold is 
good or defective. Any given unit has a SfJ1!o chance of being a good unit and 
a SfJ1!o chance of being a defective unit. When a seller wishes to offer a unit 
for sale, he or she will state a price and a wa"anty policy. There are three types 
of warranty policies the seller can offer: 
1. An' 'as is" policy, which is equivalent to no warranty. If a buyer purchases 
a unit "as is, " the buyer may not return it to the seller for a replacement. 
2. A "Type 1" warranty entitles the buyer, if he or she wishes, to return 
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the unit to the seller and automatically receive a free replacement. 
3. The third policy is called a "Type 2" and will be described in more detail 
in a moment. 
In the second stage, all buyers who made a purchase in the first stage will 
be given a "clue" for each unit they purchased. A clue will help a buyer better 
evaluate whether a unit is defective or good. Buyers then decide whether or 
not to "exercise the warranty," that is, ask the seller to replace the unit. Notice 
that a unit purchased "as is" gives the buyer no choice for that unit, since there 
is no warranty to exercise. A unit with a warranty leaves the buyer free to keep 
the unit 01' exercise the warranty. 
For each unit a buyer chooses to return under a warranty, the buyer and seller 
each must pay a small "return fee." For you, this fee is __ . What happens 
next depends upon whether the returned unit has a "Type 1" or a "Type 2" 
warranty. 
( 1 ) "Type 1" - In this case the buyer gives up that unit and automatically 
receives a replacement unit. 
( 2) "Type 2" - In this case, the seller is given a separate clue which enables 
him or her to better evaluate whether the unit is defective or good. If 
the clue suggests the unit is defective, the seller replaces the unit. If the 
clue suggests the unit is good, the seller does not replace the unit. Notice 
that the seller is not allowed to make a real choice here. The seller's deci-
sion depends entirely upon the seller's clue. 
After the second stage is over, buyers are told, for each unit they hold, whether 
that unit is defective or good. 
Specific Instructions to Buyers: 
The amount of money you earn if you purchase a unit depends on whether 
it is defective or good. The following is private information. Each good unit has 
a redemption value to you, and each defective unit has a redemp-
tion value to you. The amount of money the experimenter pays 
you for each unit you buy is the redemption value of that unit minus the price 
you paid for it minus your retuin fee (if you exercised a warranty). If you make 
no purchase during a period, you receive nothing for that period. At the end 
of the experiment, add up the amount you earned for each unit and the ex-
perimenter will pay you that amount. 
When you make a purchase, the unit will be assigned a number. You must 
record on your record sheet the unit number, purchase price, and warranty. 
Remember that you are allowed to purchase up to two units in each period. 
At the beginning of the second stage of each period, each of you who purchased 
one or two units in the first stage of that period will be provided with a clue 
about the quality of each unit. Each unit will have a separate clue. For each 
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unit you bought, you will be given a card which has the unit number on it and 
either a "1" or a "0". Record the clue on your record sheet. Roughly speak-
ing, a "1" is a positive clue, in the sense that good units usually get this clue. 
l\. "0" is a· bad clue in the sense that defective units usually get that clue. 
Specifically, if a unit is good there is a 75% chance that you will see a "I" on 
your card and a 250/0 chance of a "0". If a unit is defective, there is a 250/0 
chance that you will see a "1" on your card and a 75% chance of a "0". Thus 
a clue gives you some potentially useful information but does not tell you for 
sure whether the unit is good or defective. It is only a clue. Your clue is private 
information which you are not to reveal to anyone else. 
Recall that if you purchased a unit "as is," you cannot return it, so its clue 
does not help you. On the other hand, if a unit has a "Type 1" or "Type 2" 
warranty, you may wish to use its clue to help you decide whether or not to 
return the unit. If you choose to return a unit, put an "X" in the column label-
led "return" on your record sheet. 
If you choose to return a unit, your earnings depend on whether the unit has 
a "Type 1" or a "Type 2" warranty. 
(1) "Type I": In this case the buyer gives up the unit he or she returned 
and automatically receives a replacement unit. 
(2) "Type 2": If you return the unit under a "Type 2" warranty, the seller 
will then receive a separate card which has a "1" or "0" on it. Like your 
clue, the seller card will have a "I" on it with a 750/0 chance, and a "0" 
with 250/0 chance if the unit is actually good. If the unit is actually defec-
tive, the seller's clue will be a "1" with 250/0 chance and a "0" with 750/0 
chance. However, just because a seller's clue probabilities are the same 
as the buyer's does not mean that the seller's card will always have the 
same clue as the buyer's card. The unit you returned will be replaced only 
if the seller's card has a "0" on it. The replacement unit has a S(J1!o chance 
of being good and 5(J1!0 chance of being defective. If you receive a replace-
ment, record the new unit number on your record sheet. 
Buyer earnings: For each unit a buyer holds at the end of the period (either 
originally purchased units ot their replacement), he or she will be told whether 
that unit is good or defective. For each unit, record the outcome on your record 
sheet and calculate your earnings for that unit in the following way: 
1. If you did not return the unit, your earnings are: 
good redemption value - purchase price 
if the unit is good, or 
defective redemption value - purchase price 
if the unit is defective. 
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2. If you returned the unit under warranty, and did not get a replacement, 
then your earnings are 
good redemption value - purchase price - ____ (return fee) 
if the unit is good, or 
defective redemption value - purchase price - ____ (return fee) 
if the unit is defective. 
3. If you return the unit under a warranty, and receive a replacement, your 
earnings are 
good redemption value - purchase price - ____ (return fee) 
if the replacement unit is good, or 
defective redemption value - purchase price - ____ (return fee) 
if the replacement unit is defective. 
After figuring your earnings for each unit, record the amount on your record 
sheet. Do not be surprised if your earnings for some units are negative. This 
will sometimes happen and is not necessarily your fault. 
Specific Instructions to Selle1s: 
In the first stage of each period, you are free to sell as many units as you 
wish. When you wish to make an offer to sell a unit, raise your hand and I will 
call on you. Then state a price and a warranty (" as is", "Type 1" or "Type 
2"). You are free to sell different units at different prices and with different 
warranties if you wish. Some offers you make may not be accepted or may Qe 
countered by another seller with a "better" offer. You are free to make new 
offers whenever you wish, but each time you raise your hand and are recogniz-
ed by me you are allowed to make only one offer. If you wish to make more 
than one offer (e.g., a "Type 2" warranty offer at one price and an "as is" 
warranty offer at another price), you must be called on twice. Be sure you know 
exactly what you are going to offer before you raise your hand. If you hesitate 
for too long I will have to call on another seller. If you sell a unit, you must 
immediately record on your record sheet the unit number, the price you charg-
ed for the unit, and the warranty. The units you sell are not "free." You must 
pay a production cost for each unit you sell. 
In the second stage of each period, some of the buyers who purchased units 
from you under "Type 1" and "Type 2" warranties may seek replacement 
units. In case of a return, put an "X" in the "return" column of your record 
sheet. Each time this happens you must pay a return fee and each 
time you replace a unit you must pay a second production cost. 
Whether or not you replace a returned unit depends on the type of warranty 
. 
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it is under. 
(1 ) "Type 1": You must always replace a returned unit if it was sold with 
a "Type 1" warranty. 
( 2) "TyPe 2": If the returned unit was sold with a "Type 2" warranty, you 
will be given a card that has a "I" or a "O"on it if the buyer returns 
for a replacement. This is your "clue". If the unit is actually good, this 
card will have a "1" on it with a 750/0 chance, and a "0" with a 250/0 
chance. If the unit is actually defective, the card will have a "I" on it 
with a 250/0 chance, and a "0" with a 750/0 chance. You must replace the 
unit if your clue is a "0" and you do not replace it if your clue is a "1". 
If a replacement is made, record the unit number of the replacement on 
your record sheet. 
Seller earnings: 
At the end of the period, calculate your earnings for each unit you sold in 
stage 1. Sellers also receive an additional $1.00 for each period played. 
1. If the buyer did not return the unit, your profit for that unit is: 
purchase price - (production cost) 
2. If the unit was returned but not replaced, your profit on that unit is 
purchase price - (production cost) - (return fee) 
3. If the unit was returned and replaced, your profit on that unit is 
purchase price - (2 x production cost) - ____ (return fee) 
Do not be surprised if your earnings for some periods are negative. This will 
sometimes happen and is not necessarily your fault. Add up your profits (or 
losses) on all units you sold in the period. Then add $1.00 and record the sum 
on your profit sheet. At the end of the experiment, add up the amount you earned 
in each period, and the experimenter will pay you that amount. 
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Period # 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
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11 
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APPENDIX B 
Instructions and Subject Record Sheets 
Experiments 5-8 
I.D. No. ___ _ 
Market Experiment 
This is an experiment in market decision-making. If you make good decisions 
you can earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash 
immediately following the experiment. 
In this experiment, you are going to participate in a market in which some 
of you are buyers and some of you are sellers. Your identification number is 
indicated on the top of this page. This tells you whether you are a buyer or 
seller. In the instructions that follow, the value of any decisions you might make 
is described, along with the specific rules for trading and record-keeping. You 
are not to communicate with other buyers and sellers except when necessary to 
complete transactions. Some of the information contained in these instructions 
is private information. Such information is written in red ink. You are not to reveal 
it to anyone. 
Buying and selling will take place over a sequence of "trading periods. " All 
the rules described below apply equally to each period. 
Each period has three stages. In the first stage sellers offer units for sale 
to buyers and buyers make purchases. Each buyer may purchase at most two 
units in each period. Some of the units are ,. defective" and some of the units . 
are "good." The true quality (good or defective) of a unit is announced only 
at the end of the third stage of the period in which it is sold. At the time of 
sale, neither the buyer nor the seller knows whether the specific unit being sold 
is good or defective. Any given unit has a S(J1!o chance of being a good unit and 
a S(J1!o chance of being a defective unit. When a seller wishes to offer a unit 
for sale, he or she will state a price and a warranty policy. There are two types 
of warranty policies the seller can offer: 
1. A "Type 1" warranty entitles the buyer, if he or she wishes, to return 
the unit to the seller and automatically receive a free replacement. 
2. The second policy is called a "Type 2" warranty and will be described 
in more detail in a moment. 
In the second stage, all buyers who made a purchase in the first stage will 
be given a ,. clue" for each unit they purchased. A clue will help a buyer better 
evaluate whether a unit is defective or good. Buyers then decide whether or 
not to "exercise the warranty," that is, ask the seller to replace the unit. 
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For each unit a buyer chooses to return under a warranty, the buyer must 
pay the experimenter a "return fee". What happens next depends on whether 
the returned unit has a "Type 1" or a "Type 2" warranty. 
e 1 ) "Type 1" - In this case the buyer gives up that unit and automatically 
receives a replacement unit. 
e 2) "Type 2" - In this case, the seller is given a separate clue which enables 
him or her to better evaluate whether the unit is defective or good. If 
the clue suggests the unit is defective, the seller replaces the unit. If the 
clue suggests the unit is good, the seller does not replace the unit. Notice 
that the seller is not allowed to make a real choice here. The seller's deci-
sion depends entirely upon the seller's clue. 
In the third stage, buyers who returned units under a "Type 2" warranty 
and did not receive a replacement may appeal to an Appeals judge, if they wish. 
For each appeal, the buyer and seller must pay an appeal fee. For you, this 
fee is . If there is an appeal, the Appeals judge gets a clue about 
the quality of the unit. Based on that clue, the Appeals judge decides whether 
or not the buyer gets a replacement unit from the seller. The decision of the 
Appeals judge is binding on both buyer and seller. 
After the third stage is over, buyers are told, for each unit they hold, whether 
that unit is defective or good. 
Specific Instructions to Buyers: 
The amount of money you earn if you purchase a unit depends· on whether 
it is defective or good. The following is private information. Each good unit has 
a redemption value to you, and each defective unit has a redemp-
tion value to you. The amount of money the experimenter pays 
you for each unit you buy is the redemption value of that unit minus the price 
you paid for it minus your return fee of (if you exercised a warran-
ty). You may not pay a pric~ that exceeds your good unit redemption value. 
If you make no purchase during a period, you receive nothing for that period. 
At the end of the experiment, add up the amount you earned for each unit and 
the experimenter will pay you that amount. 
When you make a purchase, the unit will be assigned a number. You must 
record on your record sheet the unit number, purchase price, and warranty. 
Remember that you are allowed to purchase up to two units in each period. 
At the beginning of the second stage of each period, each of you who purchased 
one or two units in the first stage of that period will be provided with a clue 
about the quality of each unit. Each unit will have a separate clue. For each 
unit you bought, you will be given a card which has the unit number on it and 
either a "I" or a "0". Record the clue on your record sheet. Roughly speak-
ing, a "I" is a positive clue, in the sense that good units usually get this clue . 
. 
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A "0" is a bad clue in the sense that defective units usually get that clue. 
Specifically, if a unit is good there is a 75% chance that you will see a "1" on 
your card and a 250/0 chance of a "0';. If a unit is defective, there is a 250/0 
chance that you will see a "1" on your card and a 750/0 chance of a "0". Thus 
a clue gives you some potentially useful information but does not tell you for 
sure whether the unit is good or defective. It is only a clue. Your clue is private 
information which you are not to reveal to anyone else. 
You may wish to use its clue to help you decide whether or not to return 
the unit. If you choose to return a unit, put an "X" in the column labelled 
"return" on your record sheet. 
If you choose to return a unit, what happens next depends on whether the 
unit has a "Type 1" or a "Type 2" warranty: 
(1) "Type 1": In this case the buyer gives up the unit he or she returned 
and automatically receives a replacement unit. 
(2) "Type 2": If you return the unit under a Type 2 warranty, the seller will 
then receive a separate card which has a "1" or "0" on it. Like your 
clue, the seller card will have a "1" on it with a 750/0 chance, and a "0" 
with 250/0 chance if the unit is actually good. If the unit is actually defec-
tive, the seller's clue will be a "1" with 250/0 chance and a "0" with 750/0 
chance. However, just because a seller's clue probabilities are the same 
as the buyer's does not mean that the seller's card will always have the 
same clue as the buyer's card. The unit you returned will be rtPlaced only 
if the seller's card has a "0" on it. The replacement unit has a 5f11!0 chance 
of being good and 5f11!0 .chance of being defective. If you receive a replace-
ment, record the new unit number on your record sheet. 
If you returned a unit under a "Type 2" warranty and did not receive a replace-
ment, you may-if you wish-appeal to the Appeals Judge. If you choose to ap-
peal, you must pay an appeal fee of . If you appeal, put an X in the 
column labelled "Appeal" on your record sheet. 
If you appeal, the Appeals Judge will receive a separate card which has a "1" 
or a "0" on it. The Appeals Judge's card will have a "1" on it with a __ 0/0 
chance and a "0" with a ___ % chance, if the unit is actually good. If the 
unit is actually defective, the Appeals Judge's clue will be a "1" with a __ % 
chance and a "0" with a __ 0/0 chance. The Judge will order the unit to be 
rtPlaced if his card has a "'0" on it. Otherwise, the buyer must keep the original 
unit. If you receive a replacement after an appeal, record the new unit number 
on your record sheet. 
Buyer earnings: For each unit a buyer holds at the end of the period (either 
originally purchased units or their replacement), he or she will be told whether 
that unit is good or defective. For each unit, record the outcome on your record 
sheet and calculate your earnings for that unit in the following way: 
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1. If you did not return the unit, your earnings are: 
good redemption value - purchase price 
if the unit is good, or 
defective redemption value - purchase price 
if the unit is defective. 
2. If you return the unit under a warranty, and receive a replacement, your 
earnings are 
good redemption value - purchase price - ____ (return fee) 
if the replacement unit is good, or 
defective redemption value - purchase price - ____ (return fee) 
if the replacement unit is defective. 
3. If you returned the unit under warranty, and did not get a replacement 
and did not appeal, then your earnings are 
good redemption value - purchase price - ____ (return fee) 
if the unit is good, or· 
defective redemption value - purchase price - ____ (return fee) 
if the unit is defective. 
4. If you returned the unit under warranty. did not get a replacement, ap-
pealed, and lost the appeal, then your earnings are 
good redemption value - purchase price - ____ (return fee) 
____ (appeal fee) 
if the unit is good, or 
defective redemption value - purchase price - ____ (return fee) 
____ (appeal fee) 
if the unit is defective. 
5. If you returned the unit under warranty, did not get a replacement, ap-
pealed, and won the appeal, then your earnings are 
good redemption value - purchase price - ____ (return fee) 
____ (appeal fee) 
if the replacement unit is good, or 
I 
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defective redemption value - purchase price - ____ (return fee) 
____ (appeal fee) 
if the replacement unit is defective. 
After figuring your earnings for each unit, record the amount on your record 
sheet. Do not be surprised if your earnings for some units are negative. This 
will sometimes happen and is not necessarily your fault. 
At the end of the experiment, add up the amount you earned on each unit. 
The experimenter will pay you this amount, plus $1.00 for each period played. 
Specific Instructions to Sellers: 
In the first stage of each period, you are free to sell as many units as you 
wish. When you wish to make an offer to sell a unit, raise your hand and I will 
call on you. Then state a price and a warranty ("Type 1" or "Type 2"). You 
are free to sell different units at different prices and with different warranties 
if you wish. Some offers you make may not be accepted or may be countered 
by another seller with a "better" offer. You are free to make new offers 
whenever you wish, but each time you raise your hand and are recognized by 
me you are allowed to make only one offer. If you wish to make more than one 
offer (e.g., a "Type 1" warranty offer at one price and "Type 2" warranty 
offer at another price), you must be called on twice. If you sell a unit, you must 
immediately record on your record sheet the unit number, the price you charg-
ed for the unit, and the warranty. The units you sell are not' 'free. " You must 
pay a production cost for each unit you sell. You may not sell a unit 
for less than this amount. 
In the second stage of each period, some of the buyers who purchased units 
from you may seek replacement units. In case of a return, put an "X" in the 
"return" column of your record sheet. Whether or not you replace a returned 
unit depends on the type of warranty it is under. Each time you replace a unit 
you must pay a second production cost. 
( 1 ) , 'Type 1": You must always replace a returned unit if it was sold with 
a "Type I" warranty. . 
( 2) "Type 2": If the returned unit was sold with a "Type 2" warranty, you 
will be given a card that has a "I" or a "0" on it if the buyer returns 
for a replacement. This is your "clue". If the unit is actually good, this 
card will have a "I" on it with a 750/0 chance, and a "0" with a 250/0 
chance. If the unit is actually defective, the card will have a "1" on it 
with a 250/0 chance, and a "0" with a 750/0 chance. You must replace the 
unit if your clue is a • '0" and you do not replace it if your clue is a "1". 
If a replacement is made, record the unit number of the replacement on 
your record sheet. 
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In the third stage of each period, some buyers may appeal after being refused 
a replacement under a "Type 2" warranty. If a buyer appeals on a unit sold 
by you, you must pay an appeal fee of . Put an "X" in the column 
marked "Appeal" on your record sheet. The Appeals Judge will then receive 
a separate card which has a "1" or a "0" on it. The Appeals Judge's card will 
have a "1" on it with a __ % chance and a "0" with a __ % chance, 
if the unit is actually good. If the unit is actually defective, the Appeals Judge's 
clue will be a "1" with a __ % chance and a "0" with a __ % chance. 
If the Appeals Judge's card has a "0" on it, you must replace the unit. Other-
wise, you do not replace the unit. If a replacement is made, record the unit 
number of the replacement on your record sheet. 
Seller earnings: 
At the end of the period, calculate your earnings for each unit you sold in 
stage 1. 
1. If the buyer did not return the unit, your profit for that unit is: 
purchase price - (production cost) 
2. If the unit was returned but not replaced, and there was no appeal, your 
profit on that unit is 
purchase price - (production cost) 
3. If the unit was returned and replaced without an appeal, .your profit on 
that unit is 
purchase price - (2 x production cost) 
4. If the unit was returned, not replaced, and there was an appeal, your pro-
fit on that unit is 
purchase price - (production cost) - ____ (appeal fee) 
if you won the appeal, or 
purchase price - (2 x production cost) - ' (appeal fee) 
if you lost the appeal (i.e., had to make a replacement after the appeal). 
Do not be surprised if your earnings for some periods are negative. This will 
sometimes happen and is not necessarily your fault. Add up your profits (or 
losses) on all units you sold in the period. At the end of the experiment, add 
up the amount you earned in each period, and the experimenter will pay you 
that amount, plus $1.00 for each period played. 
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Comments 
Robert ]. Mackay 
University of California, Berkeley 
The papers in this section clearly reflect the maturing of the field of experimen-
tal economics over the past twenty years. The topics addressed involve impor-
tant issues of public policy; the theories examined draw on recent advances in 
the economics of uncertainty and infonnation; the experimental procedures are 
sophisticated and well developed; and, finally, the experimental results are clearly 
presented and interpreted. Each of these papers provides us with important 
insights into complex issues involving the determination and effects of varia-
tions in product quality. And, in each case, the insights result from the thorough 
and careful study of simple special cases that allow for sharp theoretical predic-
tions while maintaining the structural core of the rmre complex problem. In short, 
these are fine examples of the likely successes that can be obtained from the 
application of experimental methods in economics. 
After this general praise, some specific comments and criticisms seem in order. 
The Palfrey and Romer paper examines the case in which product quality is 
random but producers can respond to this uncertainty by adopting different types 
of warranties. They study the emergence of various warranty types, including 
dispute resolution mechanisms, and the effect of these warranties on product 
price. Their paper represents the state of the art in complexity of experimental 
design. Moreover, the experimental technology they have developed should 
prove to be quite valuable in future studies. Several useful extensions of their 
work come immediately to mind. First, the robustness of their results with 
respect to the probability of a defect, the accuracy of the inspection mechanism, 
the accuracy of the dispute resolution mechanism, and the cost of the dispute 
resolution mechanism should be examined. For example, the probability of a 
defect is very high in their experiments (i.e., t = .5). It would be interesting 
to see how sensitive their results are to this parameter value. Second, their 
basic framework could easily be modified to examine the case of asymmetric 
infonnation where sellers have a more precise estimate of their own product 
quality than do buyers. Finally, it would be interesting to examine the frequen-
cy of warranty types when suppliers can choose their average product quality. 
The interested reader will no doubt be able to think of many other variations 
and extensions of Palfrey and Romer's experimental design. 
The Holt and Sherman paper examines the case in which product quality is 
random and cannot be determined by the seller prior to sale. Instead. product 
quality can only be determined by the buyer after purchase. The seller. however. 
can respond to this uncertainty and avoid the losses resulting from the rejection 
of low quality units by bundling the units and allowing only bundles to be rejected. 
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Bundling, in fact, is efficient in the special case they examine since the average 
quality can be provided more reliably for a bundle than for an individual unit. 
Their experimental results reveal a strong tendency for bundles to emerge rather 
than single-unit transactions. Two comments seem worth making. First, the 
major sQortcoming of the Holt and Sherman paper is the lack of repetition of 
the experiment. More runs of the experiments, examining the robustness of 
the results to variations in model parameters, would be useful and provide more 
confidence in the authors' conclusions. Second, it would also be interesting to 
see how their results would vary with monopolistic supply rather than competitive 
supply. This modification, moreover, would allow for a more direct comparison 
of their results with the Kenney and Klein analysis of the bundling of diamonds 
by De Beers. 
The Lynch, Miller, Plott and Porter paper examines the case in which pro-
ducers can choose quality, but buyers cannot verify quality until after purchase. 
The authors examine the role of warranties and reputation formation, through 
provision of seller-specific information on the choice of product quality and price. 
Their results nicely illustrate both the lemons phenomenon, when seller iden-
tities are unknown, and the ability of enforceable warranties to resolve the prob-
lem. They also show that the seller reputations. based on public or private in- . 
formation, can have important effects on market outcomes even if they fail to 
completely resolve the problems associated with asymmetric information. 
Their results on reputation formation raise important issues. The crucial point 
to note is that theoretically we do not have good models of reputation formation 
in the type of situation they examine. Our most well-developed models rely on 
arguments based on infinite repetition or. at least. positive probabilities of con-
tinuing the interaction. Obviously, neither of these conditions apply to the ex-
perimental situation they examine. With a finite rrumber of repetitions, our models 
predict no reputation formation when players reason backwards from the end 
of the game. Yet the authors' experimental results clearly show a potential ef-
fect of reputation on product qUality. In this regard, their results remind one 
of similar experimental results on conusive behavior in oligopolistic settings. This 
combined work clearly illustrates the importance of reputation to the most basic 
issues in consumer protection and antitrust. Additional theoretical and experimen-
tal work that focuses on the determinants and effects of reputation in repeated 
games should yield significant payoffs. 
Comments 
Ross M. Miller 
Boston University 
Rather than discuss the papers by Holt and Shennan and by Palfrey and Romer 
one at a time, I will bundle my comments on the two papers around some specific 
comments on experimental methods in economics. The papers in this session, 
unlike the others, provide empirical evidence gathered in a laboratory setting 
and, as such, are subject to the scientific method more usually thought of in 
connection with the physical and biological sciences. The three aspects of the 
scientific methods that I will focus on are controls, replication, and relevance. 
The use of control experiments is a practice that I feel should be encouraged. 
There are, however, very good reasons why experimentalists run fewer con-
trols than would be ideal. First, some controls, such as double-blind experimen-
tation (a virtual necessity for medical research), are difficult to implement with 
the current technology for running experiments in the social sciences. It is prob-
able that only through computerized experimentation, such as with the PLATO 
system used by Vernon Smith, will true double-blind experiments be possible. 
Second, any experiment, examined carefully, will present many factors that 
may be subject to control. Because experiments are costly, in both payoffs to 
subjects and the experimenter's time, an experiment run to demonstrate a new 
result often takes precedence over one that simply confirms a known result, 
especially when the result of the conq-ol appears obvious in light of the behavior 
observed in the original experiment. In the Holt-Shennan work, the question 
that comes to mind is whether the bundling of goods is not just a naturally ap-
pealing notion to people and occurs even when it results in inefficiency. Cer-
tainly a biological argument can be made that the process of natural selection 
has favored and will continue in the foreseeable future to favor individuals who 
possess at least a minimal propensity for' 'bundling". If individuals like to bun-
dle items, the efficiency of prohibitions on bundling depends on the degree to 
which the bundling impulse is considered economic and, to use a loaded word, 
rational. 
Finally, a problem with controlling economic experiments is that the number 
of factors that can be subject to control is potentially enormous. For example, 
different experimenters have used different terms to refer to the high quality 
and low quality units where two qualities are available. The zer%ne dichotomy 
used by Palfrey-Romer and the Regular/Super dichotomy that I favor are in-
tended to reinforce subjects with the notion that one type of good is worth more 
than the other. The Red/Black dichotomy used by Holt-Shennan is possibly more 
neutral except to businessmen and electricians, and even they could not agree 
on which color is positive. I do not lose any sleep over such considerations 
because my impression is that they are minor, but certainly there are 
psychologists who do. 
A problem that I do lose sleep over, particularly with regard to experiments 
as complex as those of Palfrey-Romer, is the replication of experimental results. 
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Although the rational expectations and related literature has portrayed humans 
as capable of acting as if they solve complex and subtle strategic problems, con-
siderable trial and error with the proper feedback may be required before a human 
being can learn sophisticated strategies. Because there are so many paths and 
outcomes' of the learning process, experiments where learning can playa major 
role appear to be difficult to replicate between subjects pools or even within 
a subject pool. 
The complexity of the Palfrey-Romer experiments is demonstrated by the 
persistence of Type 1 ("full") warranties in many of the experiments. For Type 
2 ("limited") warranties to drive out Type 1 warranties, buyers must be able 
to logically deduce or learn through experience that the limitations on the Type 
2 warranties, which lower the costs to sellers, do not reduce the value to buyers. 
Subjects appear to differ in their ability to make such an inference, and so the 
behavior observed by Palfrey-Romer is less uniform than in a .simpler auction 
setting. 
Finally, I will look at the relevance of economic experiments. The two papers 
are excellent examples of how experiments can be relevant to policymakers, 
both by their direct application to policy problems and indirectly by causing 
economists to adjust their theoretical models. 
It is significant that both papers examine theories that were developed only 
recently; in fact, Palfrey and Romer examine a theory from their own recent 
work. Further, as has been the case in the physical sciences, experimental work 
in economics is generating results that do not fit existing theories and thus may 
lead the way for new theories. These new theories are necessary as a basis 
for examining economic policy and as a foundation for econometric studies. 
An unenlightened view of these studies would conclude that because the ex-
periments do not capture the fullness of most naturally-occurring markets they 
are irrelevant. The problem with constructing laboratory approximations to 
naturally-occurring markets is that the isolation and testing of individual 
hypotheses is not facilitated. The feature that both studies isolate,' in significantly 
different settings, is the sharing of risks between buyers and sellers that oc-
curs in a competitive market setting. For warranties, my colleagues and I have 
compiled a list of over twenty suggestions of features that characterize markets 
for warrantied products ai:J,d the list keeps growing. The Lynch, Miller~ Plott, 
and Porter work emphasizes the reputation and moral hazard aspects of war-
ranties. As Palfrey and Romer note, experimental work that combines the risk-
sharing with moral hazard is a natural topic for further work. Another favorite 
of mine is differential information; it would be interesting to see what happens 
when sellers have better signals of quality than buyers. 
Certain relevant features of markets are difficult to incorporate into experimen-
tal markets. In particular, zero-profit equilibria are hard to model in economic 
experiments because then only through lump-sum payments can adequate payoffs . 
be made to sellers. 
. 
• 
The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth 'of Sellers 
Gregg Jarrell and 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
I. Introduction 
Sam Peltzman 
University of Chicago 
This paper has a simple goal: to estimate the losses borne by owners of a 
finn that recalls a defective product from the market. While we stick close to 
the "facts," we hope they will shed some light on an important issue in the 
regulation of consumer protection. This is the extent to which information about 
product quality is sufficient to deter production of faulty products. In many areas, 
including the two which are the focus of our analysis-drugs and autos-there 
is extensive regulation of product quality prior to marketing of the product. One 
normative justification of such pre-market regulation would be that mere 
disclosure of any defects after a good is marketed does not impose sufficient 
costs on the marketer to deter optimally the production of defective products. 
Such sub-optimal deterrence could occur if, for example, consumers were in-
sufficiently sophisticated in assimilating information about defects or the tort 
liability system insufficiently compensated them for resulting damages. 
While we do not address these normative issues directly, we hope that our 
results will be useful in assessing the magnitude of the potential normative "prob-
lem. " Accordingly, we will compare our estimates of losses to owners with in-
dependent estimates of some elements of the cost associated with the product 
defects. In particular, we are able to estimate at least the rough magnitude of 
elements of the direct costs to firms of recalling defective products. These would 
include the costs of destroying contaminated batches of drugs, the costs of repair-
ing defective cars, etc. An obvious question-and a test of capital-market effi-
ciency-would be whether the capital market internalizes these costs. If it fails 
to do so, any presumption of suboptimal deterrence would be strengthened. 
In many cases, these direct costs will be a major component of the "social" 
costs of the defect. For example, the repair costs for a potentially defective 
auto part could even exceed the relevant social costs if the probability that the 
part will fail is very low. But some cases involve potentially large indirect costs 
for consumers-e.g., health damages from a dangerous drug. In these cases, 
optimal deterrence would require a penalty greater than the direct costs we 
are able to estimate. 
The main focus of the paper is on the changes in shareholder wealth which 
accompany recalls of automobiles and drugs (prescription, over-the-counter and 
medical devices). We chose these particular products, because each yields a 
·We thank James Frieden. Michael Ryngaert. Thaddeus Niemira and Monica Noether for their 
assistance. 
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good-sized sample of recalls and because we could obtain associated data on 
some elements of the direct costs of most of these recalls. The samples also 
differ in an interesting dimension: drug recalls occur much less frequently (per 
firm) than auto recalls. Important examples of the latter occur every few weeks 
or months, while the former occur once or twice in a decade. 
Our primary finding is that the capital market in fact penalizes producers of 
both recalled drugs and autos far more than the direct costs. Indeed, the capital 
market penalty seems so great that it may even exceed a plausible independent 
estimate of the relevant social costs. We do not press this point, because we 
have only the most fragmentary data on the relevant indirect costs and because 
we want to avoid the implicit issue of capital-market efficiency. But to the em-
pirical question "how much deterrence does the capital market provide against 
the sale of faulty products?", the answer implied by our data must be "con-
siderable." 
We also find that competitors of drug and auto firms with recalled products 
are not helped by their rival's travail. In fact, in both cases they bear substan-
tiallosses. 
II. How "Should" the Stock Market React 
to News of a Product Recall? 
The stock market does, not react to every event which entails a cost to 
shareholders, only to thoSe which are not entirely expected. So if product recalls 
occurred with the same regularity as, say, wage payments we would no more 
expect stock prices to fall when a recall occurs than on payday, even though 
both events impose real costs on stockholders. The market can be expected 
to respond to news of recalls only if the news resolves some uncertainty.· And, 
since recalls are not entirely unexpected, the response will untkrstate the costs 
of the recall to stockholders. To see this, let any uncertainty be resolved within 
a "month," and suppose that only one of two things can happen to a firm next 
month: either a product is recalled at some cost (K) to shareholders or there 
is no recall. So, the firm's month-end stock price (Si) will be either: 
(1) 
(2) 
where 
Sf· = V if no recall occurs, or 
Sf = V -Kif a recall occurs, 
V = present value of the firm's profits including all expected recall costs ex-
cept those occurring next month, and where we assume independence of suc-
cessive monthly events. 
The firm's stock price at the beginning of the month is the present value of 
future profits, or 
. 
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(3) So = p(V-K) + (l-p)V = V-pK, 
where 
p ~ probability that a recall occurs next month. 
Thus, if a recall occurs next month, the stock price will change by (2)-(3) above, 
or 
(4) Sf - So = -(l-p)K 
i.e., by the unexpected component (l-p) of the recall cost. Only if the recall is 
entirely unexpected (p - 0) will (4) - K. In months where recalls do not occur, 
stockholders get a capital gain of (1)-(3), or 
(5) SfR - S~ = pK 
So, to get at the market's estimate of K, we would need to subtract (5) from 
(4)-i.e., to compute the difference between the return in months with and 
without recalls. 
In practice, (4) and (4)-(5) will be about equal if p is small. This is the case 
with drugs where our data indicate that most uncertainty is resolved within a 
month and where no company in our sample has been involved in more than 
two distinct recalls in a period of about 100 months. For this sample, then, we 
use conventional "event study" methodology, more fully described below, in 
which we, in effect, estimate just (4). But auto recalls are far less of a surprise 
than drug recalls, so we attempt to estimate (4)-(5) for that sample. 
m. Drug Recalls 
A. Selection of Drug Recall Sample 
When a drug product is found to be defective, the manufacturer is required 
to remove that product from the market. This recall can be initiated either by 
the manufacturer or the Food & Drug Administration (FDA), and it can involve 
anything from a few bottles of contaminated or mislabeled product to the per-
manent removal of a product from the marketplace. The FDA classifies recalls 
by health hazard: Class I recalls involve product defects that may have serious-
ly adverse health consequences including death; Class II recalls involve tem-
porary or medically reversible health hazards while Class III cases are unlikely 
to entail adverse health consequences. 
Our sample focuses on recalls that involve a serious health hazard and/or a 
relatively large amount of product. We selected the sample from weekly reports 
of FDA Recalls and Court Actions in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Reporter, 
an industry newsletter commonly called the "Pink Sheets." Recalls were 
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included in our sample if the Pink Sheets report gives an estirtlate either of the 
direct costs of the recall or, more commonly, of the number of units recalled. 
In addition, we include those recalls where direct cost estimates are provided 
in the Wall Street Journal. Our sample period runs from 1974 through 1982. 
Our sample consists of most of the largest and more hazardous recalls in this 
period. For example, Class I recalls account for over half of our sample, while 
they account for less than 2% of the over 3,000 FDA citations reported be-
tween 1973 and 1978.1 Many of our cases received considerable publicity. Over 
half of our 32 cases were covered by the Wall Street Joumal. Five of these cases 
were serious enough so that the recalled products were withdrawn indefinitely 
from the market. Table 1, which is elaborated below, summarizes this sample. 
It shows the names of the manufacturers of the recaRed drugs in our sample, 
the event dates and estimates of the stock market response and direct costs 
of the recalls incurred by these manufacturers as a result of the recalls. We 
exclude cases without stock returns data for the manufacturer. This requires 
that the manufacturer be a publicly-traded firm having stock returns data for 
a 100 trading day period centered on the day that the recall becomes public 
information. 
B. Choosing Event Dates 
For each recall, we sought to identify the earliest date at which news of a 
recall might have become public. This could precede the date on which a recall 
actually began or was ordered by the FDA. For example, the first hint that a 
recall may eventually occur might be press reports (we use the Wall Street Jour-
nal) implicating a drug (e.g., Tylenol) in a health problem (poisoning). In such 
a case, the date of the press report is our "event date." In general, we use 
the date of the earliest press story on the troubled product, . when there is a 
WSJ story. For most cases, this is the same date that the recall begins. For 
recalls not covered by WSJ stories, the event date is the earliest date on which 
the FDA notified a manufacturer to recall a product. This date is taken from 
the Pink Sheet story that reports the citation. If these initial FDA communica-
tions appear to be strictly private correspondences, then we use the publica-
tion date (usually a week or so later) of the Pink Sheet reporting the recall as 
the event date for these non-WSJ cases. 
Sometimes news about essentially the same product defect is spread out over 
time. For example, two defective batches of a product are found several weeks 
apart (cases 2.1 and 2.2) or a product defect is found a month before the firm 
decides that a recall is necessary (26.1 and 26.2). We treated these related events 
as separate events (and split direct costs evenly among them) if more than three 
weeks elapsed between the events. These are identified by case numbers with 
1 Lawrence H. Block. "An Evaluation of Drug Product Citations in the FDA Weekly Reports 
Between 1970 and 1978." Contemporary Phamuzcy Practice. Vol. 3, No.3. (Summer. 1980), pp. 
171-79. 
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decimals in the table. ry./e treat related events less than three weeks apart, 
like the rest, as a single event beginning on the earliest date of adverse news.) 
C. Direct Costs of Recalls 
For most cases, we estimate the "direct cost" of a drug recall by assuming 
that all of the violative units become worthless upon recall. Specifically, where 
the Pink Sheet citation reports the number of units of the violative batch that 
are in distnbution channels, we multiply this figure by the wholesale price of 
the product as reported in the appropriate yearly issue of the ~rican Drug-
gist's Blue Book and the Drug Topics Red Book to estimate "direct costs." 
For some of the more publicized recalls, information on the direct cost was 
available from news stories, because the companies took an extraordinary charge 
to their income. (Case numbers 6,7,14,26 have their direct losses taken from 
the WSJ.) For instance, the WSJ reported on 10/29/82 that it would costlohnson 
& Johnson about $50 million to recall and destroy 22 million units of Extra-
Strength Tylenol capsules. In addition, it was reported that new tamper-proof 
packaging, additional television advertising, and related efforts to rebuild con-
sumer confidence would cost another $50 million. Therefore, our estimated direct 
cost to Johnson & Johnson of the Tylenol recall is $100 million. 
We make no allowance for tax benefits due to recall costs. Where we use 
reported extraordinary charges, we use the pre-tax figure, and we ignore any 
tax savings from inventory l<?sses. Accordingly, our direct cost estimates may 
be over-generous. 
For each recall Table 1 gives the estimated direct cost in dollars (last column) 
as well as in percent of the market value (just before recall) of the respective 
manufacturer's common stock. In both dollar and percentage tenns. the recall 
of Procter & Gamble's Rely Tampon (14) entails the largest estimated direct 
cost ($150 million, 2.5 percent of market value) in our sample, while the Class 
I recall of Abbott Labs' Plasmatein (1) is the least costly ($5,000, .0005 percent). 
D. Capital Market Returns 
The full costs to manufacturers of recalled drugs is measured by net-af-market 
(or excess) stock returns jn the period surrounding public announcement of the 
recall. These excess returns are obtained from the Scholes excess return file 
at the Universityaf Chicago's Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).2 
We cumulate excess returns for each manufacturer over several "event win-
dows" of different intervals to allow for pre-event leakage or post-event revi-
sion. The most narrow event window is six days, from t = -2 to t = 3, where 
2 For cases 3, 4, 8.1, 8.2, stock returns are unavailable from this source. So we constructed 
excess return series for these cases by subtracting the return to the New York Stock Exchange 
Index from returns to these firms' stocks. 
'"tl 
'" IJQ ~ 
W 
00 
t-=> 
I 
Table 1 
SAMPLE OF DRUG RECALLS WITH FIRM NAMES, EVENT DATES, STOCK RETURNS, 
ESTIMATED DOLLAR Loss, AND WSJ DUMMY 
Direct Cost as RecaU Firm's Estimated Direct 
No WSJI Percent or CER % DoUar Cost 
Case 1/ Firm Name Event Date Dummy Market Value -4 to '5 (OOO's) ~ 
1. Abbott 41'lB176 1 0.00% -1.91% $ 5 n n 
2.1 Am. Hospital 11/26174 1 0.03 -4.26 172 0 z 
2.2 Am. Hospital 1/13175 0 0.05 -7.10 430 en c:: 
3. Block 6/11179 0 2.33 -7.76 2330 ~ 
4. Bolar 12/24/80 0 2.34 -10.63 1600 ~ 
." 
5. Lilly (V -Cillin) 12/5/77 1 0.05 -1.42 1150 ~ 0 
6. Lilly (Oraflex) 8/3/82 O· 0.66 -10.46 30400 0-,1 tTl 
7. Johnson (Tylenol) 10/1182 O· 1.35 -15.88 100000 n ::! 
8.1 Mallinckrodt 11114174 1 0.00 3.55 10 0 z 
8.2 Mallinckrodt 12/10174 0 0.57 -8.43 1300 'n 
9. Merck 8/8/80 1 0.01 -2.76 353 0 z 
10.1 Milton Roy 7/15176 1 0.05 3.64 12 
'TI 
tTl 
10.2 Milton Roy 8/25176 0 0.05 -1.98 12 ~ z 
11. Morton Norwich 11/23/79 0 0.06 -2.75 250 n tTl 
'-.) 
12. Johnson (Ortho) 10/13175 0 
13. Parke Davis 8/13176 0 
14. Procter-G. (Rely) 9/18/80 0" 
15. Richardson 10/1178 0 
16. Richardson 9/26/80 1 
17. Robins 4/28176 1 
18. Searle Labs 11/17176 1 
19. Searle Labs 6/9/81 1 
20. SmithKline 4/26179 0 
21. Squibb 1116175 0 
22. Squibb 11128177 1 
23.1 Sterling 1114176 1 
23.2 Sterling 2/18176 0 
23.3 Sterling 4/14176 1 
24. Sterling 4/5178 1 
25. Amencan Home Prod. 3/4/82 0 
26.1 Robins 5/29174 0" 
26.2 Robins 6/28/74 0" 
.. 0 = Recalled products were withdrawn from the market. 
I 1 = Recall not reported in WSJ. 
0.13 2.65 
0.04 -0.63 
2.46 -5.29 
1.68 -8.18 
1.78 -2.35 
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0.09 -6.56 
0.07 -1.00 
0.13 -8.93 
0.24 -9.40 
0.05 -12.11 
0.55 -18.20 
0.55 -18.84 
0.03 -2.15 
0.02 -6.77 
0.05 -0.69 
0.47 -18.12 
0.47 -11.16 
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t = 0 is the formal event date of the recall. The widest event window is from 
t = -49 to t = SO.3 
Table 2 presents mean cumulative excess returns (CER) for various event 
windows. These are negative for every window from week to 5 months around 
the event date. But the two-week window (CER(-4, 5» yields a loss roughly 
within a percentage point of that for any wider window. This means that essen-
tially all of the market response to the event is compressed into the two sur-
rounding weeks. In addition, there are no systematic "mistakes" -i.e., there 
is no systematic recovery of some of these losses in the 50 days after the event 
date (or else the CER (-49, 50) would be smaller than CER (-4, 5». Finally, 
note that fully nine-tenths of the sample suffers a loss in the two weeks sur-
rounding a recall (see Table 3). It is clear that recalls constitute adverse news 
for stockholders and that most of the uncertainty about them is resolved in the 
two weeks surrounding public disclosure of the recall. 
It is also clear that the capital losses are substantial by any standard. In par-
ticular, they are much larger than our generous estimate of direct costs. The 
mean CER (-4,5) is -6.13%, which is fully twelve times the mean relative direct 
cost of 0.53% (and over SO times the median). We never fully succeed in ex-
plaining this enormous gap. 
The last line of Table 2 contains another mystery. This shows the CER (-4, 
5) for an equally-weighted portfolio of drug stocks. We conjectured that com-
petitors might benefit from the adversity visited on the seller of the recalled 
product. Instead, the spillover seems negative. All drug stocks suffer a (signifi-
cant) mean loss of just over 1 percent in the two weeks surrounding a recall. 
This cannot be explained by any tendency for recalls to be bunched (in which 
case one recall would beget expectations of others).4 
The disproportionate size of capital market losses relative to estimated direct 
costs led us to see if the capital market losses are systematically related to the 
degree of publicity surrounding the recall or to whether there was a complete 
product withdrawal. These may be proxies for costs which we cannot estimate. 
For example, a complete withdrawal may engender losses to specific assets (e.g., 
research and development, past advertising) which are not written off. Table 
3 presents the mean CERs over three sub-samples of recalls. The mean CER 
3 Some of the wider event windows result in overlap of the related events denoted by decimal 
case numbers in Table 1. In these cases, we (1) arbitrarily split the time between events in half 
and attributed the excess return for any day to the event closest in time, and (2) set the remaining 
excess returns to zero. For example cases 26.1 and 26.2 occur 22 trading days apart. Excess returns 
for the first 11 days after 5/29174 are attributed to 26.1 and all subsequent excess returns are set 
= 0 for that case. Excess returns for the 11 days ending 6/28174 are attributed to 26.2 and all 
preceding excess returns are set = 0 for that case. In this way, we avoid double counting 'of the 
same excess return. 
• We have 26 unrelated events in the 9 years 1974-82, or about 3 per year. If recalls were being 
generated by a Poisson process with a mean of (26/9) per year, the standard deviation would be 
l. 7. This differs insignificantly from the sample standard deviation of 1.45, so the distribution of 
recalls seems essentially random. 
. 
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Table 2 
MEANS AND DISPERSION MEASURES FOR eER TO 
DRUG RECALL FIRMS 01 ARlO US INTERVALS). 
Page 385 
RELATIVE DOLLAR Loss. AND eER TO DRUG PORTFOLIOS 
S.E. Mean2 t-stat. Minimum Maximum 
Variable Name l Mean (%) (%) Mean (%) (%) 
eER (-49. 50) -6.742 3.113 -2.17 -35.94 28.40 
eER (-29. 30) -5.479 2.411 -2.27 -30.84 15.85 
eER (-14. 15) -7.147 1.969 -3.63 -22.46 5.06 
eER (-9, 10) -6.563 1.392 -4.71 -24.10 9.05 
eER (-4. 5) -6.132 0.985 -6.23 -18.84 3.64 
eER (-2. 3) -2.832 0.696 -4.07 -15.39 3.26 
BDRUG (-4. 5) -1.170 0.335 -3.49 -8.53 5.86 
Relative Loss % 0.534 0.135 3.95 0.00 2.46 
I a) CER (-X, Y) is the cumulative excess return (from Scholes Excess Returns Tape, University 
of Chicago CRSP) from X trading days before to Y trading days after the recall event. 
b) BDRUG (-4. 5) is the cumulative excess return to an equal-weighted portfolio of all NYSE 
or ASE drug manufacturers having a SIC of 2834, 2840, or 2841 (about fifty firms). The cumulative 
excess return to this drug portfolio is computed from t - -4 to t = 5 for each date on which there 
was a drug recall that is included in our sample. The drug firm subject to the recall is excluded 
from the drug portfolio when computing BDRUG for each particular recall event. 
c) Relative Loss % is the estimated direct loss expressed as a percent of the market value of 
the equity of the recall firm. The marketva1ue is computed 40 trading days before the recall event date. 
2 The standard error a of the mean CER (-X, Y) is computed using the formula: 
where ~ is the variance of the i'· recall firm's excess stock return and N = 32 recalls. ~ is estimated 
for each firm by using daily excess returns from t = -49 to t = ·5 and t = 5 to t = 50. Let S~ 
be the variance of the above-defined time series of daily excess returns. Then ~ is computed by 
multiplying S~ by T, where T is' the number of trading days in the particular event window, (T is 
10 for CER (-4. 5), 20 for CER (-9, 10)' and so on.) These standard errors are \irtually identical 
to the standard errors of the sample-mean CERs. 
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Table 3 
MEAN CER TO DRUG RECALL FIRMs FOR VARIOUS EVENT INTERVALS 
BY CLASSES WITH AND WITHOUT WSJ STORIES AND PRODUCT WITHDRAWALS 
Mean CER to Reca1l Finn % 
Percent of 
CER No WSJ WSJ WSJ All CERs 
Interval All No Wdraw No Wdraw Wdraw Negative t-ratio· 
-2 to 3 -2.83 -1.16 -3.62 - 5.45 84.4 5.36 
-4 to 5 -6.13 -3.76 -6.36 -12.18 90.6 7.87 
-9 to 10 -6.56 -3.73 -7.58 -11.86 84.4 5.36 
-14 to 15 -7.15 -3.11 -8.80 -14.15 71.9 2.76 
-29 to 30 -5.48 0.97 -8.06 -16.82 71.9 2.76 
-49 to 50 -6.74 -1.19 -8.41 -17.95 62.5 1.46 
Number of 
Observations "32 14 13 5 32 32 
• T -ratio is the percent of AI negative minus 50% divided by the standard error (S) from a binomial 
distribution: i.e .• S • (PQ/N) liz • where P is the percent negative. Q is the percent positive. and 
N is the number of cases (32). 
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(-4, 5) for the 14 recalls that were not covered by the WSJ and that did not 
involve withdrawal is -3.76%, while the mean CER for the 13 no-withdrawal 
recalls covered by the WSJ is -6.36%. The mean CER for the five recalls that 
resulted in product withdrawals is -12.18%. (All five withdrawals were covered 
by the WSJ.) These mean CERs imply that a WSJ story engenders an additional 
CER of -2.6%, and that the product withdrawal distinction adds another -5.8%. 
So both extra publicity and a withdrawal are costly. But the remaining cases 
still entail an enormous discrepancy between the capital loss and direct costs. 
Table 4 reorganizes the data in Table 3 into specific subperiods. It shows that 
stocks typically decline both in the week before and the week after our event 
date. If our event date is, as we intend, the earlwt date of public information, 
then Table 4 implies that there is some prior leakage of non-public information. 
In no other subperiod from t ... -SO to t ... + SO is there· as large a change as 
in either of the two weeks around the recall date, and only in these two weeks 
does the frequency of negative CERs exceed significantly what would be ex-
pected from a random process. 
E. Cross-sectional CER Regressions 
We investigate the relationship between capital market losses and direct costs 
more formally in Table 5. Here we regress CERs on the relative dollar loss 
together with dummy variables for publicity (= 1 if there was no WSJ story) 
and withdrawal and the CER (-4, 5) to the portfolio of other drug firms. This 
latter is not really an exogenous variable, given the previously documented 
spillover effect of recalls. But we include it to account crudely for the industry--
specific component of the total loss (as well as •. other" industry-specific news). 
Table 5 confirms the tendency for both publicity and product withdrawal to be 
costly, though some of the standard errors are large enough to caution against 
pushing these conclusions too hard. The main new result is the negative rela-
tionship between the CERs and the relative direct cost variable. This is consis-
tent with our prior expectation, but the coefficient implies that an extra dollar 
of direct cost adds $2 to $4 to the stockholders' loss. This implies that even 
our generous estimates of direct losses are systematically low, but correlated 
positively with the "true" cost of a recall. The first line of Table 6 sheds fur-
ther light on the relationship between the stock market loss and direct costs. 
It reveals that the latter are higher for publicized recalls and for withdrawals. 
The relevant coefficients are statistically weak, but they are large relative to 
the mean direct cost. This implies that part of the extra costs of publicity and 
product withdrawals shown in Table 3 are due to the tendency for these recalls 
to have larger direct costs. 
The larger message of Tables 5 and 6 confirms that of the crude data in Table 
3. It is that stockholder losses from recalls go beyond costs which can be at-
tributed to the specific product. Note, from Table 6, that the CER to competitors 
is much more weakly related to the case-specific variables than is the recall firm's 
CER. This implies that any recall, regardless of "size," engenders a roughly 
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Table 4 
MEAN CER TO DRUG RECALL FIRMS FOR SUCCESSIVE INTERVALS 
·AROUND EVENT DATE BY CLASSES WITH AND WITHOUT 
WSJ STORIES AND PRODUCT WITHDRAWALS 
Mean CER to Recall Finn % 
Percent of 
CER No WSJ WSJ WSJ All 
Interval All No Wdraw No Wdraw Wdraw Negative 
-50 to -35 -1.94 -4.69 -0.13 1.07 50.0 
-34 to -20 1.78 2.65 1.72 -0.50 34.4 
-19 to -5 -1.16 -0.22 -1.86 -1.97 53.1 
- 4 to 0 -2.36 -0.85 -3.23 -4.29 71.9 
1 to 5 -3.78 -2.91 -3.13 -7.89 81.3 
6 to 19 0.05 1.92 -1.51 -1.13 59.4 
20 to 34 1.02 2.17 1.36 -3.08 34.4 
35 to 50 -0.36 0.73 -1.62 -0.15 43.8 
Number of 
Observations 32 14 13 5 32 
• See Table 3 for explanation. 
. 
• 
t·ratio· 
0.00 
-1.86 
0.35 
2.76 
4.54 
1.08 
-1.86 
-0.71 
32 
i (: 
Table 5 
STOCK RETURNS TO DRUG RECALL FIRMS REGRESSED ON RELATIVE DOLLAR Loss, 
DRUG PORTFOLIO RETURNS, AND DUMMY VARIABLES FOR No WSJ STORY AND FOR PRODUCT WITHDRAWAL 
~ 
I 
Independent Variables Summary Statistics 
Direct Cost CER (-4, 5) Mean of 
as % of No WSJ Withdrawal Drug Adj. RI Dep. Var.1 
Dependent Variable Constant· Market Value Dummy Dummy Portfolio F-value No. of Obs. 
CER (-14,15) -0.052 -0.039 0.040 -0.045 0.735 0.248 -0.071 
(-1.96) (-1.95) (1.34) (-1.13) (1.64) 3.56 32 
CER (-9, 10) -0.036 -0.035 0.022 -0.040 1.091 0.251 -0.066 
(-1.50) (-1.94) (0.81) (-1.11) (2.68) 3.59 32 
CER (-4, 5) -0.040 -0.020 0.016 -0.058 0.693 0.250 -0.061 
(-2.09) (-1.38) (0.76) (-2.01) (2.14) 3.58 32 
I' 
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similar industry wide asset loss. Further, even after allowing for the understate-
ment of direct costs implied by the coefficients in Table 5, we do not come close 
to rationalizing the 6% average loss of a recall. That is, the regressions imply 
that an unpublicized recall which does not result in a withdrawal and has trivial 
direct costs still entails a loss of over 3 percent (based on CER(-4, 5). Of course, 
our case-specific variables may be leaving out important product-specific costs. 
For example, they exclude any estimate of expenses for product liability suits. 
But we have to doubt that these can amount to much for a case involving a small 
defective batch of an otherwise safe product. We suspect that the major impact 
of product liability costs is showing up in the large coefficient of direct costs 
and the extra losses due to product withdrawals. Every withdrawal in our sam-
ple has engendered well publicized product liability suits. 
For one of these cases, we have a full profile of product liability costs. Even 
though samples of one yield notoriously noisy estimates, it seems worth ex-
ploiting these data to get a sense of the likely magnitude of this specific cost. 
The case involves the Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine birth control device which 
was implicated in deaths of some users. The two events in our sample (26.1 
and 26.2) emanating from this product withdrawal generated CER (-4, 5) values 
of -18 and -11 percent, or a total loss of around $150 million to the manufac-
turer, A. H. Robins. Robins took a pretax charge in 1974 of $5.1 million for 
the costs directly related to withdrawing the product and destroying inventory, 
and these are shown in Table 1. The company also agreed with the SEC to 
break out all expenses (extra legal fees and uninsured liability payments) related 
to litigation over this product in its financial statements. It has done this in every 
annual report from 1976 to date. The total of the pre-tax charges reported for 
1976-82 is $29 million. If the stream of these expenses is discounted at 10 per-
cent per year back to 1974, when the recall occurred, we obtain a 1974 pr:esent 
value of $17 million. A simple regression of the log of the annual elements of 
this expense stream against time implies a mean increase in these expenses 
of 21 percent (SE = 11 percent) per year. We then assumed that expenses 
would continue to be incurred for another five years and would equal the predicted 
values from this regression in each year from 1983 through 1987. These assump-
tions imply an additional $21 million of liability costs in 1974 present value, bring-
ing the total to $38 million. 
This exercise tells us that, in (partial) hindsight, a reasonably complete in-
dependent estimate of the full costs of the recall to Robins is on the order of 
under 1/3 the stock market loss. (Since Robins has had an average tax rate of 
over 40 percent in recent years, even this is too high.) So, if the product liabili-
ty component of this cost is anything like the consumer cost of the product defect, 
the stock market loss appears to exceed the "social loss." While we hesitate 
to push these fragmentary data this far, 5 they imply that the stock market losses 
5 A fuller treatment would require us to see if annoWicement of the liability costs affected the 
returns to Robins' stock. For example. if the initial reaction overestimated these costs. subsequent 
annoWicements of the actual costs would engender positive excess returns. 
. 
• 
Dependent Variable 
Relative Direct Cost 
in % 
CER (-4, 5) of 
Drug Portfolio 
Table 6 
REGRESSION OF RELATIVE DIRECT COST AND DRUG PORTFOLIO CER 
ON WSJ AND PRODUCT WITHDRAWAL DUMMY VARIABLES 
Independent Variables Summary Statistics 
Relative Mean 
Direct Cost No WSJ Withdrawal Adj. R' Dep. Var.1 
Constant (%) Dummy Dummy F-value No.Obs. 
0.631 -0.383 0.450 0.094 0.534 
(3.13) (-1.37) (1.18) 2.61 32 
-0.025 0.014 0.008 0.006 0.025 -0.013 
(-2.54) (1.80) (0.69) (0.35) 1.27 32 
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exceed substantially those costs to firms which can plausibly be attributed to 
the recall of a specific drug. 
Another way of putting this is that the stock market is imposing a substantial 
"goodwill" loss on a firm when a recall occurs that cannot be attributed to costs 
specific to the recalled product. The stock market appears to expect that news 
of a recall will reduce consumers' demand for other products sold by the firm 
and thereby impose additional losses on the firm. We get corroborating evidence 
for this conjecture when we add the market value of the firm to the regressions 
in Table 5. A single product typically accounts for a smaller fraction of a firm's 
profits the larger the firm, so the percentage loss due to recall of a single prod-
uct should be smaller for larger firms if there is no spillover to other products. 
But the coefficient of the firm's market value is never as much as a tenth of 
its standard error, and this result implies that losses do spill over to the firm's 
other products. Indeed, we showed earlier that the losses may spill over to 
other firms in the same industry. 
This exceptionally conservative (expected) response of consumers to news 
of a recall is something of a mystery, because there seems to be no easily ap-
prehensible rational basis for expecting one product failure to beget others. As 
nearly as we can tell from our recall data, product failures occur randomly. 
However, whatever their source, it seems clear that the costs to drug firms 
of a recall are so large that they must exert a powerful deterrent effect on the 
production of defective products. 
IV. Auto Recalls 
Since the late 1960s, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration of 
the Department of Transportation (DOT) has been empowered to order manufac-
turers to recall and repair autos with defects which compromise safety. Here 
we use a sample of 116 "major recalls" that occurred in 1967-81 to analyze 
the stock market's response to the news of this fonn of product defect. Our 
analysis here will have to be sensitive to a problem we raised in Section ll: Recall 
announcements occur too frequently to be treated as entirely surprising to the 
stock market, so the market's response to the news of a recall can understate 
the full costs it imposes on producers of recalled cars. However, the problem 
is easier to state than solve, so we defer dealing with it until later in the section. 
A. Recall Sample 
Each recall is initiated by an order from DOT specifying which particular group 
of cars are to be recalled and what is to be done to fix the car. The distribution 
of the number of cars per recall is highly skewed. Some involve a few hundred 
cars or even less, and a few involve millions of cars. We wanted to avoid deal-
ing with a lot of obviously trivial cases while retaining enough variety to analyze 
the effects of recall size. Accordingly, our sample is drawn from all recall an, 
nouncements reported in the WSJ involving the domestic "Big 3" (GM, Ford and 
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Chrysler) for 1967-19816 which exceeded the following minimum size criteria: 
50,000 cars for GM, 20,000 for Ford and 10,000 for Chrysler. These cutoffs 
are crudely consistent with the relative market shares (and stock market values) 
of these finns, and they result in roughly equal representation of each finn in 
our sample. The sample is described more precisely in Table 7. It is clear that, 
even after excising the small recalls, there is a very broad range of recalls in 
our sample, and that our sample remains highly skewed to the right; every rele-
vant coefficient of variation comfortably exceeds one. GM has the biggest recalls, 
Chrysler the smallest, but these ranks are reversed when recalls are measured 
relative to market value. 
B. Stock Market Response to Recall Announcements 
For each of the 116 recalls in our sample we computed CERs for various 
periods around the event date-the date of the WSJ story about the recall. We 
used the same source (the Scholes excess return file from CRSP) and procedure 
as for drug recalls. The basic results are in Panel 1 of Table 8. We find significantly 
negative average CERs for every event window, and the average gets larger 
absolutely as the windows widens. We did not go beyond the two week win-
dow, CER(-5, 5), because recalls are so numerous that much wider windows 
would have created serious overlap problems. 7TIlat window yields a mean CER 
of -1.60 percent. About 112 this total is realized in the 3 days surrounding the 
event, another 1/3 in the subsequent 4 days (CER (2,5» with the 115 or so re-
mainder leaking out prior to the day before the event. Also, there is a significantly 
above average frequency of negative recalls for every window, though these 
do not begin to approach the near-unanimity in the corresponding data for drugs. 
Panels A, Band C of Table 8 break out results by company. These reveal 
that every finn suffers a negative average CER and an above-average frequen-
cy of negative CERs for every event window. TIlat unanimity tends to support 
a conclusion that recalls are costly, even though many of the individual statistics 
in panels A-C are not significant. The rather wide standard errors on some of 
these makes us cautious about pushing comparisons among finns too hard. but 
it appears that GM loses about 112 as much per recall as either of its competitors 
(based on CER (-5,5». The extent to which this is plausibly due to its smaller 
recalls (per dollar of market value) is· discussed later. 
1. Does the CER Understate the Cost of a Recall? 
Our discussion in Section II implies that the CER for recall periods is an 
estimate of -(1 - p) • K. where K = the cost of a recall to a company and p 
= probability of a recall. So one way to estimate K would be to estimate p directly 
6 We have no stock market data for foreign producers and American Motors has too few recalls 
to pennit reliable comparisons with the others. 
7 As it is. 4 of our 116 cases overlap. We left the overlaps in our sample. but no result would 
change very much if the overlapping cases are deleted or if we had made. the same adjustments 
as for drug recall overlaps. 
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Table 7 
MNOR RECALLS, 1967-81 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Cars per RecaU Cars per $Million 
(OOO's) of Markel Value 
, of I~ Sample RecaUs Mean S.D. MIN. MAX. Mean S.D. 
n 
0 
1. All Recalls 116 717.8 1552.8 14 12000 158.8 342.7 z VI 
A. GM 41 1244.7 2352.0 50 12000 70.5 141.0 ~ 
B. Ford 44 567.2 859.8 50 2700 128.0 179.0 ~ 
." 
C. Chrysler 31 234.6 391.1 14 1300 320.0 582.0 ~ 0 
>-l 
2. All 1967-74 Recalls 53 612.7 1320.8 14 6700 72.0 132.0 t<l n 
::! 
3. All 1975-81 Recalls 63 806.1 1729.6 19.6 12000 231.9 437.4 0 z 
n 
0 
~ 
t<l 
~ 
Z 
n 
t<l 
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Table 8 
MEAN CER FOR AUTO STOCKS. VARIOUS INTERVALS AROUND DAY OF RECALL. 1967-81 
Event Window 
Sample (II of Recalls) (·5. 5) (·3, 3) 
I. Total (116) 
- Mean -1.60% -.96% 
- t 3.40 2.56 
- % Negative 61.2· 62.1· 
A. General Motors (41) 
- Mean -.97 -.80 
- t 1.64 1.70 
- % Negative 56.1 58.5 
B. Ford (44) 
- Mean -2.03 -1.58 
- t 3.50 3.42 
- % Negative 63.6 68.2· 
C. Chrysler (31) 
- Mean -1.83 -.28 
- t 1.37 .26 
- % Negative 64.5 58.1 
-- - -
See text for description of sample, and see note to Table 2 for method of computing t. 
• = t > 2.0. (See note to Table 3). 
(.l, 1) <·5, 1) 
-.81% -1.07% 
3.30 2.85 
64.7· 62.1· 
-.88 -.48 
2.86 1.02 
65.9· 56.1 
-.63 -1.51 
2.08 3.26 
61.4 63.6 
-.98 -1.24 
1.40 1.16 
67.7· 67.7· 
(2,5) 
-.53% 
1.87 
60.3· 
-.49 
1.38 
56.1 
-.52 
1.49 
54.5 
-.59 
0.73 
74.2· 
-
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and divide the CER by (1- p). To see where such a procedure would lead. note 
that every company in our sample experienced an average of 2 to 3 major recalls 
per year in the 1967-81 period. or about 1 in every 10 two-week periods. If 
uncertainty is typically resolved in the two weeks surrounding a recall. a plausi-
ble estimate of p would be around .1. and. using this estimate. we could estimate 
an average loss due to a recall of around 1. 8 percent of market value rather 
than the 1.6 percent in Table 8. 
However. that procedure is based on an implicit assumption that needs to 
be examined with special care in the case of the auto industry in the 1967-81 
period. This is that the other unexpected events impacting auto stocks in the 
two weeks surrounding a recall were not adverse or favorable on average. To 
elaborate: ex ante every CER is zero in expected value. If the only surprise 
is that a recall did or did not occur. the ex post CER is then -(1 - p)K or pK 
as in equations (4) and (5). If other surprises occur during recall periods. but 
are not systematically adverse or favorable. then the -1.6 percent mean CER 
in these periods is an unbiased estimate of -(1 - p)K and it therefore underes-
timates K. We can correct the underestimate as suggested above. or we could 
estimate pK directly from CERs in non-recall periods. Those CERs would be 
an unbiased estimate of pK if. again. other surprises in these non-recall periods 
are neither good nor bad on average. 
We know. however. that this last supposition is false for the 1967-81 period. 
These were hardly the best of times for domestic auto producers. The adverse 
effects of growing foreign competition. pollution regulation. etc. dominated their 
stock market performance. and the average CER in non-recall periods was 
negative. This raises two problems: (1) the CER for non-recall periods is ob-
viously not an unbiased estimate of pK. the capital gain due to the absence of 
a recall. (2) the CER for recall periods overstates -(1 - p)K If other surprises 
in these periods were also adverse on average. It helps to state both of these 
precisely by revising (4) and (5) to include "other" surprises as follows: 
(4)' (S~ - So), = -(1 - p,)K, + X, • 
(5)' (Still - So), = p,I<. + y, • 
where 
X, = the gain-'or loss due to non-recall events. in recall period t. and 
y, = gain or loss from non-recall events in non-recall period t. The t-subscript 
indicates that actual returns in any particular period-the (51 - So) variables-
are generated by a process whose elements can vary from period to period. 
Our calculated CERs are ex post realizations of this process for some particular 
time interval. They include the realizations of X, or Y .. and these can be positive 
or negative on average. We know that the mean value of y, for 1967-81 is 
negative. because the mean value of (S["R - So), is negative for this period (see 
below). We also know from Table 8 that the mean value of (S~ - So), is negative. 
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but this is insufficient to tell us that the mean of X. is negative. Therefore. either 
procedure suggested above for estimating the mean of K has potential pitfalls. 
If we estimate p, directly and divide the mean return in recall periods by (1 -
p,). we get an estimate of: -K, + X,/(l - p,). which is unbiased only if X, = 
O. If. on the other hand. we subtract the mean of (5)1 from the mean of (4)1 
we obtairi 
-K, + (X,- y,) • 
which is unbiased only_if X, = I,. If X, = its ex ante value of zero. then this 
estimate understates -K. since Y, < O. In addition. this latter estimate is likely 
to be noisier than any simple transformation of (4)1. because of the variance 
added by the Y, series. 
Since our readers deserve more than a lecture in elementary statistics. Table 
9 presents various estimates of (4)1 - (5)1 for the (-5. 5) event window. These 
are labeled "Adjusted Mean CER". and the adjustment is as follows: For each 
year we compute the mean CER(-5, 5) for every non-recall period8 for each 
of the three firms. Then we subtract this year-and-company specific non-recall 
mean CER from the CER(-5, 5) for each recall experienced by the sgmpany 
in the same year. This adjusted mean CER is an unbiased estimate of K on the 
assumption that both recall and non-recall periods within a year share a com-
mon company-specific impact of non-recall news. For ease of comparison. we 
repeat the unadjusted CER(-5. 5) from Table 8, and we provide the added detail 
of a sub-period breakdown. 
None of the results in Table 8 are much affected by our adjustment of the 
CERs. The adjusted-mean CER (-5,5) in Panel 1 is a bit smaller than the unad-
justed mean, but it remains significantly negative. The main innovation in Table 
9 is in the sub-period data of Panels 2 and 3, not in how the CERs are calculated. 
These reveal a sharp difference in the impact of recalls between periods. The 
average recall costs less than 1 percent of market value before 1975 (for every 
firm) regardless of how the CER is measured and it costs more than 2 percent 
after 1975. This difference is mainly attributable to Ford and Chrysler whose 
average recall-period CERs in this post-1975 period range from around _21/2 to 
-31/2 percent. This post-1975 period is not only more costly per recall. but there 
are more of them compared to the previous period (63 versus 53). This com-
bination is especiaBy costly for Ford, which bore the brunt of the increased recall 
activity (27 versus 17 before 1975). 
The substantial difference between the stock market response to pre and post 
1975 recalls turns out to be more apparent than real. As we show subsequently 
(see Table 11). it is due mainly to the decline in the real value of auto stocks: 
equally costly recalls translate into a higher percentage loss of market value 
the lower the market value. In addition, recalls increased in size after 1975 (see 
Table 7). 
8 More precisely. we compute 11 • mean daily ER for non-recall periods. 
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Table 9 
MEAN CERs FOR AUTO RECALLS, ADJUSTED FOR NON-RECAll NEWS, 1967-81 
Adjusted Mean Unadjusted Mean 
Sample and CER (-5, 5) CER (-5, 5) 
(Number of Recalls) Mean Mean 
1. All 1967-81 (116) -1.38% 2.83 -1.60% 3.40 
A. General Motors (41) -.60 0.91 -.97 1.64 
B. Ford (44) -2.05 3.51 -2.03 3.50 
C. Chrysler (31) -1.46 1.06 -1.83 1.37 
2. All 1967-74 (53) -0.60 0.77 -0.55 0.73 
A. GM (18) -0.56 0.57 -0.57 0.63 
B. Ford (17) -0.44 0.63 -0.44 0.60 
C. Chrysler (18) -0.81 0.40 -0.64 0.33 
3. All 1975-81 (63) -2.04 3.35 -2.48 4.19 
A. GM (23) . -0.64 0.71 -1.28 1.45 
B. Ford (27) -3.07 3.88 -3.02 3.79 
C. Chrysler (13) -2.37 1.29 -3.48 1.99 
See text for description of Adjusted Mean CER(-5,5). Unadjusted mean CER(-5. 5) is computed 
as in Table 8. 
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2. How Does the Cost of a Recall Vary with the Number of Cars? 
Every recall announcement contains information on the number of cars in-
volved, and we should expect news of big recalls to be more costly than news 
of smallenecalls. But we found it as difficult to verify this for autos as for drugs. 
As with drugs, we wanted to allow for a "goodwill" effect of recalls, which we 
assume is proportional to the firm's market value. So we want an estimate of 
$ RECALL LOSS = A • (MKT. VALUE) + B(CARS) 
across recalls. Here A = "goodwill" cost and B = cost per car. Since 
$ LOSS = % LOSS x MKT. VALUE, 
we estimated 
0/0 RECALL LOSS = A + B(CARS/VALUE) 
using - CER (-5,5) as an estimate of % LOSS. A sample of the uniformly disap-
pointing results is in Table 10. The regression estimate of B is rarely more than 
a standard error from zero and it is negative at least as often as it is positive. 
Nothing much is gained by allowing for inflation (i.e., assuming that B is propor-
tional to the GNP deflator; see lines 1(a)-3(a)) or changing the event window 
to (-1,1) in order to reduce noise. As with drugs. the A term (not explicitly 
shown in the table) accounts for essentially all of the recall cost. 
One reason for this is that costs per car vary across recalls, so that our regres-
sion model is too crude. There is no handy way to estimate independently the 
dollar cost per car or per recall. as we could with drugs. But. from fragmentary 
press accounts. we know that the firms' estimates of their explicit costs per 
car repaired range from something like $10 to $1000. so the measurement er-
ror entailed by assuming that B is constant is considerable. There is the addi-
tional complication that car owners frequently do not respond to recall notices, 
and the response rate varies considerably across recalls.9 We tried some crude 
adjustments for differences in repair costs and response rates for a sample of 
recalls, but this failed to sharpen the results in Table 10. 10 
9 The law gives the owner the right, but no obligation, to have his car fi."(ed at zero direct cost. 
Actual response rates vary over a range from about 113 to nearly 100 percent. 
10 Each recall order is published in DOT's annual Safety RelaUd Recall Campaigns for Motor Vehicles 
and Motor Vehicle Equipment Including Tires. Sometimes the order requires repair only if inspec-
tion reveals a defect. and other times repair or replacement is mandatory. We allowed B to depend 
on a dummy = + 1 if repair was required. The publication also gives response rates for some recalls, 
and we allowed B to vary with these. But neither variable worked. Nor did a variety of other ad-
justments which we tried-e.g., modeling the goodwill loss as a constant dollar, rather than con-
stant percentage, amount. 
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Table 10 
REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE MARGINAL COST OF A 
RECALLED AUTO, By FIRM AND PERIOD 
Sample (# of Recalls) Cost/Car 
1. All 1967-81 (116) -$2.62 
(a) Price Deflated (1972 1.00) -$1.21 
(b) Based on CER (-1, 1) -8.73 
2. All 1967-74 (53) -4.98 
(a) Price Deflated -9.09 
(b) Based on CER (-1, 1) 19.26 
3. All 1975-81 (63) -10.09 
(a) Price Deflated -6.63 
(b) Based on CER (-1, 1) 5.83 
A. GM (41) 33.95 
B. Ford (44) -0.94 
C. Chrysler (31) -8.80 
Note: Each Cost/Car is the estimate of B in a regression of the general fonn: 
(
CARS ) 
-CER(-t. t) - A + B VALUE 
0.2 
0.1 
1.3 
0.1 
0.2 
0.7 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
0.8 
0.0 
0.4 
where CARS "' # of cars recalled. and VALUE "' market value of the finn. Negative values of 
B imply that the marginal cost of a car is negative! t = ratio of B to its standard error. For lines 
1(a). 2(a). 3(a) V~~E is multiplied by the GNP deflator (1972 = 1.0) to account for the effects 
of inflation on recall costs. CER (-5. 5) is the dependent variable in all regressions. except l(b). 
2(b) and 3(b) which use CER (-1. 1). 
. 
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We can get some insight into the likely importance of measurement error by 
comparing the data on cars/market value in Table 7 with subsequent results. 
For example, we have already noted that GM has the lowest stock market loss 
per recall and the lowest cars/value. Note also that both cars/value and the mean 
stock market loss is much larger in 1975-81 than in 1967-74. All of this is con-
sistent with a positive relationship between the market loss and recall size which 
we suspect is being hidden by measurement error in the disaggregated data 
summarized in Table 10. But we also have to note that Chrysler has a much 
higher cars/value than Ford, but no higher mean stock market loss. 
Another approach to separating crudely the "goodwill" from direct cost 
elements of the stock market loss is to see whether it is plausible to assume 
no goodwill loss at all. For drug recalls, we found that such an assumption would 
appear utterly implausible because the stock market losses are very much larger 
than the direct costs. As a first step in such a comparison for autos we have 
converted the percentage losses (using the unadjusted CER (-5,5» to (cons-
tant 1981) dollar losses per recall and per car. The first column of Table 11 
shows that each recall cost around $140 million in market value on average, 
with GM bearing the highest mean dollar cost and Chrysler the lowest. It also 
shows that the difference between the pre and post 1975 dollar losses (see lines 
2 and 3) is much smaller than the difference in the corresponding percentage 
losses in Table 9. So, with the caution implied by the large standard errors, 
we can attribute much of that percentage difference to the combined effects 
of inflation and the poor stock market performance of auto stocks in the late 
1970s. Were it not for those twin events, the costs of recalls could well have 
been lost in the noise of stock prices. 
Table 11 also expresses these dollar losses on a per car basis. While we report 
a mean loss/car, we have little confidence that the high dollar amounts are mean-
ingful. These means are dominated by a few extremely small recalls that generate 
extremely large losses/car. Accordingly, we show two other measures less af-
fected by these extreme values-the median and the mean dollar loss/mean 
number of cars in a recall (labeled mean/mean).11 This last datum is equivalent 
to aggregate.losses in a sample divided by aggregate cars, so it comes closest 
to summarizing the experience of these finns over long periods. What is perhaps 
most interesting about this figure is its stability over time and between com-
panies: in any large sample of recalls, the loss/car seems to be around $200. 
This last result" suggests that-with sufficiently large samples to iron out the 
random fluctuations-recall costs are proportional to cars recalled. But it ap-
pears implausible that the $200 figure is entirely attributable to the direct costs 
of a recall. Since such costs are a deductible expense, it would imply pre-tax 
costs of nearly $400 per car, and this would in the high end of the range of per 
11 To illustrate the problem entailed by very small recalls, remember that losses and cars are 
essentially uncorrelated. So, suppose losses in a 1 car recall and a 100 car recall are each $100. 
The mean loss/car = lh(1001l + 100/100) - $50.50, but the total loss from both recalls is only 
200 = $1.98 per car. This last figure is our mean/mean for this sample. 
Table 11 
ESTIMATED DOLLAR LOSSES PER RECALL AND PER CAR, 1967-81, CONSTANT 1981 DOLLARS 
Loss/RecaU Loss/Car 
(Million $) ($) 
Sample (II of RecaUs) Mean Mean Median 
1. AU 1967-81 (116) 141.1 2.2 813.3 1.5 185.7 
A. GM (41) 235.5 1.4 477.5 0.6 46.6 
B. Ford (44) 128.6 3.7 694.2 2.3 198.2 
C. Chrysler (31) 34.0 1.0 1426.4 0.9 95.7 
2. All 1967-74 (53) 110.1 0.9 1092.9 1.0 64.7 
3. All 1975-81 (63) 167.2 2.7 578.1 2.0 189.0 
Mean 
Mean 
196.6 
189.2 
226.7 
144.9 
179.7 
207.4 
"0 
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Note: Loss/RecaU is estimated by multiplying CER (-5, 5) for each recall period by the market value of the finn in that period. Mean Loss/Car is I;;J 
the mean of (Loss/Recall)/Cars involved in the recaU). The last column (Mean/Mean) is obtained by dividing the mean of Loss/recaU, as shown in the ~ 
first column, by the mean of cars/recaU from Table 7. Each 10ss/recaU is deflated by the GNP deflator set to a base of 1981 = 1.0. (3 
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car costs which have appeared in press reports about specific recalls. 12 We know 
of only one publicly available piece of data which permits an estimate the per 
car cost in a large sample of recalls: GM disclosed that it spent $33 million on 
recalls in.1982 (Detroit Free Press, May 22, 1983). This amounts to about $35 
per GM car recalled that year. If this is anywhere close to being typical, then 
the bulk of the stock market loss represents indirect costs: lost sales and good-
will, liability suits, etc. 13.14 In this sense, there is a rough similarity between 
auto and drug recalls. But there seems to be a closer connection between the 
size of the indirect and direct costs for auto recalls than for drug recalls. 
3. How Are Competitors Affected by Auto Recalls? 
The surprising result that competitors lose rather than gain during a drug recall 
holds for auto recalls as well. And, as with drugs, the surprise is deepened by 
the large magnitudes involved. The data are summarized in Tables 12 and 13. 
Table 12 shows mean CERs to equal weighted "portfolios" of the two com-
petitors during recall periods (e.g., a Chrysler-Ford portfolio during GM recalls). 
The main result is that competitors lose about 1 percent on average during a 
two-week recall period, or about 213 as much as the recall company loses. All 
of this is attributable to 1975-81 recalls, where the competitors' loss (-2.40%) 
virtually matches the recall company's loss! This difference between sub-periods 
is less intelligible than the similar sort of difference we found for recall com-
panys CERs (see Table 9). In that case, we saw that the apparently weak negative 
CERs for 1967-74 were plausibly masking negative real dollar impacts roughly 
comparable to those in the later period. In Table 12 we find similarly weak, but 
positive CERs for competitors in 1967-74. These would be consistent with non-
trivial real dollar gains to competitors, a result which would excite no surprise. 
12 For example. a recent Detroit Free Press series on recalls states that a 1983 recall of 240.000 
GM cars "is thought to be the most expensive per-car recall ever." GM's estimate of its total 
direct cost for the recall is $30 mi1Iion. or $125 per car. Detroit Free Press May 24. 1983. 
13 In this connection. we note recent evidence that new car sales of recalled models appear to 
decline when the recall is announced. See S. M. Crafton. G. E. Hoffer and R. J. Reillr "Testing 
the Impact of Recalls on the Demand for Automobiles" Economic Inquiry v. XIX. Oct. 1981. 694-703 
and R. J. Reilly and G. E. Hoffer "Will Retarding the Information Flow on Automobile Recalls Af-
fect Consumer Demand?" Economic Inquiry v. XXIJuly. 1983.444-447. The latter article estimates 
that sales of a domestic recalled "line" decline about 5 percent in the month of a recall announce-
ment in the 197i-81 period. but there is no indication that the decline lasts more than a month. 
A single month sales decline of this magnitude could not account for very much of the typical 
stock market loss. There are about 60 domestic "lines" with average monthly sales of around 10.000 
cars. Reilly and Hoffer exclude lines with fewer than 8.000 cars per month. If the average line in 
the sample has 20.000 monthly sales. a 5 percent decline represents 1.000 cars or roughly $10 
million sales. The lost pre-tax profits on these sales would amount to under $2 million. based on 
the industry's margin of sales over material and labor costs. 
14 We also found no serial correlation in recalls. For example the correlation of the number of 
recalls in successive three-month periods is .03 for Chrysler .. 08 for Ford and GM and .17 for 
the aggregate of all three firms. None of these are significant; auto recalls. like drug recalls. appear 
to occur randomly. 
Table 12 
MEAN CERs OF COMPETITORS DURING RECALL PERIODS, VARIOUS EVENT WINDOWS, 1967-1981 
Event Window 
Sample (# of Recalls) -5, 5 -3,3 -I, 1 -5, 1 2,5 
1. All 1967-81 (116) 
- Mean -1.01% -.92% -.35% -.49% -.52% 
- t 2.46 2.76 1.55 1.43 1.94 
- % Negative 59.5· 56.0 57.8 62.1· 52.6 
2. 1967-74 (53) 
- Mean .64 .17 .18 .57 .08 
- t 1.09 0.42 0.62 1.07 0.22 
- % Negative 41.5 37.7 45.3 45.3 45.3 
3. 1975-81 (63) 
- Mean -2.40 -1.84 -.79 -1.37 -1.03 
- t 4.65 3.81 2.41 3.30 2.70 
- % Negative 74.6· 71.4· 68.3· . 76.2· 58.7 
---
Note: Each entry shows the Mean CER (-x, y) for an equal-weighted portfolio of competitors during recall periods. So, t.g., for a GM recall; our 
"portfolio" is Chrysler and Ford, and our CER ('x, y) for that recall is just the average of the Chrysler and Ford CERs. The ratio of the Mean CER 
to the sample standard error is shown below the mean. 
"% Negative" is the percentage of negative CERs to the portfolio of competitors. 
• = t > 2.0. 
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But the post '74 data clearly descnbe a much different world. Table 13 organizes 
the data by company. Reading across any of the rows in panels A-C gives the 
response of a particular competitor to recalls of its rivals. For example, we find 
from panel A that GM lost on average a) 2.13% during Ford recalls, b) .83% 
during Chrysler recalls, c) 1.59% during all Ford and Chrysler recalls, etc. Panel 
D shows the average response of both rivals to a particular company's recalls. 
So, e.g., panel D.l. says that Ford and Chrysler lost 1.03% on average during 
all GM recalls in 1967-81. With due respect given to the large standard errors, 
this detail reveals some interesting patterns: a) GM loses more during its rivals' 
recalls (1.59%) than it does during its own recalls (0.97%); the reverse is true 
for both Chrysler and Ford. The GM response to rivals recalls in 1975-81 
(-2.92%) is particularly noteworthy: it loses even more than they do. b) The 
most damaging recalls for competitors are GM and Ford recalls, particularly 
in 1975-81. (-2.61% and -2.77% respectively). GM's rivals lose more 'than GM 
does in this period. c) By contrast, the relatively small Chrysler recalls cost 
rivals about half as much as GM and Ford recalls (see D.3) and only about l{3 
what they cost Chrysler itself in this 1975-81 period. So Chrysler recalls seems 
to be treated mainly as idiosyncracies without strong implications for industry 
wealth. 
Since excess returns to auto stocks were negative on average over our sam-
ple period, and especially so in 1975-81, the reader may wonder if the negative 
industry effects which we attribute to recalls have a more general source. This 
seems implausible. From Table 9, Panel 3 we find that the mean company CER 
in nonrecall periods for 1975-81 was about -lh percent, or under 1/4 the mean 
CER for competitors during recall periods.1S So other news would have to be 
consistently especially bad during recall periods for a general "bad news" ex-
planation to make sense. This stretches credulity, and we can easily reject a 
hypothesis of no difference between the mean CER in non-recall periods and 
the mean CER to competitors in recall periods. 
The more intriguing question raised by Table 12 is whether there is any 
company-specific component at all in the loss due to recalls, given that the mean 
company-specific and competitor CERs are so similar. Table 13 gives us a hint: 
there is no general tendency for companies to respond identically to their own 
recalls and those of com~titors. A more formal answer is given by regressing 
a recall company's CER (-5,5) on that of the portfolio of its competitors during 
recall periods. The regression coefficient here gives the company's average share 
in any industry-wide effects of recalls, and the intercept gives the average 
company-specific component. We computed the regression for each of the three 
companies, and obtained a mean intercept of -1.12 percent (t = 2.98).16 So there 
15 Note that the -Ih percent includn the negative returns to competiton; during recall periods. 
so it is too large an estimate of the impact of non-recall news. 
15 The average regression coefficient is .69(t - 7.46). This implies that the typical company-
share in an industry-wide recall loss of 1 percent is under 1 percent. The proximate reason for 
(footnote continued) 
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Table 13 I~ 
MEAN CER (-5, 5) OF COMPETITORS DURING RECALL PERIODS, By COMPANY AND SUB-PERIOD, 1967-81. 
RecaU Company AD RecaUs of Other Cos. In 
Competitor Company GM Ford Chrysler '67-'81 '67-'74 '75-'81 
A. GM 
- Mean 2.13% -.83% -1.59% -.09% -2.92% 
- t 4.02 1.04 3.49 0.13 5.34 ~ (") 
- % Negative 75.0· 54.8 66.7>t- 45.7 85.0· (") 
- N 44 31 75 35 40 0 z 
VI 
B. Ford ~ 
- Mean -1.11 .36 -.48 .86 -1.81 ~ 
- t 1.34 0.47 0.83 1.11 2.24 '"0 ~ 
- % Negative 53.7 54.8 54.2 50.0 58.3 0 o-i 
- N 41 31 72 36 36 t<1 (") 
::! 
C. Chrysler 0 z 
- Mean -.94 -.94 -.94 1.16 -2.41 n 0 
- t 0.83 0.95 1.27 1.12 2.44. ~ 
- % Negative 53.7 54.6 54.1 37.1 66.0· e 
- N 41 44 85 35 50 z (") 
t<1 
,j 
D. All Competitors 
1. 1967-1981 (See Table 12 for aggregation 
- Mean -1.03 -1.54 -.23 across aU recalls.) 
- t 1.24 2.64 383.2 
- % Negative 56.1 63.6 58.1 
2. 1967-1974 
- Mean 1.00 .42 .50 
- t 0.87 0.45 0.50 
- % Negative 38.9 41.2 44.4 
- N 18 17 18 
3. 1975-81 
- Mean -2.61 -2.77 -1.25 
- t 2.39 4.22 1.47 
- % Negative 69.6· 77.8· 76.9· 
-N 23 27 13 
Note: Each entry under "RecaU Company" is based on the CER (-5, 5) of competitors of that company during that company's recall periods. For 
example data in Panel A. refer to GM's CER (-5, 5) during Ford and/or Chrysler recaUs. The -2.13% under Ford means that GM's Mean CER (-5, 
5) was -2.13% during the 44 Ford recall periods, etc. The last 3 columns give data for a specific competitor (e.g., GM in Panel AI aggregated across 
all recalls of other companies (Ford and Chrysler in Panel A.) for specific time periods. 
Panel D. shows the aggregated respunse of competitors to particular company recalls, again for specified time periods. For example, the -1.03% entry 
under GM in Panel D.1. is the mean CER (-5,5) of GM's competitors (Chrysler and Ford) during the 41 GM recalls in 1967-81. 
• See note tu Table 12 for definition of "Mean", "t". and "% Negative". N = number of recalls in the ceU. For Panel D., t and % negative are 
based on CER (-5, 5) of equal weighted portfulio of competitors (see note to Table 12). 
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is a significant company-specific component to recall losses over and above a 
company's share in the industry-wide loss. 
V. Summary 
There are striking similarities in the effects of drug and auto recalls on the 
wealth of shareholders. Both are extremely costly, surely more costly than the 
direct costs of recalling the defective product and, plausibly, more costly than 
all of the costs attnbutable to the specific product defect. In both types of recalls 
a more general loss of "goodwill" seems to be a large component of the total 
loss. This result is not unique to this study. One of us has found similarly large 
"goodwill" losses for FTC false-advertising cases. 17 Just what lies behind these 
goodwill losses remains something of a mystery which we leave for future 
research. Our attempts, mainly with drugs, to find answers in costs of product 
liability suits and in time dependence of recalls succeeded only in deepening the 
mystery. 
Another similarity between drugs and auto recalls-and the source of another 
mystery-lies in the response of competitors. Their owners lose substantially 
when a rival product is recalled. Any favorable effects on the demand for 
substitutes from a recall are swamped by a more general negative effect on the 
industry. This is another piece of evidence that something much more is involv-
ed in a recall than failure of a specific product. 
It is difficult to compare the magnitudes of the losses in drug and auto recalls, 
because both the frequency of recalls and the number of firms involved differ. 
Per recall, the percentage loss is much greater for drug recalls (6% versus 
11/2%). But auto recalls occur o'\ler twice as frequently, and involve only 3 com-
panies versus 19 for drugs (in our samples). So per-company per-year, auto 
recalls are considerably more costly. The average loss to rivals is roughly the 
same (1 percent) for auto and drug recalls, but with about 50 rivals in the case 
of drugs versus 2 for autos, it is clearly the drug recalls which have the more 
substantial cross-firm effects. 
We began by promising to shed light on the degree to which the capital market 
might sub-optimally deter production of faulty products. We believe we have 
done so. It is clear that, 'in the simple sense of the market's not internalizing 
even the direct costs, suboptimal deterrence is no problem. It is also clear that 
to make a suboptimal deterrence story credible requires very generous estimates 
of the indirect social costs. The only source of such large costs we have found 
is in the cross-company effects. This might suggest that there is a larger scope 
for industry cooperation in product design and inspection than economists have 
(continued from p. 405.) 
this is that Chrysler has more volatile returns than the others. so when Chrysler loses 1 percent 
the others lose less. 
17 Pe!tzman. "The Effects ~ Fl'C Advertising Regulation." J. of Law and Eam .• v. 24. December. 
1981. pp. 403447. 
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heretofore Una~ed. 
Finally, we hope that our results have begun defining an agenda for future 
research. They suggest that recall costs are like an iceberg whose easily visible 
part hides. most of what is important. The challenge for future research is to 
discover just what form-e.g., reduced sales, increased quality costs, lost 
"political capital" -these large, currently amorphous costs take. 

Comments 
Gerard R. Butters 
Federal Trade Commission 
Peltzman and Jarrell's paper presents new and provocative findings. We learn 
that a major recall of a drug imposes, for each $1 of estimated direct costs to 
the manufacturer of the drug, an immediate cost of about $12 on the stockholders 
and an additional cost of perhaps $25-$50 on the stockholders of other drug 
manufacturers.l A recall of domestic automobiles with a direct cost of perhaps 
$50-$125 per car imposes a cost of $200 per car on the manufacturer and an 
additional $150 or so on each of the other two of the big three auto firms. These 
losses are large in absolute terms: the median estimated direct cost of a drug 
recall was about $2 million, resulting in an estimated industry stock market loss 
of almost $100 million. In the case of Johnson and Johnson's recall of Tylenol, 
the firm's own stock was devalued by over $1 billion. 
Although these losses are not known with much precision, they are not 
statistical artifacts: the measures of the stock market reaction are robust and 
are based upon accepted statistical methods. Nor are the losses momentary: 
they are not reversed by a later compensatory increase in stock values, at least 
not for two months after the initial event, which is about as far as statistical 
methods allow one to test. We cannot conclude that the effects are permanent, 
but if they were, the grand totals would be staggering: ignoring timing considera-
tions, 32 drug recalls which each reduce the industry stock market value by 
over 1 % would cost investors who held the stocks over the period of the recalls 
over 27.5% of their initial investment. 
How can we explain why the market responds so much more dramatically 
to product recalls than would appear to be warranted by the direct costs esti-
mated by Peltzman and Jarrell? One possibility is that they do not estimate the 
value of the lost sales during the time that the recalled product was taken off 
the market. For those products that were totally or permanently withdrawn, 
the lost sales' were huge.2 They also omit the cost of liability for deaths and 
damage to health resulting from the use of the withdrawn drug. The prospect 
of large punitive damages for drug-related deaths, such as the $6 million recently 
1 This estimate is based upon the assumption that the finns whose products are recalled have 
capital values two to'four times larger than the average capital value of all !inns in the ~!inn index 
used by Peltzman and Jarrell. 
21 estimate that the withdrawal of Oraflex cost LiDy about $150,000,000 in potential annual sales, 
the withdrawal of Rely cost Procter and Gamble roughly $100,000,000 in potential annual sales, 
and the J;eC3Il of Tyleool put the entire $450,000,000 amual sales of Tylenol products at risk. However, 
even these huge losses do not seem to account for the stock market losses of approximately 
$500,000,000, $300,000,000, and $1.2 billion respectively, especially considering that the recalls 
of Orafiex and Rely were presaged by previous bad publicity and attendant lost sales. 
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awarded in a case involving Oraflex, could make a substantial contribution to 
the stock market reaction. Perhaps the best way to measure contemporaneous 
estimates of the expected magnitude of these losses is to study liability insurance 
rates and coverage before and after major recalls. However, I have not been 
able to convince myself that either lost sales or liability payments and increased 
insurance costs are large enough to account for the capital market reaction, es-
pecially for those recalls that were not publicized or did not involVe life-threatening 
defects. 
Another possibility is that while a recall does not itself reduce the future earn-
ings of the firms by enough to account for the stock market changes, it indirect-
ly provides information to investors about the firm whose product was recalled, 
and more broadly about the entire industry, that leads them to revise downwards 
their estimates of future earnings. For example, the recalls may act as a signal 
of unrecognized poor product quality control in the firm, of unanticipated dif-
ficulties in the production of new drug entities, or of unexpectedly strict govern-
ment regulation. But even dramatic news should not affect the market valua-
tion of a firm except to the effect that it overturns existing beliefs about product 
quality or regulatory policy. In the case of automobiles, for example, product 
quality problems "signaled" by a product recall might well have been previous-
ly anticipated as a result of bad Consumer Reports ratings, reliability problems 
of related earlier models, an observable lack of good quality control practices 
at the factory, previous recalls, etc. In the absense of supporting evidence that 
recalls are a particularly good "leading indicator" of future quality problems, 
and given the trivial nature of many of the defects for which cars were recalled, 
I doubt that signaling can account for much of the stock market effect. 
If it is difficult to explain the movement of the stock of the firm whose prod-
uct was recalled, it is nigh impoSSIble to explain how the capital value of the 
rest of the industry could fall by even larger amounts (in total dollars). While 
one might plausibly argue that reputation effects could shift demand away from 
one firm to the rest of the industry, it is hard to believe that recalls could drama-
-tically reduce overall industry demand. One is forced to the take seriously the 
possibility that although the losses from recalls are indeed substantial, the stock 
market overreacts to the prospect of these losses. 
This conclusion would be unreasonable if there were an easy way for investors 
who understood an overreaction to profit from it. But it is quite possible for 
the market to overreact significantly without providing savvy investors with 
dramatically increased rates of return. Since future earnings of firms are notori-
ously difficult to predict, there is a wide range of uncertainty as to the true value 
of any firm. Thus, if the stock value of a firm falls "too far" in response to 
a recall; there is no reason why the market price need recover its value rapidly. 
If the stock price tends to recover only gradually over a period of months or 
years, then any investor seeking to profit from the overreaction can anticipate 
only a modestly increased expected return, and is subject to the risk that in-
tervening events will cause the market price to fall rather than rise. When one 
. 
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accounts for the costs of identifying the types of news which the market tends 
to misjudge and the transactions costs of buying and selling, it would not be 
surprising to find that arbitrage need not prevent the overreactions. 
If it is true that the stock market is overreacting to the news of drug and auto-
mobile recalls, then we must question the results of event studies more broad-
ly. In particuIar, I do not think that one can easily attnbute economic significance 
to small percentage moves in stock market values, even if the changes are both 
statistically significant and large in absolute dollar terms. Thus, the main con-
tribution of Peltzman and Jarrell's study may be to improve our understanding 
of the stock market rather than the markets for drugs and automobiles. 
Peltzman and Jarrell clearly intend the reverse. In particuIar, they seek to 
measure how much deterrence the capital market provides against the sale of 
faulty products. They conclude that "the costs to drug firms of a recall are so 
large that they must exert a powerful deterrent effect on the production of defec-
tive products. " Judging from their overall discussion, they do not mean primarily 
that the capital·market reaction in itself motivates firm executives to be con-
cerned about product quality, but rather that the capital market reflects, at least 
in a roughly accurate way, real costs to the firms whose products are recalled. 
I have little doubt that Peltzman and Jarrell's final conclusion is accurate. Even 
_ if the market overreacts to news of a recall, only a fraction of the implied costs 
to drug manufacturers should be sufficient to encourage stringent quality con-
trol. But one must be careful not to generalize beyond their carefully limited 
statement. First, they make no attempt to measure the external costs of prod-
uct defects and to compare them to the private costs. Many private costs of 
a recall (e.g., expected liability suits and losses in sales) have their correspond-
ing social costs (health damages or death and losses in therapeutic benefits). 
Thus to the extent that the stock market evidence raises our estimates of the 
private costs of recalls, it should also cause us to raise our estimates of the 
social costs. Hence it is not clear that the stock market evidence should change 
one's prior beliefs concerning the likelihood that deterrence of product defects 
is either sub-optimal or supra-optimal. Second, although the point is obvious, 
to show that product recalls are costly is not the same thing as to show that 
product defects are costly. In the extreme, if recalls were based upon arbitrary 
and unpredictable regulatory whims, product recalls would not be effective in 
stimulating improved quality control. Third, it is only in the context of current 
FDA regulation that recalls (and indirectly, poor product quality) are shown to 
be costly. One cannot conclude that the response to recalls or disclosures of 
defects would be the same in a world without direct regulation of quality, especial-
ly if one believes that the current market response is being driven by fears of 
tightening FDA or NHTSA regulation. 

Consumer Shopping Behavior In the Retail Coffee Market 
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1. Introduction 
In most markets. consumers must choose from among a variety of brands 
and retail outlets. Price and quality information is costly to acquire. and con-
sumers must engage in search to obtain it. Moreover. even when information 
about the standard retail prices is Imown. the consumer may be able to obtain 
further price reductions through special deals or bargaining. Search and deal-
seeking are two elements of "shopping." Given the variety of information 
sources and deals available in some markets. the problem of detennining a fully 
optimal shopping strategy can be an extremely complex one. As a result of this 
complexity. the theoretical literature on shopping. such as that dealing with op-
timal search strategies. has largely bogged down in the mathematical difficulties 
of computing the optimum. 
In this paper. we present an empirical examination of the ways in which con-
sumers and firms respond to the costliness of information and to the possibility 
of special deals that require consumer action (e.g .• redeeming coupons). We 
use an exceptionally detailed data set to examine consumer shopping behavior 
in the retail market for ground. caffeinated coffee. 1 The detailed nature of our 
data allows us to capture much of the richness of consumer shopping behavior. 
and to identify some of the implications that this shopping behavior has for the 
demand functions faced by sellers. We are able to use the data to develop 
econometric estimates of the demand functions for coffee. and to test whether 
these demand functions conform with various theories of consumer shopping 
behavior. 
The retail coffee market offers an excellent chance to analyze the effects of 
a variety of marketing practices. and to examine consumer switching among 
brands. Consumers make frequent purchases of coffee. and many types of pro-
motional activities are used by coffee producers. Promotions include coupons 
issued by both t{le manufacturer and the store. in-store promotions (such as 
end-of-aisle displays). price advertising in local print media (newspapers adver-
• We would like to thank John Hilke. David Sappington. and Richard Quandt for helpful cominents 
and suggestions. We are grateful to Information Resources. Inc. for making the data available to us. 
1 Throughout the paper. we use the word "coffee" to refer to ground. caffeinated coffee unless 
otherwise stated. We do not. in general. include sales of soluble (instant) and decaffeinated coffees 
in our analysis. The sales of ground. caffeinated coffee make up 43 percent (in tenns of the number 
of cups of coffee that can be made from the purchased quantities) of the total sales of all types 
of coffee in our sample (including instant and decaffeinated). 
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tisements, newspaper inserts, and flyers), and nonprice advertising on a spot 
and network basis on television. Trial sizes also are used. New brands are 
introduced. 
There are two broad sets of questions that we address. The first set of ques-
tions concerns consumer shopping behavior and its relationship to manufacturer 
and retailer promotional activity. We are able to report in detail the pattern of 
consumer shopping behavior and the pattern of manufacturer and retailer pro-
motional activity. Switching among brands is one measure of consumer shop-
ping behavior that is of particular interest. We construct brand switching matrices 
for all purchases, as well as for purchases made using coupons or while the brand 
chosen was advertised. 
The second set of questions that we address concerns the existence of market 
power in the coffee market. The nature of consumer shopping behavior has im-
portant implications for market performance. Consumers may respond to price 
changes much differently in markets where information is costly than in markets 
where information is costless and complete. Moreover, when shopping is im-
portant, seller promotional activities provide several new dimensions to firms' 
competitive strategies. Our examination of consumer shopping behavior pro-
vides some evidence concerning the question of whether promotional activities 
are likely to promote or stifle interbrand competition. We also test more direct-
ly for the existence of retailer or manufacturer market power by estimating ag-
gregate demand equations. We are able to improve upon the usual demand 
specification by including in these equations important nonprice explanatory 
variables, such as the use of local print advertising. Our results indicate that 
estimates based on price variables alone may be misleading when consumer shop-
ping and retailer promotional activities are prevalent. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A general theory of con-
sumer shopping behavior is sketched in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to pro-
viding a fairly detailed description of actual consumer shopping behavior in the 
retail market for ground, caffeinated coffee. The resultant demand functions for 
coffee are estimated in Section 4. The paper closes with a short conclusion. 
2. A Simple Model of Consumer Shopping Behavior 
A. TM Elements of Shopping 
Roughly speakiilg, we can classify the components of shopping behavior into 
two categories: (1) obtaining information about the prices and qualities of the 
available products; and (2) obtaining any sorts of deals that require special ac-
tion on the part of the consumer, such as clipping coupons or bargaining. Hav-
ing engaged in shopping, a consumer then makes the actual purchase decisions. 
The utility that a household derives from the purchase and consumption of 
coffee will depend on the attrIbutes (e.g., taste or image) of the brand chosen, 
the price paid for the brand, and the level of shopping effort. The greater the 
amount of effort that a consumer devotes to gathering information or to obtain-
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ing deals, the more likely it is that he or she will find a desirable brand or a 
low price. The theory of optimal search or shopping by consumers who have 
incomplete infonnation about both prices and qualities is extremely complex, 
and there is no compelling reason to believe that consumers intuitively can ap-
ply information gathering and processing algorithms that trained economists and 
statisticians are unable to develop for any but the simplest search problems.2 
However, it is not an lUll"easonable hypothesis that in choosing the level of shop-
ping in which to engage, rational consumers will attempt to balance the benefits 
of shopping against the costs. These costs may include travel costs, the pur-
chase of infonnation, or the opportunity cost of the time spent shopping. In light 
of these costs, consumers typically will not find it in their interests to become 
completely informed or to utilize all possible deals. 
B. Information Gathering 
A consumer in the coffee market has a variety of sources from which to con-
struct an infonnation portfolio. In making their infonnation acquisition choices, 
consumers will balance the credibility and costliness of alternative infonnation 
sources.3 Some sources, such as visits to several stores, will provide particularly 
reliable or accurate infonnation, but may be too costly for the consumer to rely 
on extensively. Rational consumers may turn to sources that are less reliable 
or less accurate, but that are less costly as well. 
Potential infonnation sources in the retail coffee market include the following 
ones. 
1. Advertising 
Coffee manufacturers and retailers made use of four types of advertising dur-
ing our sample period. First, retailers used features, wherein particular brands 
of coffee are promoted in local fliers, newspaper ads, or newspaper inserts. 
A featured brand is named in the advertisement, and its price is given. Features 
were used for 11 percent of the brand-chain weeks included in our sample. 4 
Table 1 presents the frequency of feature usage broken down for each of the 
four leading brands of ground, caffeinated coffee. 
Retailers also made use of in-store displays. Such displays typically consist 
of stacking cans or bottles at the end of an aisle, where they will attract passing 
consumers' attention. Overall, displays were used for 12 percent of the brand-
chain weeks. Again, Table 1 gives the breakdown by brand. 
Coffee manufacturers made use of advertising on television. Both spot and 
national television purchases were made. In 1978, manufacturers spent roughly 
2 The natural selection arguments applied to competitive firms groping for optimal behavior are 
inappropriate for consumers. 
3 Porter (1976) gives a much more thorough presentation of a theory of consumer information 
portfolio choice. 
• Uk chains feature a given brand during a partialIar week. then the brand is said to be featured 
for k chain-weeks. We take the average over the entire sample period 
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90 million dollars nationwide on television advertisements, about half of which 
went for spot advertising.5 We do not have data on television expenditures broken 
out solely for the area (Pittsfield, Massachusetts) covered by our sample of 
consumers. 
Finally, coffee manufacturers made use of nonprice, printed advertising. In 
1978, manufacturers spent roughly 10 miDion doDars nationwide on printed adver-
tising.6 Again, we do not have data on these expenditures broken out solely 
for Pittsfield, Massaclmsetts. These expenditures may include the costs of 
distnbuting manufacturers' coupons through newspaper inserts and other print 
media. 
2. Experience 
Coffee is like many nondurable consumer items in that it is purchased relatively 
frequently by most households. Frequent purchases imply that consumers are 
likely to learn a given brand's attnbutes rapidly as it is possible to sample several 
brands in a relatively short period of time. Table 2 reports the frequencies of 
purchase of ground, caffeinated coffee across households. The mean number 
of cans purchased over the 108 week period is 30.5.1 If purchases were evenly 
spaced, this purchase nwnber would correspond to one purchase every 25 days. 
Most households' useage rates permit them to sample several brands within 
our two-year time frame. 
3. Testimony of Other Consumers 
Word-of-mouth is an important source of information in many markets. Cof-
fee is a candidate for this form of information transmission for two reasons. First, 
the information to be transmitted is nontechnical-one does not have to be an 
expert to determine whether a particular brand of coffee tastes good. Second, 
virtually all coffee consumers know other coffee consumers. A study conducted 
in 1978 for the International Coffee Organization found that in the Northeastern 
census region of United States 65 percent of the people who are over 10 years 
of age drink coffee (mcluding instants and decaffeinated ground) on any given day. 8 
4. Coupons 
Both coffee producers arid retailers issue coupons. Manufacturer coupons tend 
to be valid for greater periods of time than do store coupons. One of the three 
chains of supermarkets in our sample offered a fair number of retailer coupons, 
but stores in the other two chains made very infrequent use of retailer coupons. 
The average value of a coupon used for a coffee purchase (including instant and 
decaffe~ted) was 60.3 cents. Coupons are like advertising in many ways, but 
5 TIlt U.S. Retail Coffee Marlut (A) (1982) Harvard Business School. page 14. 
6 TIlt U.S. Retml Coffee Marlret (A) (1982) Harvard Business School. page 14. 
7 For all types of coffee (including soluble and decaffeinated) the corresponding figure was SO.2. 
8 TIlt U.S. Retail Coffee Marlret (A) (1982) Harvard Business School. page 5. 
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with an obvious difference. As we shall discuss, coupons may playa role in the 
provision of both price and quality information. 
C. Price and Quality Information 
Consumers need both price and quality information. Some sources are well 
suited for providing price information, but poor providers of quality information. 
For example, newspaper advertising conveys accurate price information, but 
has little information about product quality. Thus, although there is some overlap 
in the sources of the two types of information, it is useful to consider consumer 
information portfolio choices separately for price search and' quality search. 
1. PrX:e Information 
Consumers can obtain price information either through in-store search (direct 
observation of shelf prices) or out-of-store search (media price .advertising and 
word-of-mouth). With the possible exception of word-of-mouth, all of these 
sources of information are highly reliable. They also are costly, but to varying 
degrees. The costs of in-store search are the incremental costs of going to the 
store to search and the amount of time or level of effort spent in the store look-
ing at prices. This level of effort is an increasing function of the number of brands 
examined. The shopping time needed to examine a given number of brands also 
depends (in a complex way) on the level of in-store advertising. The lower the 
costs of sampling the price of a given brand, the more likely it is that a con-
sumer will in fact sample that brand. An in-store advertisement for a given brand 
may have the effect of directly lowering the cost of gathering price information 
about that brand by having a comparatively large sign that states the price of 
the brand and can easily be read by the consumer while he or she is moving 
down the aisle. 
A display for a given brand also may serve as a signal of a price reduction 
for that brand even if the display itself does not directly reduce the cost of gather-
ing price information. If displays and price reductions tend to be positively cor-
related, then a consumer has a higher expected return to obtaining price infor-
mation about brands that are on display. The market mechanism leading to such 
a correlation might be the following one. Displays are costly to the seller. If 
the effect of a display is to attract consumers' attention and get them to obtain 
price information (as opposed to blindly purchasing that brand), then a display 
will lead to a greater increase in sales (and be more profitable) when coupled 
with a low price rather than with a high one. This notion of display activity as 
a signal of a low price is a variant of Nelson's (1974) model of advertising as 
a signal of quality. Here. the disciplining mechanism includes the initial purchase 
and not'solely repeat purchases. 
In fact, price reductions and in-store displays are positively correlated for 
several of the brand/chain pairs. Table 3 presents the correlations between retail 
prices and other promotional activities for the four leading brands of ground. 
caffeinated coffees. Note that a negative correlation indicates that the promo-
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tional activity tended to accompany a price cut. One of the chains (Chain 2) tended 
to coordinate price cuts with promotions (on feature or on display) more than 
did the other two chains. 
Features (price advertising in print media) may reduce consumers' costs of 
direct information aquistion by allowing them to search during times when they 
have comparatively low shadow prices on their time, or by allowing consumers 
to sample different stores without having to incur the transportation costs or 
the opportunity costs of the time spent going to the store. Moreover, consumers 
also may use store features as signals of low prices. Store features are cor-
related with price reductions and hence potentially could serve as a signal of 
price cuts, again as shown in Table 3. We shall have more to say on the possi-
ble signalling role of features when we present our regression analysis in Sec-
tion 4. 
2. Quality· Information 
The most reliable way for a consumer to gather information about· whether 
he or she likes the quality or taste attnbutes of a brand is, of course, to pur-
chase the coffee and drink it. Coffee would appear to conform well to Nelson's 
(1970) notion of an experience good. It is difficult to convey the taste of the 
coffee prior to purchase, but after a single purchase the consumer should have 
a good idea of the attnbutes of the coffee. A consumer will experiment by pur-
chasing different brands if he or she has some expectation that the trial brand 
will offer a better price-quality mix than those brands about which the consumer 
already has information, and if the costs of search are sufficiently low. The cost 
of this form of information gathering is bounded above by the cost (including 
the time and transportation) of purchasing the smallest available can. Thus, the 
costs of this type of search are very low for those brands for which trial sizes 
are offered by the manufacturers. 
In choosing which brands to sample, a consumer may engage in what Nelson 
(1970) calls "guided sampling," whereby the consumer makes his or her sam-
pling decisions based on the recommendations of acquaintances with whom he 
or she believes his or her tastes are positively correlated. The sampling deci-
sion may also be based on indirect inferences obtained from the presence of 
promotional activities. For example, the fact that a firm issues coupons or 
engages in advertising may serve as a signal of product quality if consumers 
view these promotions as investments in repeat purchases. 
In addition to serving a signalling role, consumers may believe the claims made 
by advertisers about the quality of their products for psychological reasons hav-
ing to do with something other than the advertising-as-a-signal model. Marketing 
professionals claim that advertising can be used to influence consumers' beliefs 
about brands that they already have sampled.9 In particular, it is claimed that 
television advertising can influence the image of a brand. 
9 The U.S. Retail Coffee Marlett (AJ (1982) Harvard Business School. 
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D.D~I~m~-C~~Use 
Consumer activities conducted in order to obtain special price reductions or 
deals comprise the final component of shopping behavior. Attempts at bargain-
ing are unlikely to meet with much success in the retail coffee market. A coffee 
consumer could, however, obtain lower prices through utilizing coupons. Clip-
ping and using coupons is an activity that consumes time, and we would expect 
it to become increasingly time consuming for a household to find additional 
coupons. The consumer will balance the price reduction granted by an additional 
coupon against the costs of finding, clipping, and using it. Here, we mean the 
incremental cost of using coupons, and we do not include the time that would 
have been spent making the purchase even in the absence of coupons (e.g., 
driving to the store-unless more trips are required when coupons are used). 
The consumer will choose his or her levels of shopping and coupon use to 
minimize the expected "full price" of purchasing coffee, where the full price 
is equal to the retail price minus the value of the coupon plus the costs of ob-
taining and using the coupon. 
E. Implications for Demand 
1. Store and Brand Choice 
Having obtained information and formed expectations about prices, qualities, 
and deal availability, consumers will make purchase decisions. Consumers must 
choose the brand(s) and quanti~ of coffee to consume and the store from which 
to purchase it. The store decision is likely to depend on an entire basket of prices 
for various items purchased at the supermarket. Coffee prices typically are only 
a small part of consumers' implicit supermarket price indices. Locational dif-
ferences among stores also may play a significant role in consumers' store 
choices. Thus, there is a degree of differentiation among stores that coffee 
manufacturers cannot influence. 
The quantity of a given brand of coffee that a consumer purchases depends 
on the price of that brand relative to other brands of coffee and relative to the 
prices of other goods and services. The relative prices of coffee brands are likely 
to influence the brand choice, while the relative price between a brand of coffee 
and other goods and services is likely to influence the quantity of the chosen 
brand that is purchased. The result will be the usual negative relationship be-
tween a brand's sales and its price, while the prices of competing brands can 
be expected to be positively related to the quantity demanded. We would ex-
pect that the prices charged at store i would have less influence on the sales 
of a brand sold at store j than would the prices charged for the other brands 
at store- j for two reasons. First, as discussed above, consumers will have 
preferences over stores, which will reduce the degree of between-store switch-
ing. Second, a household that shops at one store is likely to have less informa-
tion about the prices charged at other stores than about the prices charged 
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at the household's chosen store since within-store price search is much less 
costly than between-store price search. 
2. Stockpiling 
In addition to considering current substitution between the consumption of 
coffee and other goods, consumers may engage in inventory behavior. Con-
sumers may form expectations about the paths of prices over time. Whenever 
the consumer believes that prices will rise at a rate greater than storage costs 
plus interest, the consumer will have incentives to stockpile the good. Of course, 
consumers also will maintain inventories of coffee so that they can economize 
on the fixed costs of going to the store; no consumer wants to go to the store 
every time he or she wants a cup of coffee. The extent to which consumers 
economize on transactions costs also will be limited by merest and storage costs. 
In the presence of stockpiling behavior, past sales of coffee may have a negative 
impact on current sales of coffee. -
3. Interaction of Promotions and Price Changes 
Consumers can be expected to make purchase decisions based on incomplete 
information concerning both the physical attributes and the prices of the alter-
native brands of coffee that are available in the market. Although direct obser-
vation provides a very credible source of price information, it is costly, and given 
the frequent changes in retail prices, consumers are unlikely to have complete 
price information. 
Features, displays, and coupons affect consumer awareness of the product 
and perceptions of its price. We would expect that price cuts are most effective 
when they are implemented at the same time that the brand is featured in a 
local print advertisement or subject to an in-store display. The interaction of 
feature activity and prices should be particularly pronounced when one looks 
at the effects between stores, where features give rise to an especially strong 
reduction in a households' shopping costs. In-store search over prices is unlikely 
to take place at stores from which-the household does not make a purchase 
due to the high cost of such a search strategy. The household can, however, 
learn about coffee prices at other stores by looking at retailers' local print adver-
tisements. The between-store interaction effects for price and display activity 
should be much less important because a household will see a display at a given 
store only if the household shops at that store. We test these hypotheses below 
by including interaction terms between price and promotions in our demand func-
tion regressions. 
4. Information Theory of Kinked Demand 
As we have stated, when there are many brands available to the consumer, 
he or she may not scan the prices of all brands when in the store. Moreover, 
when there are multiple retail outlets for the brands under consideration, the 
consumer almost certainly will not know some of the prices at stores other than 
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the one at which he or she makes a purchase. For these two reasons, a price 
cut for a brand-store combination other than the one that is purchased could 
go unnoticed. This effect often is given as a reason why price competition may 
not be effective with imperfect price information; price increases are quickly 
noted by existing customers, while price reductions are not observed by other 
consumers. The result of this asymmetry will be a kinked demand curve as il-
lustrated in Figure 1. We test for asymmetric responses to price increases and 
decreases in our demand analysis presented in Section 4. 
3. A Look At Consumer Shopping Behavior 
A. Overview 
Our data were obtained from Information Resources, Inc., a marketing 
research firm. The data cover the purchases of 935 households over a 108 week 
period (April 1980-April 1982). For each household, a time series of all of that 
household's purchases in the coffee category is provided. For each purchase, 
the time of purchase, the store in which it was made, the price paid, and the 
use of either manufacturer or retailer coupons are given. In total, about 50,000 
purchase events are included in our sample. These events occured at six stores 
in the Pittsfield, Massachusetts area. The six stores are grouped into three 
chains. The data were collected through scanners that read the universal prod-
uct codes of all goods purchased by participants in the study who identified 
themselves while checking-out.10 In addition to data on quantities and retail 
prices, we have information on in-store displays, local print advertising, and the 
availablity of retailer coupons for each of the six supermarkets on a weekly basis. 
We do not have direct evidence of the ways in which consumers incorporate 
retailer feature and display activities into their information portfolios. Indirect 
evidence, however, suggests that these activities have an important influence 
on consumer behavior. Consider features first. As noted in Section 2, retailers 
ran features for brands 11 percent of the time. Moreover, there was no brand 
that was featured for more than 27 percent of the weeks by any given chain. 
Yet, 52.1 percent (by weight) of all ground, caffeinated coffee purchases includ-
ed in our sample were made during a week when the brand bought was featured 
in the store's local print advertising. 
Looking at display activity, a similar picture emerges. The four leading brands 
were on display only 12 percent of the time~ The single strong outlier was Chock 
Full of Nuts at Chain 2, where it was on display 42 percent of the time. This 
brand/chain combination accounted for only 10.5 percent of total sales in our 
sample .. Despite the infrequency of display activity, purchases of brands while 
10 Although we have not tested the sample to determine whether it is a representative one, it 
is worth noting a point made by Telser (1962) in a very similar context. This data originally was 
collected to be sold to coffee sellers. Given that sellers are willing to pay a large amount of money 
for this data, they appear to believe that it accurately reflects the demand conditions that they face. 
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they were on display accounted for·41.9 percent of all purchases of ground, 
caffeinated coffee. 
Purchases made using coupons comprise a large percentage of total purchases, 
whether measured in terms of the number of purchases made or the quantities 
of coffee" bought. Consumers used coupons for 24.5 percent (by weight) of all 
the purchases made in our sample over the full two year period. Of purchases 
made using coupons, approximately two thirds utilized stores' coupons and one 
third utilized manufacturers' coupons. About 7 percent of purchases made us-
ing coupons utilized store and manufacturer coupons simultaneously. The use 
of coupons varies greatly across households, as Table 4 illustrates. Over 94 
percent of the households in our sample used coupons at least once to purchase 
some fonn of coffee (mcluding instant and decaffeinated ground). There is a weak, 
negative correlation (-0.1) between the total quantity of ground, ca1feinated coffee 
purchased by household and the percentage of purchases made by the household 
using coupons. 
The inferences about the individual importance of various promotions drawn 
from the data on purchase percentages need to be qualified somewhat. Stores 
often used promotions in combination with each other. Table 5 gives a sample 
of the correlations between the use of coupons, features, and displays. Over 
78 percent of the purchases of ground, caffeinated coffee that were made using 
coupons took place while the brand purchased was either on display or on feature, 
although only 57 percent of all ground, caffeinated purchases were made while 
on feature or on display. Given these correlations, it is difficult to disentangle 
the effects of alternative promotions through simple summary statistics. 
If consumers switch stores in response to between-store differentials in cof-
fee prices, or if consumers routinely vary their purchases among chains for other 
reasons (such as differentials in the price of milk), then the demand for a given 
brand of coffee at one store will be cross-elastic with the brands of coffee sold 
at other chains. Because the pattern of pricing and promotional activity does 
not vary across stores within a given chain, we examine switching among retail 
outlets at the chain rather than store level. On average, a household made 78.5 
percent (by weight) of its purchases from its preferred chain. Over 47 percent 
of the households in our sample switched the chain from which they purchased 
ground, caffeinated coffee two or fewer times during the two year sample period. 
A few consumers switched chains quite frequently, however, so that the average 
number of chain switches per household is 7.67. 
To get a sense of the extent to which consumers stockpile coffee, we looked 
at the variance in the time intervals between the purchases made by a given 
household and at the variance in the size of purchases made by a given household. 
If a conSumer's only motivation for holding inventories is to minimize transac-
tions costs, if his or her coffee consumption rate is roughly constant, and if there 
are no smoothing problems due to the fact that only pound multiples may be 
purchased, then the within-household variances of both the times between cof-
fee purchases and the sizes of the purchases made will be low. For our sample 
. 
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households, the mean coefficient of variation (the ratio of the standard devia-
tion to the mean) for times between purchases was equal to .84, and the mean 
time between purchase occasions was 7.4 weeks. The mean coefficient of varia-
tion for purchase sizes was equal to .36, with a mean purchase size of 23.4 
ounces.ll Both of these numbers indicate that consumers did not pursue steady-
state purchasing patterns. These results weakly support the hypothesis that 
households engage in stocking up for .. speculative" reasons as well as to 
minimize transactions costs. 
B. Brand Switching Behavior 
We tum now to a more detailed description of brand purchase behavior. 
Specifically, we study the pattern of interbrand switching by consumers. In the 
next subsection, we will relate this behavior to promotional activity. In the pre-
sent section, we examine the breadth of consumer switching (i.e., how many 
brands does a given household purchase) and the frequency of consumer switch-
ing (i.e., how often does a household change brands). 
As a prelude to this examination, we report, in Table 6, the market shares 
by brand for the ground, caffeinated segment. The four brands upon which we 
focus are Maxwell House, Folgers, Chock Full of Nuts, and Hills Brothers. The 
combined market share of these four brands is 74.4 percent. We treat private 
label and generic ground, caffeinated coffees as a single composite brand in our 
analysis of consumers' switching in and out of the dominant branded coffees. 
We noted above that coffee is an experience good. We therefore can view 
the breadth of a household's consumption experience across brands as a measure 
of the information that it possesses about product attnbutes. Our data cover 
a limited period. Given the durability of information about brand attributes, a 
possible explanation of a finding of low switching and sampling rates during the 
period covered by our data could be that consumers were well-informed (based 
on past consumption experience) and had strong brand preferences. A finding 
that consumers switch brands often would indicate that consumers are likely 
to be informed about product attributes (they will have gathered information 
through experience) and thus are not likely to be susceptible to the vendor market 
power that could otherwise arise due to consumers' imperfect infonnation about 
the set of alternative brapds that are available. 
Table 7 reports the number of brands purchased by household over the two 
year sample period. The most striking feature is the extent to which consumers 
purchase multiple brands. Only 18 percent of sample households stayed with 
a single brand over the two years, and half of the households tried at least four 
brands. A similar picture emerges when one looks at the number of vendors 
(manufacturers) sampled per household. There is a distinction between brands 
and vendors because several vendors produce multiple brands. For ground, caf-
11 The mean purchase size is the number of ounces bought per week averaged over the set of 
weeks in which the household had positive purchase quantities. 
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feinated coffee this distinction turns out to be an unimportant one. 12 
Information about product quality is likely to be durable. Given the frequency 
of purchase (see Table 2) and the number of different brands sampled, consumers 
appear to·have good information about the quality attnbutes of several brands. 
In light of the fact that prices change frequently and there are several stores 
that pursue different pricing policies, consumers may actually be better inform-
ed about quality than price in this market, at least for the major brands. For 
other, less frequently purchased and more complicated goods, one typically thinks 
of quality information as being more difficult to obtain than price information. 
We now consider the frequency of brand switching. We are interested in the 
retention, or loyalty, rates for the major brands, i.e., the fraction of their 
customers who return to the same brand on their next purchase occasion. For 
each household we have computed a matrix of switches, where a switch is 
calculated by looking at the brands chosen on two successive purchase occa-
sions. Sij is the number of switches from brand i to brand j, weighted by the 
size of the purchase measured in ounces. Thus, for example, Su is the number 
of times that households made two consecutive purchases of brand i. We define 
the Markov brand lovalty rate as 
Su / 1: Su . 
j 
This rate tells us the percentage of customers that a brand retains for another 
purchase given that they have purchased the brand today. The first row of Table 
8 presents the Markov brand loyalty rates for the four major brands of ground, 
caffeinated coffee averaged across households. 
A comparison of the overall market shares (from Table 6) and the Markov 
brand loyalty rates vermes the presence of significant brand loyalty. For every 
brand, the Markov brand loyalty rate is much higher than the brand's market 
share. This finding is a natural one in differentiated products markets with 
heterogeneous consumers; informed consumers tend to stay with their preferred 
brands. 
A second way to compute brand loyalty is to compute the percentage of its 
total purchases of ground, caffeinated coffee that a given household makes of 
a single brand. For each of the four leading brands, Table 9 gives the percen-
tage of households for whom that brand was their favorite. For the households 
favoring a particuIar brand, Table 9 also gives the purchases of these households' 
favorite brands as a percentage of the households' total purchases. This measure, 
too, shows that brand loyalty is present. 
12 In the decaffeinated and soluble segments this distinction can be substantial. For example. in 
the ground. decaffeinated segment the two dominant brands. Brim and Sanka. are produced by 
the same vendor. General Foods. 
. 
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C. Brand Switching and Promotional Activity 
We can use our data on consumer switching among brands to get some idea 
about possible motivations for firms' promotional behavior. Rational consumers 
will use coupons to minimize the full price (i.e., the transactions price plus shop-
ping costs) that they pay for coffee. But is it rational for firms to incur the ex-
pense of issuing coupons? In particular, from the seller's perspective what is 
the advantage from offering a coupon rather than making a retail price cut? One 
difference between a price cut and a coupon is that a coupon may serve as a 
particular form of advertising (the coupon is a means of getting the consumer's 
attention). Even viewed strictly as a means of reducing price, though, there 
are two important differences between coupons and ordinary price cuts: (1) 
coupons may be a means of price discriminating among consumers; and (2) 
coupons may be a means of preventing consumers from stocking-up coffee pur-
chased at reduced prices. 
Coupons can be a profitable means of facilitating price discrimination or screen-
ing when there is a negative correlation between a consumer's wiIlingness to 
pay for the given brand and the consumer's propensity to use coupons. In such 
cases, one could think of there being two types of consumer. One type of con-
sumer is price-conscious, uses coupons, and purchases from the brand offering 
the lowest effective price. The second type of consumer is relatively insensitive 
to price, does not clip coupons, and makes purchase decisions on the basis of 
loyalty to, or preferences for, a given brand. When a regular price cut is made, 
type-two consumers loyal to 'that brand receive the price reduction even though 
they would have purchased it anyway. By tying the reduced price to the use 
of coupons, the seller can avoid giving price reductions to such inframarginal 
consumers who would have purchased anyway. 
Coupons may also serve as a means of targeting new users and preventing 
established users from stocking up. IT a brand makes a price reduction that con-
sumers believe is only temporary, then those consumers who have information 
about the brand and prefer it to others will stock up on the brand at the low 
price. In effect, the brand will be taking (future) sales from itself. When the price 
cut is achieved through the issuance of a coupon, the lower price is available 
only for the initial unit that a consumer purchases (unless the consumer obtains 
multiple coupons). The use of coupons win limit existing customers' ability to 
establish inventories at the low price. At the same time, the coupon will lower 
the new user's c'ost of sampling the brand by making a single purchase. 13 
Under the hypothesis that coupon users are price-conscious consumers who 
switch brands frequently, the loyalty rate among coupon users should be lower 
than th~ loyalty rate among consumers who did not use coupons to make the 
initial purchase in the 51j calculation. Table 8 shows that this is in fact the pat-
13 The staff of the Federal Trade Commission has suggested that geographic price discrimina-
tion, where coupons serve as a means of preventing retailer arbitrage across regions, also may 
be a motivation for manufacturers to issue coupons. 
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tern that one finds. For example, overall, 62 percent of the time that a household 
purchases Chock Full 0' Nuts, its next purchase also will be Chock Full 0' Nuts. 
Conditional on the initial purchase being made using a coupon, however, the 
percentage of repeat purchases is only 49 percent. 
This pattern also is consistent with the view that the role of coupons is to 
attract additional customers without allowing existing customers to stock-up in 
order to take advantage of the temporarily low prices. When an ordinary price 
cut, rather than a coupon, is used to attract consumers, households may stock-
up on the brand. These stock-up purchases will be recorded as S/I transactions 
since each can is treated as a separate purchase event. Thus, the set of pur-
chase pairs where coupons were not used for the initial purchase should be more 
likely to contain a high proportion of S/I pairs. 
We have done a similar analysis of feature and display promotional activity 
(see Table 10). Again, we find that consumers who came to brand i while it was 
being promoted are less likely to remain loyal. 14 This finding is consistent with 
the view that promotional activity encourages sampling. Note that the effects 
of features and displays on the Markov loyalty rates seem to be less pronounc-
ed than in the case of coupons. 
The brands from which consumers switch to brand i also can be analyzed us-
ing our consumer switching data. The percentage of brand i purchases that come 
from consumers who last purchased brand i is given by 
S/ll :E S}I • 
J 
The first line of Table 11 gives the figures for the four leading brands calculated 
over all purchase pairs of grotmd, caffeinated coffee. Again, our main interest 
is in the split samples, where the division is by whether the second purchase 
in the S}I was made using a coupon. The table shows that coupons do indeed 
attract a large proportion of "new" users to the brand, i.e., nonrepeat users. 
For example, 64 percent of overall purchases of Chock Full 0' Nuts were repeats, 
while only 29 percent of Chock Full 0' Nuts coupon purchases were repeats. 
Coupons do appear to selectively discount to price conscious consumers and/or 
prevent stocking up. Much the same pattern is found when purchases are 
categorized by display and feature activity (see Table 12). 
4. The Determinants of Demand 
A. Estimated Demand Functions 
Our final results involve aggregate sales for a given brand/chain combination, 
rather than purchasing behavior on an individual level. Our data set allows us 
U These results are consistent with those obtained by Guadagni and Little, who fit a logit model 
to a different set of panel data for purchases of ground, caffeinated coffee. 
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to include promotional variables in addition to price in order to test some of the 
implications derived in our earlier discussion of the theory of consumer shop-
ping. Because each chain has its own pattern of pricing and promotional activity 
(which does not vary across stores within a given chain), we will examine each 
chain separately from the others in the analysis below. To reduce the number 
of parameters to be estimated in our demand equations, the prices of all brand-
ed ground, caffeinated coffees other than the four leading ones were aggregated. 
A price index was constructed using quantities to weight the prices in the in-
dex. Similarly, the prices of all private label and generic ground, caffeinated cof-
fees for a given chain were aggregated (again using quantities as the weights) 
to form a chain-specific private label price index. 
In estimating the demand for a given brand at a specific chain, we included 
the prices and promotional activities for that brand at all three chains as ex-
planatory variables, while for brands other than the one whose demand we were 
estimating only the prices and promotional activities at the chain under considera-
tion were included. More specifically, we ran regressions of the following form: 
xi. = 0: + r: 1~"Pir + 'Y"Fir + O"PirFir + e"PirFir + ~"Dirl 
n 
+ r: l~kP~. + AkF~. + O'kp~.F~r + ekP~rF~r + TkD~rl 
k*i 
where Xi. is the quantity of brand i sold by chain n in week t. Pi .. Fi .. and Dir 
represent price, feature dummy (= 1 if on feature), and display dummy (= 1 
is on display), with the subscripts and superscripts defined as for the quantity 
variable. ls Greek letters denote the coefficients to be estimated. Terms involving 
feature and display dummies were not included for the two composite •. brands. ' , 
In the ground, caffeinated segment of the market alone, we have four major 
brands, each of which is sold at three chains. across which prices and promo-
tional activities vary. This gives us 12 regressions for a given specification. Due 
to space limitations, we have chosen to report the results from only one of the 
chains. At two of the chains some of the promotional activities were linearly 
dependent combinations of others, making it difficult to interpret the results, 
as well as making'some of the estimates unreliable. On this basis we chose to 
report the regressions results for the remaining chain, Chain 2, only. 
15 Atte~pts to fit linear-log and log-log (where possible) functional fonns proved to be less suc-
cessful. and the results are not presented here. We also ran regressions using market share as 
the dependent variable. Those regressions yielded results similar to the ones reported in the text. 
In some of our share regressions. we also included the average (over the past month) of the market 
share of the brand whose share we were explaining. These tenns were included to capture stockpiling 
effects and to allow us to distinguish between long and short run effects of price changes. The \'ariables 
tended to be small in value and insignificant. 
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These results are displayed in Table 13. 16 We found that the feature variables 
were significant and had large absolute effects. For example, while Chock Full 
'0 Nuts had a mean sales level of 421 ounces per week over the full sample 
period, being on feature tended to increase its weekly sales by 1,435 ounces. 
For each of the four major brands, being on feature led to increases in sales 
that were at least this large. The display variables were much less successful 
as explanators, and often had perverse signs. 
The price variables tended to have the expected signs (under the assumption 
that all of the brands are substitutes with one another), but many of the cross-
brand price effects were not statistically significant. 17 The own-price elasticities 
of demand for the four major brands are of particular interest. Since our specifica-
tion is a linear one, we must choose a point at which to calculate the own price 
elasticities. As is conventional, we do so at the means of the relevant variables. 
The resulting point estimates of the own-price elasticities of demand are shown 
in Table 14. 
B. Inttradion Between Price Advertising and 
Price Changes Within A Single Store 
The terms that are the product of the brand i's price with its feature activity 
dummy are included to capture the idea that a price change should be more ef-
fective if accompanied by a display or a feature; more consumers will be aware 
of the price change under such circumstances. The estimated effect of an 
unadvertised price change of brand i at chain n is given by {j". The estimated 
effect of an advertised price change is given by the sum of {j" and 0". 0" captures 
the extra impact that a price change has when consumers are made better aware 
of it. 
We see from Table 13 that the interaction between a brand's price and feature 
activity tended to have the predicted effect on the brand's sales (a price increase 
lost more sales when the brand was on feature). This relationship is illustrated 
in Table 14, where for each of the four brands the elasticity of demand in response 
to an advertised price is higher than the elasticity for an unadvertised price. 
This relationship is consistent with the theory that feature activity conveys price 
18 We speculated that the poor fit for MuweJl House's ground, caffeinated coffee might be the 
result of our having omitted MaXwell House's flaked coffee, Master Blend. from the regressions. 
We ran a regression restricting the sample to the period prior to the introduction of Master Blend 
(roughly half of our sample), and the fit for MaxweU House's regular ground, caffeinated coffee 
was equaUy poor. 
17 The reader might be concerned about the omission of the prices of other types of coffee from 
our regressions. A 1978 study conducted for the International Coffee Organization (The U.S. Retail 
Coffee Manet (AJ (1982), page 8) found that less than 6 percent of consumers of caffeinated ·coffee 
also drink decaffeinated coffee. Similarly, a 1979 study for the 5an1e body (1M U.S. Retail Coffee 
Market (AJ (1982), page 6) fOlDld that less than 20 percent of consumers who drink ground coffee 
also drink soluble, or instant, coffee. These figures include consumption outside the home, and 
thus probably overstate the extent to which consumers purchase multiple types of coffee in 
supermarkets. 
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information. The estimates obtained for the effect that each brand's display-
price interaction term had on its sales, on the other hand, do not support the 
theory that displays provided pn::e information; three of the four estimated coef-
ficients were statistically significantly different from zero and had the opposite 
of the predicted sign (they were positive). 
The most surprising results are that feature activity in itself is so important, 
even when prices and price-feature interaction terms are included in the regres-
sion. 1S One possible explanation is that consumers use features as signals of 
price cuts. We regressed prices on feature activity to determine the validity 
of the use of features as signals of price cuts. The week, the square of the week, 
and display activity also were included to capture any time trends and the ef-
fects of other promotions, respectively. TIrus, the regressions were of the form: 
P"i ... ex + i3F"i. + 'YIn. + at + I'tZ . 
This regression analysis indicates that on-feature is a weak signal of low prices. 
While in 9 of 12 of these regressions 13 did have a negative sign, in 8 of 12 cases 
the coefficients were insignificant at the .05 level. Display activity is even less 
valuable as a predictor of price, being significant for only 3 of the 11 brand-chain 
combinations where displays were used, and for one of those 3 combinations 
the display coefficient is positive. H consumers do place too much emphasis on 
feature activity, then we might expect chains to use it more often than they 
do. An interesting next step in the analysis of feature activity would be to develop 
estimates of retailers' costs of this type of advertising. Once developed, the 
estimated costs and benefits to the retailer and manufacturer could be compared 
to see if they were consistent with the hypothesis that retailers and manufac-
turers (the latter through giving retailers incentives) made profit-maximizing 
use of these promotions. 
C. Do Prices and Promotions at Other Stores Matter? 
Changes in the price of a brand at one chain may induce consumers to make 
substitutions of purchases of that brand at one chain for purchases of the same 
brand at another chain. H such within-brand, between-store switching is impor-
tant, then attempts to gauge manufacturer market power by looking solely at 
the effect of price on sales at a single chain'will overstate the elasticity of de-
mand faced by the manufacturer. 
Do the prices and features at one chain affect the quantity of coffee demand-
ed at another? As discussed in Section 2.E, we would expect that unadvertised 
prices at other chains would have a very weak effect on sales at a given chain. 
Advertised prices, those on feature that week, might have a stronger, positive 
effect, but we would expect this effect to be dampened by households' prefer-
18 The importance of promotional activity through effects other than interaction with prices also 
was found by Guadagni and Little. 
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ences over chains. Feature activity at competing chains might have a negative 
effect on sales. In terms of our regression, for n =I: m, these hypotheses are: 
{3" - 0; {3" + tI' > 0; and -.; < o. Our results concerning the effects of prices 
and promotions at chains 1 and 3 on sales at chain 2 were mixed. For example, 
an unadvertised rise in the price of Folgers at chain 1 had a positive and signifi-
cant effect on the sales of Folgers at chain 2. Due to multicollinearity, one can-
not determine the corresponding effect for an advertised price increase. For 
Hills Brothers, {j1 +01 is the only one of these terms that was significantly dif-
ferent from zero at the 90 percent confidence level. For display activity, we 
would expect the cross-chain effects to be minimal, and the regression results 
support this hypothesis. 19 
Given the cross-chain effects of price on demand in some cases, the elasticities 
of demand faced by the manufacturer and retailer will differ. To calculate the own-
retail-price elasticity of demand faced by a coffee producer, we IInlst look at 
the total effect on sales across all three chains when the price of a given brand 
is raised by one percent at all of the chains simultaneously. Again making this 
calculation at the mean sales level, we find that Chock Full 0' Nuts has an 
unadvertised price elasticity of -2.0, Maxwell House 2.0, Folgers -9.4, and Hills 
Brothers -20.2. 
D. Kinked Demand Theo1y 
When price information is costly to gather, a seller may face a kinked demand 
curve, at least with respect to unadvertised price changes (see Section 2.E). 
We tested this hypothesis by nmning the following regression, which includes 
separate coefficients for the effects of price increases and price decreases, in 
addition to a feature-price interaction term and the first difference of feature 
activity: 
where 
u... _ {I -if Pj.-Pj..1 ~ 0 
Jr - 0 otherwise . 
19 The Jipding of generally weak cross-store effects appears to contradict the conventional wisdom 
in food retailing that consumers will switch stores in response to swings in the price of coffee. One 
explanation of this seeming discrepancy comes from the fact that the consumers' sensitivity to the 
price of coffee in choosing a store is greatly magnified from the retailer's perspective. When a rise 
in the price of coffee induces a consumer to shop at another store, the retailer will tend to lose 
the consumer's entire set of supermarket purchases. 
. 
• 
KATZ AND SHAPIRO Page 433 
If the kinked demand curve theory is correct, then both "(J and OJ will be 
negative, but "(J will be larger in absolute value. Constructing an F-test, and 
again restricting attention to chain 2, for all of the brands except Folgers one 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that "(J = OJ even with a confidence level of 
only 20 percent. For Folgers, one can reject the null hypothesis of equality even 
at the 99 percent level. The F olgers' kink, however, is the opposite of the one 
predicted by the theory; 0, is larger in absolute value than is ,,(,. The cross-brand 
price effects tend to be insignificant and the kinks in the demand for brand i 
with respect to the price of brand j, j * i, tend to be insignificant as well. In this 
market, at least, the imperfection of consumer information does not appear to 
give rise to kinked demands. 
5. Conclusion 
We have examined both conswner and firm behavior in the retail coffee market 
in some detail. The patterns of consumers' shopping behavior and firms' pro-
motional activities that we observed have important implications for the perfor-
mance of the retail coffee market. 
First, consider consumer shopping behavior. Given the frequency with which 
households purchase coffee, we would expect experience to be an important 
source of quality information. The relatively large number of brands (3.7 on 
average) sampled per household over the two year period covered by our data 
indicates that consumers should be well informed about the (quality) attributes 
of the various ground, caffeinated coffees. At the same time, the typical con-
sumer's information about prices, especially at stores other than the one at which 
the consumer shops, may be highly imperfect. 
There are two indicators that consumers' price information may be limited. 
First, in our regression analysis, we found that prices at rival supermarket chains 
tend to be insignificant in explaining sales at a given chain. This pattern is con-
sistent with consumers having poor information about the prices at chains other 
than the ones from which they make purchases. Of course, it also is consistent 
with consumers having strong preferences among stores. Second, consumers 
react strongly to local print advertisements (features) that typically provide price 
information. As we have Seen, the strength of consumers' reaction to features 
even after price-feature interaction effects have been accounted for is surpris-
ing; our regressions of prices on time, display activity, and feature activity show 
that features are a poor predictor of price-although features are weakly cor-
related with price cuts. Consumers may incorrectly be taking features to be 
strong signals of price cuts, indicating that consumers are not well-informed about 
prices. ' 
In summary, we see a pattern that may be typical of consumer non-durables 
that are purchased relatively frequently: consumers' price information is poor 
relative to their quality information. This pattern occurs when experience is an 
important source of information and product qualities change much less frequently 
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than do prices, so that information· gathered through experience tends to 
depreciate less rapidly for qualities than for prices. The opposite pattern tends 
to hold for less frequently purchased, "big-ticket" items, where experience 
is less likely to be an important source of information. The appropriate con-
sumer protection policies for different types of goods tlms are likely to be rather 
different. 
The use of coupons constitutes another aspect of consumer shopping behavior. 
Consumers do use coupons, and some households use them quite heavily. 
Households are willing to switch away from their favorite brands to alternative 
brands in order to make use of coupons. A household that has purchased a brand 
using a coupon is less likely to remain with that brand for its next purchase, 
and is less likely to have bought that brand in the past, than is a household that 
has not used a coupon to make its purchase. 
Turning to the sellers' side of the market, our results indicate the great im-
portance of promotional activity. One dimension of promotional activity that we 
have investigated from the seller's perspective is the use of store- and 
manufacturer-issued coupons. Our findings are consistent both with the theory 
that coupons are a way of reducing prices without permitting loyal customers 
to stock up, and with the theory that coupons are a means of targeting price 
reductions at price-conscious consumers. 
In our regression analysis, we found that promotional activities are important 
determinants of the quantities of the brands that are purchased. These results 
point out a danger in using highly aggregated data to estimate demands. Once 
data are aggregated across· chains, it is difficult to look at promotional activity. 
In view of the promotional activity which is so prevalent in the retail coffee 
market, and in view of the correlation between price reductions and promo-
tional activities, prices would appear to have more significance than they in fact 
do if the promotional variables were omitted from the regressions. 
Even when promotional activities are accounted for in the analysis, the own-
price effects on demand are signjficant. There appears to be little market power 
at either the manufacturer or retailer level. Consumers have enough informa-
tion about the prices of alternative brands within a single supermarket that they 
do switch brands in response to price changes. Moreover, the level of within-
store price information is sufficient to eliminate any kink in the demand for a 
particular brand. Further,·both the brand switching analysis and the regression 
results support the hypothesis that feature activity strengthens price competi-
tion and reduces market power. Neither product differentiation nor the in-
completeness of consumer information is a source of significant market power. 
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Figurel 
KINKED DEMAND CURVE 
Price 
Quantity 
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Brand 
Chock Full 0' Nuts 
Maxwell House 
Folgers 
Hills Brothers 
Average Across 
All Four Brands 
Table 1 
RETAILER USE OF PROMOTIONS 
Percentage of 
chain-weeks 
featured 
15 
9 
10 
10 
11 
Table 2 
Percentage of 
chain-weeks 
displayed 
27 
8 
7 
10 
12 
DISTRiBUTION OF PURCHASE NUMBERS ACROSS HOUSEHOLDS 
Number of 
Purchases 
1-5 
6-10 
11-20 
21-40 
41-60 
61-80 
81-100 
>100 
Proportion of 
Households 
28 percent 
12 percent 
14 percent 
16 percent 
13 percent 
7 percent 
4 percent 
5 percent 
Mean number of purchases per household: 30.5. 
Cumulative 
Proportion 
28 percent 
40 percent 
54 percent 
70 percent 
84 percent 
91 percent 
95 percent 
100 percent 
The top 5 percent of the households account for 2l.4 percent of the purchases. 
Here. a purchase is defined as buying a single can. Thus. a consumer who buys several cans of 
coffee during a single trip to a store would be reported as making multiple purchases . 
. 
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T8ble 3 
SAMPLE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PRICE AND PROMOTIONS 
Correlation Correlation Correlation 
Between Price Between Price Between Price and 
Brand/Chain On Display On Feature Store Coupon 
Maxwell Housell -.01 .02 -.04 
Maxwell Housel2 -.17 -.04 -.07 
Maxwell House/3 .08 -.11 -.13 
Folgers/1 -.23 -.24 -.08 
Foigers/2 -.57 -.61 N/A 
Foigers/3 .00 -.22 N/A 
Chock Full 0' Nuts/1 N/A -.04 -.04 
Chock Full 0' Nuts/2 -.22 -.39 N/A 
Chock Full 0' Nuts/3 -.38 -.28 -.17 
Hills Brothersl1 -.34 -.37 -.06 
Hills Brothersl2 -.55 -.60 N/A 
Hills Brothers/3 .50 .30 N/A 
N I A : Dot applicable. 
Table 4 
DISTRIBUTION OF COUPON USE ACROSS HOUSEHOLDS 
(For all types of coffee) 
Number of 
Purchases Made 
Using Coupons 
o 
1-10 
11-20 
21-30 
31-40 
41-50 
> 50 
Proportion of 
Households 
6 percent 
47 percent 
24 percent 
13 percent 
6 percent 
2 percent 
2 percent 
Mean number of purchases using coupon per household: 13.9. 
Cumulative 
Proportion 
6 percent 
53 percent 
77 percent 
89 percent 
95 percent 
98 percent 
100 percent 
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Table 5 
SAMPLE CORRELATIONS AMONG PROMOTIONS 
(Maxwell House ground, caffeinated at chain 2) 
On Display 
On Feature 
Store Coupon Issued 
Brand 
Maxwell House 
Folgers 
Chock Full o' Nuts 
Private Label and Generic 
Hills Brothers 
Chase and Sanborn 
Martinson 
All Other Brands 
On Display 
1.0 
0.45 
0.24 
Table 6 
On Feature 
0.45 
1.0 
0.72 
MARKET SHARES BY BRAND 
Market Share 
24.4 
23.0 
18.3 
18.0 
9.0 
2.6 
2.3 
2.4 
Table 7 
Store Coupon Issued 
0.24 
0.72 
1.0 
Cumulative Share 
24.4 
47.4 . 
65.7 
83.7 
92.7 
95.3 
97.6 
100.0 
NUMBER OF BRANDS PURCHASED, BY HOUSEHOLD 
Number of 
Brands Purchased 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9-11 
Proportion of 
Households 
18. percent 
17 percent 
14 percent 
13 percent 
16 percent 
12 percent 
7 percent 
2 percent 
1 percent 
Mean number of brands purchased per household: 3.7. 
Cumulative 
Proportion 
18 percent 
35 percent 
49 percent 
62 percent 
78 percent 
90 percent 
96 percent 
99 percent 
100 percent 
. 
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Table 8 
MARKov LOYALTY RATE 
(With breakdown by coupon use) 
Loyalty Rate 
Chock Full Maxwell Hills 
0' Nuts House Folgers 
All Purchases 62 62 63 
Consumers Who Came with a 
Purchase Using a Coupon 49 55 56 
Consumers Who Came with a 
Purchase Not Using a 
Coupon 63 70 65 
Difference Between Coupon 
and NonCoupon Rates (14) (15) (9) 
Table 9 
QUANTITY MEASURE OF BRAND LOYALTY 
Page 439 
Brothers 
42 
14 
44 
(30) 
Household's Most-
Purchased Brand 
Most-Purchased Brand as 
Percentage of Househokl's 
Total Purchases 
Percent of Households for 
Whom the Brand is Their 
Most-Purchased One 
Chock Full 0' Nuts 
Maxwell House 
Folgers 
Hills Brothers 
Private Label· 
61 
68 
63 
60 
68 
21 
29 
22 
2 
20 
"Private Label is a composite of all of the private label and generic brands that are offered. 
Table 10 
MARKov LOYALTY RATE 
(With breakdown by presence of features and displays) 
Loyalty Rate 
Chock Full Maxwell 
0' Nuts House Folgers 
All Purchases 62 62 63 
Consumers Who Came While 
Brand Was on Feature 
or Display 61 55 57 
Consumers Who Came While 
Brand Was Not on Feature 
or Display 67 68 70 
Difference Between On and 
Off Rates (6) (13) (13) 
Hills 
Brothers 
42 
42 
43 
(1) 
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Table 11 
WHERE CUSTOMERS COME FROM 
(With breakdown by coupon use) 
Chock Full 
o' Nuts 
All Purchases 64 
Consumers Who Came with a 
Purchase Using a Coupon 29 
Consumers Who Came with a 
Purchase Not Using a 
Coupon 66 
Difference Between Coupon 
and Non Coupon Rates (37) 
Proportion of Customers Who Bought 
Same Brand on Previous Purchase 
Maxwell 
House Folgers 
60 65 
52 58 
70 66 
(18) (8) 
Table 12 
WHERE CUSTOMERS COME FROM 
(With breakdown by presence of features and displays) 
Proportion of Consumers Who Bought 
Same Brand on Previous Purchase 
Chock Full Maxwell 
o' Nuts House Folgers 
All Purchases 64 60 65 
Consumers Who Came While 
Brand Was on Display 
or Feature 63 53 59 
Consumers Who Came While 
Brand Was Not on Display 
or Feature 67 67 69 
Difference Between On and 
Off Rates (4) (14) (10) 
Hills 
Brothers 
46 
31 
46 
(15) 
Hills 
Bro·~ers 
46 
46 
44 
(2) 
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Tatile 13 
DEMAND FuNCTION REGRESSIONS 
Naming Conventions 
The variables that are used in the analysis are labeJIed according to the foRowing conventions: CHOCK 
refers to ChOCk Full 0' Nuts, MXHSE refers to Maxwell House, FOLGR refers to Folgers, HILLS 
refers to Hills Bros., PRIVT refers to an aggregation of private label and generic coffees, OTHER 
refers to an index of branded coffees with very small market shares. OWN refers to the brand 
given by the column index. P as a prefix refers to price (all prices are in cents per 16 oz. can of 
ground, caffeinated coffee), D as a prefix refers to the display dummy (which is 1 if and only if 
that brand is on display), F as a prefix refers to the feature dummy (defined analogously). If the 
variable name contains no number, then the chain referred to is Chain 2. A single digit suffix refers 
to the chain number. 
REsULTS 
Dependent Variable: Chain 2 Quantity Sales: 
Chock Full Maxwell Hills 
Independent Variable 0' Nuts House Folgers Brothers 
INTERCEPT 334 -578 355 -196 
(582) (376) (393) (491) 
P-CHOCK -11.7 -1.2 -0.36 0.63 
(2.8) (1.8) (1.9) (1.6) 
P-MXHSE -8.9 3.8 1.5 Ll 
(3.8) (4.2) (2.5) (2.2) 
P·FOLGR 0.60 -0.67 -10.9 0.96 
(2.1) (1.5) (1.4) (Ll) 
P·HILLS 1.7 0.52 0.97 ·3.2 
(1.5) (1.2) (Ll) (1.0) 
P·PRIVT 1.5 -0.66 0.49 0.61 
(0.76) (0.53) (0.48) (0.40) 
P·OTHER -0.16 -0.12 0.32 ·0.16 
(0.53) (0.38) (0.34) (0.28) 
P-OWN-1 21.7 -3.1 4.6 ·0.89 
(4.6) (4.1) (2.1) (2.4) 
P-OWN-3 -4.9 4.0 3.6 2.0 
(2.4) (2.9) (1.8) (2.4) 
F-CHOCK 1,435 197 -6.5 -204 
(683) (461) (439) (350) 
F·MXHSE -1,570 2,571 -406 48 
(1,645) (1,124) (1,085) (855) 
F-FOLGR 117 496 1,248 -270 
(857) (629) (571) (474) 
F·HILLS 596 118 -1,235 987 
(624) (441) (464) (331) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
" , 
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Table i3 (cont'd) 
, 
Dependent Variable: Chain 2 Quantity Sales: 
Chock Full Maxwell Hi11s 
Independent Variable o' Nuts House Folgers Brothers 
F-OWN-1 COL 1.908 1.478 1.367 
(2.757) (649) (958) 
F-OWN-3 -1.008 -1.762 1.297 COL 
(1.008) (2.728) (862) 
P-CHOCK -4.3 -0.96 0.60 0.81 
x F-CHOCK (2.9) (2.0) (1.9) (1.5) 
P-MXHSE 5.4 -7.2 1.6 0.08 
x F-MXHSE (6.1) (4.2) (4.0) (3.2) 
P-FOLGR -0.84 -2.9 -4.6 1.8 
x F-FOLGR (3.7) (2.8) (2.5) (2.1) 
P-HILLS -3.2 -0.70 6.2 -1.6 
x F-HILLS (2.9) (2.0) (2.2) (1.5) 
P-OWN-l 1.5· -5.5 -9.3 -5.5 
x F-OWN-1 (1.4) (10.5) (2.9) (4.0) 
P-OWN-3 4.0 7.1 -5.2 -1.2· 
x F-OWN-3 (4.6) (10.1) (3.6) (0.90) 
D-CHOCK -1.199 -106 77 53 
(560) (404) (376) (316) 
D-MXHSE 2.964 860 762 -428 
(1.838) (977) (949) (747) 
D-FOLGR -1.128 -339 -3.086 431 
(1.011) (733) (728) (555) 
D-HILLS -364 12 679 -1.589 
(673) (462) (435) (345) 
D-OWN-l N/A -1.338 COL -1.236 
(2.767) (857) 
D-OWN-3 -504 1.138 COL 2.255 
(822) (2.438) (8.608) 
P-CHOCK 5.3 0.33 -0.10 -0.17 
x D-CHOCK . (2.4) (1.7) (1.6) (1.3) 
P-MXHSE -11.4 -3.6 -2.7 1.4 
x D-MXHSE (7.2) (3.8) (3.7) (2.9) 
P·FOLGR 4.7 2.2 16.4 -2.6 
x D-FOLGR (4.8) (3.5) (3.5) (2.7) 
P-HILLS 2.1 -0.04 -3.3 7.4 
x D-HILhS (3.0) (2.1) (2.0) (1.5) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
N/A: Not Applicable. No Display Activity for Chock Full o' Nuts at Chain 1. 
COL or .: Variable is Perfectly Collinear with Other Variable(s). 
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Table 13 (cont'd) 
Dependent Variable: Chain 2 Quantity Sales: 
Chock Full Maxwell Hills 
Independent Variable o' Nuts House Foigers Brothers 
P-OWN-1 N/A 3.3 1.5* 4.5 
x D-OWN-l (10.5) (1.0) (3.8) 
P-OWN-3 2.2 -4.9 3.1 -7.2 
x D-OWN-3 (3.7) (9.6)" (1.0) (31.2) 
R2 0.80 0.58 0.87 0.86 
Number of Observations 108 108 108 108 
Mean of Dependent 
Variable 421 148 258 186 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
N/A: Not Applicable. No Display Activity for Chock Full o' Nuts at Chain 1. 
COL or *: Variable is Perfectly Collinear with Other Variable(s). 
Table 14 
OWN-PRICE ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND AT CHAIN 2 
Brand 
Chock Full 0' Nuts 
Maxwell House 
Foigers 
Hills Brothers 
Unadvertised 
Price Elasticity 
-6.5 
+6.9-
-10.6 
-4.2 
Advertised 
Price Elasticity 
-8.9 
-6.0 
-15.1 
-6.3 
*The own-price coefficient was not significantly different from zero at the .60 confidence level. 
. 
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Comments 
David Sappington 
University of Pennsylvania and 
Bell Communications Research 
This paper by Katz and Shapiro provides some interesting insights concern-
ing purchasing behavior of consumers. Their empirical findings extend our 
knowledge of how coupons, newspaper advertising, and in-store displays pro-
vide information to consumers, and thereby affect purchase decisions. The 
authors provide some evidence that coupons allow successful price discrimina-
tion, and that promotions tend to attract first-time buyers. 
My brief comments on this paper focus on two areas. First, I suggest a few 
caveats concerning interpretation of the econometric results in Section 4. Se-
cond, I discuss a few consumer protection issues that might inform future 
research, should the data permit. 
1. Econometric Estimation 
In Section 4 of their paper, Katz and Shapiro estimate demand curves for cof-
fee. The results of such estimates are intuitively appealing, but are difficult to 
interpret because no formal model of either consumer or producer behavior is 
offered in the paper. Hence, the exact nature of the null hypothesis that is be-
ing tested in the regression equations is not apparent. Admittedly, it is a dif-
ficult task to formulate a theoretical model and link the parameters of the model 
to regression coefficients. Recent work by Spady (1984), though, provides keen 
insight as to how this task might be accomplished. His analysis is nicely suited 
to the problem at hand here. 
There are two particular problems with the estimation techniques adopted 
by the present authors that warrant brief mention. First, the error terms across 
estimating equations appear wilikely to be independent. Generalized Least 
Squares, therefore, seems to be a more appropriate estimating technique than 
Ordinary Least Squares. Second, all of the right hand variables in the estimating 
equations are actually endogenous variables in a fully specified model. Hence, 
the possibility of simultaneous equations bias arises. It should also be mention-
ed that much ricfier lag structures than the one reported in footnote 15 should 
be examined. It is quite possible that current purchases depend upon past prices 
and anticipated future prices, particularly if firms are known to systematically 
offer p~riodic price discounts. 
2. Suggestions for Additional Investigations 
The detailed analysis that Katz and Shapiro offer is probably best regarded 
as an examination of how various promotional policies influence consumer pur-
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Page 446 FTC CONSUMER PROTECTION 'CONFERENCE 
chasing patterns. In as much, their work is a crucial predecessor to an examina-
tion of how firms will structure their promotions to maximize profits. Such an 
examination appears essential to answering the important question of whether 
features, .coupons and displays are employed in the best interest of consumers. 
It has been suggested in the industrial organization literature that coupons 
might be used by incumbent firms to deter entry. The idea is that coupons can 
make credible threats by incumbents to maintain low prices after entry has oc-
curred. It would be interesting to test whether incumbent firms tend to issue 
more coupons when entry is deemed more likely. A related test of interest would 
be whether incumbent firms increase promotional expenditures in response to 
entry, and whether the effect is to drive new entrants from the market. Similarly, 
it would be helpful to know whether entrants are afforded the same access to 
display and feature promotions that incumbents enjoy. 
An empirical investigation of whether multiproduct firms employ coupons and 
other promotions differently from firms that market a single product would also 
be valuable. For example, do multiproduct firms alternate the brands they pro-
mote so as to limit effective competition among the different brands? Our 
knowledge of the strategies and performance of multiproduct firms is sorely in-
adequate, and might well be enhanced by a careful analysis along these lines. 
It would also be interesting to examine empirically the different effects of dif-
ferent types of coupons. Katz and Shapiro have accurately identified functions 
of coupons that are printed in newspapers. Coupons that come bundled with 
the product purchased have different functions. With data that permits distinc-
tion among the various types of coupons, future empirical analysis should be 
sensitive to these distinctions. 
References 
Spady, Richard, "Non-Cooperative Price-Setting by Asymmetric Multiproduct 
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The Impact of Government Policy on the 
U.S. Cigarette Industry· 
Robert H. Porter 
State University of New York at Stony Brook 
1. Introduction 
This paper describes an empirical study of the U.S. cigarette industry from 
1947 to 1982. The cigarette industry was very unstable in this period. due to 
several health information "shocks" and a variety of government policy interven-
tions. This study attempts to determine the effects of these shocks and policy 
measures on the industry. For example. I shall examine the impact of the ban 
on television and radio advertising that became effective on January 1. 1971. 
Structural econometric methods. which estimate demand. price and advertis-
ing equations. are employed in order to measure how both producers and con-
sumers responded to the developments in the industry for purposes of com-
parison with previous studies. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains a brief account of the 
U.S. cigarette industry since 1946. arid the various changes it has undergone. 
Previous empirical work is reviewed and revised in Section 3. These earlier 
studies focused. for the most" part. on the demand for cigarettes. A second pur-
pose of this study is to examine in detail the decision rules of cigarette manufac-
turers. so that a simultaneous equation model of the industry as a whole can 
be estimated. Part of the revision of the earlier studies. then. is a correction 
for simultaneity bias in their estimates. In particular. if the actions of cigarette 
companies are considered. how are the estimates of changes in consumer de-
mand in response to the health shocks affected? If. for example. cigarette com-
panies cut prices in response to the publicity about the adverse health effects 
of smoking. then such a price cut should be viewed as a result of that publicity. 
The net effect on cigarette consumption will be less than that measured by shifts 
in aggregate demand. Section 4 then turns to estimation of the firnis' decision 
rules. with emphasis on the determination of prices and advertising levels. Sec-
tion 5 concludes with a list of caveats and qualifications. as well as suggestions 
for further research . 
• I have benefited from the research assistance of Cristina Mazon and the financial support of 
the Federal Trade Commission. Pauline Ippolito and Therese McGuire provided helpful comments 
on an earlier version of this paper. 
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2. The Cigarette Industry Since 1945 1 
In 1946, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the major cigarette com-
panies of conspiracy in restraint of trade and of monopolization under Sections 
1 and 2 o'f the Sherman Act. However, no structural remedies were adopted. 
Rather, fines of only $250,000 were assessed. 
Since the 1946 decision, six firms have dominated the industry: Reynolds, 
Philip Morris, Brown and Williamson, American Brands, Lorrilard and Liggett. 
Together they have accounted for all cigarette sales, for practical purposes. Other 
companies have occasionally captured a negligible share of the market Oess than 
one per cent), and imported cigarettes have not been a factor. Furthermore, 
cigarette sales have been dominated by a subset of the major firms. Table 1 
shows the evolution of various concentraction indices over five year intervals 
since 1947. CR.. is the percentage market share of the n largest companies, 
and H is the Herfindahl index, the sum of the squared percentage market shares 
of the six major companies. The two largest firms have always had market shares 
in excess of 50%. 
The entries in Table 1 would seem to indicate a stable industry. The Herfin-
dahl index declined after 1946 to a low of 2061 in 1958, remained between 2060 
and 2270 until 1976, and then increased slightly each year to its 1982 figure. 
What is unusual about cigarettes, however, is the instability of individual firm 
market shares. Table 2 lists individual firm market shares for the period covered 
in Table 1. This table indicates that there have been large swings in market 
share, particularly between 1957 and 1972. While Table 1 alone might be in-
dicative of a stable oligopoly which is immune from entry, interfirm market share 
movements have been dramatic, which could be characteristic of a highly com-
petitive industry. Whether the cigarette industry has behaved competitively is 
a hypothesis the empirical work will attempt to test. 
Much of this instability may be attributable to government policy and health 
information shocks. In 1953, a report by the American Cancer Society and the 
British Medical Research Council concluded that mortality rates were significantly 
higher for smokers than for non-smokers. A 1964 Surgeon General's report, 
summarizing existing research, concluded that cigarette smoking causes lung 
cancer. These were the two most prominent reports in a succession of studies 
which pointed out the health problems associated with smoking. As a conse-
quence of these studies, the federal government intervened in a number of ways. 
The Federal Cigarette Labelling and Advertising Act of 1965 required that the 
warning "Caution: Cigarette smoking may be hazardous to your health" be 
displayed on packages. The FCC required that one anti-smoking commercial 
be aired for every four pro-smoking advertisements, under the Fairness Doc-
trine. This campaign was in effect from July 1, 1967 through December 31, 1970. 
1 A more complete. if somewhat dated. description of the industry is given by Tennant (1971) 
and by Schmalensee (1972), Whitten (1979) contains a detailed account of changes in cigarette 
characteristics and the brand introduction strategies of the major finns. 
. 
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In 1967 the FTC began its program which annually publishes the tar and nicotine 
content of each cigarette brand (as well as carbon monoxide levels after 1981). 
The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1970 strengthened the health war-
nings on packages, to read "Warning: The Surgeon General has determined 
that cigarette smoking is dangerous to your health." In addition, this Act 
banned all radio and television advertising as ofJanuary 1, 1971. Agreements 
between the companies and the FTC in 1971 and 1972 ensured that tar and 
nicotine contents and a •• clear and conspicuous" health warning appeared in 
remaining advertising messages. In addition, there have been a number of federal, 
state and local measures which restricted areas in which people could smoke. 
Further, federal, state, county and city governments have imposed per pack 
excise taxes on cigarettes. Federal taxes were 7e per pack from November 1942 
through October 1951, and 8e per pack until the end of 1982. State taxes rang-
ed from 2' to 25e per pack in 1982, with an average levy of 13.1 e per pack. 2 
County and City taxes varied from Ie to 15e per pack in 1982, with an average 
levy ofO.56e per pack for the U.S. as a whole. Figure 1 plots the variable TAX, 
the sum of federal, state and local excise taxes collected, divided by total U.S. 
cigarette consumption and converted to 1967 dollars. (The units of TAX are 
1967 cents per pack.) Evidently, real taxes increased until 1969 but declined 
thereafter, as inflation outstripped excise tax increases. According to the Tobacco 
Institute (1983), state and federal taxes as a percentage of average retail price 
peaked at 51.4% in fiscal year 1965, and declined to 26.8% in fiscal year 1982. 
While cigarettes are very heavily taxed, the real burden decreased after 1969. 
(That trend was reversed in 1983, when federal taxes increased to 16c per pack.) 
What has been the impact of these policies and shocks on the industry? Before 
turning to econometric evidence, we examine the trends of the variables 
displayed in Figures 2 through 9. Figure 2 plots C, per capita cigarette con-
sumption, for the noninstitutional population 16 and older, in packs per year. 
(A list of variables appears in Table 3.) It experienced a drop in 1954-55, then 
grew until 1963, after which it has declined, although not smoothly. PTC in Figure 
3 is the percentage of tobacco consumed as cigarettes (as opposed to hand-
rolled cigarettes, cigars or pipe tobacco). This percentage has increased since 
1947, with temporary drops in 1954-55,1964 and 1969-70. Figures 4 and 5 show 
F and L, the percentage market shares of filter and low tar (15 mgs. or less) 
cigarettes, respectively. Filter cigarettes appeared in 1953, and eventually 
dominated the market. Low tar cigarettes appeared in 1964, but did not cap-
ture 5% of the market unti11972. Their share then increased rapidly unti11981, 
and declined slightly in 1982. (This decline continued in 1983.) TPC, the weight 
in pounds of tobacco per cigarette consumed, is displayed in Figure 6. This has 
declined from 1953 to 1982 by 38%, .as manufacturers put less tobacco (and 
more air, since tobacco was less tightly packed) in individual cigarettes. TPC 
2 Total gross state collections divided by U.S. cigarette sales. The exception is New Hampshire, 
which imposes an ad valorem tax. 
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is very highly correlated with average tar and nicotine content per cigarette, 
when these figures are available. A retail price index for cigarettes, P in Figure 
7, is converted into 1967 dollars, and P equals 100 in 1967. Roughly speaking, 
real retail prices increased until 1972 and declined after that. Of course, much 
of the variation in retail prices is attributable to real tax rate movements. 
Figure 8 shows ADV, real advertising expenditures. These grew until the 
ban, fell for a few years, and have since grown to record highs. The industry 
advertising/sales ratio averaged 5% from 1955 through 1967, but it has fallen 
to approximately 3% in 1981. At their peak in 1967, radio and television adver-
tising accounted for 78.5% of total cigarette advertising expenditures (and 69.1 % 
in 1970). Thus the ban prohibited access to the advertising media favored by 
cigarette companies, and almost certainly reduced the effectiveness of adver-
tising expenditures thereafter. 
Finally, T, per capita consumption of tobacco (for the noninstitutional popula-
tion 16 and older) is graphed in Figure 9. Unlike per capita cigarette consump-
tion, T peaked in 1952 and has declined ever since. To the extent that the de-
mand for cigarettes is a reflection of the demand for tobacco, this is the most 
relevant consumption series. As discussed in the next section, C may not have 
declined as much as T because TPC, tobacco per cigarette, fell, and so con-
sumers increased their consumption of a relative to T in order to maintain their 
desired tobacco consumption levels. 
Another notable statistic is the number of cigarette brands being marketed. 
This series is available since 1967, when the FTC tar and nicotine measure-
ment program began. For example, 134 brands were marketed in 1972, and 
208 in 1982. While the number of brands has increased dramatically, the ma-
jority have not been successful, in that few have captured a market share of 
0.5% or more. 3 To some extent, this increase in brands is illusory, as many 
new brands simply employ existing trademarks (e.g., Camel "Lights"). 
In summary, the following changes in the cigarette industry are evident from 
the raw data series displayed in Figures 1 through 9. Cigarette consumption 
per capita has fallen 10.7% from 1963 to 1982, although not as much as tobacco 
consumption per capita, which fell 33.2% in the same time period and 37.5% 
from 1953 to 1982. Producers have reduced the amount of tobacco per cigarette 
(and so tar and nicotine contents), and filter and low-tar cigarettes have come 
into prominence. Real advertising expenditures fell temporarily after the ban. 
Perhaps more importantly, they have been diverted into less effective media. 
Real retail prices have fallen since 1972, but so have real excise taxes. 
In order to obtain quantitative rather than qualitative estimates of these 
movements, and in order to infer causality, structural econometric techniques 
are emt>loyed in the following sections. 
3 See, for example, the 3IUlUai industry studies in Business Week, which tabulate market shares 
for the leading brands. 
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3. The Demand for Cigarettes 
This section summarizes previous research on the demand for cigarettes and, 
with some modification, applies the methodology of that research to the post-I946 
sample. The principal modification is the use of simultaneous equations tech-
niques, so that the resUlts presented in this section consist of a subset of a system 
of equations describing behavior in the cigarette industry. While this section 
concentrates on consumer demand, the next section examines firm behavior, 
particularlY pricing and advertising rules. 
The data employed are annual observations from 1947 to 1982 inclusive. 
Besides data availability considerations, the sample period was selected to follow 
the 1946 Supreme Court decision, and to precede the disruptions associated 
with the 1983 federal excise tax increase. In 1983, a low price generic brand 
was introduced by Liggett, and an effective price cut was initiated by Reynolds 
which offered 25 cigarettes for the price of 20 (their Century brand). Although 
there were price differences between king-size and regular brands, for the 
1947-82 sample the cigarette market equalibrium can be modelled as a situation 
where comparable brands had the same price at any location or point of sale. 
A list of variables is provided in Table 3. Apart from the variables discussed 
in the previous section, a number of exogenous variables are available. Of par-
ticular interest are the dummy variables, which reflect the 1953 and 1964 health 
information shocks (DA and DB respectively), the Fairness Doctrine period of 
anti-smoking commercials (DF), and the radio and television advertising ban 
(DC). When simultaneous equations techniques are called for, I employ two-
stage least squares (2SLS), which provides consistent single equation parameter 
estimates even when other equations in the system are misspecified, unlike 
three-stage least squares or full information maximum likelihood estimators. As 
will become apparent, specification issues figure prominently in the erisuing 
discussion. 
A number of studies have examined various aspects of the demand for cigar-
ettes. For example, Lewit, Coate and Grossman (1981) studied a panel data 
set of teenagers from 1966 to 1970. They found that, unlike adults. teenagers 
had responsive smoking demand and smoking participation rates with respect 
to price (elasticities of -1.4 and -1.2, respectively). Also, the Fairness Doctrine 
had a substantial negative impact on their participation rates. They cite evidence 
that individuals ape much less likely to start smoking after age twenty-five, so 
that the FCC doctrine may have had a long-term impact as well. They did not 
present any evidence on the effect of the advertising ban, apart from noting 
that teenage smoking participation rates rose from 15.2% in 1970 to 15.6% in 
1974, but fell to 11. 7% in 1979. They attributed the 1970-74 increase to falling 
real retail prices. 
In a study of a 1976 cross-section, Lewit and Coate (1982) estimated the adult 
price elasticity of demand for cigarettes to be -0.42. This elasticity had two com-
ponents. The elasticity of smoking participation (-0.26) exceeds that of demand 
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by smokers (-0.10). They also found that the decision to begin smoking regularly 
is price elastic for young adults, especially males. Income elasticities were signifi-
cant and positive, but very small (0.08). In conjunction with the results of their 
earlier study with Grossman, they conclude that higher cigarette prices "ap-
pear to effect cigarette demand by affecting the decision to smoke or not rather 
than by causing existing smokers to reduce the amount of cigarettes they smoke" 
(p. 136). 
Among the studies which employ aggregate annual time series data are those 
by Hamilton (1974), Ippolito, Murphy and Sant (1979), and Schneider, Klein 
and Murphy (1981). Hamilton's sample covered 1926-70. He estimated that per 
capita cigarette consumption fell 8.9% in 1953-70 due to the first health scare, 
an additiona121.1 % in 1964-70 due to the second scare, and a further 20% dur-
ing the Fairness Doctrine period. Since this latter effect exceeded the positive 
effect of advertising on consumption by a factor of six, he predicted that the 
advertising ban would result in an increase in consumption; because anti-smoking 
commercials were also eliminated. He also predicted that the ban would reduce 
competition in the industry, as a principal channel for rivalrous product promo-
tion expenditures would be closed, and companies would not fully shift their 
broadcasting expenditures into other media. 
A more recent study is that of Ippolito, Murphy and Sant (1979). In a 1926-75 
sample, using Cochrane-Orcutt techniques to correct for serial correlation, they 
obtained the estimates: 
I/o 
InC, = K, + 0.021 t - 0.176 DA, - 0.035 DB,Ct-1963) - 0.8111nPr + 0.71nY, 
(4.8) (5.6) (4.0) (4.6) (8.0) 
R2 = .986 
where the notation corresponds to that of Table 3,4 t refers to calendar year, 
In indicates natural logarithm and t-statistics are displayed in parentheses. The 
term K, includes a constant term and insignificant variables (DA,(t-1952), DB" 
DC, and a dummy variable which equals one for 1968-75). Here DB,(t-1963) 
is a time counter which equals·one in 1964, zero before that and four in 1967, 
for example. 
These results indicate that the 1953 health scare lowered per capita con-
sumption 16% permanently (since 1-exp(-O.176) =0.16). Consumption had been 
growing 2.1 % per annum before 1964; thereafter it fell at a rate of 1.4% per 
annum. The 1964 scare did not immediately depress consumption. Rather, the 
trend growth pattern was reversed. Neither the Fairness Doctrine nor the adver-
tising ban had a significant effect. However, this equation does not forecast very 
well out of sample. An associated problem is that the estimated coefficients are 
not robust to changes in sample selection. When a similar equation is estimated 
4 They used total population 17 years and older to create C, and GNP rather than NNP to create 
Y. Neither distinction is important. 
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for the 1947-82 sample, with an advertising stock variable (A) included,s the 
trend and dummy variables have comparable coefficients, but the price elastici-
ty is much smaller in absolute value and the income elasticity is negative. (See 
equation 1 in Tables 4, 5 and 6 and equation 2 in Table 5.) The estimates are 
virtually identical whether estimation is by ordinary least squares (OLS), 2SLS, 
or single equation maximum likelihood (MLE) with first-order autoregressive 
(AR(l» or first-order moving average (MA(l» errors. The problem is that the 
specification is somewhat arbitrary. The dummy and trend variables explain most 
of the variation in InC, yet there is not a good economic justification for the 
inclusion of the trend variables. 6 
Schneider, Klein and Murphy (1981) explicitly account for the underlying deci-
sion rules of consumers. In a 1930-78 sample, they obtain the following OLS 
equation: 7 
A A 
InC, = K + 0.462 InY, - 1.22 InP, + 0.97 InPTC, + 0.046 InA, 
(5.5) (10.5) (0.7) 
-0.075 OF, -0.0021 F,-O.24 L, -1.39 InTPC, 
(1.4) (0.8) (4.1) (2.0) 
Rl = 0.948 D.W. = 0.98 
where the In Y coefficient is prespecified, and Riltained from a tobacco demand 
equation for the same sample.·The variable InPTC is an instrument obtained from 
the predicted values of a noiilinear regression of InPTC on a function of income 
Y. It is included to capture the secular trend of consumers to switch from hand-
rolled cigarettes to factory cigarettes as incomes increase, thereby increasing 
cigarette demand. The advertising variable is obtained by the equation A = AI 
+ .264A1 where AI is pre-ban advertising stock and Al is post-ban advertising 
stock. In both cases the stock is a distributed lag of past real advertising expen-
ditures where a depreciation rate of 1/3 is used. 8 The coefficient of Al is· estimated 
and has a t-statistic of 0.11. Schneider et al. argue that the impact of the health 
scares was cumulative rather than instantaneous, which is consistent with the 
Ippolito et al. results for the 1964 scare. The filter and low-tar market shares 
are intended to proxy the cumulative impact of the 1953 and 1964 scares, respec-
tively. In addition, the TPC variable fell as a result of the health scare, and 
in response consumers increased their consumption of cigarettes in order to 
5 An explanation of how A is calculated is given in the discussion of Sclmeider. Klein and Murphy 
(1981). The results are similar when A is excluded. 
6 For further details of this line of criticism. see Sclmeider. Klein and Murphy (1981). See. however. 
the penultimate paragraph of this section. 
1 They employ total population age 14 and older to calculate C. Again. the distinction is not important. 
8 One problem with the advertising data is that cigarette marketing has evolved into new forms 
(e.g .• free samples. coupons and sponsorship of music and sports events) that are now a non·trival 
part of marketing expenses. Traditional advertising series do not include these expenses. 
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maintain desired tobacco consumption. However. the estimated absolute value 
of the elasticity of C with respect to TPC is greater than 1. which seems im-
plausibly large. 
The impact of the advertising ban was two-fold. First. real advertising ex-
penditures fell. as indicated in Figure 9. Second. the advertising stock that was 
subsequently created (Az) was much less effective than the previous advertis-
ing stock (At) in stimulating demand. 26.4% according to the estimated coeffi-
cient. (Two caveats are in order. First. the estimated standard error for the 
coefficient of Az is relatively large. Second. there is an implicit assumption of 
constant marginal effectiveness of advertising stock on demand. Presumably. 
this should diminish with increases in stock.) However. the coefficient of InA 
in the consumption equation is small and insignificant. so that neither effect was 
estimated to be very important. 
This equation is also characterized by poor out-of-sample forecasts. For ex-
ample. the coefficient of L is quite large. and predicts a 57% fall in C from 1978 
to 1982 as L increases from 27.5% to 58%. A fall of this magnitude did not 
occur. Equation 2 in Table 4 displays estimated OLS coefficients for the 1947-82 
sample for white noise errors. The coefficients are not directly comparable to 
those of Schneider et al .• in that the income elasticity is estimated. and the ac-
tual value of PTC is used. For this sample. the estimated coefficients of Yin 
the tobacco demand equations of Table 7 are negative (although not .significant-
ly so). which conflicts with the estimate from their sample. In general. the 
estimated coefficients are somewhat different. most notably the smaller (and 
hence more reasonable) coefficient of L. and the much smaller price elasticity. 
Although the impact of the health scares and government policy on the variables 
DF. F. L. TPC and A are recognized. for estimation purposes they were treated 
as exogenous variables. In addition. price is assumed to be exogenous. and unaf-
fected by these events. Neither of these assumptions is very satisfactory. Equa-
tion 2 of Table 6 shows 2SLS estimates of the parameters. in which F. L. TPC. 
A. PTC and P are treated as endogenous and replaced by instrumental variables. 
A comparison of 2SLS with OLS estimates reveals some distinctions. In par-
ticular. advertising is estimated to have a much larger effect. However. so does 
TPC. Its coefficient is much too large in absolute value. It indicates that as TPC 
fell by 38%. cigarette consumption rose by a factor of 2.07. 
If one examines the residuals from equation 2 in Table 6. it is apparent that 
this specification misses something captured in equation 1. There was a signifi-
cant permanent fall in demand after 1953. Filter market share changes were 
not rapid enough to capture this effect. Equations 3 and 4 in Tables 4. 5 and 
6 therefore include DA as an explanatory variable. (The latter also includes PC. 
a price index for cigars. to see whether the price of this substitute good in-
fluenced cigarette demand.) The coefficients in these equations seem more plausi-
ble. and both the adjusted RZ and the Durbin-Watson statistic are satisfactory. 
(Equations 3 and 4 in Table 5 indicate that the OLS estimates are not affected 
very much when either AR(1) or MA(1) errors are permitted.) The estimated 
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price and income elasticities. while small in comparison with those obtained in 
the other time series analyses which used pre-1947 data. are roughly consis-
tent with the 1976 cross-sectional estimates of Lewit and Coate (1982). (Recall 
that the estimated impact of income on cigarette demand is two-fold. PTC cap-
tures the secular shift from hand-rolled to factory cigarettes as income increases. 
The slightly negative additional impact of income on C, although insignificant. 
may reflect the fact that cigarettes have been an inferior good since 1946. and 
particularly since the 1953 health scare.) The estimated effect of advertising 
on demand. while small. is double that obtained by Schneider, Klein and Mur-
phy (1981). 
L'l order to estimate the cumulative effect of policy and health scares on de-
mand. consider equation 3 in Table 6, for example. Suppose that the changes 
in the filter and low tar market shares and in the amount of tobacco per cigarette 
are entirely attributable to the health scares. Also consider the permanent drop 
in demand reflected by DA. Then, from 1953 to 1982, demand for cigarettes 
fell only 4.7% because of the health scare. However, a similar calculation for 
equation 2 of Table 7 reveals that the demand for tobacco fell 40% in the same 
period. To some extent, cigarette demand did not fall as much because con-
sumers appear to have increased their consumption in order to compensate for 
the reduced amount of tobacco per cigarette. (The elasticity of C with respect 
to TPC is estimated to be -0.23.) Tobacco per cigarette fell 37% from 1953 
to 1982, causing an increase in cigarette demand of 11.4%. The net effect was 
a relatively larger decrease ·in tobacco demand. 
An alternative explanation of these particular results is that female smoking 
behavior differs from that of males, and that these differences affect the em-
pirical results. In particular. female smoking participation has been increasing 
since the turn of the century, and much of the "trend" in demand captured 
by Ippolito et al. may be associated with the growth of this segment of the 
market. rather than a switch from hand-rolled to factory cigarettes. especially 
since 1946. The negative and significant TPC coefficient may reflect female 
preference for cigarettes with relatively less tobacco and their growing 
significance in the market. In an effort to control for this effect. Ire-estimated 
equation 3 of Table 6 and included the U.S. labor force participation rate (LFP) 
as an explanatory variabl~. Much of the movement in LFP is attributable to 
females entering the labor force, which may be correlated with smoking rates. 
However. the estimated coefficient of LFP was negative. reflecting a secular 
decline in C since 1946. Furthermore, the estimates of the other coefficients 
were quite similar. Although most were 20 per cent smaller in absolute value, 
all retained their original sign and approximate significance. (The estimated price 
elasticitt increased to -0.36.) Nevertheless. the specified demand equation does 
not adequately proxy the distinction between female and male smoking behavior. 
In addition. cigarette demand was affected by the Fairness Doctrine period 
and the advertising ban. The coefficient of DF in equation 3 of Table 6 indicates 
that demand was 5.9% lower during the Fairness Doctrine. (This calculation 
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ignores any effects on A.) The radio and television ban affected cigarette de-
mand by reducing the effectiveness of advertising expenditures, and by reduc-
ing the amount of advertising done by firms. If one attributes the fall in A from 
1970 to 1982 entirely to the ban,9 then demand fell 7.5% as a result. The figures 
for tobacco demand are similar; tobacco demand fell 7.5% during the Fairness 
Doctrine period, and 10% due to the advertising ban. However, the advertising 
ban also ended the Fairness Doctrine period of anti-smoking commercials, so 
that the net effect of the ban was a modest decrease in per capita cigarette and 
tobacco demand (1.6% and 2.5%, respectively). 
The next section considers the effect of government policies and the health 
scares on firms' behavior. 
4. The Impact on Firms' Decisions 
This section examines how prices and advertising expenditures were affected 
by the health scares and government policy. First, I briefly review previous 
studies of the cigarette industry, none of which addresses these issues directly. 
The best known earlier studies are those of Telser (1962) and Schmalensee 
(1972). Both of these focused on interbrand competition and the effect of adver-
tising on individual market shares. Neither attempted to estimate the deter-
minants of prices. Whitten (1979) examined brand introductions, how their suc-
cess is related to advertising, and whether there was an advantage to early en-
try. Vernon, Rives and Naylor (1969) estimated an industry model, but concen-
trated on the tobacco leaf market. They did not estimate a cigarette manufac-
turer supply function. 
Barzel (1976) examined cigarette prices and state excise taxes for a panel 
data set consisting of states and fiscal years, and found that cigarette prices 
responded more than proportionately to state tax rate variations (the estimated 
elasticity was 1.065, which was significantly greater than one). He concluded 
that this reflected unmeasured quality variations across states. Sumner (1981) 
showed that these results could arise in a noncompetitive industry with an 
isoelastic demand curve. Unfortunately, neither Barzel nor Sumner attempted 
to control for the effects of bootlegging between low-tax and high-tax states, 
nor did they devote much effort to estimating inter-state cost variations, other 
than a distance from North Carolina variable, so that their interpretations of 
the results are oot necessarily correct. (Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983) argued 
that a correction for specification errors may alter their conclusions.) 
Appelbaum (1982) attempted to estimate the degree of oligopoly power in 
several industries, including the cigarette industry. He used full information max-
imum liRelihood techniques for 1947-71 annual data to estimate an industry model. 
This model consisted of a demand equation, a price equation and cost share 
equations for each of three factors (labor, capital and an intermediate input 
9 As we shall see later. this is not necessarily an innocuous assumption. 
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(presumably tobacco». In order to specify marginal cost in the price equation 
and the cost share equations, he employed a generalized Leontief cost func-
tion. Profit maximization implies the price equation. He derived the equation 
(1- e lEW = MC(W,Q), so that a markup (1- elf.) times price equals marginal 
cost, which depends on a factor price vector, W, and output Q. Both e, the 
degree of oligopoly power, or conjectural variation, and E, the absolute value 
of the price elasticity of demand, affect the markup. Here e equals zero for 
a competitive industry (and so price equals marginal cost), the fractional Her-
findahl index for an industry of Cournot quantity-setting firms, and one for a 
perfectly collusive industry (the monopoly outcome). In estimation, e is iden-
tified both by the cross-equation parameter restrictions implied by maximizing 
behavior, and by the specification that e varies linearly with factor prices. 10 
The estimated values of e vary from 0.41 in 1947 to 0.39 in 1971. (The 
estimate of E is 0.62.) The estimates of e exceed zero, as well as the Herfin-
dahl index, in both cases significantly. Thus the industry acted more collusively 
than a Cournot industry would, according to these estimates. In addition, the 
correlation between e and H is 0.8 in this sample (both decline monotonically), 
which is consistent with theories which postulate that non-cooperative schemes 
are easier to enforce the more concentrated is an industry. However, the sam-
ple variation in e is very small, so these results may not be very significant. 
Two caveats are worth noting. First, the demand equation is very simple (total 
U.S. consumption as a loglinear function of prices and GNP), and so probably 
misspecified. This could have an important bearing on the estimate of e , which 
depends directly on the estimated demand elasticity. Second, the data set is 
not very rich. As we shall see, taxes are an important determinant of retail prices, 
and they varied significantly over 1947-71 (see Figure 1). Also, advertising was 
ignored altogether. 
Nevertheless, most researchers seem to agree with Appelbaum's conclusion 
that the cigarette industry is not perfectly competitive (see, for example, Geroski 
(1983». In that case, prices could respond to demand shocks. For example, 
a change in the price elasticity of demand would alter the optimal markup of 
price over marginal cost. 
The analysis of this section bears some resemblance to that of Appelbaum. 
It uses as a starting point the fact that competitive firms should produce to equate 
price and marginal cost. The hypothesis of perfect competition can then be tested 
using an approach suggested by Rohlfs (1974). If price is regressed on a list 
of the determinants of marginal cost, then the residuals of this regression should 
be uncorrelated with exogenous variables which only affect demand, for com-
petitive firms. As far as competitive firms are concerned, price is a sufficient 
statistic ~for exogenous demand variations when they choose quantities. One 
can test whether these residuals, which are essentially price-cost margins, are 
uncorrelated with exogenous demand variables by using simultaneous equations 
10 There is no ob\ious reason why this should be the case. 
Page 458 FTC CONSUMER PROTECTION CONFERENCE 
specification test techniques. which are reviewed by Hausman (1983). 
Equation 1 in Table 8 reports the results of regressing InP on several poten-
tial detenninants of marginal cost. These include CONS. total U.S. consump-
tion; F. the filter market share. as king-size cigarettes are typically more ex-
pensive than shorter cigarettes. and are more likely to have filters; TPC. as 
costs should fall as tobacco content does; TAX. since P is a retail price; PT. 
since tobacco is the principal input; and W. the real wage rate for tobacco pro-
duction workers. While the fit is reasonably good. the Durbin-Watson statistic 
is low. Most of the explanatory power of the regression is provided by taxes 
and wages. The PT series is a noisy one. and costs probably depend on a 
distributed lag of past tobacco prices. rather than just the contemporaneous price. 
as much of the tobacco crop is stored for some time. 
When the residuals from this regression are regressed on a complete list of 
exogenous variables of the system. as suggested by Hausman (1983. p. 433) 
the null hypothesis of no explanatory power is rejected. The Rl of this regres-
sion is 0.338. which is 12.16 when multiplied by the number of observations 
(36). When compared to a chi-squared distnbution with 5 degrees of freedom. 11 
the null hypothesis that the specification suggested by a model of perfect com-
petition is correct is rejected at a 5% significance level. Two caveats are impor-
tant here. One is that other kinds of specification errors could be responsible 
for this result. The second is the absence of a cost of capital or capital stock 
variable. It is notable that much of the explanatory power in the regression of 
the residuals on the exogenous variables comes from demand side variables, 
notably PC, DC and OF. PC may be serving as a proxy for the true cost of 
tobacco used in cigarettes. 12 It is conceivable that DC and OF are correlated 
with movements in cost factors that were not included as explanatory variables 
(e.g., capital costs), but not very likely. 
Equations 2, 3, and 4 in Table 8 show the results of 2SLS regressions of price 
on cost determinants and a subset of demand factors. While neither the adjusted 
Rl nor the Durbin-Watson statistic are very meaningful for 2SLS regressions, 
both indicate that these equations provide a better specification than that of equa-
tion 1. Note that neither the Herfindhal index (H) nor advertising capital (A) 
have much explanatory power. One worry here is that the price of tobacco (PT), 
and so also the price of cigars (PC), are not exogenous. in that tobacco used 
in cigarettes is a major component of total tobacco demand. Specifications with 
PT and PC treated as endogenous yielded similar results, and so are not reported 
11 There are 12 exogenous variables in the system. and seven explanatory variables in this equa-
tion (including the constant term). This statistic has a chi-squared distribution with 12-7,",5 4egrees 
of freedoRl under the null hypothesis. 
12 When Equation 1 of Table 8 is re-estimated with PC as an additional explanatory variable. and 
the residuals from this regression are regressed on the vector of exogenous variables. one obtains 
an R2 of 0.2748. The value of the test statistic. 36 x 0.2748 - 9.89. when compared to a chi-squared 
distribution with four degrees of freedom. also leads one to reject the null hypothesis of perfect 
competition at a 5% significance level. 
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here. (The same is true of estimation with H endogenous.) 
It is also possible that prices are more responsive to federal excise tax changes 
than they are to state and local tax changes. To the extent that the latter are 
not uniform across states or municipalities, bootlegging may prevent as large 
a price response than if tax changes were uniform. This is in fact borne out 
by the data, in that the elasticity of price with respect to the real federal excise 
tax exceeds that with respect to real state and local taxes. However, this 
specification did not significantly alter the other estimated coefficients, and so 
is also not reported here. 
What effect did the advertising ban and the health scares have on prices? Con-
sider equation 3 in Table 8. Again suppose that movements in F and TPC are 
entirely attributable to the health scares. Then the effect of the health scares 
on price, as reflected by DA, DB, F and TPC, is negligible, a decrease of less 
than one percent, and not statistically significant. If one also accounts for the 
4.7% fall in C, and hence CONS, obtained from demand estimates, this conclu-
sion is not affected. The health scares seem to have had little direct impact on 
cigarette prices. Of course, if real excise tax rate increases from 1954 to 1970 
were prompted by governmental reaction to the results of the health studies, 
then the large real price increases in this period were indirectly attributable to 
the health information shocks. 
There is also little evidence of any impact of the Fairness Doctrine anti-smoking 
advertising campaign on prices. The estimated effect, obtained from the coeffi-
cients of OF and ADV, is a price increase of 2-3%, and this figure is not statistical-
ly significant. The estimated price increase is slightly smaller if one also accounts 
for the indirect effect of the Fairness Doctrine on prices via a fall in consumption. 
There does appear to be some effect of the advertising ban on prices, as in-
dicated by the significant coefficients of DC and InADV. Real advertising ex-
penditures fell dramatically after the ban, as indicated by the ADV series depicted 
in Figure 8, and by the advertising regressions in Table 9, which are discussed 
in more detail below. The estimated effect on prices appears to have been an 
increase of 3-6%. Since specification issues are a concern, I employed a number 
of different specifications of the price equations. While the estimated coefficients 
vary significantly from one equation to another, the conclusion about the impact 
on prices of the advertisiJlg ban is fairly robust, in terms of sign, magnitude and 
significance. 
This conclusiog is consistent with a theoretical model in which advertising 
generates information about products, and thereby facilitates entry of new 
brands. Under this theory, the effect of the cigarette advertising ban would be 
to create barriers to entry, and so to solidify or magnify any monopoly power 
wielded- by existing successful brands. Hence prices would increase as non-
competitive firms increased their markups. 
One alternative explanation might be that the advertising ban coincided with 
a change in the characteristics of a typical smoker, as the cumulative impact 
of the health scares and the Fairness Doctrine was realized. The results of Lewit, 
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Coate and Grossman (1981, 1982) suggest that much of the decrease in cigarette 
demand was caused by reductions in the smoking participation rate, as opposed 
to reductions in cigarette consumption by smokers. If those smokers who quit 
had a more price elastic demand for cigarettes, for whatever reason, then the 
aggregate demand curve would not only decrease but also become more inelastic 
as the quitters left the market. Then optimal markups would have increased. 
I attempted to test whether this occured by reestimating equation 3 in Table 6 
with an additional DCxlnP term, to allow for a change in aggregate price elasticity 
coincident with the advertising ban. The coefficient of this term, although positive 
as predicted, was small and insignificant, so that this explanation is probably 
unimportant. 
Another possible explanation is that the advertising ban precluded the use 
of the most efficient advertising technology, and so firms switched to a higher 
cost technology (print, billboards, etc.). In a competitive equi1ibrium, the price 
of cigarettes could have increased, if one views the product as a bundle of cigar-
ettes and advertising services, since the marginal costs of supplying the bundle 
increased. To some extent, the inclusion of ADV or A as explanatory variables 
captures this effect, but a price of advertising services variable would be more 
appropriate. 
We now tum to the determinants of advertising expenditures and the estimated 
impact of various shocks on them. Estimated advertising expediture equations 
are displayed in Table 9. TV is the percentage of households owning a televi-
sion. Premultiplying this variable by I-DC creates a variable that falls from 93.5 
in 1970 to zero in 1971. Hence, (I-DC) x TV captures both the growing attrac-
tiveness of television as an advertising medium until 1970 and, together with 
DC; the effect of the advertising ban. Other explanatory variables include CONS, 
to capture the extent that advertising expenditures follow total consumption; 
F and L, in case cigarette companies advertise more to promote new cigarette 
characteristics; H, to capture the influence of market concentration; and the 
various demand dummy variables. Also included are price P or M, the price 
residuals from equation 1 of Table 8, which correspond with movements in price 
that cannot be explained by cost changes. Advertising expenditures might be 
affected by prices or margins, in that they affect the expected marginaI return 
to advertising. . 
The results in Table 9 should be regarded as preliminary. The fit is good, 
but some of the toefficients are difficult to interpret. As expected, advertising 
expenditures are positively influenced by total consumption, and the advertis-
ing ban had a large impact. The increases in advertising at the end of the sam-
ple might be attributable to the growth of low tar cigarette market shares, as 
new brands were heavily promoted. However, the large negative coefficients 
of P and M are implausible, unless one believes that over the sample there were 
changes in oligopoly power that resulted in price increases (or decreases) 
together with advertising decreases (increases). Such a story is consistent with 
the negative coefficient of H, which indicates that advertising decreases as con-
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centration increases, although this effect is not statistically significant. 
Any impact the health scares had on advertising appears to be indirect. Neither 
DA nor DB have significant explanatory power. However, to the extent that 
the health scares caused a fall in CONS, advertising expenditures fell. Similar-
ly, L has a significant positive sign, so advertising expenditures may have in-
creased at the end of the sample as companies promoted their new brands more 
than they had existing brands. 
The coefficient of DF is insignificant in both equations, so that the Fairness 
Doctrine also apparently had no direct effect. However, CONS fell in this period, 
and so advertising expenditures may also have been indirectly reduced as a result. 
Not surprisingly, the advertising ban had a large negative impact on advertis-
ing expenditures. These expenditures fell by 33% according to equation 1, or 
41 % according to equation 2. (These estimates are obtained from the coeffi-
cients of DC and (1-DC) x TV.) As noted in the previous section, the post-ban 
expenditures were much less effective in generating demand. 
5. Summary 
This section summarizes the findings of the previous sections, points out some 
caveats, and provides suggestions for future research. 
At this point, it is legitimate to ask why I did not employ reduced form methods 
in the previous sections, and just regress each of the endogenous variables on 
the complete list of exogenous variables. There are several reasons for using 
a structural approach. First, I do not capture all of the exogenous factors which 
could conceivably affect the industry (e .g., either cost of capital or capital stock), 
and so omitted variables problems might bias the results. Second, by estimating 
structural equations one estimates parameters which can be compared to those 
of previous studies, as well as a priori micro-economic predictions (e.g., the 
sign and magnitude of the price elasticity of demand). For example, by estimating 
a demand equation one has some idea whether the results are reasonable. Also, 
one can determine whether the health scares affected consumers' or firms' 
behavior, or both. Finally, the zero-one dummy variables may inadequately proxy 
the effects of the health scares and government policy on consumers' percep-
tions and so on aggregate demand. Both Ippolito et al. (1979) and Schneider 
et al. (1981) found that the'l964 health scare had a cumulative, rather than in-
stantaneous, effect on the demand for cigarettes, a conclusion supported by the 
estimates reported in Section 3. Nevertheless, I estimated a reduced form 
system for purposes of comparison. The qualitative results were very similar 
to those obtained from the structural equations. 
, In summary, the 1953 health scare resulted in a permanent drop in the level 
of demand. In addition, after 1953 filter cigarettes emerged and the amount of 
tobacco per cigarette (and so the average tar and nicotine content) fell. The 
net effect was a drop of 12.5% in demand. Neither prices nor advertising were 
affected very much. 
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The 1964 Surgeon General's report also had little or no effect on prices or 
advertising, but had a more gradual effect on demand, affecting the growth rate 
rather than the level. Low-tar cigarettes appeared as a result, but were not 
prominent until the late 19705. The growth in the share of filters accelerated 
slightly, and tobacco per cigarette continued its drop. 
The FCC period of anti-smoking commercials resulted in a 6% drop in de-
mand, and a somewhat larger fall in advertising. Prices also increased 2-3%. 
All of these effects served to reduce total consumption, on the order of 9%. 
The ban on advertising resulted in a large drop in advertising levels, and in 
the effectiveness of these expenditures in stimulating aggregate demand. Fur-
ther, prices appear to have increased 3-6%, probably because successful brand 
introductions were more difficult to achieve, and so the monopoly power of ex-
isting brands increased. In other words, barriers to entry for new brands became 
higher. Together, these two effects served to reduce total consumption, on the 
order of 12%. Taking into account the end of the Fairness Doctrine period, the 
net effect of the ban on consumption was a modest fa.l.l of 3%. 
This study does not directly measure the effect of the FTC tar and nicotine 
measurement and labelling program. However, by creating a readily observable 
metric for firms to differentiate their products, the reduction in the amount of 
tobacco per cigarette, and hence tar and nicotine levels, was undoubtedly par-
tially attributable to this program. To some extent, the effect of this program 
may be reflected in the cumulative effect attributed to the 1964 health scare. 
The quantitative conclusions of this study should be viewed with some skep-
ticism. For example, aggregate annual data for a relatively short period (36 years) 
was employed. As a result, the conclusions which are most in accord with 
previous studies of aggregate time series or cross-sectional data are probably 
the most reliable. These are the demand equation estimates. Enough work has 
been done that the appropriateness of the specification is not at issue. Nev~r­
theless, simultaneous equations techniques seem to be more appropriate than 
the single equation methods employed in previous studies. In contrast, very 
little work has been dorie before on pricing and advertising decisions in the 
cigarette industry (or many other industries, for that matter). As a result, these 
equations are best viewed as preliminary attempts to estimate these decision 
rules. While the functional fonns are influenced by previous work by Appelbaum 
(1982) on pricing and Schmalensee (1972) on advertising, some of the estimated 
coefficients indicate that the specification is not correct. Obvious exampies are 
the omission of a cost of capital variable and inadequate proxies (PC or PT) for 
the true cost of the tobacco leaf used in cigarettes. 
As a result, it is appropriate to conclude that more work on the behavior of 
cigarette-companies is needed. A time series of firm-specific data might be more 
useful to analyze their decision rules. 
. 
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Table 1 
SELECTED CONCENTRATION INDICES, 1947-82 
Year CRt CR2 C~ H 
1947 34.5 64.2 92.5 2604 
1952 33.0 60.2 87.8 2318 
1957 29.1 57.8 83.0 2139 
1962 35.0 60.5 81.3 2268 
1967 32.5 54.7 81.8 2086 
1972 31.4 51.4 85.6 2079 
1977 33.1 59.8 87.9 2295 
1982 33.6 66.4 88.6 2543 
Table 2 
INDMDUAL MARKET SHARES, 1947-82* 
Year R P B A Lo Li 
1947 29.7 7.0 3.2 34.5 4.3 21.3 
1952 27.3 9.6 6.0 33.0 6.3 18.0 
1957 28.7 9.3 10.7 29.1 7.7 14.5 
1962 35.0 9.4 9.3 25.6 11.0 9.8 
1967 32.5 12.7 14.3 22.2 10.2 8.1 
1972 31.4 20.0 17.3 16.8 8.9 5.6 
1977 33.1 26.7 15.8 12.3 8.7 3.4 
1982 33.6 32.9 13.4 8.8 8.6 2.9 
• R = Reynolds. P = Philip Morris. B = Brown and Williamson, A = American Brands, 
Lo = Lorrllard, Li = Liggett. Numbers may rot sum to 100.0, due to rounding. Source: Schmalensee 
(1972) and various issues of Busimss Week. 
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Table 3 
LIST OF VARIABLES· 
aggregate annual cigarette consumption 
per capita tobacco consumption (noninstitutional population 16 and older) 
per capita cigarette consumption (noninstitutional population 16 and older), 
in packs per year 
retail price index of cigarettes, deflated by CPI 
TPC average annual amount of tobacco per cigarette consumed, in lbs. 
F market share of filter-tip cigarettes 
L market share of low-tar cigarettes (15 mgs. of tar or less) 
PTC percentage of tobacco consumed as cigarettes 
ADV advertising expenditures, deflated by CPI 
A stock of advertising capital 
Y per capita net national product (total population), deflated by CPI 
H Herfindahl index for cigarette sales, divided by 10' (Source: Schmalensee 
(1972) and various issues of Business Week.) 
TAX average federal, state and local excise tax collection per pack, deflated by 
CPI (Source: Tobacco Institute (1983).) 
PT price index of leaf tobacco, deflated by CPI (Source: various issues of An-
nual Report on Tobacco Statistics.) 
W average hourly earnings for tobacco industry production workers, deflated 
by CPI (Source: various issues of SUnJey of Current Business.) 
CPT consumer price index for tobacco products, deflated by CPI 
PC retail price index of cigars, deflated by CPI (Source: various issues of Hand-
book of Labor Statistics and CPI Detailed Report.) 
M price-cost margin estimate (Source: residuals from equation 1 of Table 8.) 
TV percentage of households with television 
DA 1 from 1954 to 1982 
o otherwise; reflecting the 1953 American Cancer Society report 
DB 1 from 1964 to 1982 
o otherwise; reflecting the 1964 Surgeon General's report 
DC 1 from 1971 to 1982 
o otherwise; reflecting the TV and radio advertising ban 
DF 1 from 1968 to 1970 
= .5 in 1967 
= 0 otherwise; reflecting the period of anti-smoking commercials 
°The sample is annual data from 1947 to 1982. All price indices equal 100 in 1967. All data sources 
are those of Schneider, Klein and Murphy (1981), unless otherwise indicated. 
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Table 4 
DEMAND EQUATIONS (ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES)· 
Equation Nwnber 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
Constant -53.33 -15.32 -1.197 -2.547 
(7.05) (3.30) (2.441) (2.851) 
InP -0.0527 -0.2021 -0.2709 -0.2937 
(0.1174) (0.1942) (0.1391) (0.1417) 
lnTPC -0.6684 -0.1260' -0.1975 
(0.2912) (0.2324) (0.2456) 
lnPTC 1.438 1.476 1.557 
(0.430) (0.307) (0.320) 
F. -0.0010 0.0024 0.0025 
(0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
L -0.0040 -0.0037 -0.0033 
(0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
InA -0.0429 0.0792 0.0867 0.0779 
(0.0240) (0.0203) (0.0145) (0.0174) 
InY -0.1667 -0.1473 -0.1386 -0.0948 
(0.0963) (0.1142) (0.0814) (0.0945) 
InPC 0.1423 
(0.1541) 
DA -0.1015 -0.1009 -0.1007 
(0.0172) (0.0194) (0.0194) 
DBx(t-1963) 
-0.0368 
(0.0051) 
DC 0.0130 
(0.0382) 
DF -0.0039 -0.0481 -0.0580 -0.0558 
(0.0261) (0.0212) (0.0152) (0.0155) 
t 0.0303 , 
(0.0037) 
R2 0.912 0.826 0.912 0.911 
D.W. 1.14 0.88 1.52 1.54 
'Estimated standard errors In parentheses. The dependent variable is InC. 
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Table 5 
DEMAND EQUATIONS (AR(l) OR MA(l»* 
Equation Number 
1. AR(l) 2. MA(1) 3. AR(l) 4. MA(1) 
Constant -51.38 -52.62 . -1.065 -1.247 
(6.56) (6.92) (2.121) (2.544) 
lnP -0.1089 -0.0626 -0.2842 -0.2527 
(0.825) (0.0839) (0.1234) (0.1469) 
lnTPC -0.2109 -0.1859 
(0.1788) (0.2212) 
lnPTC 1.345 1.392 
(0.290) (0.333) 
F 0.0016 0.0019 
(0.0010) (0.0012) 
L -0.0036 -0.0036 
(0.0007) (0.0007) 
lnA -0.0571 -0.0609 0.0798 0.0821 
(0.0195) (0.0197) (0.0156) (0.0167) 
lnY -0.0937 -0.1341 -0.1037 -0.1300 
(0.0829) (0.0850) (0.0766) (0.0879) 
DA -0.0865 -0.0815 -0.0718 -0.0804 
(0.0168) (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0202) 
DBx(t-1963) -0.0371 -0.0371 
(0.0041) (0.0042) 
DF -0.0426 -0.0480 
(0.0144) (0.0171) 
t 0.0294 0.0300 
(0.0034) (0.0036) 
R~ 0.934 0.941 0.921 0.922 
e =0.488 e =0.641 e =0.470 e =0.405 
(0.145) (0.134) (0.147) (0.163) 
• Estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 6 
DEMAND EQUATIONS (TwO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES)· 
Equation Nwnber 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
Constant -52.99 -11.55 -2.191 -3.253 
(7.76) (5.23) (3.929) (4.797) 
InP -0.0502 -0.2589 -0.2774 -0.2902 
(0.1205) (0.2477) (0.1537) (0.1589) 
InTPC -1.524 -0.2332 -0.3192 
(0.535) (0.4510) (0.5057) 
InPTC 1.919 1.559 -1.622 
(0.575) (0.367) (0.4051) 
F -0.0043 0.0019 0.0017 
(0.0023) (0.0010) (0.0021) 
'j' 
L -0.0058 -0.0040 -0.0039 
(0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
InA -0.1016 0.1201 0.0936 0.0909 
(0.0173) (0.0312) (0.0203) (0.0217) 
InY -0.1669 -0.2285 -0.1461 -0.1300 
(0.0971) (0.1424) (0.0905) (0.1003) 
InPC 0.0688 
(0.1737) 
DA -0.1016 -0.1010 -0.0989 
(0.0173) (0.0239) (0.0247) 
DBx(t-1963) -0.0365 
(0.0056) 
DC 0.0132 
(0.0394) 
DF -0.0047 -0.0614 -0.0607 -0.0599 
(0.0268) (0.0262) (0.0163) (0.0166) 
t 0.0301 
(0.0041) 
Rl 0.912 0.767 0.911 0.908 
D.W. 1.14 1.37 1.53 1.52 
"Estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 7 
TOBACCO DEMAND EQUATIONS· 
Equation Number 
1 (OLS) 2 (2SLS) 
Constant 3.436 3.965 
(0.744) (0.945) 
F -0.0015 -0.0014 
(0.0006) (0.0007) 
L -0.0048 -0.0054 
(0.0009) (0.0011) 
InA 0.1217 0.1260 
(0.0159) (0.0171) 
InY -0.1436 -0.1078 
(0.0888) (0.0927) 
InCPT -0.3375 -0.4694 
. (0.1774) (0.2202) 
DA -0.0590 -0.0645 
(0.0223) (0.0228) 
DF -0.0782 -0.0778 
(0.0190) (0.0203) 
[2 0.978 0.978 
D.W. 1.39 1.45 
·Estimated standard errors in parentheses. CPT is a consumer tobacco retail price index. 
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Table 8 
PRICE EQUATIONS (TwO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES)* 
Equation Nwnber 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
Constant 3.91 0.495 1.90 -0.331 
(0.90) (2.834) (3.53) (3.124) 
InCONS -0.078 0.087 0.172 0.039 
(0.070) (0.145) (0.181) (0.160) 
F 0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0011 
(0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0018) 
InTPC 0.0460 -0.169 -0.090 -0.306 
(0.1104) (0.313) (0.395) (0.380) 
InTAX 0.445 0.367 0.304 0.384 
(0.020) (0.053) (0.077) (0.059) 
InPT -0.014 -0.039 -0.080 0.057 
(0.079) (0.092) (0.113) (0.145) 
InW 0.325 0.345 0.450 0.309 
(0.061) (0.103) (0.141) (0.116) 
InADVllnA -0.091 0.030 
(0.059) (0.034) 
H -0.486 0.145 
(0.567) (0.413) 
InPC 0.305 0.178 0.229 
(0.156) (0.204) (0.184) 
DA 0.014 0.034 0.016 
(0.028) (0.035) (0.029) 
0.032 0.007 0.031 
DB 0.009 0.009 0.005 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.016) 
DC 0.033 -0.048 0.055 
(0.028) (0.063) (0.038) 
OF 0.032 0.007 0.031 
(0.022) (0.031) (0.023) 
Rl 0.983 0.981 0.973 0.979 
D.W. 1.20 1.61 1.71 1.84 
"Estimated standard errors in parentheses. Equation 3 employs InADV, equation 4 uses InA. 
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Table 9 
ADVERTISING EXPENDITIJRE EQUATIONS 
(TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES)· 
Equation Numbers 
1 2 
4.680 -3.884 
(7.203) (6.171) 
1.631 1.533 
(0.998) (1.077) 
0.0019 -0.0011 
(0.0058) (0.0060) 
0.0067 .0176 
(0.0059) (0.0036) 
-3.321 -3.441 
(3.663) (3.953) 
-2.104 -4.187 
(1.015) (2.167) 
0.2068 0.1611 
(0.2295) (0.2484) 
0.1676 0.0618 
(0.1064) (0.1028) 
0.2823 0.0703 
(0.4944) (0.5182) 
0.0071 0.0062 
(0.0045) (0.0048) 
0.0158 -0.0856 
(0.1352) (0.1317) 
0.958 0.952 
1.23 1.28 
'Estimated standard errors in parentheses. Equation 1 employs InP; equation 2 uses InM. the 
residuals from equation 1 in Table 8. The dependent variable is InADV. 
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Comments 
David T. Sche/fman 
Federal Trade Commission 
Porter attempts to estimate the structural effects of various government 
policies designed to alter the flow of information and advertising received by 
consumers about cigarettes. Using simultaneous equations techniques Porter 
provides more refined estimates for some of the models of cigarette demand 
that have appeared in the literature. This is a useful contribution. As is usually 
the case for comparisons of OLS and 2SLS estimates. significant differences 
do not arise. In the second part of the paper some tentative beginnings are made 
toward modelling the effects of the government policies on the "supply" side 
of the cigarette industry. Some testing of industry conduct is performed. and 
an attempt is made to determine the effects of the policy changes on advertis-
ing. Perhaps the main contribution of the paper is the attempt to quantify the 
separate effects of price changes and government policies on the amount of 
cigarette and tobacco consumption. 
Although the paper contributes to our understanding of the effects of govern-
ment policies on the cigarette industry. I am surprised by all the obvious avenues 
that Porter did not pursue in his research. The policies studied in this paper 
provide a particularly rich menu of information remedies: third party disclosure. 
government disclosure. mandatory producer disclosure. "corrective" adver-
tising. and a ban on radio and TV advertising. It would be very interesting to 
compare the relative effectiveness of these remedies on demand. To some ex-
tent this is possible by comparing the coefficients on the policy dummy variables 
in the Porter demand equations. 
Unfortunately. the modelling of the policy variables as simply dummy variables 
does not feature enough of the structure of the policies to yield very interesting 
comparisons. In particular. the demand equation specifications assume particular 
types of responses to the policies when one of the interesting issues to be re-
solved is what are the characteristics of the responses? For example. Porter 
follows Ippolito. Murphy and Sant in specifying the form of the effects of the 
American Cancer Society and Surgeon General's Reports. This does not allow 
testing of the hypothesis that the effects of affirmative disclosure remedies are 
perishable. The cfefects in the modelling of the policy variables are to some ex-
tent intertwined with the simplistic modelling of advertising used throughout 
the paper. 
The richest vein of potential research left untapped in this paper lies in the 
effects of the policies on the supply side of the market. In attempting to assess 
the effects of the policies on industry advertising strategies. the aggregation 
of advertising flows or stock expenditures is particularly undesirable because 
of the differential effect of the Fairness Doctrine and advertising ban on TV and 
483 
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radio advertising. Certainly, the Fairness Doctrine cries out for a cost-of-
advertising approach. 
The shocks experienced by this industry should make it particularly amenable 
to an empirical testing of market conduct. However, to begin such testing it 
is important not to model industry demand so that the price elasticity is assumed 
to be constant since one of the revealing characteristics about industry conduct 
is whether pricing is influenced by demand elasticity, ceteris paribus. Porter in-
dicates that some testing of this assumption was done, but the assumption should 
be retested in a demand equation in which the policy variables, advertising, and 
the effects of filter and low tar cigarettes are modelled in a more satisfactory 
fashion. 
In order to test for market conduct, some theoretical analysis of the effects 
of the policies under competition and imperfect competition is required. Explicit 
modelling of the industry's advertising and product introduction strategies is 
not too difficult and is amenable to empirical testing. Perhaps the most impor-
tant question to be answered here is whether the increase in new product in-
troductions is a response arising from competition or from imperfect competitors 
dissipating monopoly rents. This has an important bearing on the basic consumer 
protection policy issue arising in the supply side of the market: what are the 
supply side costs of the government policies? 
To sum up, although this paper is of interest, I hope that Porter will pursue 
further research on the effects of government policies on the cigarette industry. 
The major questions are s~ to be answered. 
. 
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